CENTER FOR INTELLIGENCE SEMINAR ON S & T ANALYSIS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80M01048A001100140026-9
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
C
Document Page Count: 
5
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 7, 2006
Sequence Number: 
26
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 17, 1976
Content Type: 
MF
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP80M01048A001100140026-9.pdf208.6 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2006/08/09.: CIA-RDP80M01048A001100140026-9 U01', tf UU H AL 17 June 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Knoche SUBJECT: Center for Intelligence Seminar on S and T Analysis 1. The booklet attached summarizes subject seminar; John Hicks' memo to DDS&T, also attached, discusses a specific issue emerging from the seminar: the need for a 25X1 mechanism for evaluat= and T analysis. Both were for- warded to you by lat Hicks' request. 2. I suggest you might want to solicit comments from DDSFT (who has this package) as to whether the issue is worth raising before the new EAG.. It looks a little abstruse for you to get into on an individual b-asis;--- Attachments Distribution: Orig - Mr. Knoche, w/atts. 1 - ER 1 - FR Chrono FR:tsy (17 Jun 76) E2 IMPDET CL BY Annrnvarl Fr )r Ralag, l~ qq fl' JOglk11 f i" iA~ ,rhPRO A01048A001100 Approved For Release 2006/08/09: CIA-RDP80MOl048AO01100140026 ? ? 11PIC/D-196-76 MEMORANDU4 FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology. FROM : Direct or, National Photographic Interpretation Center SUBJECT : Semina r Report - Center for the Study of Intelligence 25X1 1. 1 recorrend that you read the sur.3nary issued on 25 May 1976 by the Center for the Study of Intelligence on the nFifth Seminar on Intelligence Analysis: Scientific and Technical Analysis." It con- tains a goodly nu ber of productive tf:oughts. One part in particular intrigued ma and it is the subject of rry following comments. 2. I Ia panelist at this Seminar suggests that.S&T intelligence analysis needs a forral mechanism for criticism: He suggests that just as novelists, composers, aiid artists are judged by hired critics, sc.:.e subjective, critical standards could also be applied to SGT analysis. He also suggests that we could e-panel some "old curmudgeons" who would offer unsubstantiated, subjective judgments on the quality of analysis. 3. I did not attend the Seminar -- I read the summary of its pro- ceedings. My reaction, like that of the Seminar participants, is that suggestions merit further consideration. 4. %le previously have experienced three different kinds of such mechanisms for criticism of analytical intelligence work. The Board of National Estimates, advisory panels of eminent experts from outside 25X1 the intelligence apparatus, and the Product Review Division of the Intelligence Coi:naunity Staff, have in their various ways provided 1 feedback. None of then have satisfied the need tha dentifies. Those kinds of mechanisms had additional purposes or n erests to serve, were adversary efforts, were arenas for compro- mise, or were simply self-serving. - 5. What is the need? I believe that the need is primarily a personal need of individual analysts and of individual supervisors of analysts for objective. feedback from respected persons whose sole Approved.For Release 2066/08/09: CIA-R DP80M01048A0011.0140026-9 ? SUBJECT: Seminar Report - Center for the Study of Intelligence fully by querying the recipients of the criticisms. such a feedback capability, how could -we t en value the contribution that it rakes? I suggest that this could be done simply. and meaning- Bence production ccmponents.? If we assign some resources- to- establish tation'should be Dade. Implicitly, the recipient also could, at his initiative, discuss the criticism with the giver, and could s:,re the criticism with others in his co;ponent including his supervisor.. 7. I think that an independent feedback mechanise based on those conditions would be well worth trying, not only for S&T intelligence analysis and presentation but also for the work of our other intelli- interest is the.. quality of our analysis and its presentation. It is a need which sometimes is but usually is not satisfied in the process of analyst-supervisor relationships on a given analysis and production effort. The essence of the need in our context exists in the attitude, of the recipient toward the giver of critical co^:ent. Put another way,-irhy is the critical cogent being given and what will happen as a result -- in the perceptions of the recipient?_ 6. Thinking along that line, the mst fruitful feedback conditions would be those in which the giver co?riunicates privately to the recipient in his analytical method and_'presen- and the recipient d~ ides if changes 8. I do not believe that a formal evaluation system involving gradings or other quantifications, or one involving any of the standing bureaucratic committees would be productive. 9. What could be developed into a productive technique would be.: a small group of experienced intelligence officers, working full-tire, who would be selective in choosing the on-going efforts which they w.uld critique. They would relate directly to the responsible analyst or the responsible supervisor in a way which would not interfere with the ana- lytical and production schedule for the effort being critiqued --- except that the responsible analyst or supervisor might himself choose to make a change as a result of an input from the-critique group. 10. Such a critique group should be free (be given carte blanche) to critique any facet of an analytical production effort -- problem fon::u- lation, methodology, usefulness, presentation, and so on. The critique SUBJECT: Seminar Report - Center for the Study of Intelligence group should only make its effort, however, for the purpose of being helpful to the analyst in producing a piece of work which responds well in tens of its quality to the responsibilities and purposes of the Agency to*serve-the needs : of the customer. 25X? Approved For Release 20040 :I JlP MAk48A001100140026-9 ? ? . INA EPORT CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY