PERSPECTIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01048A000400090002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 18, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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USIB/IRAC-D-22.1/18
MEMORANDUM FOR USIB PRINCIPALS
IRAC MEMBERS
SUBJECT Perspectives for Intelligence
The DCI has requested your comments on the attached Perspectives
for Intelligence. Please forward any comments you may have to the
Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community, Room 6E2914, CIA
Headquarters Building by 27 June 1974.
Executive Secretary
See Attached Dist.
671, 27 June 74
See USIB-M-
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PERSPECTIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE
Introduction
Attachment
U SIB / IRAC -D - 2 2. 1/ 18
18 June 1974
1. These Perspectives for Intelligence 1975-1980
are issued by the Director of Central Intelligence to
provide general guidance for planning for all elements
of the Intelligence Community for the next five years.
They are particularly designed to stimulate early action
on programs requiring long-term research, development, or
planning such as complex technical systems, language
training, skills augmentation, etc. They are designed to
influence Fiscal Year 1975 decisions whose effects will be
felt only after several years. For Fiscal Year 1975, near-
term guidance is provided in the Director's Objectives
submitted to the President, which include both Substantive
Objectives (further detailed in Key Intelligence Questions)
and Resource Management Objectives. The Director's Annual
Report to the President on the work of the Intelligence
Community will include comment on steps taken during FY '75
to meet future requirements.
2. These Perspectives open with a general overview
of the political, economic and security environnment anti-
cipated during the coming five years (Part I). This is
followed by an overall statement of the anticipated role of
intelligence in these situations during that period (Part II).
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Finally, more specific guidance is given with respect to
activities which should be planned or initiated in order
to meet the needs of the period ahead (Part III).
3. The Perspectives are focused on major intelligence
problems and guidance. They recognize but do not deal with
three additional categories of problems which will require
attention and resources during the coming years;
(a) Continuing lower priority national responsi-
bilities which must be satisfied with a limited allocation
of resources.
(b) Departmental or tactical intelligence support
of civil and military elements of the United States
Government. This will also require continuing
investment of attention and resources, but at a lower
priority than national priority matters.
(c) Unexpected problems or crises which can pose
major political, economic or security problems to the
United States. Some reserve capability must be included
in planning to meet them.
Part I - Major World Problems
1. General. The balance of power between the US and
USSR will continue relatively unchanged. Many other nations,
however, will play major roles in the international arena.
Additional nations posessing nuclear weapons or having
significant control over critical economic resources will
be capable of seriously upsetting the international equilibrium.
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The changing balance between the world's supply of and demand
for natural resources will strain the world's political,
economic, and social institutions. The steady-state Soviet
threat to US national interests will thus be compounded by
turbulence in other world relationships.
2. The USSR. Notwithstanding the probable continuation
of detente and an absence of armed conflict, the USSR will
remain the principal adversary of the US during the next
five years. It will regard the US as its major security
threat, and act accordingly. In foreign policy, its
continued efforts to expand its international influence
will bring it into conflict with US interests. This will
include political action in Western Europe and, to a somewhat
lesser extent, in the Near East and Latin America. In its
economic policy, Moscow will continue to give high priority
to the kinds of growth which increase national power and
its projection abroad.
The circumstances which commend detente to the USSR,
however, have complicated this picture. Moscow recognizes
the necessity of controlling local crises lest they lead
to general war, the burden of China's hostility and competition,
and its own need for economic -- particularly technological --
assistance from the West. The Soviets will have to deal in
the coming years with a number of dilemmas as it attempts
to square traditional attitudes with the requirements of
a detente posture.
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This dilemma may take an acute form in the strategic
field. While continuing to modernize its ground, naval,
and tactical forces, the USSR is vigorously pursuing the
opportunities left open by SALT I. Except to the extent
restrained by arms limitation agreements, the Soviets will
make substantial improvements in their missile forces,
including MIRVing, improved accuracy, increased throw-
weight, and better survivability. At the same time, they
will continue to maintain and to improve their defenses.
They will be working to develop effective weapons and
supporting systems in such areas as ASW, satellites, and
lasers. Expecting strategic equality with the US, the USSR
gives indications of angling further for a measure of
strategic superiority, if that can be obtained at reasonable
risk, although adequate defense is likely to remain the
primary Soviet security concern.
Domestically, the pressure for modernizing reforms of
the Soviet system, and particularly its economic administrative
structure, will grow. Prolonged detente may also eventually
have some effect on the Communist Party's ability to wield
its authority effectively in all areas of public life.
But these are long-term possibilities, and over the next
five years the essentials of the Soviet domestic system
are not likely to be substantially altered.
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5. Eastern Europe. While East Europe will continue to
be under Soviet control, recurrent pressures for some
loosening of ties with Moscow will complicate the picture.
