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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
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Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 6, 2006
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Publication Date: 
March 2, 1974
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Approved.Gor Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP80M'G4009A003100010018,-3- CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505 2 March 1974 The Honorable William Proxmire United States Senate Washington, D. C. 20510 It is true that a background briefing was given to certain newsmen on February 27th which resulted in the article in the New York Times you cited in your letter of March 1, 1974. The reporter made certain errors in his article which have been raised with him separately and which can be clarified below. The briefing contained nothing of a truly classified nature. You will note from the attached excerpts of the public hearing on my nomina- tion before the Armed Services Committee of the Senate the gist of what was stated in this briefing. Specifically, I described in that hearing and the journalists were told that CIA solicits from American citizens any information they may have of value on foreign matters. I am pleased to say that a large number of American citizens, institutions, and firms provide us such information as a patriotic act. Contrary to the. reporterts mistaken assertion, we do not pay for such information, but we do make arrangements to classify or otherwise protect our sources of such infor- mation from possible exposure or from possible misuse of any proprietary interest they may have in the information. This testimony also referred to the fact that CIA personnel appear abroad not as CIA employees but as representatives of "some other entity. t' The discussion with the newsmen indicated that in some instances these arrangements are made with U. S. business institutions which pro- vide this assistance as a patriotic act. As noted in the article, we do not pay such business enterprises any return for this beyond reasonable sums for the administrative overhead and similar costs involved. In the course of Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO03100010018-3 Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP80MG4009AO03100010018-3 the discussion with the newsmen, an obvious fact was mentioned that a business that has one of our officers among its staff can benefit inci- dentally from his knowledge and expertise of the foreign country, but we do not provide these companies the kind of direct assistance mentioned in the first question you raised. Your second question reflects a second error in the reporter's account. At the briefing it was stated that it would be quite improper for an intelligence service to spend nonappropriated funds and that CIA does not do this. The incident involving the ITT, in which CIA refused such a proffer, was mentioned, and the fact that CIA had not accepted any such funds in at least the last ten years or so but that an answer was not available about the period of the 1950's. I can assure you that CIA will not spend any such nonappropriated funds, as I feel it essential that CIA's expenditures be under the control of and pursuant to the annual appropriations provided by the Congress. With respect to your third question, the miniscule number of CIA individuals under business cover as compared to the total number of American businessmen abroad does not in my opinion cast suspicion on legitimate business activity. CIA obviously takes considerable pre- cautions to ensure that the entities providing assistance are protected against exposure. With respect to your fourth question, the intelligence community has no different relationship with the oil industry than it does with any other industry or institution. The intelligence community has benefited from information received from the oil industry, in the forms noted above. The intelligence community, however, does not rely solely on such infor- mation in making its assessments. As indicated to the journalists, there is a certain natural exchange of views and comments with business repre- sentatives as well as with journalists, academic experts and others in the course of discussing foreign intelligence matters, but this is no different in the intelligence community than it is in the normal American Embassy, Government department, or private American institution interested in making the best possible assessment of a foreign situation. Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP80MO1009AO03100010018-3 Approved4or Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP80MQJ009A003100010018-3 I hope these comments satisfy the concern expressed in your letter. As indicated in my confirmation hearings and you noted in your letter, I indeed wish to be responsive to Congress to the maximum degree feasible within the Congressional charge laid upon me in the National Security Act to protect intelligence sources and methods. I have appeared before several Committees in an effort to do this. Ex- cept for my confirmation hearing, these have been in executive session in order that I may respond fully with classified as well as with un- .classified information to the questions posed. It has also been the prac- tice of the Senate that CIA respond with respect to the operational details of its activities only to the designated subcommittees of the Armed Services Committee and Appropriations Committee. Unless the Senate wishes to change this arrangement, therefore, I would respectfully re- quest that any questions which would involve such operational matters follow that procedure. Sincerely, WEC:blp Distribution: Original - Addressee (handcarried by LC on 4 Mar 74) 1 - Mr. Braswell for Senator Stennis (handcarried 1 - Mr. McConnell for Senator McClellan (handcar 1 - Mr. Nedzi (handcarried 1 DDCI 1 - DCI 1 - OLC 1 - DDO 1 - Mr. Thuermer rieq on 4 Mar 74) 4 Mar 74) 25X1 14 Mar 74) 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP80M01009A003100010018-3 Excerpts from Hea- '*ig Before the Senate Armed Se -rites Committee on the Nominat rofieW FAtaFizWelilseC280166O tk9 7bp-C3 i. #taRbWv QGA131l dW*63Lc e Seiiatbii= S cro c. Right. rn general, What 'do you consider to be the proper scope ?of your agency activities witl ntheUnited States? Mr. Corsr. Mr. Chairman, we obviously have to run a headgna:rters here; We havo to recruit people for our staffs, and so fdrth;: we have to cbh:dt ct investigations on those peo~ile ; we have to biotebt, Our -own intelligence sources and. methods within the Agency; we hare-to con- tract with a large number of American firms for the various. kinds of eecquipmeat that we might have :need for abroad. We also- I believe Pages quite properly, 'can -collect foreign intelligence -in the' United Stag 25-26 iiicluding requesting American citizens. to share with. their. -Govern. Pages 26 - 27 nient certain information they may know about forei situations. We have a service that does this, and I am happy to say, a very large .number of American citizens have given us some very important in formation. We do not pay for that information. We can protect their proprietary interest and even protect their names if necessary, if they world rather not be exposed as the source of that information.