MEMORANDUM FOR DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER FROM JAMES R. SCHLESINGER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01048A000300330005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2005
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 13, 1973
• Content Type: MF

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13 MAR 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the Director for
National Security Affairs
The attached, developed b and his
colleagues, are some thoughts on the subject of Iraq and
Southern Arabia. If you have a generally positive reaction,
we could refine these further in the 40 Committee context.
Is/ James R. Schlesinger
James R. Schlesinger
Director
DDO/WEColby:gls (12 Mar 73)
Distribution
Orig - Addressee w/atts
2 - DCI w/1 copy atts
2 - DDO Reg w/o atts
1-C/NE w/o atts
1 - DDCI w/ atts
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SUMMARY
THE PROBLEM
Soviet Influence in Iraq and Southern Arabia
Soviet military support to Iraq and PDRY, in progress
for the past several years, has visibly deepened since mid-
1972. Iraq is now the principal Soviet client in the Middle
East. Its status as such has been formalize! in the Soviet-
Iraqi Friendship Treaty of July 1972 and tangibly reflected
in the more recent Soviet deliveries to Iraq of modern and
sophisticated arms.
When PDRY, the only Soviet foothold in the strategic
southern Arabian Peninsula, came in October 1972 under the
increased pressure of raiding by Saudi-financed Yemeni
tribesmen and activist !IUF exiles, this time supported and
participated in by elements of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR)
army, the Soviets swiftly increased the quantity and quality
of their aid to this client state. Commencing in October,
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ATTACHMENTd
SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ AND SOUTHERN ARABIA:
A SITUATION REPORT
While the Soviet Union had long supported Iraq and, more
recently, the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), its
involvement with these.radical Arab states has visibly deepened
since mid-1972. In the case of Iraq, this deepening over an
extended period was formalized by the signing of a Soviet-Iraqi
Friendship Treaty in July 1972 -- at a time when the Egyptian
expulsion of Soviet military advisors was already in full swing.
The treaty did not itself cause, but it was certainly consistent
with, the previously-planned improvement of the Iraqi armed forces'
weapons inventory through provision of more modern and sophisti-
cated Soviet arms such as MIG-21 aircraft, MI-6 cargo and troop-
carrying helicopters, T-62 tanks, Komar missile boats, and SAM 2
and 3 systems . The total to date of more than $1 billion in
military aid to Iraq represents, apart from Egypt, the Soviet
Union's largest such investment in the Middle East, and the
approximately 600 military advisors now assigned to Iraq consti-
tute the largest such Soviet contingent in the Arab World. With
the recent cooling in Soviet-Egyptian relations, Iraq is now the
principal Soviet client in the Middle East and appears virtually
certain to remain so for the foreseeable future.
Immediate, external pressures seem to have played a larger
role in increasing Soviet involvement with PDRY since mid-1972
than was the case with Iraq. Given the Soviet Union's attenuating
relations with the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and its inability to
date to establish a presence anywhere else on the Arabian Peninsula
except Kuwait, the deteriorating position of the leftist National
Front (NF) regime in Aden posed not only an immediate threat to
the strategic Soviet foothold in the southern peninsula facili-
tated by that regime's control over PDRY and its active hostility'
toward its conservative neighbors -- the YAR, Saudi Arabia, and
the Sultanate of Oman -- but also a threat against which decisive
Soviet action could, at relatively modest cost, rapidly erect an
effective defense. The Soviets did in fact so act when, in October
1972, the chronic Saudi-financed raiding forays of both YAR tribes-
men and activist PDRY exiles in the YAR expanded, albeit only
briefly, into a more serious campaign supported and participated
in by elements of the YAR regular army, which also seized Kamaran
Island, claimed by PDRY. The increasing success of the Sultan
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-As to the purposes underlying Soviet involvement with Iraq
and PDRY, Soviet policy is blended of both long range objectives
and the immediately reactive factors which affect or even block
effective pursuit of these objectives. The latter factors,
arising from opportunities or setbacks which the Soviets did not
foresee or cannot directly prevent, will necessarily alter the
pace and tactics of the Soviet program for achieving their long
range objectives, or may, under certain circumstances, exert
more basic and lasting impact on the Soviets' definition of
these very objectives themselves. For example, the Soviets may
well not have fully foreseen and certainly could not have pre-
vented the increasingly anti-Soviet policies of the Egyptian
Government during this period, but when these became unmistakably
clear with the Egyptian decision to expel Soviet advisors, the
value and importance to the Soviet Union of Iraq increased over-
night. Another characteristic of Soviet foreign policy is its
frequent tendency to copper bets, to put primary effort on backing
one especially promising horse, while at the same time making a
contingency investment in a competing one. In the Arab world,
for example, the Soviets have long placed primary stress on 1m-
proving their relations with established Arab governments, but
they concurrently have also sought to maintain and improve their
ties with the Palestinian fedayeen movement, even though it is
anathema to many of those same governments. Finally, there is
the defensive aspect of Soviet policy, with its considerations
of big power prestige which impel the Soviets to support those
clients in whom it has already invested heavily. Just as this
was a key factor in Soviet support of PDRY during the period, so,
too, is it in Soviet support of Iraq's efforts to come to satis-
factory terms with the restive Kurdish movement led by Mulla
Mustafa Barzani, whether by pressuring Barzani to join in a Ba'thi-
dominated National Front through which the Kurds could be effec-
tively neutralized as a dissident force in Iraq, or, should this
fail, by assisting direct Iraqi military action against the
Kurdish irregular forces. The upgrading of the Iraqi arms in-
ventory, coupled with increased Soviet training of Iraqi airborne
forces, clearly has direct relevance to the improvement of Iraqi
military capabilities against the Kurds.
