ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY FIELD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01048A001500040011-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 26, 2005
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: April 12, 1967
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller
SUBJECT : Organizational Arrangements in the National
Security Field
1. You have asked me to read the Director's memorandum to the
Chairman, President's Task Force on Government Organization
prepared as a basis for the Director's meeting with that group which is
to take place on April 15. The memorandum is strong in the area of
the intelligence community's interface with h S t D tme .s
polio
ufdance and programs and with the programs of other
affairs agencies It tends to avoid substance on the DCI's role as
intelligence coordinator. I be~liev this_ ia.A-gag.
2. In meeting with the Task Force, it is quite likely that this
coordinator role will be of considerable interest, especially to a group
formed to consider reorganizationgovernment-wide. The back-up
material needed by the Director should anticipate this possible avenue
of inquiry and provide the Director with an identification of the programs
he has in mind to improve current conditions. NIPE has its work cut
out to supply this.
3. In the event that the Task Force is concerned with the structure
and mechanisms which have been created to coordinate the plans, programs
and procedures of the intelligence community it would be well to supply
the Director in advance with brief descriptions of USIB and USIB
committee functions, the NRO, other instruments, and the role of
NIPE staff. With regard to USIB, it might be useful to describe the
committees' functions as falling into general categories, rather than
to cover each one separately. For example, it could be pointed out that
there are USIB committees which are concerned primarily with the
coordination of intelligence production in critical areas such as atomic
energy and guided missiles, some of which are concerned primarily with
the establishment and coordination of collection targets and priorities
(e. g. , the IPC, COMDR, and SIGINT committees), and some which have
been established to deal with special intelligence problems, such as
CODIB in the information processing area. It would seem to be especially
important, in view of the Director's responsibilities, to deal with the
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Security Committee's functions, particularly in the field of audio
countermeasures and with the CCPC in coordinating the community's
attack on critical intelligence problems.
4. There are other formal mechanisms which have been established
to assist in the coordination of community plans and programs which also
could be mentioned and which might be of interest to the Task Force.
The DCI's responsibility to establish PNIOs, for example, is illustrative
of devices to create unity and provide a singleness of purpose to
community efforts. Other systems for coordination, such as the Con-
solidated Cryptologic Program, the Consolidated Intelligence Program
and the PPBS are also very good examples of the community's attempts to
achieve coordination and optimum cost-benefit results in the management
of intelligence programs. In this general area it may be useful to
include some brief description of the role of the NRO and o r frffr
staff.
5. If it occurs during the course of his meeting with the Task Force
that the Director is asked for his evaluation of intelligence community
coordination mechanisms and procedures it would be well to have provided
some back-up in this areas as well. There may be areas in USIB,
for example, where organizational and procedural improvements are
planned (for example, the "instrumentality" which was proposed as a
result of the JIIRG study) which should be mentioned to the Task Force.
There may be other areas where you may believe it would be beneficial
for the Director to point out institutional weaknesses in the system and
to provide constructive suggestions for improvements.
6. With the specific reference to the DCI's memorandum to the
Task Force, you asked whether any of the passages might raise questions
for which back-up should be provided the Director. The following are
offered:
a. Ref. para. 4., page 2: What is the intent of this
statement? Why does it not list some of the publications of
other intelligence agencies?
b. Ref. para. 6. a. , page 3: What specific effect on
intelligence operations has resulted from less use of the NSC
in the past two Administrations? How frequently, or what
percentage of your projects do you place before the 303 Committee?
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c. Ref. para. 6. c. , page 4: What sorts of things, have
been the subjects of NSAMs? How many have been issed?
What gaps exist in DCI judgment?
7. You may want to pass these comments along to NIPE.
/j/
John M. Clarke
Distribution:
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
8 April 1967
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, President's Task Force
on Government Organization
SUBJECT: Organizational Arrangements in the,
National Security Field
1. In response to the request passed on by Mr. Bohen, I
would like to outline some of the ways in which the Central Intelli-
gence Agency (CIA), and I as the Director of Central intelligence (DCI),
support and cooperate with other elements of the Government, within
the national security structure.