The five-year period could see an explosion from within
one or more East European countries against Soviet dominance,
but Moscow would quickly reestablish its hegemony (by force
if necessary), whatever the price in terms of other policies.
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Internal discipline may be alleviated somewhat in these
countries so long as they adhere to Soviet guidance in
diplomatic and security matters. Economic relations with
the West and with the Third World will grow in quantity and
in independence from Soviet control. The passing of Tito
could open an arena of difficulty and contest over the
succession internally and over the future orientation of
Yugoslavia externally.
7. New Powers. During the coming years, a number of
nations will increase in absolute and relative strength and
become at least regional great powers, plus playing more
substantial roles in world international forums. An example
is Brazil, whose economic and political power is increasingly
felt in Latin America. Another is Iran, whose Shah is determined
to build Iran's relative strength in the region so as to play a
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full great power role there. Nigeria could also develop
this sort of role in Africa. Aside from these, several
nations having considerable influence within regions will
display greater independence from the close US relationship
which has characterized them in the past. This will be
particularly prevalent in the economic field, but it will also
occur in various international relationships. Examples of such
powers are Canada, Australia, Mexico, and Thailand, plus
several South American nations such as Venezuela, Panama,
and Peru.
8. The Third World will present a variety of problems.
A number of local disputes will preoccupy not only the
leaders of individual countries but the international community.
Examples are relationships between India and Pakistan, between
black and white Sub-Sahara Africa, and within Southern Arabia
and the Persian Gulf. Several existing disputes will continue
to be a matter of concern to the international community and
will sow the seeds of potential larger scale involvement
(Arabs and Israel, North and South Vietnam, North and South
Korea, Taiwan and China). A number of Third World countries
will become increasingly antagonistic toward the great powers
and their local presence in the economic, political and cultural
spheres, e.g., in Africa, Latin America and South Asia. In
this respect some identity of interest may grow between nations
divided by the Cold War, developing into collaboration
against both superpower complexes, e.g., the Arab nations,
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the rising Black nations of Africa, and the nations of the
Malay Archipelago. Internally, many Third World nations will
suffer serious damage from tribal and regional differences,
economic extremism, and ideological zealots (India, Cambodia,
Ethiopia, et al). Some of the Third World will find an outlet
for its frustrations in self-defeating assaults on great power
economic relationships and in hamstringing the effectiveness
of a variety of international forums.
9. Social change will cause turbulence and possibly
create power vacuums in a number of areas. These will stem
from increased expectations and a perception of the growing
economic gap between less developed countries (and classes
within countries) and the developed world. Areas particularly
succeptible to this process will be the Persian Gulf, certain
other Arab states such as Morocco, India, possibly Indonesia,
the Philippines,, and, in Latin America, Peru, Ecuador and
Bolivia. Internally this turbulence may be temporarily stilled
by authoritarian governments, but they will have difficulties
in maintaining themselves over the longer term and transferring
power to successors. The resulting turbulence can present
temptations to neighboring states to exploit long-standing
differences or to great powers desirous of extending their
influence. Such turbulence will also exist within advanced
nations, as economic, racial, ideological, or regional
minorities turn to violence and terrorism to press their
claims against more and more delicately tuned and interdependent
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10. The acceleration of events will be a characteristic
of the years ahead. This will come from improved communication
and transportation, sharply reducing the time available to
reflect on, negotiate, and resolve international problems.
It will also raise many local events to international pro-
minence and inflate national or political pride, posing
further handic)aps to successful negotiations. There will be
a resulting tendency towards shorter attention spans for
individual situations and a need for simultaneous perception
and management of a multiplicity of international relation-
ships. Acceleration will also mark the process of change.
To a major degree this will occur in the fields of science
and technology, but the pace there will.have substantial effects
on the pace of sociological, industrial, and institutional
change, with resultant political and economic impacts, Iden-
tification and accurate assessments of such changes and their
effects will be needed on an increasingly rapid or even
immediate basis.
Part II - The Role of Intelligence
1. General. The primary charge on intelligence during
these years will be to provide accurate and pertinent information
and assessments with respect to the increased range of problems
requiring US decision. In particular, the need will be for
early warning, because of the acceleration of events, to
permit the resolution through diplomacy, negotiation, or other
benign initiatives, of matters which might otherwise involve
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political, economic or military contests or unrest. The
acceleration of events and the explosion of information will
also require a major effort by intelligence to process raw
information into manageable form and to devise adequate
techniques to identify for consumers the essential elements
of foreign situations, the reliability of our assessments,
and the likely impact of alternative policy decisions.
Intelligence will be increasingly expected to provide assess-
ments of the intentions and likely courses of action of foreign
powers, in addition to their basic capabilities. To do this
will require interdisciplinary analysis which melds economic,
technological, sociological and cultural factors with political
and military data.
