THE(Sanitized) PAPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01066A000800260004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 2, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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7,1
"fit `. w;L,c r tc
2 December 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
INFO:
SUBJECT:
Morning Meeting Participants
The attached was prepared by and
distributed at yesterday afternoon's ICG meeting.
The paper represents his analysis of the issues
involved in the intelligence community investigations.
went over the five lettered items
tentatively assigning responsibility for three of
them. The only one currently being worked on is
"C" -- Resource Management.
Quite frankly, the analysis and the use to
which it is to be put is not clear. The document
will be discussed again on Wednesday at a 8:IS a.m.
meeting. I am forwarding it for your information.
Specia_rTr_n_rs L LU -ector
Distribution:
DCI
DDC I
DDO
DDA
DDI
DDSET
D/DCI/IC
OGC
IG
OLC
OCI
NIO
Review
SC/DCI
ER
25X1
25X1
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 TIX
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Analysis of Issues
A. Goals and Objectives
1. Provide for national defense needs
a. Predict "Pearl Harbors".
b. Identify and assess threats.
c. Provide timely military intelligence to military command.
d. Prevent loss of effectiveness through loss of secrecy.
2. Affect U. S. Position in World
a. Assist in achieving foreign policy objectives.
b..Assist friendly governments and allies.
c. Injure unfriendly governments and adversaries.
d. Meet economic, commercial and resource intelligence needs.
e. Provide understanding of issues, trends , developments
and personalities world-wide.
3. Maintain effective intelligence community
a. Command public confidence, foreign respect.
b. Provide useful product with increasing cost-effectiveness.
c. Maintain strong intelligence resources.
d. Develop new technologies, skills and capabilities.
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B. Functions of Intel.li.gence Community (i\,-lissions)
1. Covert Action and Paramilitary Action
2. Intelligence collection
a. Human (Clandestine, FSO, Overt Sources, etc)
b. Technical (Signals, Electronic, Photo, Sensors, etc)
3. Analysis and Production of Intelligence for users.
a. Civilian Command (Incl. President)
b. Military Command
c. Economic and specialized
4. Counterintelligence
a. Domestic activities
b. Foreign activities
C. Resource Management (by participants)
1. Overall Monitoring, Evaluation and Control -- Direction
a. Mission accomplishment (primarily internal)
b. Effectiveness (producer/consumer)
c. Compliance with laws, standards and expectations (primarily
external)
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2. Program management
a. Program data acquisition
b. Program evaluation
c. Program control
3. Budget management
a. Evaluation process
b. Decision making process
c. Budget disclosure, presentation
d. Allocation of appropriations
4. "Product" management (dissemination, publication, briefings, etc. )
5. Resulting structures and organizations
a. Role of CIA
b. Role of DOD and components
c. Others, including leadership through DCI, etc.
D. Secrecy ID 1S
1. Classification system
a. Basis - Statute, Executive Order
b. Resolving Executive Privilege disputes
c. Standards for Classification
d. Compartmentation
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2. Protection of classified information
a. Scope of protection
b. Criminal penalties
3. Protection of intelligence "sources and methods"
a. Authority/Responsibility
b. Sanctions
4. Relation to other standards
a. 4th Amendment
b. Privacy Act
c. Freedom of Information
d. Hughes Amendment
E. Oversight (by non-participants)
1. Intelligence Community internal controls
a. Legal advisors and observers
b. Inspectors General
2. Executive Branch
a. Presidential agents (i. e. Asst. to President for National
Security Affairs)
b. Committees (NSC, PFIAB)
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3. Congress
a. Committees
b. GAO
4. Public, Press
RJW/December 1, 1975
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1 December 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: CI
DDS&T
DDI
DDO
DDA
D/DCI/IC
D/DCI/NIO
IG
General Counsel
Legislative Counsel
Co.n troller
Mr. Breckinridge
Herewith are Comments on the
delivered to him 29 November.
25X1
25X1
Y i -- c.~ 41U 3 c~
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WASH I NGTON, D.C. 2050S
28 November 1975
SUBJECT . CIA Suggestions on "Review of
Background information"
1. As we discussed, I have redone pages 23-26 and
added an introduction. This might also eliminate the
need for Tab C. For this reason we have not tried to
.make specific suggestions with regard to Tab C.
2. Our specific points elsewhere on the paper
are as follows:
25X1
--Page 9, last para. Insert "dollar" before
resources in line.4. Delete sentence beginning
"CIA covert action".
--Page 14, third tic. Add "and covert action"
after "CIA collection".
