THE WORLD SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01009A003100040003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 13, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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DCI ADDRESS FOR
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
17 June 1974
THE WORLD SITUATION
Introduction
I. Gentlemen; I have been asked to review with you
the World Situation. This is, to put it mildly,
a large order. Where to begin might be a problem
were it not for the importance of recent develop-
ments in relations between the two most important
factors in the equation--the United States and the
Soviet Union.
A. So, I would like to start out by defining
and examining the change in Soviet foreign
policy that we have come to call detente.
B. This should be a useful exercise, since
those who know Russian tell me that there
is no word in the Russian language for this
concept. The fact that we call it "detente"
is sufficient evidence that there is no word
for it in English, either.
UOR'IAMF except for the
ollow?ing pages
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A. SALT, where the stakes are the greatest, is
moving slowly.
1. The Russians still lag qualitatively and
are reluctant to give up current numeri-
cal advantages in strategic weapons. They
appear increasingly concerned with third-
countryproblems, especially China.
2. Moscow seems not yet ready to reconcile
itself to the need for comprehensive con-
straints on the arms race as the price of
continued progress in relations with the
US. Instead, it prefers to take a piece-
meal approach to strategic arms limitation..
B. At the MBFR talks in Vienna, which began last
October, progress has been slow. The Warsaw Pact
is still arguing that all direct participants in
the talks should reduce their forces from the out-
set, and that all types of forces should be re-
duced. NATO is arguing that US and Soviet ground
forces-should be cut in a first phase, with other
participants making reductions later.
C. At the Geneva Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe, or CSCE, progress has come to a
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halt because of Soviet intransigence on the is-
sues of freer movement of persons and ideas, and
military confidence building measures.
1. Western and neutral delegations have been hold-
ing firm in seeking Soviet concessions.
2. While Moscow still says it wants to complete
the talks at a summit meeting in July', any last
minute concession may now be too late.
3. It is more likely that the final phase of the
talks will come in the fall.
VIII. In spite of this limited program and public op-
timism, we see clear signs that the Soviets are
troubled by several recent developments, and are
trying to sort out how they may affect detente.
A. US diplomatic successes and Soviet reverses
in the Middle East have touched a very sensi-
tive nerve, and have given Soviet critics of
detente a powerful weapon to use against the
Brezhnev leadership.
B. The USSR is suspicious of American motives as
it attempts to move back into the Middle East
negotiating process.
C. Lack of progress on trade and credit conces-
sions from the US has also sharply disappointed
ado s c ow .
1. The Soviets have shown no inclination to
liberalize further their emigration policy--
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have discussed this morning would not pro--
vide Moscow an assured "first strike" capa-
bility against the US strategic forces.
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SOVIET NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS
I. Before leaving the Russian military establishment,
I would like to mention the steadily increasing ac-
tivity of the Soviet Navy. What used to be basically
a coastal defense force now sends units to the Carib-
bean, Mediterranean, Indian ocean, and off West Africa.
In addition to their "show the flag" operations, the
Soviet Navy continues to fulfill its traditional
functions as a close-in defensive force.
A. The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron averages
about 15-20 surface combatants, 10 to 12
submarines and 20 support ships. In time of
crisis, however, reinforcements can move in
quickly. During the war last October, the
squadron reached an all time high of 95 units.
1. The squadron lost its air support in 1972
when Egypt ousted the Soviet naval air arm.
2. Soviet ships and submarines continue to use
Egypt's ports.
3. The Russians reportedly have secured an
agreement for increased use of Syrian ports.
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1. Normally they have one submarine and
two surface combatants there, but they
can rapidly augment their force. During
the Indo-Pakistani war in December 1971
they had 23 ships in. the area--half of
them combatants.
2. The Soviets are building a naval support
facility at the Somali port of Berbera
on the Gulf of Aden. They have done
maintenance work on warships, set up a
naval radio station, and are expanding
the port's piers and fuel storage capa-
bility. We have reports they are build-
ing an airfield nearby.
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who fears the Porguguese will mount an-
other raid like the abortive one in 1970.
D. Since Soviet naval visits to the Caribbean
started in July 1969, groups of Russian com-
batant ships and submarines have gone to Cuba
Two guided missile destroyers
and a diesel powered ballistic missile sub-
marine recently concluded a month long visit
to Cuba.
1. In each of the past three years, Soviet
combatant ships and submarines spent about
370 ship-days in the Caribbean.
2. Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft have
flown between the USSR and Cuba
times since 1970.
a. In late 1973, and again this year, some
of them made reconnaissance flights
over US naval ships in the western
Atlantic.
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A. Peking's major propaganda outlets have been.
depicting Confucius and his followers as
conservative, tradition-bound figures who
were successfully opposed at crucial peri-
ods of Chinese history by more progressive
elements. Lin Piao, the deceased former
defense minister, is described as a modern.
Confucian.
1. The real targets of the critical attacks,
however, are leaders who are still active.
In some instances they are being referred
to as "followers" of Lin Piao.
