FURTHER THOUGHTS ON PRM-11 ISSUES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01048A001100070067-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 67
• Publication Date: May 6, 1977
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Fuse 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80M01048M1100070067-2
9 Hay 1977
Taylor and0 have beeiresponsive to the DCI's request, and
given the premises of the talking paper before us last week, make a
strong case for rationalizing the structure of the three major
collection agencies. Concerning Gary's point, the paper does assume
that the DCI has acquired an appreciation for the strengths and
weaknesses of the old CFI, now PRC(I) system. I think that is a
reasonable assumption.
There is one point that is dealt with ambiguously, and which I
know concerns you. In paragraph 14, Jim states that if the DCI
were given "far-reaching" budgetary authority, demands would emerge
for him to separate himself from CIA, and that this in turn would
require that the DCI take the NIO's and the DDI with him. Thus,
he would have line authority only over the production elements
and budgetary authority (without line authority) over N7RP,CCP and
what's left of CIA. 'The argument that in return for a budgetary
control that does not do much to strengthen the DCI, he would have
to separate him e f from CIA is not very convincing.
But more important, Jim doesn't deal at all with the argument
that if the DCI had true line and tasking as well as budgetary
authority over NRP and CCP, he would need to break DDI out of CIA
and put it directly in his own office. This seemed to be the
thrust of the position that some were arguing at our meeting last
week.
NRP and CCP.
It sounds fine in logic--but I don't think we should accept it
as the ideal solution. After all, under such an arrangement, the
Director of CIA would report directly to the DCI, and the latter
could presumably make whatever special arrangements he needed to
assure responsiveness of the DDI.to his needs as advisor to the
President, etc. There are powerful institutional and historical
arguments for maintaining the integrity of the CIA structure. If
the significance of these are appreciated, the DCI would want to
retain the CIA organization, and fine tune it enough to assure that
the DDI element would fill his needs if he is given authority over
Approved For Release 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80M01048A001100070067-2
 Approved For Rose 2005/05/24: CIA-RDP80M01048 1009 OOt7~2!-!---V-V-1-4---
EY. ic:1.i Fi3Q:3: ! f
6 MAY 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Comptroller
VIA : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : Further Thoughts on PRM-11 Issues
1. During your session with us the other day on our paper
on the options available under PRM 11, you asked several fundamental
questions about the nature of the authorities we thought you needed
to do your job. Following the meeting we spent some additional time
talking with about his related efforts and got from him
some further insight into your questions. As I understand it, you
have divided the question of authorities into three basic areas:
those dealing with the ability to task the Community to do your
bidding, those which involve enhanced budgetary authority, and those
which deal with line authority. suggested that a paper
dealing with some of the issues inherent in these concepts might
be helpful to you, and we offer the following.
2. We see the problem similarly but would argue that line
authority and tasking are in fact one and the same thing. Tasking
in our view is a subset of line authority and not an independent,
stand-alone variable. But let us take you through our reasoning.
To do that we will talk about the tasking question first, then line
authority, and then budgetary authority.
3. There is a good deal of confusion surrounding the concept
of tasking. Let us elaborate on two different views as to what
tasking means. You are today under the 1947 Act charged with pulling
together intelligence from all the various producers and collectors
in the Intelligence Community and integrating it for the considera-
tion of policy makers. You thus have the legal authority to ask
for the product of all Community components and to ask collectors to
collect certain kinds of information. In the case of CIA you cannot
only ask that the information be collected but direct that that task
7`: t
'
Approved For Release 2005/05/24
: `CL4-RDP80M01048A001