.--Page 16, first sentence. Add "--based on the
Schlesinger and PFIAB recommendations" at end.
--Page 17,.-third line. Begin sentence with
"The directive also--".
--Page 20, last para. Change second sentence
to read "--(through the PFIAB and the CIA Inspector
General)--". Change "reorganization" to "changes'_'..
in next sentence.'
--Page 21, last para.. in second sentence,
after "question". insert ", including those". . Break
last sentence after "efficiency". New last sentence
would read "It noted the need for external and
internal controls which would develop public confi-.
dence, but did not address these questions."
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--Page 22. Revise first pare as follows:
The report recommends mantaininc a national/
departmental balance in intelligence. The ICI (rena :iced
the Director General of Intelligence) would be a mem rer
r~ n
of the DISC to increase his standing, )gut would be separate
.
from the CIA (renamed 'Pore; Foreign Tn?-.ell; , n rice c er Cy) ne
-new DGI would prepare a total nat.iona. int.e:l _l? genceu r dget
to him. A strengthened staff, perhaps, i.nc:L udirn.g the analy:.;:i
The
t him
i
.
s
.and-production elements of CIA, would ass
DGI would establish now arrangerneenUs w5-i th DOD to mar.: ge
tactical intelligence, wartime t:r-ansi~..ian, NSA., and the
:national reconnaissance program. The FICA. would havE a.
separate Director reporting either to the 1?GI or the NSC.
ld
i
h
wou
c
The DGI would chair the NSCIC, USIB, -_.nu 11473C wh
have essentially the same roles .hey do t:.oday
,.that must be weighed against the benefits sought'."
have costs in disruption of existing machinery
--Page 27. Add new second s ntE,inr.e r ISom?
also ' point out that any major r_ e srganizati.on w_ J.:#_
_- Page . 28. .- We have a genera .l concern abou 1, this
list that the act of listing certain. questions may
make them into larger issues than they now are
Examples are B-3 (Why should we single out inteelli-
gence employees for criminal lir:`~ ~lit;y more than any
other government employee:), B-E, and e ecial. E-l0.
"Accountability to the Attorney- (ener. -1 J.
..:,for possible abuses of authority and cri ninal
and policy on public disclosure" -
7-acts
,
"Policy on secrecy agrcemen.ts with intelli-
gence personnel"
-Page 28,,Under B, add:
:"Statutory clarifi.6-atio1i of the
eel ie.1L5
.-Page 29, C-4, add ", resp~ansibilities,
authorities" after "Powers".
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--Page 29, C-6. Add, "re~po-ssibii:Lties and
relationships" after "powerr.;".
--Page 29, Section C. Add E 3 f rorrt page 3 0 .
---Page 29, D-2. Reword to road "Responsibility
for clandestine co_l.lecti.on. and. c-,vent action".
--Page 29, D-3. Add "incl-ad:nc
"Methods" .
---Page 29, D-9. Reword to road "Select ion
Director and Deputy Director (s) of CIA".
--Page 29, Section D. Add "yilole of NRO".
-_-Page 30, E-2. Reword to x k :ard '"Relat Lori } . ,. of
DCI to management of CIA".
--Page 30, E-3. Move ..~o Sec _J.ori (1.
--Page 30, E-9.- Delete.
--Tab A, Page 1. Reword Sec :ion
the CIA Act of -1949, as amended, (Section 8). The House
Subcoirnittee has seven members and it's Senate counterpart
..-permanent budgetary authority under the provisions c"f
?nation on the CIA budget despite the fact that CIA ).as
with respect to the activities of CIA and are given infor-"
have delegated their authority to the intelligence sub-
committees. These subcommittees arec pt totally ac vised
Service with respect to its investigation of the "mtil
intercept" programs. Both of the Armed Services Coranittees
These committees have "legislative jurisdictior"
over matter-s pertaining to the CIA or to the intell3 genre .
activities of the Department of Defer 3e . In the excise
of this jurisdiction, they have primary congressional
responsibility for the CIA. However, a number of other
congressional committees have some foam of "legislative
oversight" over CIA and other elements of the intel)i.crence
community. They include the Committe?s on Goveir_nmeit
Operations, International Relations, ?ind have recently
Aeven included the Committee on Post Office and Civi:
has five.
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----Tab A, I j n next. to Just ,,enc.c:nce, rh.~~: cjc
"four" to "five".
