TO PROF. LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK, JR. FROM GEORGE A. CARVER, JR.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01048A000400080005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 63
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 22, 1974
• Content Type: LETTER

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE N10 #----------
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
22 July 1974
Prof. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr.
Brown University
P. 0. Box 1844
Providence, Rhode Island 02912
Dear Professor Kirkpatrick,
Bill Colby asked me to thank you on his behalf for
your thoughtfulness in sending us the monograph entitled
"Defense Policies for the Seventies" which just arrived.
The evening of 22 March must have been an interesting one.
You certainly had an impressive group of participants
addressing issues of importance to us all. The written
record indicates that it was a very good and often
stimulatingly provocative discussion which, incidentally,
I think you chaired admirably.
You put your finger neatly on what really are the
two key questions: What do we need and how much is
enough? These are matters over which, as the discussion
showed, well-informed and reasonable men will differ; but
it behooves all of us in the national security field to
keep remembering that these are the basic questions behind
much if not most of our continuing work.
uv r
I enjoyed are recent conversation in Washington and
look forward to another chance to talk with you when you
visit us again. There are few people who can take pride
in even one successful career; you are one of the rare
people who have made great contributions and achieved,
well-merited distinction in two.
Once again, thank you for sending us the monograph.
ve would appreciate receiving copies of similar documents
.in the future if you hold other symposia, particularly
ones as enlightening as this.
)pith best regards, 7>'
Sincerely yours,
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers
Wp
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 Review Copy
Compliments of
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr.
Brown University
P P. 0 . Box 1844
Providence, R. I. 02912
 ! ' l 4~
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MONOGRAPH ON
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
Defense Policies for the Seventies
A SYMPOSIUM HELD AT BROWN UNIVERSITY, MARCH 22, 1974
Dr. Donald Hornig, Presiding
The Hon. Clark Clifford, Keynote Speaker
The Hon. John Chafee, Panelist
Vice Adm. Stansfield Turner, Panelist
Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., Panelist
Prof. Laurence Radway, Panelist
Prof. Lyman Kirkpatrick, Panelist
BROWN UNIVERSITY
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DEFENSE POLICIES FOR THE SEVEIITIES
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by
JTJNE 1974
PROVIDENCE, RH?E ISIAND
THE SYMPOSIUM ON NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICIES FOR THE SEVENTIES
AND THIS MONOGRAPH WERE MADE POSSIBLE THROUGH A GRANT
FROM THE CARTHAGE FOUNDATION., PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA
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iii
Far too long has defense policy been a subject discussed and
debated principally in the Congress. Public discussion, and even
interest, has been limited. In an effort to stimulate analysis and
debate this symposium focused on those matters which should inter-
est the American citizen whose tax dollars pay for defense. The
need for a defense establishment was accepted: therefore the issues
which were raised were on how much to spend, and for what.
The symposium was held from 8 to 10 P.M. on March 22, 1974 in
Alumnae Hal]. at Brown University. The public was invited and ap-
praxinately 500 attended. It was televised live by Channel 6,
New Bedford-Providence, and taped for rebroadcast by WGBH, Boston
aver some 112 radio stations. This is the verbatim transcript.
B. Kirkpatrick, Jr.
Brown University
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DR. HCRNIT :
Good evening., ladies and gentlemen. This is not really the be-
ginning of the discussions for this evening. Each of the panelists
and the technical crew need to get themselves ready for the live TV
broadcast and radio tape recording of tonight's discussion. The sym-
posium will be used throughout the public broadcast network at later
dates. The format for the program will be as follows: I will intro-
duce the panelists and the moderator, Professor Kirkpatrick, when the
broadcast director gives me the signal. Professor Kirkpatrick will
introduce the issues and the keynote speaker. After Mr. Clifford
gives his remarks each panelist will be called upon for a short
critique of the positions advanced by Mr. Clifford. The last half of
the program will be open to questions and answers among the panelists,
the keynote speaker and from you in the audience. Our usual procedure
for questions from the floor is to urge you to ask well-designed ques-
tions pertinent to the positions advanced by the panel. You may as-
sist us and the radio and television audience by avoiding long com-
ments or unrelated asides. Questions will be limited to one from
each person in the audience until everyone has had their chance to
query our panel. We will appreciate your making your point interest-
ing and effective.
SYMPOSIUM INTRODUCTION
Welcome to Brown University. It is a pleasure to present this
symposium on Defense Policies for the Seventies. We hope this pro-
gram will help our radio and television audience as well as those of us
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DR. HORNIG :
in Alumnae Hall to understand the major issues which face the nation
and our defense policy. Two or three years ago, a discussion such as
this would have been very difficult to conduct in any university in
this country. Nonetheless, now the importance of this discussion is
appreciated. On the one hand, we are all aware that the escalation
of nuclear arms born of the competition between the Soviet Union and
the United States has led to what many of us consider an unreasonable
level of armaments on both sides. This is being dealt with in the dis-
cussions of the SALT II talks. On the other hand, as a consequence of
the very unpopular war in Vietnam, there has been some tendency to
avoid altogether the fundamental issues of defense. For example, nu-
clear arms are totally irrelevant in the kind of situation we have
recently faced in the Near East. We have to ask what does a rational
defense policy consist of? At the same time all of the issues in-
volved in defense policy are constantly changing because of the progress
of defense technology on the one hand and a constantly changing polit-
ical situation on the other. These are the things on which our panel-
ists will have to cope with this evening.
Our panelists for this evening are:
The Honorable John Chafee, former Governor of Rhode Island and
Secretary of the Navy, who now practices law in this city.
Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, president of the Naval War
College in Newport, Rhode Island.
Dr. Herbert Scoville, Jr., Former Deputy Director for Science
and Technology of the Central Intelligence Agency and former
Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
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DR. HORNIG : c ont' d.
Professor Laurence Radway, who specializes in defense policy
studies and teaches in the Department of Government at Dartmouth
College.
The keynote address will be presented by the Honorable Clark
Clifford who has held many distinguished assignments in goverrmbent.
Most recently he served as Secretary of Defense. He now practices
law in Washington.
The moderator for this evening's discussion is Professor Lyman
Kirkpatrick, University Professor of Political Science at Brown Uni-
versity. His early career included senior government assignments
and the executive directorship of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Ladies and gentlemen -- Brown University is pleased to welcome
you to the Symposium, Defense Policies for the Seventies. Professor
Kirkpatrick.
PR(&'. KIRKPATRICK :
Thank you, President Hornig. The discussion of Defense Policy
for the Seventies really revolves around two basic questions - what
do we need, and how much is enough? The real controversies arise on
these particular issues. To determine what the present needs are we
obviously must have considerable knowledge about our potential ad-
versaries, whoever they may be, and whenever the potential hostility
might occur. Mr. Clifford and all of our panelists will probably
agree that an adequate defense is necessary. The real question be-
fore the house is again, the need and what is adequate?
It's a great pleasure on my part to introduce to you a man whom
I have esteemed and honored through many years of government service,
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PROF. KIRKPATRICK: cont'd.
Particularly during his service as chairman of the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board and of course later as the Secretary of
Defense at a most crucial time in the history of the nation. Mr.
Clifford will open with an address following which each of the panel-
ists will have an opportunity to comment. We will then have dis-
cussion among the panel, and sooner or later you'll get a chance to
ask questions. Mr. Clifford
CLARK CLIFFCIRD :
President Hornig, Professor Kirkpatrick, distinguished guests,
members of the panel, ladies and gentlemen:
I consider it a privilege to be at Brown University and to pay
to Brown the debt that's owed by all citizens for the contribution
that it has made to the intellectual life of our country.
I particularly appreciate being here because it gives me an op-
portunity to see two old friends with whom I served in government -
your President Hornig and Professor Kirkpatrick. I honor them tonight
for the contribution that they have made in many years of service to
our government.
Our nation's policy regarding its national security is of such
vital significance to all of us that it should be the subject of wide-
spread discussion and debate. If war is too important to leave to
the generals, then defense policy is too important to leave to of-
ficials in Washington. It is you, the public, who must make your
views known. It is your lives that are affected, your futures that
may be imperiled, and you are the ones who have to foot the bills.
It is my hope that you will find this evening's discussion suf-
ficiently provocative and challenging that you will choose to enter
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the controversy on this subject that is now just beginning to emerge
in Washington.
The major thrust of my remarks tonight is that A) the world has
changed; and B) the United States' defense policy and defense budget
have not changed. I cannot state the problem more simply.
As our tragic intervention in Indo-China draws too slowly to a
halt, we look at the world around us and we see a near total trans-
formation. It is in this transformation that we will find the guides
for reshaping our defense policies and budgets.
During the Cold War era, faced with an aggressive Soviet Union
and what we took to be Soviet-Chinese solidarity, and a communist
effort to be involved itself in every significant conflict over the
future of any nation -- those responsible for our nation's policies,
including the state of our military forces, felt that the United
States had to plan its military forces with the real expectation that
they might, at any moment, be called upon to resist militarily, and
directly, large-scale aggression in Asia or Europe, and perhaps in
both simultaneously.
