MIKOYAN'S CALL ON THE PRESIDENT.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A000801140008-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 2, 2013
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: January 17, 1959
• Content Type: MEMO

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APPVD BY W.H.
1/26/59 Memorandum of Conversation
LIMIT DISTRIBUTION
Mikoyan's Call on the President.
DATE: January 17, 1959
PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Secretary of State
Livingston T. Merchant., Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Llewellyn E. Thompson., American Ambassador to-'the Soviet Union
First Deputy Prime Minister Mikoyan
Ambassador Menshikov
WIN _1r* Troyanovaki
SAS - 2 SAP
W EUR-2
G INR
C Amembassy Moscow
The President said he had heard from the Secretary of:State about his con-
versation with Mr. Mikoyan and could say that the Secretary of State had reflected
accurately the views of the United States Government concerning Berlin, the Far
East and the other. matters covered. It was understood by both sides that these
were conversations and not negotiations. The purpose was for each to explore the
mind of the other to see if it were.possible to find a better basis for understand-
ing. If these had been negotiations they would have had to have been on a more
formal basis with experts present (the Secretary of State added "and allies"9 to
which the President agreed). The President recalled his previous visit to Moscow
in 1945 and said that he thought that was the only time he had met Mr. Mikoyan'
before. He also recalled meeting Mr. Khrushchev in Geneva. The conversations
there had been sterile so far as any material advance was concerned but they had
nevertheless been useful. The President was convinced that the Soviet people., as
the people of the United States., wanted peace and to remove the anxieties that
existed on both sides. It was the function of governments and Statesmen to find
programs that could be agreed upon and a path which could be fo1Lowed by both
countries that could lead to better feeling between our peoples.`. It was not our
purpose to condemn communism or the Russian people. That would be wrong and the
Russian people should have whatever government they wanted., but there was no reason
why we could not find a path which could lead to better relations between us. In
all aspects in our foreign policy where we have a firm position stich as that con-
cerning Berlin., we try nevertheless to be conciliatory and we seek to find a way
for our two peoples to raise their standards of living and find a better life.
Mikoyan
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I ikoyan -.said. he had instructions fran a n ~ad also crasked- greet-
ings and his ?wishes. for the good health of the: ,
to say that, knowing the President as he did, he 'hapedtiie President would make use.
of his second term to improve relations between .the. two: countries.: It was necessary
to make a start and while the ?first agreement might not be important it was possible
for it to snowball and lead to a great impr ement. He said ushohev had remarked
that if he had been .permitted to, vote in the United States -he would have voted for.
the President. He had had prolonged talks in the, United States and he thought the
Secretary of State could donfn that they had been useful,: Thd Secretary of State
bad made several statements. that had been rat ng.to hind :He had said that it
was not the policy of the United States to act against the Soviet Union and that
the United States had no desire 'for violent 'saction.wirth`: respect to East Germany.
-The question, of European. security had also been discussed. ? What. the President had
just said was gratifying and he hoped it would find `reflection the.practical
steps to be taken: Although the d'+ aretaryOf State had made somsr ,spec ;fir remarks
about atomic .tests cessation.` and about s3urprise atta t, Mikoyan 4id not feel that
on some other matters any practical steps ware con`teznplated. iHethought that the
conclusion of. the German' pease treaty:wold::.have a great i:inportazioe and that they
could find armor ground on ; this 'matter. There were 'forces' however which opposed
this and in this connection 'he drew attention .to Chancellor Adenauer' a statement of
January 12. Adenauer apparently desired to influence the U. S. position on the
question of. a peace . treaty bir hast y expressing his own view. I seems strange
nst a possible'peace treaty. "Perhaps Adenauer believes:,that 'by delaying a pears.
treaty he might beccrose stronger, e>5plait the differences between tis and base his
position upon force. He wai 'ignoring -the existence of ' a second Ca iman state and
was conducting subversive activities it an attempt to.overthrow its, if such a
pallcy were followted, 'this German Democratic . Hepublio might attempt''ito bring about
changes in `the Federal Germs Republic.; Such a line .of policy: was 't?raught with
danger. Soviet Union thought that if a-peace- treaty were concluded, perhaps with
the two (3ersaan states, ' this might. open to the road for, reunification . - Thee U.S.