2. The DCI has two principal functions. One is running the
CIA. The other involves responsibilities with respect to all the
foreign intelligence agencies of the Government, which together make
up the so-called intelligence community. This consists of the intelli-
gence components of State, Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission
'(AEC) and the military services, as well as the National Security
Agency (NSA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the CIA.
3. In this second capacity the DCI is looked to by the President
as the principal intelligence officer of the Government and is charged
with coordination and guidance of the total United States foreign
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intelligence effort. The most important instrument in accomplishing
this coordination and guidance is the United States Intelligence Board
(USIB), with its 14 subordinate stand g committees. The Board
was established by the National Security Council as an advisory body
to assist the DCI in carrying out his community responsibilities.
I serve as Chairman. I also have a small, highly qualified personal
staff to assist me in the coordinating role. There are a series of
National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID's) and
implementing Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCID's)
which spell out respective roles and procedures within the intelligence
community,
I assume that this intra-community coordination is of
secondary interest to the committee, but I can of course elaborate
to whatever extent you wish when I meet with you.
4. With respect to intelligence, the relations of CIA and of
the intelligence community with other agencies of Government can
be somewhat arbitrarily broken down into support given through
published intelligence documents, by membership in standing groups
and committees and other miscellaneous methods of interface.
(See Tab A.)
5. You have also asked for information on sources of guidance
to CIA for action operations as contrasted to intelligence ones.
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This ui dame comes in a number of ways and has proved to be
effective, particularly in light of the unique character of covert
operations. (See Tab B. )
6. So much for the existing mechanisms of support and
guidance. You have also asked' for my views on what has been called
"instruments of integration." As I see them, the principal
mechanisms of this kind are those listed at Tab C. I will comment
briefly on each of them as it affects the intelligence community and
the Central Intelligence Agency.
a. The National Security Council (NSC). It has been
suggested that I discuss the effect on intelligence operations
of the fact that the NSC has not been used as extensively in
the past two Administrations as it once was. This fact as
such has not affected intelligence operations greatly. While
the CIA is responsible to the NSC, I believe it was never
intended that that b h . lnnk _rl to fnr PffP~++ve cox~tin ing
intelligence guidance. When the Council was meeting
regularly, the sessions. were usually opened with a current
intelligence briefing by the DCI. The function of keeping
principal NSC members advised of pertinent intelligence is
now handled in other ways, as I have indicated earlier.
The problem is not so much one of a gap in intelligence guidance
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as one of working out the means of intelligence support
which will be most useful to other components of the Govern-
ment. This is a continuing process,,
b. 303 Committee. Despite the greatly decreased
level of NSC activity, guidance in the field of covert action
continues to be effectively handled through a high-level
committee set up by NSC directive. This is the 303 Committee,
formerly known as the Special Group, and it is the principal
policy approval authority for covert action operations. It is
very important for the CIA, and to a lesser degree for DOD,
but it is a specialized mechanism. As a result of recent
widely publicized disclosures, this Committee will engage
in more extensive and longer range examinations of these
programs than it has to date.
c. The National Security Action Memoranda (NSAM's)
are important documents with the full weight of the White House.
behind them. They are designed to give guidance and direction
to all aspects of the national security effort. They seldom
attempt to give detailed guidance to the intelligence community
but they are of great significance in indicating a framework
for intelligence coordination and support which might be
required.
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d. Department of State National Policy Papers.
There is some question in my mind as to the net advantage
deriving to the Government from this series of papers.. One
of the principal problems, I believe, is the length of time it
takes to produce them (sometimes several years) so that
often by the time they are fully agreed and published they are
already somewhat out of date. In the meantime, policy making
and execution- -being necessarily a dynamic, constantly-
shifting process--must go on. Thus decisions are taken
outside the parameters of these papers. The more important
a country the more this is likely to be so.