On the nuclear side, as our atomic monopoly evaporated, the need
for a constantly increasing stock of even more sophisticated nuclear
weapons seemed to grow greater, not less. The first priority was to
build a deterrent, proof against the most effective conceivable sur-
prise Soviet attack. In addition, in an effort to extend our nuclear
strength to protect our allies, we deployed literally thousands of
nuclear weapons throughout the world.
This image of the world on which our military forces were
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: cont d.
premised is scarcely recognizable from the perspective of early 19Th.
First, our relations with the Soviet Union have changed. To be
sure, profound differences between the social and political systems
and the international interests of the United States and the Soviet
Union remain. Nonetheless, the relationship of the two superpowers
simply can no longer be described as one of general and unrelenting
confrontation. We have seen two United States-Soviet summits marked
by effusive cordiality, and a third is promised for this spring.
There has been a strategic arms limitation agreement which, whatever
its limitations, marks an acceptance by both sides that there is no
real defense against nuclear war except mutual vulnerability, and
opens the way for the current talks on further agreements. We hear
intense discussion of immensely expanded economic links between the
United States and the Soviet. Union.
The European security conference and the negotiations on force
reductions in Europe are signs of a change in the relationship
between the Soviet Union and the nations of Western Europe and may
portend more basic settlements in the long run.
By contrast, relations between China and the Soviet Union have
so deteriorated as to make the phrase "Sinn-Soviet Bloc" but a memory.
Even as the Soviet Union and China remain openly hostile to each
other, the United States and China have opened a process of re-
establishing corm unications and contact. Domestic government up-
heavals in China -- or one might add in the United States -- are un-
likely to change the foundation of that process, which is a recog-
nition that however different we are from China and she from us, the
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M. CLIFFC!D: contd.
real points of conflict between our important interests are few indeed.
And, of course, in planning defense policy, there is the fact
that we are involved no longer in direct combat in the war in Indo-
China.
Finally, in a world in which economic issues on the internation-
al scene are growing in relative importance, we must recognize that
the United States has lost its economic domination of the internation-
al scene, even while retaining its vast military strength.
From these profound changes in the international setting, one
would expect profound changes in American military policy and American
military forces. For it is, of course, to serve our international
policy that we create military forces, however often it may seem that
the relationship is reversed.
Yet, despite these changes and the much-advertised winding down
of American involvement in Viet Nam, we are being asked to spend
more, not less, on military force. The Administration has asked
Congress this year for more dollars than have ever been spent in de-
fense in our history. Even in today's inflated dollars, the amount
is still staggering -- apprax mately $95 billion in new appropriations
for the Defense Department, after adjusting the stated figures to re-
flect more accurately funds properly attributable to the coming year.
That represents an increase of $13 billion over the 1971 budget.
And that increase is by no means due only to inflation. The growth
in the defense budget exceeds pay and price increases by more than
$7 billion -- which means an increase in real terms of more than
eight percent. What a contrast to past post-war budgets -- note not
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MR. CLIFF(1 ): contt d.
a cut in spending, but a big increase: And I ask myself what kind of
forces would the Administration be asking the American people and the
economy to support if international relations had remained essential-
ly the same? And what would we be told we required if relations with
China and the Soviet Union had worsened?
These profound changes in the world setting are not reflected in
our defense policies. Instead, we maintain and we are being asked to
pay more in the future to continue to maintain, essentially the forces
that were created to meet what we felt to be the needs of the height
of the Cold War. When we look at the forces today and compare them
with the forces of the early 60's, it is evident that it is simply in-
correct to proclaim, as Administration spokesmen sometimes do, that
in demobilizing the forces created to fight in Viet Nam, we have also
made significant cutbacks in the pre-Viet Nam "baseline" forces.
Of course, there are differences between our 1975 forces and
those of 1964, but it is striking how similar they are. To be
specific:
--We have 70 percent more strategic missiles than in 19624,
more than compensating for the decline in bombers.
We maintain the same number of tactical air wings --- 38 --
as in 19624.
-- The Navy has the same number of attack carriers and 32 times
as many nuclear submarines. The Pentagon itself explains the decline
in the number of surface war ships as due to retirement of "marginal-
ly"effective ships.
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MR. CLIFFQRDt contd.
--- The number of ground divisions has declined from 19 1/3 to
16 1/3, while there have been major increases in firepower and equip-
ment. This modest reduction reflects, one would assume, such facts
as the Berlin buildup included in the 1964 force, the vastly increased
cost of manpower relative to equipment, and the abandonment of plans
to fight major land wars simultaneously in both Asia and Europe.
And, these are crude comparisons of numbers only. Qualitatively,
the 1975 forces are vastly more powerful than those maintained in
1964. To give just two examples, the 1964 missiles mounted about
1,000 warheads, while the force planned for the end of 1975 will
have in excess of 7,000 warheads. The number of helicopters at-
tached to Army units has increased from about 4,000 in 1965 to well
over 8,000 today.
And perhaps more important, the missions assigned these forces
seem to be essentially the same as those of 19611 -- deep interdiction
by the Air Force of enemy supply routes as part of a prolonged war
in Europe or on the Asian continent; a sustained anti-submarine effort
by the Navy in the North Atlantic and carrier air support for sus-
tained shore combat; for the Army, a long land war in Europe, and, to
judge from the deployment and numbers of ground forces, also a sus-
tained land battle on the Asian continent.
The future cost of maintaining such a force for the indefinite
future regardless of international events can only climb steadily up-
ward. The time has come to look critically at our military forces
and to bring them into line with our real needs for the last quarter
of the twentieth century.
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Certainly nothing in very recent events, dramatic as they may be,
can justify the large increase in funds for defense which are pro-
posed, or continued adherence to our Cold War defense policy.
Our nation's current economic difficulties may, it has been re-
sponsibly suggested, have led to the inclusion of as much as $5 billion
extra in the defense budget to "help the economy." Such a load factor
for pump priming makes a mockery of the argument that this huge budget
is dictated by real national security needs. When we face such im-
mense inflationary pressures, this kind of wasteful spending will not
help the economy but it will do the reverse. Nor is increased spend-
ing on unproductive and unnecessary weapons of war a sound way to
avoid unemployment when there are so many truly vital projects crying
out for funds*
This has been the year of energy. In a period when increasing
energy prices and shortages of fuel may have a serious adverse econom-
ic impact, we should cut back the costs of government wherever we can,
including in the defense area. At the very least, the energy shortage
suggests that our true national security in the long term would be
better served by taking some of the excessive funds allocated to de-
fense and putting them into an effort to improve our sources and
uses of energy.
Nor does the renewed fighting in the Middle East furnish any
excuse for ignoring the need to reexamine our defense policy in the
light of changed world conditions. Far from the October War shoring
the world to be a highly unstable place in which relatively small
differences in military power may make a crucial difference, I be-
lieve that the war shows the reverse. The sharp fighting between
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 MR. CLIFFCPD: conttd.
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the Israelis and the Arabs did not draw the United States and the
Soviet Union into conflict, despite the important interests of each
side involved.
Of course, a basic adequate U.S. military force is an essential
part of effective diplomacy, and maintaining such a force is not in
dispute. But, for me, the lesson of the recent Mid-East crisis is
that military gestures that are but dangerous window dressing, far
from being crucial aids, may be a serious interference with the
process of diplomacy and negotiation which offers the best hope of
a solution to this long-standing problem.
Nor does the American concern for the security of Israel justify
either an increase in defense spending, or the permanent maintenance
of our present force. We can meet our obligations and commitments to
Israel, like those to our other allies, at a significantly more
economical force level.
In short, a critical item on our national agenda remains to
bring our defense establishment and budget into line with world
realities -- to give us a defense policy for the world as it is,
not as it used to be.
Substantial savings can be made simply from greater efficiency,
particularly in use of manpower, in curtailing our propensity for
excessively complex weapons, and in restraining ourselves from pro-
curing nuclear weapons which may actually lessen our security by
making the nuclear balance less stable. But we must ;o beyond these
steps to a more fundamental reexamination of the missions and struc-
ture of our military forces.
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c We must ask "What military missions make sense in this decade
of the twentieth century?"
First, of course, to defend the United States itself. Indeed,
we see how large our military has become by realizing how small it
could be if defending the territory of the U.S. itself were the only
mission. For that an invulnerable nuclear deterrent and minimum con-
ventional forces, costing perhaps a third of our current budget,
would be enough.
But despite the changes in the world, it remains true that
America in her own self-interest also needs military forces adequate
to support her international commitments jointly agreed upon by the
Congress and the President.
In strategic forces, we need a secure and stable nuclear deter-
rent. But we must not expect more of our nuclear forces than deter-
rence. For all their frightfulness., the political and military use
of nuclear weapons beyond the deterrence of their use by others is
limited indeed.
The recent proclamation of a strategy of increased "flexibility"
for our nuclear forces must not be allowed to lead us astray from ab-
solute deterrence of nuclear war as our objective. It may be de-
sirable that we should have some response to a nuclear attack other
than a world-destroying spasm, horrible as even the smallest such a
strike would be. However, we can have all the choice of response to
.a nuclear attack any one would want without any significant change
in our present force.