Secretary of, State kept 'his eye on what'Adenauer-. thought but so far hs a peace
treaty was concerned there was also Great Britain -sand France. S viets attach
great importance to the peace treaty question. The peace treaty coud of course riot
settle the question of reunification but-it could prepare the ground.' The Soviets
would be 'persistent in pressing for -a peace treaty. - If the United Staten .supported
k
A.denauer's position on this -matter, .then the Soviet Union and the other Eastern
European .countries would have to 'find their `:.own independent way to a s olution of
that question. He hoped the peace 'treaty would serve to bring the So.et Union and
the United States 'together; We were both faced with many problems now'adays and
watry to solve some of s some advantage in them. te fact that realized
merely onvrstionsaince
they were these
and there ations since
it was possible to :speak more frankly. He wished to express: the hope that the
President.and the U.S. Government would examine- the outstanding points between us
and find a way to resolve their; He wished to assure-the President that all of
their steps in foreign affairs were designed to consolidate peace and t prevent
war although!' ,some of the steps they had taken had been described as iea4ing to new
aggravations;
After a. prompting by Ambassador Nenshikov.,Mikoyan referred to the.President+'s
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reply last summer to Ehrushchevls letter on trade. This reply had produced a
favorable impression but there had been no subsequent-progress in this field. The
Secretary of State had suggested that he meet with Under Secretary Dillon and he
had therefore not discussed this matter with the Secretary of State. The President
in his letter had pointed out that even now there was the possibility of developing
trade but one difficulty was that the commercial treaty between the Soviet Trion
and the United States had been denounced. The Congress had also passed legislation
directed against the Soviet Union. They had no desire to buy arms or strategic
materials and in fact could sell us scone..
The President said that Mr. Dillon vas :a very reasonable and well informed man
and he was sure that Mr. Mikoyan'a conversation with him would be valuable and in-
teresting. He asked Mr. lttkoyan to carry back to Mr. Khrushchev his thanks for the
cordial greeting and say that he reciprocated the sentiments he had expressed for
his health and happiness, He .was prepared to use the final part of his term to
promote a better relationship and he was convinced that this could be brought about.
Mr. Mikoyan had spoken of making a beginning. The President had hoped that this
beginning had been realized when the Austrian peace treaty was signed and at that
time he had expressed the hope that it would be possible to have talks with the
Soviet leaders. This had been done at the Geneva conference. Two things had come
up there that had aroused great interest and hope. The first was the possibility
that Germany could be reunited in such a way that Germany would not become a danger.
The agreement had been that this would be done peacefully and by popular elections.
The President did not agree that we were too much influenced by any individual In our
efforts to resolve these problems. We did not know of any other way of doing this
except by free elections. He pointed out that free elections were in our tradition.
If we tried to establish an imposed peace we would have to keep observers and main-
tain forces in order to make Germany observe the conditions imposed and we knew of
no practical way other than free elections. We do not desire that there be another
militarized Germany. We had had four experiences of German militarism and wanted
no more. In our view,, Germany also wanted no militarism. In the associations in
which West Germany had become a member., provisions in regard to German armaments
had been made and had been observed. It was fair to say that we would share the
Soviets' anxieties if Germany got in a position to start trouble but the Germans
were a strong, virile people and if oppressed could react in a way which we would
consider undesirable. It was also important to both of us to remember that if the
Germans did not have to bear the cost of arms they would have an advantage in
economic competition. We wanted a peaceful Germany united in such a way that neither
the Soviet Union nor the United States could have any apprehension about it.
Another point which had come up in the Geneva talks had been the increased
contacts, visits,, exchanges of literature, etc. The President had sent a letter to
Mr. Khrushchev,, or perhaps it was to Mr. Bulganin, saying that we would welcome
visits here of high Soviet officials and he would like to feel that Mr. Mikoyan' a
visit here was a result of that invitation. The idea of these exchanges had not
been implemented in the way it should. We had made arrangements for the exchange
of twenty
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of twenty or thirty students but these exchanges should be in the hundreds if we
could find enough who had the requisite knowledge of the language. The Russian
language appeared to be harder for us than our language was for the Russian people.
The President said he would not speak about trade as Mr. Mikoyan would talk
with Mr. Dillon on this but he thought this was an area in which we could seek
better relations. We both put too much of our work and talent into arms. In this
field we must so act that we can make progress but with confidence in what we are
doing. The President said that he wished to conclude as he- had started by saying
he'was persuaded the peoples of both countries wanted peace,, and opportunity to
improve their cultural level and to raise their standard of living. This basic
truth should guide us even when we disagree on some specific problem. He wished to
thank Mr. Mikoyan for having come to visit us and if he had encountered bad manners
anywhere on his trip-he wished him to know that this did not express the attitude
of the United States.
