CIA COMMENTS ON SEMI-ANNUAL NSC INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01048A001100180017-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: November 19, 1976
• Content Type: MF

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SUBJECT : CIA Comments on Semi-Annual NSC Intelligence Review
1. Pursuant to your request, I held a brief meeting with
and Dick Kerr Friday morning to inform them that the DD cri i
o t elr semi-annual review of the Intelligence Co:im-unity was very
critical indeed. I, and you, were concerned that incorporating all
the criticisms in question would delay publication for weeks, particularly
if certain areas of contention, such as the Community's performance
OnF_ had to be thrashed out by the contending parties.
Also, you were aware that some persons, like Dick Lehman, felt that we
should not send forward such a self-critical draft, particularly on the
eve of a new Administration.
2. 0 said that his staff was going through a learning process
and would benefit from our criticisms no matter how harsh; he urged that
you send them forward as is. He said that he disagreed with Lehman; he
thought that the best image for the Intelligence Community at this time
was an honest and self-critical one, not that of an organization which
tried to paper over its deficiencies and mistakes. I said that there
was obviously an honest difference of opinion here and inquired whether
the Director would be made aware of it. 0 assured me this would
be the case.
3. You asked what the review's criticisms of the Community were.
When this volume first came through I made an Executive Summary of its
Executive Summary, which is attached, and will give you a general idea of
the basic aspects of the IC Staff's fault finding. It does not tcuch
on various criticisms of Community performance in specific fields, which,
in the case of East Asia were pretty brutal, and were certainly direct
in other areas.
4. You will note that DDI's comments do not refer to the Executive
Summary, which is the heart of the review, or to the general aspects of
the review, except to say that it is a creditable job. You might wish to
check my brief summary and see if this is something you want to comment on -
or perhaps it would be more desirable to ask DDI to prepare a few additional
thoughts on general matters and incorporate them in the covering memo. My
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main reason for suggesting this course is that Dick Lehman's two memos
to re the review, which are attached, dwell largely on
general aspects - particularly - do we want this kind of review at this
time? Can't we criticize ourselves in private? He has a point, I think,
but, in fairness, he neglects to say that the review says several complimentary
things about the Community. The NIO's, I find, are death on post mortems,
you should pardon the expression.
5. A possible solution: Go ahead with the review more or less as it
stands; draft for the DCI's signature a forwarding memo indicating all
the great things (!) the Community, particularly the DDI, is doing to come
to grips with the criticisms in the review.
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Attachments:
Tab A - DDI draft for your signature
Tab B - Summary of Summary
Tab C Two Lehman memos
Tab D - Semi-Annual Review
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Intelligence Community is generally doing a good job, and performs
at an excellent level on current intelligence matters. It is doing less
well on longer term: assessments and problems requiring interdisciplinary
analysis. Also, it does not do enough in the area of forecasting trends
or in regional analysis.
There is insufficient communication between intelligence producers
and users. Consequently, production does not always meet user needs. NIE's
and inter-Agency intelligence memoranda meet some requirements for longer
range papers; but they are often criticized for being too waffled and "old
hat" - not in tune with current needs.
There is a need for improving our mechanism for handling crisis
situations, particularly in terms of increasing the flow of information
between intelligence and operational components. In this connection, there
should be a better definition of the DCI's wartime responsibilities,
particularly as during wartime the Defense establishment will control most
intelligence collection assets.
The Intelligence Community needs to be able tD shift more rapidly
to meet changing user requirements. To an extent, such flexibility is a
function of resources. Also, as suggested above, it will be more easily
realized if producers get closer to users, including policymakers, so as
to anticipate change; but this must be watched so that intelligence is not
contaminated by policy concerns.
There is an apparent imbalance between the resources assigned to
collection vs. production. Also, within the production field, "bread and
butter" current intelligence resources compete with those available for
longer range analytical work.
Available IC resources in terms of real purchasing power have declined;
and the personnel of the Intelligence Community has shrunk substantially
in the last four years.
Specific recommendations to the DCI include:
a. To examine resources available to production, confer with
users regarding priorities, and establish means for determining the
best balance of resources among collection, processing and analysis.
b. Reduce current and increase estimative and interdisciplinary
analysis.
c. Direct NIO's to solicit user views.
Paper also recommends the IVSC strongly support the DCI in these regards and
develop specific ways for users to communicate their needs to the Intelligence
Community.
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