It seems to me useful also to say what we do not need our mili-
tary forces to be able to do. We do not need to exceed our potential
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opponents in every possible category merely to avoid the supposed
stigma of not being "number one" in everything. We do not need to be
ready to intervene everywhere in the world on short notice. We do not
need to maintain forces prepared to fight in contingencies -- such as
the so-called war at sea or a long conventional war in Europe -- which
are not only remote, but which would occur only after we had received
advance warning of a radical change in the political setting.
For strategic forces, that is, our nuclear forces, we need suf-
ficiency; we do not need to be frightened of disparities in crude
force levels or destructive per which measure only how many times
over each side can utterly destroy the other, or as Winston Churchill
once said, "Why do we need additional nuclear weapons just to make
the rubble balance?" We do not need to accumulate "bargaining chips"
which in fact make negotiations on arms control more difficult by
fostering responsive programs by the Soviets and creating vested con-
stituencies on each side for the preservation of weapons. We may
need to offer the President a greater range of horrible choices should
nuclear war occur; we do not need the missile accuracies or other
technology which might give our opponents cause to fear that we were
seeking the choice of a first strike.
If we proceed from these goals, both positive and negative, and
not from the habits of the past or the pressures of bureaucratic and
service interests, it is clear that substantial cuts can be made in
our defense budget and in our forces, while fully meeting our real
national security needs.
I do not favor that the kind of cuts we need be made precipitate-
ly all in one year. Smaller reductions spread over a period of years
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would have less impact on our domestic economy, upon employment in
defense industries, and upon the attitude of other countries.
However, I do believe that far from a $7 billion real increase
in defense spending, we should begin in fiscal 1975 -- that's the
year that starts this coming June, a process of cutting back on real
defense expenditures. I have proposed before annual cuts of about
8% billion, to stabilize at a budget of around $70 billion in four
years -- all stated in terms of constant 1974 purchasing power. In
this period, therefore, under the plan I recommended, we would, in
round numbers, have instead of a current budget of some $95 billion --
likely to grow in the future -- have a budget stabilized by 1979 at
a figure of about $70 billion.
This is not the occasion, nor have I the time this evening, to
present in detail the specific cuts to reach this objective. I can
indicate some general areas in which changes should be made.
The substantial ground and air forces earmarked for Asian con-
tingencies can be cut back sharply or eliminated, to reflect the
tragically hard-learned lesson that we should not and need not fight
land wars in Asia.
We should start bringing some troops back from Europe now.
Bringing our NATO forces up to date gradually and in close consul-
tation with our allies will not, as is so often claimed, unbalance
the deterrent in Europe, destroy the alliance, or foredoom arm
control possibilities in Europe.
In our strategic nuclear and our conventional weapons, in our
tanks, in our airplanes, in our missiles, and ships, we must put a
stop to the technologically-driven process of buying systems which
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MR. CLIP CRD: con .
are inordinately complex and expensive, and which represent little
if any real advance in terms of real combat capability over existing
systems, or over more combat wise alternatives. And we must deter-
mine the design of such forces, and their numbers, with a view to
the most likely and not the most remote contingencies.
We must make more efficient use of military manpower, both uni-
formed and civilian. Some 55 percent of the defense dollar now goes
for pay and allowances for personnel. This huge part of the defense
budget --- like the massive support costs area generally -- has only
recently been subjected to intense public analysis. Those analyses
demonstrate that very significant cuts can readily be made.
I emphasize that such cuts will leave us with a military estab-
lishment fully adequate for our own defense, for meeting our commit-
ments to our allies, and for providing the necessary underpinning
for our diplomacy. Indeed, by reducing the costs to a level we can
sustain, they will strengthen our economy and the overall confidence
and unity of our society, and with that they will increase our true
national security.
For the debate is not between proponents of military strength
and advocates of deliberate weakness, but over what military posture
will give us the strength we need at a price we can afford.
Let me urge you to take part in this debate. It is our younger
citizens who have the greatest stake in the determination of these
questions. The decisions made now will have an impact on your
entire life.
Get in the struggle. A quote that I find inspiring let me
pass on to you. It was uttered by President Theodore Roosevelt and
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I think it might very well apply today particularly to our younger
people :
It is not the critic who counts; not the man
who points out how the strong man stumbled,
or where the doer of deeds could have done
better. The credit belongs to the man who
is actually in the arena; whose face is
marred by dust and sweat and blood; who
strives valiantly; who errs and comes short
again and again; who knows the great en-
thusiasms, the great devotions and spends
himself in a worthy cause, who at the best
knows in the end the triumphs of high
achievement; and who at the worst, if he
fails, at least fails while daring great-
ly; so that his place shall never be with
those cold and timid souls who know neither
defeat nor victory.
Thank you very much.
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PROF. KI KPATRICK :
And now we come to our panel. Each of the panel members first
will be given an opportunity to comment on Mr. Clifford's remarks or
to express their own views regarding defense policy.
In the area of defense studies, there are those whom we regard
as defense intellectuals, military intellectuals. This is not al-
together a welcome designation because to the military they are in-
tellectuals and to the intellectuals they are military. However, I
think that we can say tonight that we have truly a man who deserves
that recognition. He is Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, graduate of
the U.S. Naval Academy, a Rhodes Scholar, and the youngest man ever
to become President of the Naval War College. In some parts of
Newport, you might hear a discussion of what is called the "Turner
Revolution" because he has truly changed the Naval War College in
many very important respects. Naval officers at the War College now
read about 1,000 pages of texts a week; have three hour seminars and
take examinations. I'm sure there are many in the Navy and the other
services who attend the War College that might not find this totally
welcome. In any event, it has been a change of rather strildng di-
mensions. It's a great pleasure to welcome to this stage, Vice-
Admiral Stanfield Turner.
ADM. TURNER:
Thank you, Professor Kirkpatrick. Good evening everybody. Mr.
Clifford's remarks are certainly well balanced, thought-provoking
and a fine basis for our discussion tonight. As I understand it, he
is making two basic points. First, that we in the military have to
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ADM. TURNER.: cont'd.
review our missions or purposes in light of the changing environment
and that in his view, we can meet those purposes with fewer resources.
I agree with you, sir on both points. On the first, let me assure
you however that much thought and effort has gone and is going into
the adaptations of our military missions to the changing world en-
vironment. We in the military are very much aware that the incipient
detente with the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic must
and should have an impact on military policy. We are, for instance,
actively participating in the government's preparations for the stra-
tegic arms limitations talks and for the discussions on mutual and
balanced force reductions in Europe. On the Navy side, we have al-
ready negotiated and signed an agreement with the Soviet Navy to pre-
vent incidents at sea.
On the second point, that we might be able to do our missions
with fewer resources, I agree to the extent that that is precisely
what we are doing today. The resources available to the Defense
Department are less today than they were prior to Vietnam. Now,
Ni. Clifford cited some budget figures to the contrary but he care-
fully noted that those were not actual budget figures but adaptations
of them. And I fully agree that all budget figures require inter-
pretation. I have a chart here that I'd. like to use to share with
you the actual budget figures over the past decade because I think
we need a common point for our discussion and these figures clearly
show the rising costs of defense that Mr. Clifford has portrayed
(Fig. 1). But there are two interpretations on these figures. Note
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ADM. TURNER: cont'd.
that the rise from 197 to 1975 is a dotted line. That rise will
only occur if the Congress passes the amount of funds the President
has requested for the Defense Budget of 1975. That issue is still
in doubt. That rise may or may not take place. Secondly, this en-
tire chart is misleading. Yes, it's misleading as were all the
figures you've had cited to you so far tonight. It's misleading
because these figures all assume that the dollar is worth as much
today as it was in 1964. There's no one in this room who believes
he can purchase as much today with a dollar as he could 10 years
ago. And that's just as true for a defense dollar as it is for your
personal dollar. This next chart (Fig. 2) takes these same figures,
removes inflation, and shows constant dollars. You can see there
was a large jump of real spending for Vietnam, but that is long
behind us. It tapered off some time ago, and today we are out here
just about where we were prior to Vietnam, and even that assumes
that the President's budget is passed.
Now, beyond that there are two other things that make this
money not as valuable as back in 1964. We have two charges against
the Department of Defense today that we did not have in '64 -- the
first is the cost of prior wars and military readiness. The cost
of military retirement in this ten-year period has gone up by
$5 billion dollars. The second is that today we must pay for what
used to be a free good or a subsidy, principally the draft. Today
we must compete in the marketplace for our manpower, and our man-
power costs have gone up in this period by $20 billion dollars.
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Over and beyond these statistics the real proof that our pur-
chasing power has not gone up is the marked decline in military
forces and capability. Again, Mr. Clifford cited some instances
where our forces have increased in the last ten years. Those, in
my view, are questionable cases. They were the strategic missile
forces and the nuclear powered submarine forces; but, ten years ago
those were brand new weapon systems. We had none of them. We were
building up from scratch. They had to go up. The real facts are
that while they were going up, the total submarine force for in-
stance, dropped by 33 percent. The total aircraft carrier force
dropped by 40 percent. The total ships of the Navy dropped by
45 percent. But let's leave weapon systems aside because they are
controversial and difficult to comprehend.
Military manpower must be some index of military strength and
here is what happens in that field (Fig. 3). We are today 22 per-
cent below where we were in manpower in' 1961. Even so, Mr. Clifford
suggests that a $70 billion dollar budget would be acceptable today,
and that's a perfectly reasonable suggestion. There's no reason
that we necessarily must have the same military strength in 1975
that we had in '614. But let's look for a moment at what the impact
would be of going today to a $70 billion dollar budget. Mr.
Clifford said that was Q70 billion dollars fiscal '714 purchasing
power.
Let's look at the 19714 defense budget to see what it would
mean. It was an I`?8 7 billion dollar budget divided almost equally
between people and other things (Fig. 11). Now if we're going to
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Fig. l
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET TRENDS
(BILLIONS OF CURRENT $-TOA)
68 71
FISCAL YEARS
Fig. 3
MILITARY MANPOWER
Fig. 2
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET TRENDS
(BILLIONS OF CONSTANT FY 1975 $-TOA)
BILLIONS
$ I30 1
120
Fig. 4
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET
FISCAL YEAR 1974
(BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
0 i I I
1964 1968 1973 1975
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take that to $70 billion we have to find 917 billion to remove from
the budget. If we take 17 out of people we must remove about
1,200,000 people from the military. That's the equivalent of the
entire U.S. Navy and the entire U.S. Air Force. If we take it out
of the other things we would have to cut our weapon systems about
in half. We would all like to spend less for defense, to spend less
for our federal budget and I would welcome the day that we could
have a $70 billion dollar defense budget just as much as Mr. Clifford.
The question is what would we cut to get there? What military capa-
bilities that we have today are you willing to forego?
Today the military world is still bi-polar. There's us and the
Soviet Union. We are in a real sense of balance. This is not just
an artificial thing like counting missiles, airplanes and ships.
This is real and is reflected in perceptions: our perception of
the Soviets; the Soviet's perception of us; the perception of other
nations of both of us. Any precipitate or careless change in the
visible power on our side of this balance could destroy the great
progress we have made recently towards a detente. It would be one
thing if we shifted that balance downward by mutual agreement. It
would be quite another if we should unilaterally tip that balance
off-center. If we did that I personally believe that we would
jeopardize the steps that have been made and lie ahead of us to
be made to ease the tensions in this world. Thank you.
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PRCF. KIRKPATRICK z
Thank you Admiral Turner. Our second panelist is a scientist.
He has had a distinguished career in both the academic world and in
government. Since leaving the government a few years back, he has
devoted himself to writing about the field which he knows best, that
is, the field of missile warfare generally in the arms control area,
having been in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. It is a real
pleasure to welcome an old friend and colleague, Dr. Herbert Scoville,
Jr.
DR. SCOPILI s
Thank you Professor Kirkpatrick. I'd just like to start off
fraan what Admiral Turner was talking about when he referred to the
fact that he was using actual budget numbers. I believe that secre-
tary Clifford also was using actual figures. He just was interpret-
ing the actual figures slightly differently from the way that the
Administration would like to present them. However, I will go one
step further and I will even use actual figures which the Adndnistra_
tion has put out without even trying to interpret them. I would like
to refer to a specific field which happens to be a field which I an
particularly interested in because I think it is the most dangerous
area of military security; that is the strategic weapons area.
Now two years ago we had had an agreement with the Russians
which guaranteed the state of mutual deterrence to avoid nuclear war.
President Nixon stated this was the greatest agreement in the nuclear
area that we had ever had to date, and I am perfectly prepared to
agree with him on that conclusion. On the other hand,' in those two
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DR. SCOVILLE: cont'd.
years, what have we done as a result of that agreement? What we have
done is we have continued to increase our nuclear strategic arsenals
at an alarmingly fast rate. We have added to our stockpile of nu-
clear warheads at the rate of more than three every single day.
But to get to the budget figures, actually we are also sending
more dollars each year now than we ever did before these so-called
SALT agreements were reached in 1972. This year by the Administra-
tion's own figures, we are increasing our budget for new strategic
weapons by more than 700 million dollars and this increase is far
greater than can be accounted for by inflation. This is still a
major increase even on a constant dollar basis.
But perhaps there is one other thing this year which is even
worse. That is, we have just agreed in SALT that our basic strategic
posture should be a posture of mutual deterrence in which nuclear war
is avoided by the fact that the risks of starting nuclear war were so
horrible that nobody would seriously contemplate it. This is not a
very happy situation but it is about the only one you can have when
nuclear weapons create such untold damage. And this mutual deter-
rence was essentially legislated by the ABN treaty agreed to in
Moscow in 1972. Since we have now guaranteed deterrence we have no
further excuse for buying more weapons in order to improve that de-
terrent. But what do we do? We come up with a new strategic posture.
And the new strategic posture is that we must now acquire weapons
which can threaten the deterrent of the other side.
Now I would say that this is an extremely dangerous move we
are making. In terms of dollars this year this program does not
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DR. SCOPILIE: cont'd.
involve a great deal of money, as defense budgets go something around
$200 to $250 million for research and development. But these weapons
if we actually put them into our arsenals in coming years can cost
5 or 10 billions of dollars depending on how far we go. But even worse
than the cost -- I'd be willing to spend necessary money -- this ex-
penditure decreases our security when it gives our land-based ICBM
missiles a capability of attacking and destroying the Russian deter-
rent. What we are doing is making our ICBMS very tempting targets
to the Soviet Union. We are providing great incentives to the Soviet
Union to attack these missiles because if they attack them first then
they will have a tremendous advantage; on the other hand if we are
allowed to shoot first, then we would have the advantage. This is a
very dangerous situation -- these weapons are increasing the risk
that we will all be incinerated in a nuclear war. So it's not just
dollars, it's the real danger that worries me.
Moving on to the dollars; I can't resist the temptation because
the dollars are so shocking also. Since SALT I, not only have we
been building more weapons, we've been building all kinds of new
weapons. And the classic example of where we are proposing to
spend very large sums of money is the so-called Trident submarine.
Now I know the Trident submarine is perhaps a bit of a difficult
problem in this locality, but I think that one might as well face
up to the issue. The Trident submarine program is a fiscal, tech-
nical, and military disaster. It not'only costs billions of dollars,
the present estimate is 1132 billion dollars for the first ten
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DR. SCOVILLE : cont' d.
submarines, but it is technically a very bad solution if at some time
we need a new submarine to replace our presently invulnerable sub-
marine rdssile forces. What we are doing is we are putting more of
our missiles in a smaller number of submarines and thereby increasing
in the long run the vulnerability of this ke-ir element in our deter-
rent forces.
Furthermore, because this submarine is so big and so expensive,
tre can only afford one base. For political reasons which I will not
discuss here, we decided to put that one base in the state of
Washington. As a consequence, after spending $13 billion dollars
and maybe eventually $15 billion dollars, we will end up with a sub-
-marine fleet which can only operate in the Pacific. And this is the
worst ocean in the world if we're going to have to operate a sub-
marine force. So what are we doing? We are only increasing our
vulnerability after spending billions of dollars.
At last I have to say something nice about the present defense
budget because I always think you're vulnerable if you don't say any-
thing good. I'm very pleased to find that in this year's defense
budget there is a $$20 million dollar item for an alternative to the
Trident submarine. This is a smaller submarine that has fewer mis-
siles in each ship. Therefore it decreases the vulnerability of
the -fleet as a whole and will permit these submarines to operate in
the Atlantic as -Tell as the Pacific. It could perhaps even be based
i-: the Ievrreort area. So at last we see at least a ray of sanity in
this program. But unfortunately, coupled with a paltry $20 million
icli,ars for this smaller submarine, which is an infinitely better
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DR. SCOVILLE: conttd.
solution than the Trident, we have more than two billion dollars for
the Trident submarine in the budget. If Admiral Turner says we can't
afford to cut back funds because we need them for our security, I
submit we can save several billions of dollars this year and many
billions in the future by stopping such weapons programs as the
Trident submarine.
PROF. KIRKPATRICK:
A moderator of a program like this always starts to wonder as
the program progresses as to-whether he is going to have controversy.
There is little interest unless there's a bit of controversy. I
think we have the basic flame flickering at this point.
Our third panelist is a noted scholar in the field of defense
studies. He has served in Washington but he has been resident more
frequently of Hanover, New Hampshire. I think all of us should be
grateful tonight for one especial reason, Larry Radway interrupted
a determination to walk across the entire state of New Hampshire and
speak at every town and hamlet on behalf of his candidacy for the
United States Senate so it is a pleasure to welcome you here, Dr.
Laurence Radway.
Thank you. Thank you very much. I've been waiting to see maybe
if the commentators were going to a 2-2 tie up here waiting for our
last man to get on board. In case there is any doubt, let me say at
the outset that my cu-n remarks assume the general validity of Nr.
