FINAL PLAN FOR LOW-LEVEL RECONNAISSANCE OF CUBA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80M01048A001500120091-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 28, 2013
Sequence Number:
91
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 26, 1963
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr2013/02/11 : CIA-RDP80M01048A001500120091-5
TO
SUBJECT :
REFERENCE:
(CLASSIFICATION)
?
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
A-208
Action Memorandum No
Date 26 April 1963
Deputy Director (Research)
mai Plan for Low-level Reconnaissance of Cuba
1. The Director has informed me that the President, at yesterday's
meeting at the White House, approved three low.level missions (two aircraft
each) on a trial basis after Mr. Harriman had returned from his trip. The
Director has instructed me to review this **tire matter and develop the three
most desirable missions on the basis of highest priority, moat important
targets on which we have acute intelligence requirements that are unattainable
or unverifiable by high.level nights. W* will vont the most persuasive
arguments for establishing these requirements for low-level flights, particu-
larly a.s to unidentified or unknown targets and construction, areas. We should
Include one of the four combat command camps. Our justification should be
specific and should not be based on the need for acquiring technical Intel..
ligence or increasing our total inventory of intelligence. We should plan our
missions so that the aircraft spend a minimum amount of tinse over the island.
2. This is to be a CIA paper which I will cable to the Director for his
approval prior to submission to the President. It is not a COMOR or NRO
paper but you should probably use the JRC flight-planning information (Colonel
Steatkley) for determining the optimum eorties within the above parameters.
3. This requirement, as you might well imagine, has a considerable
degree of urgency. If you or your people used any further information,
SUSPENSE DATE:
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(CLASSIFICATION)
/
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr2013/02/11 : CIA-RDP80M01048A001500120091-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr2013/02/11 : CIA-RDP80M01048A001500120091-5
7
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please contact me soonast. I would expect the paper could be done entirely
nin?house" and it does not require coordinathilli or concurrence outside of
the Agency.
MSC:blp
Distribution:
Original ? DD/R
1 DDCI
Executive Director
1 ? DD/P
I EA/DCI
I
/-1//sc/bie
Marshall 8. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr2013/02/11 : CIA-RDP80M01048A001500120091-5
Declassified
50X1
Declassified
in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr2013/02/11 : CIA-RDP80M01048A001500120091-5
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans
26 April 1963
1. Attached is a copy of my memorandum to DD/R based
on a telephone call I had from the Director last night and his
conversation with WI this morning. U you have any further inputs,
it would be most helpful to Pete Scoville to give them to him.
2. As to Cuba, it was my understanding FitsGerald was
to prepare an expansion to his current Cuban-operations paper on
a more extreme basis, that a sort of catalogue of possible actions
was to be prepared for me, and that in any discussions that might
come up. I was to indicato capabilities on a very broad and general
basis and to be cosy about details.
3. When I receive back from the Director his proposed
changes on his Cubanvolicy paper, I am to bootleg a copy to Mac
Bundy and McNamara. I intend to do this by hand, without any
covering letter, and indicate clearly to them that it is for their
information and is not being put forward as an Agency or DCI formal
paper, and that no further circulation is being given to it.
4. The Diroctor wanted our deception people to concentrate
on misinformation or disinformation or deception which would assist
Although he sug ge stag that
a group be organised in SAL I am We he would We perfectlyglippy
if Cord Meyer's people continued in this field.
5. I have informed Bundy about the Stennis Subc tee
report, our inability to get any further information from Kea g as
to his sources, and the impossibility of getting toothpaste beglt into
the tube once it has been squeezed out.
A ttantument:
Action Memo No. A-208
Distribution:
Orieinalwiatt
1 - DDCI var/ a oitt Lk-
1; ilarDir vido att 1 - LA/DCI w/o att 1 ER w/o att
Sc/bie
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant Generals U$A
Acting Director
t
in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr2013/02/11 : CIA-RDP80M01048A001500120091-5