Although. the policy papers do not mention CIA
activities, we comment on the papers from the point of view
of the factual intelligence foundations from which the policy
promulgations stem. Additionally, we make suggestions as
appropriate in cases where we might have something to
contribute in terms of objectives and tactics.
I believe that the Senior Interdepartmental Group
(SIG) /Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG) mechanism'
is more useful in developing practical policy than the slower-
moving device of papers of this sort, which involve a really
sizeable amount of work by responsible officers. They
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certainly are of some value; it could be argued, however,
that the time spent on them could be used to better advantage
elsewhere.
e. SIG and IRG's. In general the IRG's are
particularly useful to members of the intelligence community.
They provide useful forums where relevant intelligence can
be brought to the attention of policy makers--particularly
information on Communist penetration and subversion abroad.
Moreover, participation in the IRG's keeps us informed on
regional situations and operational problems in the Government.
This permits CIA to identify in broad terms possible require-
ments for intelligence and for covert action in support of
policy and thus to target its operations more effectively. It
also gives the CIA formal representation at an effective level
of the foreign policy structure.
Such committees cannot, of course, usurp the
A
basic foreign policy responsibilities of the President and the
Department of State, but they certainly at a minimum contribute
to.better understanding of major problems by all responsible
agencies. This is particularly true with respect to the less
developed areas of the world.
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The effectiveness of the IRG's depends to a
considerable degree on the capabilities and diligence of
their individual members, and on the direction that the
Chairmen provide. It might help to achieve more decisive
results if the attendance at meetings were tailored to the
problem at hand, and if dissent rather than consensus were
encouraged.. Dissents could then be resolved at the SIG or
at a higher level.
The operation of the SIG is necessarily different
from that of the IRG's and it raises certain basic questions
as to the proper role of such a body. . For example,
Mr. Marks has posed a problem as to whether the SIG should
restrict itself to being a reviewing authority or court of
appeal for actions taken by the IRG's or whether it should
itself inspire new initiatives in the foreign policy field. My
own feeling is that the SIG should do some of both. On the
other hand, if the IRG's function. smoothly and efficiently,
they should be able to accomplish most of the on-going work
involving interagency coordination, including inspiration for
new initiatives. Certain problems cut across the jurisdictional
area of more than one IRG and thus disagreements could arise
which would require resolution at the SIG level or higher.
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f. Foreign Affairs Programming System (FAPS).
This proposed system has been under discussion for a number
of months. It is designed to integrate planning and program-
ming of operations of the various agencies in the field. The
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA) of State has also
instituted a pilot program of its own which is consistent with
the PAPS objectives. This program, known as Country
Analysis Strategy Papers (GASP), has taken the form of a
practical schedule for coordinating individual agency
programs at the Embassy level and then having them
reviewed by the IRG with coordinating assistance from the
country director of the State Department.
The FADS' and GASP concepts have, I believe,
a potential for producing useful results, particularly in terms
of providing the same sort of coordination at the Washington
level that obtains in a well-ordered Embassy country team.
It may be, if the GASP process proves to be as useful as it
appears to be so far, that it could take the place of FAPS.
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In any case, it will be necessary to make sure--
as is being done in the ARA area- -that intelligence and
covert action activities are not included in the eonsoiida,tc4
programs. This applies not only to CIA but also to clandes-
tine activities of the DOD, and it is a necessary concomitant
of the program if the security of such operations is to be
safeguarded. As you know, the DCI has as one of his statutory
functions the protection of intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure.
Personal Consultations. By their nature the
conduct of foreign affairs and of intelligence operations form
a constantly shifting pattern. It is impossible to predict with
any consistent clarity the numerous important developments
or indeed crises which constantly arise. Accordingly, it is
necessary to maintain a pattern of frequent personal
consultations at all levels. In the intelligence field this can
include occasional conferences between the DCI and the
President. and his principal advisors; meetings with the
Secretary of State and other high-level officials of that
Department; with.the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of
Defense; with the Joint Chiefs; and so on down to continuing
contact between respective desk officers in CIA and in State.