--Tab A, I B. Reword I.c st ser'tencc as follo?; ; :
"Its House counterpart, on which jou served, is
formally the"Defense subcommittee (12 7ner;bers),
although---"
rl'ab l~` I C. ,(}lC)l1`:f::
Affairs Committee and reword as f(.ellows :
These committees have always received inteiligen-~e
briefings by CIA based on the. National Innnte11igence' F_;timatc~s> .
They had no oversight, function over the intelligence :;c):r ;IUni t_)
until. 1974 when, in response to a request from the leadership
of the Foreign Affairs Committee, endorsed by the lea.l.er-ship
of the House Armed Services Conmittee, Secretary Kissinger
and Director Colby made an ci.ccolnmedation to brief the then
Foreign Affairs Cc rm3_ ttee on C3:s cov rt r c tivitiE ?, Which
might in any way affect foreign policy.
On 8 October 1974, as part o..- the adoption of t1 a
Bolling/Hansen report on committee jurisdiction, special
oversight was vested in the House Inte:-national Relations
Committee with respect to "intelligence activities relating
to foreign policy." Subsequent amendments to the Foreign
:Assistance Act of 1974 (Section 32, PL 93-559, Deceml-er 30,
1974, by Representative Leo Ryan and Senator Harold Iughe.s,
resulted in the adoption of a, new Sect ion. 662 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1974, as amended) prohibit the expenditure
of funds by or on behalf of CIA for operations in foreign
countries "...other than activities-intended solely -.or
obtaining necessary intelligence..." unless the Pres:.dent
makes a finding that each such operation is importan- to
national security and reports are made to t_ e "appro; jr-.ate
.committees of the Congress," specifically including '.he
Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees.
--Tab A. Add new I D as follows:
Senate and House Committees on Government Operations,
These committees have traditionally exercised
legislative oversight over government offices generally
with a view to determining the of fici: nc=y of the ope ations .
A recent example of the exercise of the oversight is
found in the Committee's jurisdiction of all governor nt
departments and agencies with respect to the provisi'mns.
of the Freedom of Information and. Pritacy Acts.-
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---Tab A. Change I: D to 1 E, :t F. to
--Tab A. II A 1. NSCIC was estab], i.shed by
the President's letter of 5 Noverft er 1971.
.
----Tab A, II A 2. Delete "All major sensit i_v i"
Change "reconnaissance" to `technn _ca1_ coJ_:l.ectiorn'`
--Tab A, III A. Add footnote: "The CIA Act
of 1949 provides the DCI with a number of import -ant
operating authorities".
--Tab A, III ), 1. Add mo ~tec(~n d para. "The
chiefs of the military service in telligence. ages ci es
are participating observers". Change last sentc.iioe
of third para as follows: "It ha a number of
specialized subcommittees",
--Tab A, III A 2. IPJC was established by
the President's letter of 5 Novem> er_ :k 971
---Tab. A, III A 3. Change "persons" to prof(ssionals"
and "four" to "three". Change last sentence to read
"--after Dr. Schlesinger became D`CI in 1973."
---Tab A, III A 4.
-for the DCI has a range of responsibi.li.t1es, inc]ud-L,L'
supervision of the preparation of National. Tntelligeice
Estimates. (When created in 1973, it replaced the B, )a.r.d
of National Estimates, which had existed in some for-t)
since. 1950.)
Reword as f of lows
This group of 11 substantive officers working d_ -7, (~ctly
--Tab A, III 13, line 5. Add "and covert" a= ter
"overt."
-.-Tab A, III C 1. DIA was established in 1961.
NSA was estab i_ished
--Tab A, III C 4. "---sui~kor?fp:" NSA
-Tab A, III C 2. We believe
by Presidential directive.
L
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--Tab A, III D. $? - ~heaed by an officer of
Assistant Secretary rank---`~
--Tab B. There is sc-tie danger that a busy
reader might gain the impression that all the
problems described here are still pressing.. So; :e
still. are, some have been oived, ;?nd : or ie have
been overtaken. A footnote. might take care of
this problem.
----Tab C. Although the CIA study did not aid ir_ es s
a number of the matters cited hex:e, the DCI has in
fact expressed positions on. several of them. T aa..>
will be apparent if you get the package to whic .i
referred.
E :c i..R D ;La}:.IHMAN
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The Intelligence Community is passing through a
crisis of public confidence. If the nation is to have
the intelligence system it needs, that confidence must
be restored. This requires inter alia clearer definition
of the-responsibilities and authorities of the intelligence
agencies.