Yet, there assuredly are fundamental elements of consistent
long range purpose in Soviet policies in the Middle East, espec-
ially as these pertain specifically to Iraq and PDRY. These can
be defined as the Soviet goals of achieving paramount influence
in areas of critical strategic importance and the reduction or
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elimination of the official, and especially military presence
of the Soviet Union's chief competitors in the area as a whole.
With respect to Iraq, the Soviets have sought, and with some
success, to improve their relations with Iran, but recognize
realistically that there are and will remain very distinct
limits to the Shah's willingness to collaborate with them.
Soviet support to Iraq accordingly has its basic, long-term
anti-Iranian facet, as well as its facet of Iraqi potential
for subversion against the conservative, major oil-producing
countries in the area. In both these facets, the Soviets can
support and increase area trends ultimately detrimental to the
interests of major rivals, chiefly those of the US, but also
those of Western European countries and Japan. Soviet policy
in the southern portion of the Arabian Peninsula is fully com-
plementary to that in Iraq. Iraq affords the Soviets secure
entree to the northern Persian Gulf, especially through the
Soviets' recently-acquired naval base rights at Umm Qasr. PDRY
affords the Soviets the potential for ultimate control over the
mouth of the Gulf through overthrow of the conservative, pros
West government of Oman by the PDRY-supported Ohufar rebels of
the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf
(PFLOAG), coupled with subversion by Iraqi-supported PFLOAG ele-
ments working in and against all the conservative Arab govern-
ments along the western shore of the Gulf -- Kuwait, Bahrain,
Qatar, and the states of the Union of Arab Emirates (UAE). PDRY
also affords the Soviets the potential for ultimate control over
the mouth of the Red Sea in combination with their influence in
Somalia, where Soviet activity has been steadily on the increase.
Finally, the Soviets clearly appreciate in PDRY its potential
for both military action and subversion against the YAR (which
they deem increasingly a mere client of Saudi Arabia and, by
extension, of the US) and, in time, against Saudi Arabia itself.
To the extent the Soviets continue to strengthen their presence
and influence in Iraq, PDRY, and Somalia, they also enhance their
capability to exert pressure on all riparian states of both the
Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, including Israel and Jordan.
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THE REBELLION IN OMAN: STATUS REPORT
Quick foreign assistance has relieved the immediate -
threat to an important government position in Dhufar Province,.
but action around the position may signal an increase in the
tempo of the guerrilla rebellion in Dhufar, Oman's westernmost
province. The action began in early February, when forces of
the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab
Gulf (PFLOAG) increased pressure on a 500-man garrison at the
government Station Mainbrace, which was established last spring
deep in enemy-held territory with the idea of cutting off
guerrilla supply lines from neighboring PDRY.
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The PFLOAG guerrillas may be receiving increased aid
from PDRY, which has for several years been their chief source
of both moral and material assistance. The guerrillas would
be hard put to sustain any serious offensive without substantial
aid from their PDRY allies. The PDRY. Government funnels Soviet
arms to the guerrillas, and some of the increased Soviet deliv-
eries to PDRY in 1972 have probably found their way to the
Dhufar front.
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