2. The USSR. The USSR will remain as the major intel-
ligence target. Its military power, its economic role in the
world, its foreign policies will continue to pose major
problems for American leadership. Intelligence will be expected
to provide precise data on Soviet military capabilities and
economic activity. It must follow Soviet efforts to acquire
advanced scientific and technological assistance and the
potential impact on both military and economic capabilities.
It will be expected also to supply reliable assessments of
Soviet political dynamics and intentions. These must be
supplemented by clear and accurate forecasts of likely Soviet
courses of action in the political, economic, and military
fields. While a small percentage of this material will become
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available through open exchange and access, vast fields of
highly important information will be kept by the Soviets
within a closed society, requiring extraordinary efforts
to obtain and understand them. A particular requirement will
be accurate and demonstrable monitoring of arms limitations
agreements made with the Soviet Union. In the military field
special attention will be focused on Soviet research and
development, in particular with respect to weapons and supporting
systems which could substantially affect the balance of power.
These will include antisubmarine warfare, anti ballistic missiles,
satellite and advanced technology systems. Intelligence will
be required to identify and maintain a base-line capability
for tactical intelligence coverage, for rapid augmentation
in case of local or general confrontation or conflict. Trends
and factions in Soviet leadership and political doctrine
will be a major subject of interest to assist in negotiations
and to warn of undesirable developments ahead. The Soviet role
abroad, either directly through diplomatic means or indirectly
through party or subversive means, will be a matter of
particular attention with respect to the turbulence of the
Third World .
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systems already under development, greater emphasis will have
the greater increased date flow expected from collection
with technological advances in target entities., Because of
explosion. New collection systems must be developed to cope
range of intelligence requirements and an information
resources through inflation, with a need to cover a greater
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Part III - Implications for. Intelligence Planning
1. General. The prospect is for further reduction of
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to be applied to the development of more sophisticated processing
systems and dissemination techniques. A third major planning area
will be in the refinement of requirements and evaluation systems
to ensure the application of available resources to priority needs
and the most effective distribution of intelligence tasks among
components of the Community. The Community will need, finally,
a different mix of manpower to meet both the substantive and
technological problems which will be confronting the Community in
future years.
2. Collection vs Exploitation. Over the past decade,
management focus and the allocation of resources have been
directed especially to the application of advanced technology to
the collection and, to a lesser degree, the processing of
intelligence data. This has been highly successful, resulting in
major substantive advances in our knowledge, particularly with
regard to the military capabilities of the Soviet Union. This
investment has made a major contribution to the negotiations
required for detente. This forward technological progress will
soon reach a point with new capabilities in the photo and SIGINT
fields. This plateau will present large problems of success.
Within the time frame of this document, an important and
pervasive problem facing the Intelligence Community will be to
ensure efficient exploitation of the enormous amounts of information
it will be collecting. Exploitation means not only sifting, selecting
and analyzing the most relevant data, but also the application
of advanced techniques to transfer
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that data from collectors to analysts and the analytical
product, in turn, to the ultimate users of intelligence --
all in the most meaningful and useful form we can devise.
New styles of using information and the relationships they
can portray may force new styles of policy deliberation that
will differ markedly from those of the past.
Action: Study and planning must be initiated by
Intelligence Community agencies in:
(a) Processing in rapid time the raw information
received, to include selection and discard of non-
essential material at the earliest possible time,
identification and acceleration of critical material
and reducing manpower and investment on lower priority
material.
(b) Development of improved techniques and
disciplines of analysis and production.
(c) Development of improved methods of presentation.
3. Demands vs. Resources. Another problem of great
magnitude facing the Community over the next five to ten years
will be the changing (and in all probability increasing) demands
for intelligence while available resources for intelligence
decrease in real terms.
In the past, the major portion of our intelligence effort
has necessarily been deployed against the military capabilities
of the Soviet Union and our other adversaries, actual and
potential. Even assuming a period of genuine detente, much of
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this military focus must be maintained because of the importance
of this subject to national security and the need for information
on the quality of enemy weapons systems. It must not only
serve to keep us alert militarily, but also support negotiations
and verify arms limitations agreements. At the same time, the
demands for other types of intelligence are growing. The
result is a probable net increase in demand with a new
proportionate mix among political, economic, military and
technological target objectives.
This simultaneous shift and increase in requirements
is occurring in a period of serious resource constraint and
continuing inflation. Until very recently we have had the
freedom to invest resources in a number of functional areas
simultaneously without undue difficulty. This is no longer
true. We will have to accomplish our objectives without the
benefit of significantly greater resources. We must find
trade-offs in the systems we use, the areas we cover, and the
depth of the data we seek.
One area which holds promise for greater efficiency is
the national/tactical interface. Current studies seek to
identify ways by which national programs can better support
tactical requirements, and vice versa. As more capable and
flexible systems come into the national inventory, they must
be made to serve the needs of operational forces as well as
national-level consumers. Modernized systems and procedures
which, by their design, permit greater mutuality of effort
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