At the same time the political atmosphere-of the day,
together with the breakdown in confidence, has encouraged
an attack on the conventional defenses of intelligence
security. If the national intelligence system is to be
effective, better defenses must be found for those: things
essential to intelligence operations. it should be noted
that many desirable measures to this end run directly
counter to those designed to restore confidence.
The need for public confidence and the need for
secrecy mean that change is inevitable. Congress will
clearly reconsider the intelligence provisions of the
National Security Act of 1947. There is thus a unique
opportunity to make fundamental improvements in Community
management, and ultimatel
in the intelligence__ roduct f
improvements that many intelligence officers have believed
long overdue.
Three major and inter-related categories of measures
are needed: measures to restore public confidence,
including those restricting and defining intelligence
responsibilities; measures to protect secrecy;'measures
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I
NOTE: This outline could be developed ad infinitum.
Subheadings marked with an asterisk are not_ used in
the attached matrix.
.I. Measures to restore confidence
A. Oversight
1. Executive
2. Congressional
3. Provision of product
*4. Public
B. Intelligence agency internal controls
*C. Public education
II. Measures to restrict activities
A. Fiscal controls
*1.
Open budget
*2. GAO audit
B. Prevention of "abuses"
C. Covert action
iii. Measures to protect secrecy
A. Classification system
B. Protection of classified information
C. FOI and Privacy Acts
D. Protection of the intelligence budget
IV. Measures to improve management of foreign intelligence
A. DCI's relationship to the President
B. DCI as manager of the Community
1. Resources
2. USIB
3. Relations with Defense
4. Relations with State
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C. DCI as manager of CIA I
*1. Deputies
*2. Production elements
*3. Clandestine activities
D. Collection
*1.
*2.
*3.
Human sources
NRO
NSA
E. Organization of Defense Intelligence
Role of OSD
Influence of DCI
Responsibilities of DIA
National/tactical questions
Transition to war
F. Quality control of production
Independent review by outsiders
The National Estimates process
Consumer inputs
Analysis/collection balance
Competition in analysis
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 CONFIDENCE
A. External
Oversight
1. Executive
Congressional
3. Provision
of 'product
Intel Agency
Internal
Controls
Schlesinger '71
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PFIAE "71
DNC '72
(Presidential Comm.
! on civil 1i bbertie,
Pres & Sec State
to control clan-
destine activities
Oversight Comm
for FBI.
Cong. Committees
on Privacy &
Internal Security
Office to serve
Congress.
Another to serve
public.
Murphy '75
Stronger PFIAB
(Endorses
Rockefeller)
Iit Committee on
Nat'l Security
has jurisdiction
over Intel.
(No changes in
standing Com-
1mittees, but
IJt Comm to
jauthorize annual
1budget).
Central Cong.
,repository for
(intel?) reports
Rockefeller '75 CIA '75
Executive order
to limit domestic
activities
Stronger PFIAB
Proper Choi e of
DCI
General statement
of need for stronger
oversight
it committee on
Intel replaces
Armed Service
Committees
CIA IG reports to
PFIAB
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Strengthen CIA
IG
StrengtEen CIA
;Gen Couns.
Issue CIA Regula-
tions on per-
missible acti-
vities
Reduce CIA
compartmentation
General statement
of need for stronger
oversight.
DGI to have IG
for Community
 II. RESTRICTIONS Schlesinger '71
A. Fiscal
"Abuses
C. Covert Action
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PFIAB '71
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DNC '72
Force CIA to de-
fend publicly
its own budget
National register
of data banks
Put Attorney
General on NSC
Guidelines on
domestic collec-
tion
Pres & Sec State
should control
Amend NS Act
clause on,"such
other functions"
Severely limit
no. of covert
actions
Separate analysis
and CA?
Murphy '75
Rockefeller '.75
DCI "person of
of stature"
from outside CIA
IMake part of CIA
budget public
Revise NS Act to
limit activities.
Pres should not
iinvolve CIA in
internal security
Single channel CIA
to White House.
CIA-FBI agreement
on jurisdiction
CIA-Justice agree-
ment on criminal
acts. by CIA
employees
.
Rpt to Jt. Comm.
No Presidential
Certification
Approach gin-
gerly (consider
risks as well
as benefits)
Review periodi-
cally.
Strengthen CIA
internal oversigh
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CIA '75
Continue. Keep
in CIA. Keep
combined with
clandestine
collection.
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A. Classification;
System
B. Protection of
classified
information
D. Protection of
intelligence
Budget
Schlesinger '71
DNC '72
,Congress set
classification
!standards; limit
(use of.classi-
1fication.