Cliffordts argument without necessarily embracing the particular
dollar figures he has used and go on to a related, but to me very
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DR. RADWAY: contd.
important, point which also relates to the introduction that was given
here - that is, the state of mind of the American people as I see it
on some of these points at present. I'm a teacher also and you just
have to forgive me if I refer at this point to a place in Plato's
Republic where wise men are discussing the nature of justice and
eventually one of them says, "Well, let's see what the people in
the streets say about the subject." And I'm very mach interested
in what the opinion on the street is. And my perspective here is
not that of a guy who's had a major executive office, but really of
a political figure who has been walking around talking to maybe
2,000 people in the last couple of months. And that, I think, sug-
gests the importance of saying something about the framework of
opinion within which these issues we are talking about tonight are
going to be discussed and debated by public opinion at large. I
want to draw one inference from that framework of opinion.
Mr. Clifford said that the world has changed. My notes say:
"The war is over." I had in two months not a single question, not
a single comment on the foreign relations of the United States, the
national security of the United States, or the military budget from
any person I met, not even about the Middle East, although that
crisis was very much on our minds at the time. What people are
concerned with are the domestic issues. They're concerned with
prices, with the supermarket, with what's going on at the gas pump.
We're here immersed in the politics of the check-out counter rather
than in world politics. So, there is silence, I think, among the
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DR. RADWAY: cont'd.
general public on the issues which to us seem so terribly important
here tonight.
I believe this silence masks a fundamental underlying pessimism
in the public, a general agreement that perhaps American power is
fated to decline at least in the near future vis-a-vis Soviet power,
that Soviet power is on the whole slated to increase, a pessimism
about allies and about neutrals in the sense that they' re deemed in-
creasingly to be unworthy of American assistance, American aid. This
pessimism, in contrast to the pessimism of twenty years ago, is not
the occasion for alarm, for a sense of crisis, or a desire to spring
into a posture of confrontation with rivals. The threshold of inter-
vention is markedly higher than it has been in the past. I think
opinion on issues such as the bombing of Cambodia and Laos runs about
2 to 1 against it principally because of the concern or fear that
somehow we will be drawn back into the morass. I think most people
would be prepared to cut our commitments to NATO and probably still
fewer support the maintenance of our forces in Asia. At the same
time, however, I think there is substantial support for the present
level of defense expenditures and that that support is reasonably
stable. It changes from time to time, but let me put it this way,
that the growing reluctance as I sense it to use a big stick is not
accompanied by a comparably growing reluctance to whittle the stick
There is still pride in national power; there's satisfaction
in being number one. "We're number one, we're number one." You
hear it in the basketball courts. You see it in public opinion.
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DR. RADWAY : coat' d.
There's concern about becoming number two. There is a machismo ele-
ment in world politics just'as there is in ward politics. I find
this particularly strong and this brings me really to the point I
want to make - among working people in our country. I find it a
little less strong among the college educated and among professional
people and I find a remarkable and significant parallel here with a
structure of public opinion in the late 1930's before we got into the
second World War. When middle America was isolationist, middle
America was nationalist, at least as measured, say, by the leadership
of the American Legion and such organizations, it was supportive of a
somewhat higher level of military expenditure.
Well, what inference do I draw from this? I think that it leaves
me, or anybody with the premises I share, a highly important job for
the opinion leaders of the United States. If they believe as I do
that the nature of the world, the nature of what the military calls
a "threat" has indeed altered and that this country should rely more
on diplomatic and economic instruments of policy than on military
(and particularly, unilateral military) instruments, they're going
to have to campaign vigorously. They're going to have to maintain
a vigorous and sustained educational effort, in alliance frequently
with fiscal conservatives, in an effort to keep our level of defense
expenditure and our defense budget under control. Thank you.
PRC? KIRKPATRICK:
Perhaps I should anticipate a question here. Was Prof. Radway
out yesterday? Yes, he was out yesterday walking all day, stopping
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only periodically to have his staff dry him out,
Our fourth panelist is a man who needs no introduction to this
audience. He is batting in the clean-up position as one would call
it in baseball. He has had experience both at the state level and
as Secretary of the Navy of the United States. It's a great pleasure
to welcome John Chafee to our stage.
}4R. CHAFEE :
Thank you very much, Professor Kirkpatrick. First, I'd just
like to say a word of encouragement to Professor Radway. I wish him
good luck and in rr present mood I'm very supportive of outs who want
to get in - that is, on the state level. Secondly, I'd just like to
mention a story Jim Farley used to tell when he was Democratic
National Chairman, about spending on political campaigns. He said
that he was absolutely convinced that half the money he spent in
political campaigns was wasted. The only trouble was he never knew
which half. And to a degree that applies to, I presume, military
spending although I'd hate to think that it was one half.
Before we get into this too deep, I'd like to just mention
something about what we're talking about. Frequently there is talk
about "the Pentagon wants to spend." I really think it has to be
broadened to: "the nation wants to spend" because our representatives
in Congress vote on the military budget. I certainly had the experi-
ence while I was there in the Navy Department of finding that fre-
quently Congress would increase our spending.
For example, Mr. Clifford mentioned nuclear submarines. We went
up with a class of submarines which Congress encouraged us on,the
688 class. And the first year I was there we asked for two and
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MR. CHAYEE: contd.
Congress gave us three; so the next year we asked for three and
Congress gave us four; so the next year we asked for four and Congress
gave us five; and they've accepted nothing but five ever since. It's
not only Congress that has an input into the defense budget but other
departments of government do. For instance, it's the State Depart-
ment that insists that the U.S. have always two aircraft carriers in
the Mediterranean. The Navy didn't want that. We felt that was
locking us in.
Mr. Clifford's remarks, it seems to me, made two assumptions or
two points. One, that the world has changed for the better for the
U.S. and secondly, that U.S. defense policy, and particularly, the
U.S. defense budget, hasn't changed. Now it is true that there's
this growing detente with Russia, yet what has happened say in just
looking at the ten-year period that Admiral Turner referred to? At
the start of that ten-year period I think there is no question but
what the United States had nuclear superiority. They had for ex-
ample, a Navy that was unquestioned in its supremacy over the Soviets.
iTow, ten years later, I don't think anyone would say the U.S. has
nuclear superiority, taking all factors into account. And certainly
anybody who suggests that the U.S. Navy was superior in all facets
to the Soviet Navy would be making a rash statement. And so, things
have changed but in those ten years Russia, the Soviets, have grown
incredibly stronger in the particular areas of concern to this
panel and to this nation - mainly in nuclear matters and in naval
matters. Certainly their land strength has not decreased. Now
sure; the Indo-China War is over, but that was a disaster from the
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MR. CHAFEE: contd.
military preparedness point of view of our armed forces.
Just to give you a little illustration - in the last ten years
there hasn't been a new destroyer join the U.S. Navy, not a single
new destroyer - because our resources were going into that war.
There hasn't been a new carrier join the U.S. Navy in six years.
What I'm saying in connection with the U.S. Navy applies to the
other armed forces as well. So there's a tremendous amount of
catching up, if you would, to improve our weapons systems to make
them equal or close to what the Soviets have achieved in these years
of relative peace for them. Now I think there is a tremendous
factor that has improved and that is namely as far as we're con-
cerned the Soviet-Chinese bloc doesn't exist the way it did ten
years ago, but at the same time I think another factor that's come
into the equation has been the growing importance of other nations
to the United States. We've always been dependent on other nations
and had concern, but I think the fact that our imports of strategic
materials, particularly oil, are so much greater than they were ten
years ago, that it gives us concern far more for the rest of the
world, particularly say the Persian Gulf area, than was true ten
years ago. And I don't think anybody would suggest that now having
a fortressed America, that is, just defending the United States,
would be adequate for us.
But the question we have as we look at what's taken place, is
why do the Soviets behave the way they do? It's been mentioned that
the United States has gone ahead with weapons systems, development
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I.M. CHAFEE: contd.
of nuclear warheads, but in just the past year, the Soviets alone
have tested four different intercontinental ballistic missiles.
That's a tremendous achievement but it's a frightening one as far
as we're concerned.
Now the second point that Kr. Clifford made, has the United
States defense budget changed? And in numbers it certainly has.
And Admiral Turner mentioned these but I don't think it sinks through
unless we see it happen quite close up. The manpower as we mentioned
in the military forces in the past ten years, and we're taking ten
years because it was prior to the Vietnam buildup, has decreased for
the military services by 20 percent. But the curious thing is that
while that manpower has gone down 20 percent, it costs us twice as
much to pay for then and these were shown in the chart. And the
cost of the all-volunteer force is tremendously expensive and frank-
ly we haven't seen the end, because of the inducements we're having
to offer cash-rise, bonuses and so forth. Frankly, in some of the
services, we have not been able to achieve the force levels that
are sought for.
Another factor, I think, we've talked about real dollars and
1975 dollars but one way of looking, I think, is significant, is
looking at the federal budget -- how much of this piece of pie is
the Defense Department taking? Ten years ago, the Defense Depart-
mnt was taking t2% of this piece of pie and now they're taking
27% - still a substantial slice but still it's some 35% less of the
total federal budget than was taking place ten years ago. So in
comparison to what's taking place within the entire federal spending,
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the defense has certainly gone down. As part of the Gross National
Product which is another indicator that is significant I believe,
defense is taking 29% less.