Mr. Mikoyan observed that the President had covered many subjects and he had
been much pleased with what the President had said. With regard to Germany the
Soviet Union had no desire to seek revenge or to place Germany in a subjugated
position. The Soviet Union had good relations with East Germany and would like to
have good relations with the Germans in West Germany. About a year ago he had gone
to Bonn and had talked with Adenauer as well as with German business leaders and
others,, and he thought the Germans did want peace because they know what a new war
would mean. There were however groups in West Germany that were revenge-minded and
wished to bring about changes by forceful means. Although he did not know him well
it seemed that Mr. Strauss was like a sponge who concentrated in himself these fee3,.
ings. Chancellor Adenauer knew how to talk and they had had an interesting coxes
versation in which Admauer had made same reassuring statements. However,, the
Chancellor was not constant in his policies. Perhaps these zigzags were deliberate.
As an example he had asked Adenauer if he considered it right that West Germany did
not recognize Poland and Czechoslovakia. Adenauer had replied that he was personally
favorable to the establishment of relations but thought that the Soviet Union-would
have objections. When Mikoyan had said the Soviet Union thought the contrary,,
Adenauer said he would establish relations. It is true that Brentano was present
and had said nothing in assent to this position. Nothing however had been dons
despite Adenauer's remark and two months later he had made inadmissible statements
concerning Germany's eastern frontiers,, stating that they should be changed al-
though it is true that he said only peaceful methods should be used. &denauer
knows that Poland and Czechoslovakia would not give up territory. Statements of
this kind encourage those in Western Germany who seek revenge. The Soviet Union
does however desire to improve its relations with West Germany. From the infor.
mation at the disposal of the Soviet Union the limitations that had been established
for West Germany had been practically brought to nought and they might be done away
with altogether. It appeared that they were being given rockets. Mikoyan said
that he had raised the question of the law passed by the German Bundestag concern.
ing missiles and that Adenauer had tried to reassure him that this was only a
theoretical step and had no practical significance. Recently Strauss had spoken
of introducing these arms in Germany more quickly. Despite reassurances,, the Soviet
Union had misgivings that Germany was getting more arms than were needed for defense
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purposes. The Soviet Union had no objection to German possession of defensive
armaments*
With regard to elections there was a time back in 191.6 when the United States
and Soviet positions were close on such questions as elections, demilitarisation,
etc. He had no intention in engaging in polemics but the fact remains that to date
there were two German states with practically no relations between them and West
Germany did not even want to talk. Even armies at war found means to talk to each
other through third parties. Under these conditions how could free elections settle
the problem. The time might come when free elections would be possible but in the
present situation they were no cure-all. Therefore the Soviet Union Tought* that
intermediate steps and forms should be evolved. A coalition government should be
formed and no matter how weak it was such a situation would be better than the
present total lack of relations. A peace treaty., far from preventing the reunifies
cation of Germany, would assist in achieving this goal.
Mi,koyan said that the resident had spoken of military expenditure and he
could express full agreement with his remarks. Some of the American cabinet
officers and particularly the Minister of Defense had said that the Soviet Union
should reduce its arms and expenditures. Mikoyan said that he had replied that
this was what they wanted to do but if they did it unilaterally they were afraid
the United States would continue to develop its position of strength.
The President interjected that this was what we both always said,
Yikoyan said that then we should both do it together. He pointed out that in
the past three years the Soviets had made no increase in their military expendi-
tures whereas the United States expenditures had been very high and Congress on
occasion even increased the proposals made by the President which were already at
a very high level.
Mikoyan pointed out that the President had indicated that if Germany had no
military obligations it would have an economic advantage. There was a way to
avoid this. They could revert to the old position and ask for some reparations from
Germany and thus deprive her of any advantage. There were also other ways of pre..
venting danger.
The President intervened to say that he had said this would be an opportunity
for the Germans.
Mikoyan continued that arrangements could be made for the Germans to help the
underdeveloped countries,
Mikoyan said that he had been pleased when the President spoke about develop-
ing contacts. Some practical steps In this field had been taken and neither side
had reason to be disappointed as reciprocity had been observed and both sides had
been correct. With respect to students we should exchange not 100 but several
hundred. It was true that the Soviet Union preferred to start with a smaller number
and he could say frankly why they were so cautious. The Soviet Union was
suspicious
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uspicious :of the United States intelligence service although it was headed by a
very. pleasant man; the brother of the Secretary.of States -whom he had met lase
evening, The Soviet Government suspected, although they; m ght be 'wrong, that this:'
exchange would be used for other purposes than study. If they were real students.
this was-all right but if they were agents i t is another, matter, .