11Do away with
Executive
,Privilege
CIA should de-
fend its budget
publicly
Murphy '75 Rockefeller '71 CIA '75
`Procedures for !General statement
resolution of Exec 'of need for a
!Privilege claims fresh look"
,Statutory class.
(system
Mandatory classi- Clarify NS Act re eneral statement
fication of DCI's responsi- f need for pro-
information on abilities for pro- ection
!sources & methods tection of
jCriminal penal- sources & methods
{ties for un- Criminal penalties
!authorized dis- for unauthorized
!closure disclosure.
ISupports FOI '7.4 Intel agencies
!amendments should review
System for auto- periodically for
may-;n dnwnaradina declassification
in public interest
Make part of CIA
budget public
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 [V. IMANAGEMENT Schlesinger '71
A. DCI's rela- Option 43.
tionship to Coordinator on
President President's Staff,
B. DCI as 11. DNI has bud-
manager of get appropriated
Comunity. to his office.
#2. DCI prepares
1. Resources ~ consol.intel.
budget.
#3. Coordinator
advises Pres.
on resources.
2. USIB 'Make advisory
to DCI
3. Relations #l. Main Def
with Defense Coll. assets
transferred to
DCI.
4. Relations
with State
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PFIAB '71 DNC '72 Murphy '75 Rockefeller '75
'Establish USIB
;Resources Comm.
!Reconstitute
under DCI.
;Expand role
in budget &
policy.
Recognize need
for tactical
.intel for
field com-
lmanders.
Shift resources
`from CIA and
DoD to State,
ACDA, White
House
!Move DCI to
White House; give
!access to Presi-
dent; retitle as
DFI.
Only President
,Only have line
authority over
Community.
DCI should pre-
i
,pare multi-year
plan and con-
;authority over
Community
jDCI should not
have line
SecDef should
not be nation's
chief intelli-
Mil. Deputy
DCI to handle
defense rela-
Larger role for
State
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CIA '.75
DGI should have
!access to and
confidence of
President, but
should not be in
White House.
Should b mmember
of NSC.
jDGI has funds
approp. to him,
allocates to
operating com-
ponents.
;Reconstitute
advisory to DGI.'
Confine primarily'
to production
smatters.
IStatutory change
,in DGI-Defense
relationships.
DGI-State coor-
dinating mechani.m.
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MANAGEMENT Schlesinger '71 PFIAB '71 DNC.'72
C. DCI as manager,#2. DCI keeps CIAiDCI should dele- Separate analysis
of CIA 'production. Rest !gate admin of and clandestine
becomes separate.lCIA. !activities
(agency He should direct-
Collection
;boundaries !Increase domestic
between col- clandestine coil
election agencies of foreign intel.
Revise NSCID's Improve Foreign
to reestablish Service reporting
(esp by FBI)
ly control BNE
and DDI.
Reduce clan-
destine
collection
E. Organization 1#1 Director of DASD/I for
o--': Defense Defense Intelli- resources
Intelligence gence in full
charge.
#2 ASD/I to
handle resource
!issues
F. Quality
Control for
Intelligence
Production
Murphy '75
Retitle as FIA.
DFI should dele-
gate much of
administration
to hid deputy.
I
Improve Foreign
Service report-
ing.
Sec Def must en-
force national
intelligence
priorities.
Restore national
estimates staff
Endorses Rocke-
feller on PFIAB.
Stronger NSCIC
Rockefeller 175 CIA '75
Sedond (civilian) Retitle as FIA.
Deputy DCI to .Separate from
administer CIA DGI.
#l.DGI retains
production
#2.FIA retains
production
PFIAB to assess
quality of col-
lection and
production
Must balance
national and
tactical require-
ments for coll.
DGI has larger
voice, through
budget and EXCOM,
in DoD management
of national pro-
grams. He has
greater responsi-;
bility to provide'
support to
Defense.
Invigorates NSCIC
role by making
DGI chairman
Stronger DGI role
in eval. of pro-
duct.
Approved For Release 2004/10/28 : CIA-RDP> 0M01066A000800260004-
High level con-
sumer feedback
f(NSCIC).
!Review of pro-
duct by out-
Isiders.
More resources
for analysis
Competing cen-
ters (INR, DIA)
Establish
"consumer in-
Ifluence"
USIB Committee
on evaluation
to approve
national esti-
mates.
Executive Office
"Council on
Foreign Affairs"
draws from
academia etc.
Institute ad-
versary pro-
ceedings at all
levels. -