Now, of course, you always get the question, "How much is
enough?" Well, I don't Imo r if anybody has the ability to say how
much is enough. As nuclear parity has been achieved over the past
ten years, it.. I believe, has placed a greater reliance on the non-
nuclear forces, what is called in the trade the "conventional
forces," that is, the regular ships, the regular aircraft, the men
in the armed services, military and army air force and so forth;
because no one wants to be the first to start a nuclear war. And so
if there are threats and pushes and shoves, it seems to me we've got
to have another way of meeting it other than somebody pushing a
button with a nuclear weapon. The way to do that of course is with
the conventional forces to the extent to which we can afford them.
The whole thrust of the U.S. policy is, as I see it, to deter
the Soviets, to discourage them from making a move that is rash;
for them to understand we've got this ability as well as for us to
understand it. For the last twenty-five years, we have, in this
country, been able to achieve through our military farces, an un-
easy peace throughout the world. Certainly, we all hope that through
the agreements that are being reached, through the mutual force re-
ductions that are being talked about in Europe, through the SALT
talks, we can achieve a mutual reduction. As has been pointed out
we've taken reductions in this country whereas such has not been
true for the Soviets. And there is a lag in development of weapons
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MR. CHAFES: cont'd.
systems. But just a little example - I think all the U.S. forces
were quite shaken by the effectiveness of the Soviet surface-to-air
missiles which were not only deployed around Hanoi, which is a very
concentrated area, but were used in the Yom Kippur War by the
Egyptians. I think the effectiveness of those surface to air missiles
really took the U.S. by surprise.
And so it isn't enough to think that we're big and strong and
we've got this deep-rooted technology that is superior to what any-
body else has and that somehow we can grit it through and if the
crunch canes, we'll come up with something better. In this modern
world, there isn't time enough to come up with something better
quickly, and the Soviets have shown that they're very skillful and
intelligent and they've got great capacity and are willing to put
the money into these weapons systems. It seems to me that we've
achieved these reductions. We're taking a smaller part of the nation-
al budget, we've come down and I think the course we're on is the
right one.
PROF. KIRKPATRICK:
Before we open the discussion up to the audience, we would like
to have Mr. Clifford respond to the remarks made by the panelists.
Mr. Clifford.
MR. CLIFFCRD :
last October, Admiral Turner and I appeared on a program in
Washington called Pacem In Terras. Admiral Turner had his turn just
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MR. CLIFFORD: cont'd.
before another panelist, and did such a superb job that he took away
most of the arguments that that panelist had in mind so the panelist
told a little story. He said a man was sitting at the dinner table
as a guest and turned to his right to his dinner partner and said,
"I understand your name is Post." And she said, "Yes." He said,
"Is it Miss Emily Post?" and she said, "Yes," and she said, "Why do
you ask?" "Because," he said, "You've just eaten my salad."
I have a major point to make, and I'll make it as simply as I
can because we can become so complex that we could empty the hall in
a hurry. Recently we had very strained relations with the Soviet
Union. Also, we had no knowledge of where Red China was heading and
we were engaged in a war in Vietnam. Now all three of those equations
have changed. We're not in the War anymore with our military forces.
We have established a detente with Red China which seems to be work-
ing very effectively. Our whole relationship with the Soviet Union
has been altered. Yet the simple fact is that, from the time we've
had all those three problems until now, instead of our budget going
down our budget has gone up very substantially. I cannot understand
it. It doesn't make any sense to me.
Now the figures are subject to some different interpretations.
I will give you my figures and Admiral Turner is certainly equipped
to give his. The way I have analyzed the present figures, for fiscal
1974 I believe that our budget was 82 billion dollars. I believe
that our budget for 1975 is 95 billion. Now one reason why there
is some difference is that certain items that should properly be in
the f75 budget have been transferred by the Defense Department to
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the '74 budget. They're what is known as supplementals and as you
get near the end of the year then the Department says, "well we didn't
ask for enough so here are some supplemental requests for appropria-
tion." They are including some of those items in '714 when they prop-
erly belong in '75. So under my interpretation I think the proper
figure for '714 was 82 billion. I believe '75 is 95 billion approximate-
ly. Now out of that, I will concede 512 billion for inflation. That to
my way of thinking still leaves approximately 72 billion more dollars
than we're asking for in '75 than we did in 19714, although we're out
of the war and our relationship with Red China and Russia has im-
proved substantially.
Now it would be splendid if, whatever the Joint Chiefs and the
Secretary of Defense and the Congressional committees wanted for de-
fense we could give them. How comforting it would be just to say
whatever you want we'll give you because then we all will be com-
fortable. We can't do that. Right now every one of us knows the
economic problem our country has. We're having the worst inflation
that we can remember in our lifetime. The dollar is going down in
value steadily. It's almost a joke now, that old expression I used
as a boy, "sound as a dollar." And we have a real energy problem.
So I say we don't have the funds at this time to afford this lavish
expenditure on defense. I believe we've got to cut it every single
place that we can cut it. If there's money in the defense budget
which Secretary Schlesinger says there is, to prime the pump of the
economy, I'd get it out of there just as quickly as I could. You
put money in a tank, you put money in a piece of artillary, you put
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MR. CLIFFORD: conttd.
money in a missile, you get no benefit from it at all. It's a loss.
You put money in a house, you put money in a lunch, you put money
in an education, then you get a real return from it. For that reason
I believe we must pare this budget down to the bone.
Another quick comment, Dr. Scoville said that as we go on, we're
creating three new nuclear weapons a day in this country. Well,
that's a lot. You.figure out how many days in a year there are,
Saturdays and Sundays included, and we're creating three a day. Now
why do we do this? Again, I cannot understand that.
I've read a lot about what our atomic scientists say it would
take in missiles to subdue the Soviet Union. Some scientists say
that it would take ten of our hydrogen bombs, which as you may know
may be a thousand times stronger than the bomb that was dropped at
Hiroshima. Ten of those, some scientists say would do the job.
Others say, "no, they're wrong." Some groups have estimated that
as high as 400 would do the job. The highest I have read, is a
thousand. Some scientists say a thousand hydrogen bombs falling
on the Soviet Union, and you have just a cinder left.
All right, suppose we take the figure of a thousand. We have
over 7,000 today already, and we're getting more all the time. The
sole purpose of Trident and the B-i bomber is to deliver more nuclear
weapons against the Soviet Union. I don't know what Admiral Turner
thinks about Admiral La Roque, but I heard Admiral La Roque say,
that if all of our present plans for the development of nuclear
weapons are to go through to their ultimate realization - that in-
cludes Trident, B-l, exchanging Poseiden, all of those - he says we' 11
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MR. CLIFF(): cunt' d.
have 18,000 nuclear weapons. Now I say why? I think we have enough
today. We are ahead of the Soviet Union. Governor Chafee says we
were much farther ahead ten years ago. Thatts right and what a marvel-
ous comfort it was to be that far ahead, but it's unrealistic to think
that we can stay that far ahead. Suppose the Soviet Union pulls up
even with us. All right, we can destroy them and they can destroy us.
But we're still infinitely ahead of them and as far as I can tell from
the figures, it looks to me like weere getting a little farther ahead
all the time. I'd like to stop that.
I'd like the Congress to examine every single item in the 1975
budget and say we can't afford this, we can't afford that, and I'd
like to bring it down.
Now-, my last point, I don't suggest bringing our budget sudden-
ly down to $70 billion. So that Admiral Turner might understand my
point, I'd like to get it from where it is today back down to
70 billion in five years. I'd like to take off about four billion
a year, and get it down to about 70 billion and keep it there. That
I think would be realistic in the light of the situation in the
world today. Thank you.
PROF. KIRKPATRICK:
Thank you, M?r. Clifford. We have just five minutes until the
audience gets its chance to ask any questions. This panel was of-
fered the opportunity to make five-minute opening statements. They
averaged ten minutes apiece. Who would like a minute? Would any
of the panel like a minute at this point to comment? If not, the
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first question from the audience comes from the Honorable Thomas
Corcoran, a Presidential adviser and a distinguished graduate of
Brown University. I might just say that last year, that is a year
ago last June, Mr. Corcoran was the Grand Marshal of the parade on
MR. CCRCCCRAN
I don't understand, and yet I respect all the panelists. They
are great admiration of mine but I don't understand all these figures.
I never did understand the new math. But, you know, I have a little
worry about the fundamental assumption that the world has changed.
At the risk of making a speech, my first experience in international
affairs was with a great under-secretary of state named Cotton to
whom I was a law clerk in Washington. He went down to try to keep
the British from letting the Japanese invade Manchuria. It was the
time of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Many assumed that with these cove-
nants that were made there would be no war. Now Cotton said to me
after that,, and I say this in no derogation of my profession, and
with no aspersions to my very much admired friend and colleague,
Clark Clifford,he said, "You know Corcoran, no lawyer should ever be
Secretary of State, or make any decisions about international poli-
tics, because an American lawyer thinks that once you have a contract
and the deal made, it will be enforced or the guy who doesn't agree
with it will go to jail. There never was an international treaty
from here to kingdom come that ever was enforced or that ever will
be enforceable or that you can rely upon."
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MR. CCRCORAN: contd.