The President interrupted to say that.he would be very.; surprised if it were
possible to take an 18 year old student and make an intelligence agent out of him.
Mikoyan said the outcome would `dee d: upon the ?behavior of the strtidents.
'The President said we: must `develop a situation ? of confidence so that there
would be no need for this feeling of secrec
Mikoyan said,_ that Mr. Johnson, had
important because pictures, influence peop,
an exchange of films and this was
Secretary Dulles "observed that." Corti -- fi3ms:were;.not always helpful,, such as
crime' pictures, Mikoyan ' replied , that they.- did not :make such films and would not
take them from us Ike'::Said-,'the`Soviet fi3 ns which 'they were: supplying us con-
tamed virtually no, propaganda .and -he hoped the- President.-would see: them.
The President said Mikoyani 'was` :familla r with our form of Government and if
'
Congress exaggerated our need for arms as he sometimes -thought they tended to dog.
it 'was' because the .Congress 'represented-the sum of the fears -of our people,. It
was clear that we had different views on Germany and : Berlin. If those problems
were difficult to resolve `now Set us leave' them aside and tackle them later. when
they could be' resolved. We riow enter "our, attention :on-tbis'problem because it
is',the most -important and difficult, The-President,said that our people have'
.definite view's and debate them :sharply but: in a' : few things- they are closely united
and there should be no doubt in His Exicellencys a :mind: about. our unity on h ques-
tion of Berlin and Germany, The President, therefore suggested we tackl8a problems
and perhaps by solving them we could develop a better climate and more mutual trust.
Mikoyan :suggested' `we should end the Cold war. This 'was the reason for the
mi3itar7 appropriations by the *Congress and , the Soviet Union did not consider that
it was to blame for the cold war. There was no basis for the suspicion that they
would oonnnit- 'aggression. As for -Berlin there had 'been no .exchange of views. In
the time before us-he-hoped that we would-'advance.some'views instead of taking a
purely negative line, He ' realized the desire to- seek- a settlement of easier prob.
lems. Some such problems had been resolved but that.did not seem to help in
improving our relations;
''The- President said that 'in several meetings between the Soviet Union and the-
West daring and at ' the end,of the war we had undertaken certain resporisibilitieso
He had been there' at that time and' his own forces - had withdrawn to the agreed line,'
Part of this agreement was that 'Berlin would be handled as it is today and he did'
not think it fair to ea it-negative when we insisted upon discharging. our reason.
sibilities there,
Mikoyan
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Mikoyan said that as far as the earlier part was concerned he had no com.
plaints. However the occupation had been terminated in East and in West Germany.
Only Berlin had occupation forces. They did not ask that Berlin be turned over to
East Germany or that Soviet troops replace ours. After such a long period after
the war the occupation should be ended. Berlin should be demilitarized and turned
into a free city with no loss or gain on either side. Be hoped the President would
consider the matter again and that a settlement could be found which would involve
no risk,
Secretary Dulles said one of the difficulties is that it is believed in Germs
many and elsewhere that the goverment in East Germany was not a Government of
Germans but one that was wholly imposed upon them and hated by the Germans. It
was a form of masked occupation as long as the government was not responsive to the
will of the people. The United States had proposed' free elections but on that
question the' Soviet Union was persistently negative.
Nikoyan said-that this view was spread from abroad and'did not correspond to
the facts. The Government of East Germany was supported by Socialists, Liberals
and Social Democrats in East Germany. The people in the East German Government
did not spring to power by accident. They were people who an well known there.
Many personalities in the government had been in the Bundestag in the time of the
Kaiser. One, Grotewald, was a Social Democrat leader and had never been a
Communist. The head of the Parliament, Dikmenn, had newer been a Communist but
was once Secretary to Streseman. If one.compared the composition of the govern-
ments in East and West Germany it would be found that the government in East
Germany was more authoritative. Recently elections had been held by secret ballot
in East Germany and the people overwhelmingly supported the government, It should
be easy to get true information about the situation there. Neither the Soviet
Government nor Soviet forces interfered in East Germany. The East Germans were
allies just as we had relations with Adenauer. We were allied to one part of
Germany and the Soviet Union to the other. This was a bad situation and it would
be better if the Soviet Union and the United States were allied.
Mikoyan hoped that this exchange of views had been useful. He would report
to his Government and would take great pleasure in conveying the President's
greetings to ffihrnshchev.
The President said he was glad Mikoyan had taken the trouble to come to the
United States.
Mikoyan expressed his thanks for the help he had had from the authorities in
this country and the reception he had received from the people and the business
world, The President said we.would be glad to compete in hospitality.
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