- - We also, I- believe, have -certain support activities that we must conduct in the United States in order to conduct foreign intelligence operations abroad. Certain structures are necessary in this country to give our People abroad perhaps a reason for operating. abroad' in some respects so that'they, can- appear not as CIA. employees but as representatives of some- other entity. Lastly, I think that there are a number of activities in the United States where foreicrn intelligence can be collected from' foreigners, and as Ion- as this is oreign intelli-22 gence; 'I thins it giute proper that -we- do so, I can certainly, into more detail?-on? this 'in -executive session any time you would 1 ; dlr. Chairman, 'but I* reiterate that-the focus should and must be foreign intelligence only, and that' all the: other. activities, are only supportive of that major function. Senator S TlR waro e. What tivould be your position 'regarding CIA, collaboration with private American corporations overseas t Mr. Co=.BY. Well, I think that in many respects there are perfectly legitimate ways .in which we can collaborate with American corpo- rations overseas.iirterms of the exchange of information and in some situations corporations overseas Can help the intelligence: activityand However,'--I'think your: reference -is-rather to-the situation that de- veloped with FIT in .Chile and ?I think that our position there is, that we are-not goino to be a conduit forcorporate policies -and that we:will not allow ourserves to be controlled by some corporation.; Senator?SYnrmdrox.' There would 'appear no reason; from the stand, for- point of logic; that prevents you utilizing American citizens in.a.for: eign -country-to the best of your ability to obtain information.-You would awe, would sou not? 1enntor SY3i1 oTo . On the other hand, you would riot want that corporation to take advantage of your request by in turn obtaining special favors from the Government? Mr. Coi ar. Right. I think we have only one source of our authority and that is the statute, and the President, and that we should make decisions on what we do overseas based on the best interests' of the United States as articulated by the Congress and the President, and not by any individual company. Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP80M01009A003100010018-3 Qiie?rtiolc. Mir. ')y. your previou.t te. tinnony about lloulc.tic 'ivies of CIA has pfcp s t~~~~,>s~~(~~$~ 9k.aF~-u 80 00e~et01W1O0010018 examples-hypothetical erampics if you like-nf the kind of ('IA inquiries and interviews which you would new as proper within the United Statcsf Answer. Provided that CIA's activities within the U.S. are In the prosecution of foreign Intelligence and do not contravene U.S. law, I believe they do not cou- flict with the statutory restriction against CIA involvement In domestic affair: Examples of this kind of activity are : Page (a) interviewing American citizens who knowinty and willingly share their 157 information about foreign subjects with their government. (b) Collect foreign intelligence from foreigners temporarily within the U.S. (c) Establish support structures within the U.S. to permit CIA operations abroad. (d) Recruiting. screening and training our own personnel. (e) Contracting for supplies essential to foreign Intelligence operations. (f) Providing training to foreigners in the U.S. (g) Passing the results of foreign intelligence operations to appropriate U.S. agencies luiving a legitimate Interest therein, e.g., the FBI. (b) Under the economy act, providing assistance or service to other U.S. agen- cies for activities within their statutory authority which do not involve CIA in activities outside its statutory authority. . Pages 183 - 184 Question. Moving to the question of 'domestic CIA- operations,' ecould Von please describe the full eztcnt of CIl operations Acre in the. US..including tho*e that relate to overseas program.t Answer. CI L's operations in the US can be summarized as follows: (a) headquarters and administrative activities, to Include proctire>nent, re- cruitmeut, security clearances, experimentation, training, etc. .?'? - (b) Domestic eollertton. American citizenLq are interviewed' on a knowing voluntary bash for their knowledge of foreign intelligence which they will share with their Government. (c) Foreigners-operations are conducted to collect foreign Intelligence from forelgners temporarily resident in the US. (d) Mrrhanisms. rrlatfanships and faculties are required within the US to support foreign Intelligence operations abroad. (e?l Analysis and researrh of foreign intelligence matters by PIA staff and contractors, consultants and Institutions. - _ ? Question. Would you csplain the role of the Domestic Contact Serrice? Answer.?Domestic collection-American citizens are interviewed on a know- Ing and voluntary basis for their knowledge of foreign intelligence which they will share with their Government. Question. In it true that the Domestic Contact Service now has been placed under the organizational authority of the clandestine services? If so, why? Answer. Yes; In order to Improve the. coordination of its collection activities with those of the Agency abroad. ? Question. Have covert programs or personnel ever been run out of or in co- operation with DCS operations or ofcca? If so, under what conditions? Answer. Covert programs are not ran out of DCS offices but DCS contributes from time to time to the Identification- of operational opportunities. Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP80MOl009AO03100010018-3