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The regular meetings between Clandestine Services
Division Chiefs and the respective regional Assistant
Secretaries of State are particularly valuable to CIA.
Relationships with the top level of DOD, involving direct
intelligence support, have been especially close. I believe
that there has been a considerable advance in recent years
in the mature understanding of each other's problems and
thus in constructive cooperation in solving these problems.
h. Ad Hoc Committees and Task Forces. Since it is
not possible nor probably desirable to establish a rigid
mechanism to accommodate all national security problems,
it is inevitable that there will be a number of ad hoc
committees and task forces established from time to time.
A number of these are set up within the intelligence
community structure and numbers of others are established
which involve intelligence participation. As a general rule,
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I think most responsible officials will agree that one should
attempt to avoid "ad hoc - e ry, " but this is not always
possible nor in every case desirable. Just as bad as a
proliferation of ad. hoc groups is the continuance of standing
committees or task forces past a point of productive life.
10.
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necessary and generally useful tools for bringing intelligence
programs into line with over-all Government operations and
policies. Contrary to apparent popular opinion, and as
members of this committee know, CIA gets a pretty thorough
going-over in the course of these reviews--and I welcome it.
j. Congressional Committees and The President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). We get useful
support from our relations with the four subcommittees of
the Congress to which CIA reports. We keep the PFIAB
fully informed on our activities and we get advice from that
Board. It serves as a special link to the President.
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i. Bureau of the Budget Reviews. These are
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1. USIB. I have touched on this device for coordinating
the intelligence community. I can develop the subject further
if you wish.
Attachments
Tabs A, B and C
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I. Intelligence Support (a representative list)
A. Publications
1. President's Daily Brief (PDB)
2. Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB )
3. National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's) and
Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIE's)
4. National Intelligence Projections for Planning (NIPP's)
5. Special CIA studies and reports (e. g. , Office of
Current Intelligence (OCI), Office of Research and Reports (ORR),
Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) memoranda)
6. USIB-sponsored studies (e.g., Infiltration into
South VietnamI
7. Joint studies (e.g., Assessment of Effects of
Vietnam Bombing, with DIA)
8. Weekly Report for Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG)
B. Through Standing, Groups and Committees
1. National Security Council (NSC), through DCI
as Advisor
2. SIG and Interdepartmental Regional Groups (IRG's),
through regular membership on these bodies
3. Committee of Principals (disarmament)
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4. Economic Defense Advisory Committee
(support to Secretary of State)
i?iey
6. Advisory Committee on Export Policy
(support to Secretary of Commerce)
C. Other
1. Responses to special requests from Secretary
of State, Secretary of Defense, White House, etc.
2. Direct support to Ambassadors overseas
3. Representatives at military commands
(e.g., SAC, NORAD, SACLANT,
4. Briefings of President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board (PFIAB) and Congressional Committees
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U. Policy Guidance Mechanisms for Action Operations
A. 303 Committee
B. Regular meetings between Clandestine Services Division
Chiefs and regional Assistant Secretaries of State
C. Deputy for Coordination, Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, Department of State
D. Special Assistant for Counter Insurgency and Special
Activities, Joint Staff
E. Contingency Coordinating Committee (possible use of~
military force)
F. War planners with major commands
G. Ambassadors
H. National Security Action Memoranda (NSAM's)
I. Personal consultations
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III. "Instruments for Integration"
A. NSC
B. 303
C. NSAM's
D. Department of State National Policy Papers
E. SIG, IRG's
F. Foreign Affairs Programming System (FAPS)
G. Personal consultations at all levels
H. Ad hoc committees
I. BOB reviews
J. Congressional reviews; PFIAB reviews
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