CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADORS RESOR AND DEAN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80M01048A001100160012-2
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
November 20, 2006
Sequence Number:
12
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 20, 1976
Content Type:
MF
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 87 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2SD 6/C11k2~: f IA-RDP80M01048A001100160012-2
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20 September 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: DDCI
SUBJECT : Conversation with Ambassadors Resor and Dean
1. The DCI asked me to attend his meeting at 1000 this morning
with Ambassadors Resor and Dean so that I could communicate to you
anything significant which took place.
2. Much of what Resor had to say pertained to recent MBFR
history, with which you are quite familiar. He mentioned that you
had done a "first-rate job" in ,your VP presentation.-- He-also refe
11
rlative support" he received froml t6 nd
He references as well--to `fie reporting Lfro
but both he and"-Dean made strong pitches
tor additional human source reporting on Bloc and Soviet order of battle,
particularly Soviet T/O in the area. Lastly, he requested MBFR require-
ments be given hi h priority in a riefings. He
mentionedi if I recall
correctly - Rao slipped through the fingers of U.S. intelligence before
he could be questioned on the spot by qualified
3. Ambassador Resor declared that MBFR was a more important process
than it had been given credit for. First, it provided us with an indication
of Soviet intentions. Time would soon tell whether the Soviets considered
detente significant enough for them to make adequate concessions in the
MBFR arena. Moreover, if we and our NATO allies continued to pressure them,
it was more likely that they would make concessions. Furthermore, if we did
reach an agreement with the Soviets on force levels in Western Europe, it
would provide a framework within which we could hold our NATO allies to
their own agreed upon force levels.
I m assn or can suggested this data could
possibly have an BFR application.
SECRET
E-2 IMPDET
CL BY 022367
25X1
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? SECRET i
5. At the conclusion of our discussion the D d is guests
information if thpy had any vipws or the recent
m assa or can
said a i was airy certain e gui y party of been involved
with hostile espionage,but his motivations for his "homework project"
remained unclear. The State Department was trying to institute separation
procedures, but Subject was fighting them. He had hired a lawyer who was
demanding that the Department show that his client's lapse had caused serious
damage. This in turn required a statement from us or NSA, or both, detailing
the specific damage done. It was Dean's impression that we had not been
forthcoming with such a statement. I said that the last memorandum I had
seen merely indicated that the Department was going to contact us on this
matter. The DCI, commenting that any statement along the lines requested
could in itself be damaging from a sources and methods standpoint, requested
me to contact Mr. Gambino and get a reading on where we stood.
S E C R E T
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Approved For Release 2006/11/20: CIA-RDP80MO1048AO01100160012-2