B. The campaign is part of a struggle over the
course China will follow after Mao and Chou
leave the scene. In the broadest sense, it
expresses Mao's desire to revitalize the revo-
lution.
1. The course of the campaign in 1973 reflected
factional struggle, but Chou En-tai's ef-
forts to keep Chinese policy on a moderate
course seemed dominant.
2. In recent months, however, the situation
has been more fluid. There has been a
countermove featuring criticism
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EUROPE
I. When we look at recent events on the continent
of Europe, it is not hard to find considerable
cause for concern. Certainly, to say the least,
change is the word of the day there. Within the
past month alone we have seen new governments
take over in Paris and Bonn, and the coup in
Lisbon in late Aprij has challenged many en-
trenched positions both in Portugal and in
southern Africa. I would like to address these
three specific situations before commenting on
the general state of US-European relations.
II. Portugal, first of all, had long been NATO's
however--the Azores in the eastern Atlantic, and
vast territories in southern Africa. Now we are
witnessing a historic reconstitution of political
life in Lisbon.
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2. One of his campaign themes, however, emphasized
his opposition to the US on trade and monetary
reform in 1971-73. Giscard also knows that
Gaullists will be quick to rebel if he tries
to move far from anti-US elements of traditional.
Gaullism.
D. Giscard may be more flexible in interpreting Gaul-
list defense and arms control policies. For the
immediate future, however, France will not partici-
pate fully in NATO, not join the Geneva disarmament
or MBFR talks, nor sign any multilateral disarma-
ment agreements. He would also continue to develop
the nuclear strike force.
1. Giscard may be more inclined than previous
Gaullist presidents to cooperate on Euro-
pean arms production.
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D. In these circumstances, it is no wonder that we
see so little movement on major area-wide issues--
progress toward effective unity, and improvement
in trans-Atlantic relations. The energy crisis
has precipitated action--but clear directions do
not yet appear.
E. You recall the decision of the EC Nine last
winter, for example, to seek wide-ranging economic
and cultural agreements with the Arab states.
Europeans, even Britain's pro-US Labor government,
regarded this as a positive step toward expressing
their unity.
1. At the same time, many feared that US insistence
on systematic consultations with the Nine on
political initiatives could frustrate joint
EC policies.
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II. As for-the chances for a major North Vietnamese
offensive, we are fairly confident that one will
not. be launched in the next few months, even though
Hanoi has built up its forces in the South.
A. Large quantities of war materiel have been
moved into South Vietnam in the past year, and
Hanoi now has more troops in the South than it
did at the start of the 1972 offensive.
B. On the other hand, dry season infiltration evi-
dently has ended for the central and southern
parts of the country. It is continuing into the
northern half.
1. The 93,000 troops sent south so far this dry
season (September-May) have been less than in
comparable periods preceding the big offensives
of 1968 and 1972.
C. We also note that communist officials in South
Vietnam continue to tell Viet Cong cadre that
no major offensive is planned in 1974 or 1975.
D. Looking beyond the next few months, however, the
communists are clearly building a capability to
revert to large scale warfare. The leaders in
Hanoi themselves have probably not yet decided
whether or when to use this capability.
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III. Meanwhile, the Paris talks on a political settlement
between the Thieu government and the Viet Cong remain
suspended, and both sides are demanding some hard terms
for their resumption.
IV. At home, the Thieu government continues to strengthen
its political position vis-a-vis its communist and non-
communist opponents.
A. The government's most serious problem is in the
country's economy--heavily dependent on foreign aid.
Prices, after rising some 65 percent last year,
have already increased 25 percent in the first five
months of 1974.
V. In Cambodia, the fighting continues.
A. Government forces, having withstood the communists'
push against Phnom Penh in January and February,
are now trying to stem insurgent attacks against
certain provincial enclaves.
1. In the far southwest, the communist siege of
Kampot City has been broken, but the insurgents
recently have tightened their control over
nearby stretches of Route 4--the government's
only access route to its seaport at Kompong Som.
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A. Advocates of Cuban re-entry into the OAS feel
that they won a round in granting of an exception
to a US subsidiary in Argentina to export to
Cuba, and in the agreement that members would
be polled on inviting Cuba to the next foreign
ministers' meeting.
1. Those still hostile to Cuba, on the other
hand, are gratified at the unchanged
basic position of the US, and are less
worried that the US will alter Cuban
policy without consulting them.
2. The proponents of lifting OAS sanctions
probably have 12 votes, an absolute ma-
jority but short of the needed two-thirds.
3. Cuba now has diplomatic and commercial re-
lations with seven Latin American states:
Argentina, Mexico, Peru, Jamaica, Guyana,
Barbados, and Trinidad. Among the others,
only Venezuela seems intent upon re-establish-
ing formal ties with Cuba--although the new
government that takes over in Colombia on
August 7 may have similar ideas.
4. Although Cuban subversive activity in Latin
America is at an all-time low, Havana is pro-
viding logistical and training support to
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