Now when I hear that we now have a changed world in which we
are getting to detente with Russia and China, I think that may have
been the situation six months ago. There are strange things that
have happened since that time that make you wonder whether we believe
in detente and believing we hope, because we want to maintain the
fact, whether the Russians believe in detente or whether the Chinese
believe in detente. Now just see where our friend Mr. Kissinger's
world is right now. The nice situation that we had with the Chou
faction in China is beginning to be under suspicion. If there were
any tell-tale signs to make you wonder, it's that David Bruce was
brought back from Peking, that nobody's been put in his place despite
the story they tell you in Washington, that he was brought back to
fix the North Atlantic Alliance. And as far as the Russians are con-
cerned, it seems that detente depends completely on economic loans
from the export-import bank. I am sure the Congress is not going to
give them concessions. The present cessation of hostile attitudes
toward us which has characterized the Soviets for so many years is
based, as is the Chinese thing based, on the fact that for a moment
they can drop their ideological designs against us and the rest of
the free world for the sake of getting a crack free at our American
technology. Now, may I say, doubting the fundamental assumption
of this whole discussion, may I ask Admiral Turner, "Are the
Soviets acting in the ways that they are, building up their mili-
tary business (and the ruble doesn't cost as much as the dollar
because they draft their men and they order their economy):
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MR. CORCORAN: contd.
Are Soviets and the Chinese acting militarily, the way they're re-
building up their budgets and their strengths, in such a way that
makes you believe that we may assume that the world has changed with
detente?
PRCF. KIRKPATRICK:
Thank you, Mr. Corcoran. Admiral Turner.
ADM. TURNER:
Mr. Corcoran, we certainly see no sign of any slackening of the
Soviet military buildup in any of the fields in which they are moving
very forcefully with new equipment and larger size forces. I think
what you've said is most poignant here. I would suggest that I would
not like to take Mr. Clifford's term of the "effusive cordiality" of
detente because cordiality is rather inexpensive. I would like to
see deeds for detente. And my experience tells me that last October
when the Soviets thought they had us at a disadvantage in the Middle
East, their deeds were to try to take advantage of that. Our ex-
perience a few weeks ago was when the Soviets thought that we were
vulnerable on the oil embargo, with their deeds they encouraged the
oil producing countries to continue that embargo. I would like to
see some deeds in the other direction and I think lastly, that we
should never forget that when you are dealing with a country where
there is a total suppression of freedom of expression you can never
count on any warning of abrupt change on a policy like detente.
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 PROF. KIRKPATRICK:
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Thank you Admiral Turner. Our next comment is by Dr. Scoville.
DR. SCOVILIE:
I think that it is basically false to base your military poli-
cies on the thought that you can count on detente for the indefinite
future. I think we should base our arms policies on our fundamental
security needs, and that applies to our arms controls policies as
well as our arms procurement policies. Now we fortunately do have
ways of checking up on what the Soviets are doing in the major
weapons area. This is a major change from what it was in the early
1960's and 1950's. We do know what the Soviets are doing. In fact,
you see the Secretaries of Defense continuously reporting on Soviet
developments. It is perfectly true that the Russians have been test-
ing four new types of ICBMs. This is not in violation of any treaty.
:]hat they are doing is testing ICBMs with MIRY , the multiple war-
heads that can be aimed at separate targets. These are the same
kinds of weapons we started testing in 1968. Now in 1969, Secre-
tary Laird said they'd already tested MVPs, but now he's admitting
they only started less than a year ago. So what they're doing is
trying to catch up to us. We are also not acting with restraint.
I'm not happy about the Soviet actions but I'm not happy about
our own because while the Russians have been developing new ICBMs,
we have been deploying new ICBMs which add more than three warheads
to our stockpiles every single day. The Poseiden missile we are
deploying is heavier than the Polaris it.replaces. We're putting
these in as fast as we can put them in. Our old Minuteman missiles
are being replaced with new ones, and these are heavier too; yet
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wed ryeea building bigger missiles. Sure, I don't like
the Russians building them but we're doing it too and we have no
security need for all of the ones we're building. At some point
someone's got to blow the whistle. If we keep on going ahead we're
going to be another 5,000 warheads ahead of them in 1980. At the
rate we're going now, we can never expect the Russians to stop. We
can afford to wait because there is absolutely no threat to our de-
terrent; Secretary Schlesinger has repeated this just in the last
couple of weeks.
PROF. KIRKPATRICK:
Thank you. Dr. Hornig.
DR. HORNIG:
Thank you very mucch. I would just like to ask the panel a few
questions. I spent about ten years of my life trying to inquire what
"rationality" meant, with regard to this question of national defense
policy and political theory. And part of my great admiration for
Secretary Clifford comes from the fact that in a decade when much
of the discussion centered around how much it took to settle the
Vietnam affair, he was perceptive enough to perceive that defense
policy did not revolve around how much, but about how national pol-
icy related to the political situation with which we were confronted.
And one of the great triumphs of his regime as Secretary of Defense,
it seemed to me, was that he was able to see clearly a route to dis-
engagement, from a most unhappy situation and this has always seemed
to me a triumph of defense policy.
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DR. HORNIG: conttd.
Now, the question - wetve listened tonight to a discussion which
has to a considerable extent related to how much, but although there
have been some allusions there has not been enough discussion it
seems to me of how it is related to the world of the future. And
for example, I think there are two kinds of defense policy which
have gotten very widely separated in the decade behind us. I think
there is no question that the matter of strategic weapons is a mat-
ter of life and death for all of us. It' s the particular question
over which probably both the Soviet Union and the United States could
destroy each other. We've become preoccupied with things. We have
gone through a decade and a half with each side making conservative
assumptions about what was happening on the other side - constantly
overbuilding to meet threats and the threat was constantly met by
overbuilding on the other side. This is the whole progress of mutual
escalation which has led us into the third situation that has already
been mentioned in which everyone can reduce everyone to cinders.
But the consequence of this is that our nuclear strategic policy
and that of the Soviet Union as well, seems to have very little re-
lation to the ongoing political situation. All one has to ask is
how much did these massive nuclear forces affect our position one
way or another in Vietnam, for example? Or, how did these massive
nuclear forces affect our position or that of our allies or that of
our opponents one way or another in the Middle East? The answer,
of course, is that this has become an esoteric sort of game in which
there are only two players - the Soviet Union and the United States -
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DR. HORNIG: cont'd.
playing for supreme dominance and this is one game and then there is
the whole rest of the politics with which we're concerned. And I
would say that in relation to that policy it has been demonstrated
that nuclear warfare is so out of proportion to the stakes that it
is no use either to the Soviet Union or to the United States. And
therefore a significant part of any discussion of defense policy must
concern itself with what, besides strategic nuclear warfare, is
relevant to the decade ahead of us? Thank you.
PROF. KIRKPATRICK:
Thank you, President Hornig. Do we have other questions from
the floor?
WILLIAM (TRIP) SYMINGTON:
Dr. Hornig, speaking about the nation as a whole and its ability
to handle the war in Vietnam, mentioned something that is of great
interest to we who, as qtr. Clifford mentioned, are concerned with
continuing U.S. expenditures in Southeast Asia. So, I'd like to
ask a question of Admiral Turner and of Mr. Clifford. Could each
of you tell me in your own numbers what percentage of the military
budget for fiscal 174 was spent in any way in Southeast Asia? And,
what you think should be spent in any way in fiscal '75 and Dr.
Hornig's question, what is the relevance of these expenditures to
American defense policy not just in '75 but in the rest of the 70's?
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NR. CLIP 70I D :
Perhaps it will take both Admiral Turner and me to answer that.
My recollection is that in this 1975 budget there is something like
a billion nine for military expenditures in Indo-China -- that would
include South Vietnam and I suppose Laos and Cambodia. Then recent-
ly I've heard that the administration has asked for another $690,000,000
so that would mean in '75, ('74 figures I do not have, sir) but I be-
lieve in 1975 the request is somewhere in the neighborhood of 22 bil-
lion dollars for Indo-China.
Now, I can't understand it. I think that an expenditure of that
magnitude in South Vietnam where a substantial portion of it goes
merely to keep President Thieu in office is a calamity. I don't
believe we're going to get a settlement of the Civil War in Vietnam
until President Thieu leaves office. As long as we continue to sup-
port him I think we're not going to have peace. In January of 1973
we had a cease-fire and a good deal of congratulating went on about
the peace treaty signed in Paris. Keep in mind that in this last
year, in which we were supposed to have peace, 60,000 Vietnamese
have been killed. That's South Vietnamese. So there is no peace
there. And we won't get peace by continuing to pour military funds
into South Vietnam. I wish we would stop it.
A.DM. TURNER :
The military funds that we are pouring into South Vietnam, as
Mr. Clifford says, are in conformance with, and in support of, the
negotiating settlement in Vietnam whereby we are to replace equip-
ment that is worn out on the South Vietnamese side just as it is
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ADM. TURNER: coast' d.
being replaced even more so on the North Vietnamese side. I think
that with the sacrifice those people have made over the years with
our support, we owe it to them to continue this small contribution
to their continued survivability, particularly when they are opposed
by a large influx of equipment and money from the Communist side.
