NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 6 JUNE 1960 AND ARMY WAR COLLEGE 7 JUNE 1960

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A001502630001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 6, 1960
• Content Type: MISC

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
6 June 1960
and
ARMY WAR COLLEGE
7 June 1960
I. Essential issues facing us are:
To analyze as best we can the policy of the USSR and Communist
China over the immediate future in the light of recent developments,
and prepare measures to meet it.
It is obvious that if our problems with the Communist Bloc
could be resolved peacefully, other issues from Cuba to Laos, from
Berlin to Black Africa would become manageable.
But with Soviet, Communist China and their satellites competing
with the Free World for every inch of the uncommitted world, the
struggle will continue to be an intensive one; although it may well
remain "peaceful" - in the sense of short of nuclear war.
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Must recognize,however.
objective of Internatiana
They openly preach that Coni:
that just as our resent capitalistic free .enterpr
eudalism, so :Comunism wiU swaUow up capita
Khrushchev suggests this can be for us a peaceful and painle
development.
No secret that the Co
to help along tn every way possible to them what they conceive to be
this wave of the future.
this is so, and I fundamentally believe ttt?be, why should
K have staried out on h
of tensions?
Primarily he felt he needed
:?
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.(1) First, to realize.'his.
an and to
develop his economic and industrial
successful competition for
to.a pa
arid do
where.
'Lion became
feasible both in time of piace and where,
he could emerge succes
( ) Second, to cOmplet
to provide adequate
against our bombe
(The an missi? e rnissi
Third to secure, during this period, of relaxation,
working bases political and
0110321/0 in the uncommitted
world, particularly in the Mid
a t
Black Africa and Latin America.Iraq - Laos
Indonesia - Guin
Cuba.
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Ltit.
(4) Fourth, to drive a wedge? in TO and other
Free World alliances by creating the mpression t
It was no longer necessary to ally aga
Communism
and that U. S. was leading aUiances toward nuclear war.
? .
(5) Fifth,to get the United State
and out of overseas bases; this tob?
ccomplished through.
realizing objectives mentioned in last point.
(6) Sixth
often us tip, to el *Ur
preparedness, by selling us tiaweetnesa and lig
(7) Seventh, hopefully to get trade going between.
the Commun t World and the Free World so that they could
please on the Adustrial development. i ore effectively by
f
ob aining prototype a, Machinery, plan nd equipment from
the West.
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C.
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SECHET
There well may be others ns, but these constitute quite
a program.
M. Communist China n
? While it desired some of the Same objectivea.as
to get
his co-existence program, the
ence.
hchev desired
tally,
both as to the extentof the'danger of this program to
society and to its ult
(Di
e effectiveness.
UBS Sino-Soviet problem.)
IV. Khrushchev probably understood
program e n
involved risks to his form of Goverrnnent, to Communis
Still he felt
What w
these could be kept manageab
roportions.
world both hums.n contactsud contacts to all forms of news
media and the like.
SECRET
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? SECRET 0
b. This in turn permitted the Soviet people to.
realise what oc ie had accomplished
me
in ter
iberty and Opportunity
individual.
1!hie also carried the implication to the Sovie
peoples that a compromise was poseib
and Communism, between freedom and s
be
capita:. s
that our free societies were not all b 4, that o
were people with whom he c
4. AU this,coupled with the massive progressin
educationin the Soviet Union es
ver the past
decade, tended to show the Soviet people that there
alternativ
workablernat ve, to Comm
32711, .
philosophy, to ma
socie
7.
some of them
Le a
closed
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When Wendell Wilkie vis
and studied the Soviet educ
that he was likely to educate
Lted the Soviet o uring the war
onal. system,suggested to Stalin
iimself out of a job. Stalin laughed.
Khrushe ev has been pondering. ?
i,tuatiOn asKhrushchev prepared
siden s visit to the Soviet Union.
V. This was background of s
for the Summit and the
If he could have wrun?
concessions out of the Summit on Berlin
and disarmament -- or if wit
unity of the Western Powers.
?with all
t that he could
Summit and
disadvantages Might have bee
failed inthis and yet the Co e and the iit
plus might have been turned into a
e broke
resider,.Vs visit
however,
oceeded, the
SEed.c
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? SECRET
VI. It eema clear h
Conierence is sues such
the Kremlin. Pro and c
MeanwhIe the evide
would have littIe thence
over
uring the week.e preceeding ummit
above weie vigorously de
ed:in
s of "coezLstenc&
e was-accumulating that K at Summit
breaking up the Western solidarity
rlin or in a major way over disarms.
(Refer speeches Herter,
His own pre-Summit speeches,
to the tong
Warty at Baku reverted
ssibly evidencing that the tough group
Kremlin was having its inthence an him or tht he
and more to follow their lead.
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sp'?
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? SUR
tuation came the U-2 incident. From May I to
May. 5, four full days dun'
been a debate as to whether to remain quiet about th
shove it. under the rug aa It were,
e flight risked baring t
but
people o
eat on May 5 showed decLion to publicize incident --
Ma d decisio
point
The reault.of
Washington with the official ac
for. the flights.
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VIII. My presentation o
. The i1u,e
subject.
e of the
Undoubtedly the e
Have -eady Judie
opportun
les to talw
other course -- Between May
Then
osure made.
in in Paris -
Pr sident statd
ghts stopped and
would not be resumed.
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