NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE LECTURE 3 FEBRUARY 1956 ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNIST SUCCESSES, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440006-9
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RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
12
Document Creation Date: 
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 29, 2013
Sequence Number: 
6
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 3, 1956
Content Type: 
MISC
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440006-9.pdf392.45 KB
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-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440006-9 NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE LECTURE 3 February 1956 ASSESSMENT OF COMMU21L5T SUCCESSES, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 1. Basic Considerations. (a) No change in Soviet objective., tactical variations within traditional Communist zig- ass theory Le Stalin. Policy makers must avoid being deceived by temporary variations Soviet policy. (b) No change likely as long as present leadership and present system mains in Kremlin. Obviously problem of dur own popular opinion mains and we must avoid impression of warlike posture, threats, etc. (c) They must demonstrate performance not promises. (d) Continued massive military build up as threat to hold over he neutralists and as deterrent to U.S.A. and allies. (e) Despite lip service to raising lving standard and consumers goods, they will continue to devote as now some 35 per cent of their gross national production to capital investment largely adapted to military end items. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440006-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440006-9 (f) Whereas industrial output in 1950 roughly 1/5th of USA it is projected under their 5 year plan to be about 2i5ths in 1960. (g) New 5 year plan provides for the tripling or quadrupling of items in the electronic field and a sixfold increase of production of separate heat resistance alloys, pointing up emphasis on items for guided missiles, jet engines, aircraft, etc. .(h) In steel, their 1955 production rose to 45 million metric tons (against 106 for USA), and in primary aluminium to 500, 000 metric tons (as against 1.4 million for USA). (Look at contrast in automobiles and trucks where their production 1/20th of ours washing znachines.1/50th, and radio and TV sets where they are about 115th of our, for a population 1/4th greater.) (i) Making substantial strides in cr (1) Nuclear. (2) Jet and long range aircraft. (3) Guided missiles. fields: Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440006-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440006-9 (j) Policy dornhated for immediate future by determination to avoid risk of zna,lor war. (k) At present state of their nuclear, aircraft and missile developme do not wish risk danger of massive nuclear retaliation, hence will avoid risky adventures. Consider themselves encircled by our oversea bases and undermining of these bases will be main element of their policy. 2. Balance (a) With this background of basic element. of Soviet policy, let us draw a balance sheet of Soviet policy over the past decade. (b) Where do we stand in the Cold War struggle. (c) USA really first aroused to magnitude and nature of Communist threat period beginning1946-47 and started to react. (d) Have gone through two phases and now enteringa third phase of Soviet Cold War techniques. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440006-9 - Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440006-9 (e) The first phase started with following events: (1) Greece threatened with Communist take-over from mid 1946 on. Iran and Turkey threatened with aggression. ) European economy ci early 1947 on. (3) Csechoslovaia fell to Communism February 1948. (4) Commrxunist threate over italy in April 1948 elections. ) Berlin blockade started June 1948. (6) ChIna Main' land threatened with Communist conquest by mid 947 and lost by October 1949 (fall of Nanking April 1949)? Cumulative effect these developments. Stunned government. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440006-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440006-9 The First Answer: (a) Aid to Greece and Turkey started April 1947 - (U 5). (b) Commies ousted from French and Italian governments in May 947. (c) Marshall plan and NATO. (Voted April 1948, emergency aid December 1947). (d) I (f ections won by anti-Co(April 1948). ) Berlin airlift. (July 1948). 9 had responded with reasonable success to various Soviet thrusts in Europe. But, China lost with impact on Indochina. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440006-9 1 . Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440006-9 4. The Second Threat. (a) Repulsed in European efforts to extend direct Soviet control by end 1950, and perhaps encouraged by their first A-bomb test (September 1949), and China success. the Soviets turned to military aggression by proxy, through their satellites. (1) Korea. (Z) Indochina. (b) In 1950-51, Viet Minh, having only ittle Chinese or Soviet aid were repulsed by de Lattre. , (c) In 1952 and 1953, Chinese Communist aid was stepped up, Dien Bien Phu invested in Deceniber, lost April 1954. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440006-9 . Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440006-9 . The Second Ammer. (To open sures 011 (a) Communist blocked but not defeated in Korea, (b) In Indochina, saved what was salvageable without war worked to build up a Diem government. (c) Start toward bringing Germany into NATO and rear (d) SEATO and coalition in SEA. (e) Baghdad Pact. (f) Congressional resolution re Defense Formosa (Quemoy and Matsu). (g) Mossaxlegh overthrown in Iran. (h) Arbenz driven from Guatemala. On balance West fared well. (For example 1 1/4 million East Germane fled from their "paradise" since 1949 -- now nearly 1000 day). *7 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440006-9 . Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440006-9 6. The Third Threat (And the Answer). (a) Peace and Bli makers Red Riding Hood. Ruble, Rifle and Ric - arming the trouble mic penetration - appeal to neutrals Little (b) Said due Stalin's demise (February propter hoc" fallacy. (c) Typical Commie strategy - retreat regroup and attack on new front Lenin' policy ZIG-ZAG. Soviets don't want war now - had come to verge in Korea and Indochina. (d) Wanted new policy so subtle no danger of war involvement. Really frightened at trend. Chose soft "underbelly" of Asia prom Syriz to Siam. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440006-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440006-9 (e) Their Smoke Screen (Retreat) Because their bluU called, (1) (We weren t caught napping - but how could you refuse without playing their game). (2) Austrian peace. (First Soy held territory given up). (3) Swallowed threats about January rearming and joining NATO. (4) Communist China temporarily halted attack on off -shore islands. (5) Settled for half-a-loaf in lndoch1n.a (f) Asian Underbelly Policy: (I) Appeal to former "Colonial" or recently free areas - Arab World, India, Burma, Afgans, etc. Economic aid. Military aid where it will cause trouble (Egypt - Israel) (Their excess of 123 Merchants of Death on a Grand Scale. MIG- 15, IL-28 Tanks, old subs Use of Satellites - Czechoslovakia, Poland, etc. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440006-9 . Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440006-9 (g) Seale - some half billion promised and good bit in pipe line - Some ZOO million of arms to Egypt - 100 million steel milli for India - 100 million credit for Afghans (22 years withdraw annually). Buying Burma rice, etc. (Real cost not great). (Ix) Discuss subtlety and appeal of new look. (1) Read mo on reasons for Commie appeal. swer to Third Thr (In the Making The New Yorker Cartoon. Must tackle this problem a with Marshall Plan. But in not the answer. tackled Europe collapse in 1947-48 case great outpouring of money - 10 - Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440006-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440006-9 While c ting their major drive on Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, Commies are not neglecting Europe and Far East. (a) In Europe encouraged by French elections (explain) and by the prospect of upcoming Italian elections. Despite some troubled areas in Satellites, consider their basic hold there to be secure. While same true in East Germany, have a worrying situation U East Germany gains more independence and its own military force. (h) In Far East, desire hold Comimmist Chins back from adventuresome activities that might bring war. Do not object to their keeping up the pressure and feel that Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Malaya, Indonesia, etc. present likely targets. 9. Over-aU Summation. Popular ImpressionLed by colul1miuts and prophets of gloom not borne out by calm appraisal. They are not winning the Cold War, but they are not losing it and still see prospects ahead for their new line of policy. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440006-9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440006-9 . - ? 10. But they too have their problems. (Recall Nazi situation (a) Question of Kremlin leadership - how long can Committee form last. Khru c ev seems to be consolidating his hold (Mention Kruglov, etc.). (b) The agricultural problem. (c) Hanging to and controlling satellite areas and China. (d) Keeping their people under control without really improving living standards for effect of their "open door" policy to visiting delegations. (e) How to maintain iron discipline and State direction with vast expansion of education - scientific training, etc. 1 1 . Conclusions. No reason to be panicky. No evidence that popular support for Communist form of government has increased over past year in any Important areas, though still some soft spots. Their promising program is "making hay," but will their performance equal expectations. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/29: CIA-RDP80M01009A001402440006-9