PRCIF. KIR PATRICK:
Questions from the floor?
ANDREW SOUfii( :
I have a relatively simple question. Given the fact that Western
Europe has a population base greater than ours and an industrial base
that is at least the equivalent of ours, Why it is necessary for the
United States to spend so much money in defense of Western Europe?
Specifically, why shouldn't Western Europe be responsible for its
own defense and America responsible for its own continental defense?
Thank you.
ADM. TURNER:
We're not spending a great deal of money on the defense of
Western Europe. We have troops stationed there. It would cost al-
most as much to station them at home. There is a balance of pay-
ments problem. The West German government in particular, off-sets
that balance of payments problem in a large measure and therefore
this is not a major expense to the United States.
MR. Cam:
I'd just like to comment on that too. We're not doing it, I
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MR. CHAF'EE : cont'd.
don't think any Secretary of Defense has ever suggested that we're
doing that in order to do a great favor to the Western European
nations. I think every Secretary of Defense has put as much pres-
sure on them as he could. I see where recently they negotiated an
agreement with the West Germans where they're going to pay a
2.2 billion dollars a year for the maintenance of our forces to help
defer the cost of our forces. Because we're really doing it because
we think it's right for our nation. Everything we do is for our own
good. And it's our feeling that it behooves us to spend what extra
money is involved in order to give them the cohesiveness and the
mortar as it were to get them to stick together in their common de-
fense. It's an investment for our own self interest that every
Secretary of Defense has felt to be a wise one.
PROF. KIRKPATRICK:
I think the point should be made too about defense of Western
Europe that if you take the American forces out of there, there is
a very strong likelihood that NATO might disintegrate, because of
the very psychological factor that the United States is not there.
So I think that this deserves consideration. Professor Radway.
PROF. RADWAY:
Yes, I think the original reasons were perhaps largely military
for stationing our forces there but the logic that I have heard in
defense of it more recently has been primarily political - it has to
do with the domestic politics of the two Germanys and so on. And I
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PROF. RADWAY: cont'd.
personally would not be disposed to any kind of abrupt or radical
change in the level of those forces but I think that situation is
evolving and that particularly I think there is a relationship between
our forces there and our position in the Middle East as well. And
when the Middle East is crisis-quiet, the pressure will build up in-
side the United States and should build up inside the United States
for a gradual thinning out of our forces there. And I personally
would like to see that done on a unilateral basis with respect to
our supply or logistic support forces in a kind of Europeanization
of the supply side of NATO that is a sort of counterpart to the con-
cept of Vietnamization of Southeast Asia. And a further thinning
out of our combat forces in tandem with comparable Soviet initiatives
but linked to that, not unilateral.
PR(P. KIRKPATRICK:
Thank you very much. We have less than 10 minutes left. We've
got two questions waiting so both questions and answers brief,
please.
QUESTIONER:
I was drawn here tonight because this was advertised as a sym-
posium of reasonable and intelligent men - the subject of defense
and that disturbed me somewhat deeply, in that 10 years ago, when
I was an undergraduate in Cambridge, there were similar symposiums
held. The people might have been different. The names might have
been McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, but surprisingly the subject matter
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and some of the exact words used were very similar - "land war in
Asia," "cost effective," "economic distribution of forces." Two
years later as an undergraduate and a reasonable white.. Anglo-Saxon
male faced with induction into the draft, I chose the more honor-
able way and became an officer in Mr. Turner's Navy.
Two years later I found myself in Vietnam and there I began to
understand certain things of which I would like to perhaps remind
people of this evening. At that time I began to gain the perception
that all the abstract notions of economics and strategy
PROF. KIRKPATRICK:
Would you come to your point, please?
QUESTIONER : cont'd.
intersected reality with a piece of metal in a man's gut. And I
night offer one example. Some American adviser commuuiicated a
tenuous piece of intelligence to someone and as a result, the boat
on which I was riding at the time was ordered to stand off a small
tree line while an air raid came in. Following the air raid, a
Vietnamese man of indetermi.nant age - it's very difficult to tell -
paddled out to us and occasionally stopped paddling and held a
small object over his head. That object turned out to be his infant
son who was completely burned. His eyes were burned, and the man
in Vietnamese kept saying something and pointing to his son's burned
genitals and the other officer on my boat could only say, "San Loi"
which meant, "excuse me," because we weren't trained to talk to
these people, we were only trained to shoot them. But I don't
think I could have gained this perception without a unique
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QUESTIONER: cont'd.
phenomenon occurring, which occurred here in the United States,
which was that with the kind of clear perception that occurs in the
middle of the night, maybe when a mind is at peace with itself,
people understood that in real human terms, these abstract subjects
that we sit here reasonably listening to tonight, mean only death
and destruction to individual human beings, members of our own so-
ciety, members of other societies in the world. And so I find my-
self disturbed that once again, rooms are filled with people listen-
ing to such "radical" or "revolutionary" excuse me, reasonable dis-
cussion.
PROF. KIRKPATRICK:
Thank you very much. Will you sit down and let us continue with
this, please. We've heard your. statement and I think it's fine.
Thank you. Would you sit down. Mr. Cohen, would you please go ahead
with your question. On behalf of the speaker, he appreciates your
applause.
STEVE CCREN:
Mr. Clifford said earlier that we don't need vested constituencies
of various weapons programs and many authors and scholars have sug-
gested that one of the reasons we were in Vietnam was a result of
mis-information or vested interest. My question is directed to
Governor Chafee and Admiral Turner and it's basically that since
1969 many of the top positions in the defense department which were
previously held by civilians or civilian posts have been filled now
by military officers. Is this a contradiction of civilian control?
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Well, I don't believe the statistics will bear out that state-
ment that many of the top positions are filled by military when they
were filled by civilians before. Certainly, in the experience I had
there, I didn't find that to be true. You still have your civilian
people, at the top and in all the appointed positions. From what I
saw I couldn't agree with your statement, whether Mr. Clifford found
that too I don't know.
MR. CLIFFORD:
I can see no threat or challenge to civilian control of the
military at this time because we believe fully in civilian control.
PRClF. KIRKPATRICK:
I think the question that Mr. Cohen has proposed is the fact that
40 to 50 percent of the deputy assistant secretaries of defense are
now military. Those studying the trends in the defense department
are speculating as to how much longer this trend will go with in-
creased militarization of the senior defense posts.
Ladies and gentlemen, I regret that we have reached the end of
our time. I want to just briefly recapitulate as to some of the
comments that have been made. I think first it's necessary to say a
word or two about the young gentleman who had the microphone. He
speaks as though those of us on the platform do not know the reali-
ties of war. Nearly every one of us here have been at war, have
seen men, women and children killed. I experienced something over
100 air raids in London and those killed were just as innocent
civilians as exist elsewhere in the world. We are all very very
concerned about war and one of the main purposes of talking about
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PROF. KIRKPATRICK: contd.
American defense is to talk about how to avoid war. Nobody wants
war. Nobody wants a nuclear war especially: Nobody wants a war
between the Soviet Union and the United States.
Our friend, Mr. Thomas Corcoran expressed the concern that many
people feel about detente and how much reliability one can put on
detente. Mr. Clifford in his opening address and his related com-
ments made it clear that he was concerned too about the adequacy
and the necessity for having adequate defense forces. He was talking
about the immense cost of the weapons that one mentions such as
Trident and one could add F-14,-F-15, B-1 bomber, and a long list
not necessarily all Navy or all Army or all Air Force, which raise
the immensity of these defense expenditures that we are making to-
day. I think again in relationship to the young manss comments,
none of us found the war in Vietnam either appealing, attractive or
necessarily to the honor and the credit of those participating. And
it is with great regret we see that the bloodshed still continues
unabated in a most unfortunate area of the world.
However we think we have brought at least some questions to
mind about defense problems. I would note that we talked about bud-
gets and you heard two or more interpretations of budget figures
based upon inflation, based upon the escalation of costs, based
upon the increase in manpo:-rer. It is a most difficult, complex
subject and we could probably talk about it all night with constant
new views coming forward. We did not get into a complex or perhaps
meaningless comparison of 1,054 United States ICB:1, (inter-continental
ballistic missiles) against 1614 P.ussian missiles. The whole purpose
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PROF. KZhXPATRICK : cont' d.
of the discussion tonight was really to get at the problems that
consist of defense policymaking in trying to decide what this nation
should have in the way of an adequate policy for defense.
Perhaps like any discussion of this nature, we have had an ex-
pression of feeling about the intensity, by some, of the fact that
there is bloodshed going on, that there was an appalling war in
Vietnam in which many people suffered. We would encourage those
who have listened to us to pursue this further. This is a govern-
ment by the people. Your congressmen act on defense policy. They
pass the budget. They are elected by the people of the United States.
On behalf of President Hornig, and the Brown University com-
munity, I would like to thank the Honorable Clark Clifford for ap-
pearing tonight, Admiral Turner, John Chafee, Herbert Scoville,
Iaurence Radway who gave up of their valuable time to be here and
discuss the matters which I think are of almost prime importance
to the United States. So if there is any consequence of our dis-
cussion tonight, carry it home and talk about it with your friends
and act above all. Thank you.
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