THE WORLD SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01066A001400340001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 3, 1969
• Content Type: SPEECH

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NAVq~ CJA~ C'.OLLc'G~
3 DECEMBER 1969
THE WORLD SITUATION
I DO NOT WANT TO TAKE THE OVERSIMPLIFIED AP-
PROACH THAT COMMUNISM IS AT THE ROOT OF ALL OF THE
PROBLEMS THE UNITED STATES FACES IN THE WORLD TODAY
FOR ONE THING. THERE ARE TODAY A GROWING VARIETY OF
COMMUNISMS WHICH MAKE SUCH A WHOLESALE, MEAT-AXE AP-
PROACH MISLEADING IF NOT DANGEROUS FOR ANOTHER,
WE HAVE ENOUGH PROBLEMS SO THAT IN SOME OF THEM--
NIGERIA. OR CYPRUS. OR PERU, TO CITE A FEW--COMMU-
NISM HAS PLAYED ONLY A MINOR PART. IF ANY AT ALL,
BUT THE FACT REMAINS THAT WHEN YOU COME DOWN TO THE
MAJOR CHALLENGE TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.
YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT SOVIET RUSSIA, AND COMMUNIST
CHINA, THE MEN WHO RUN THESE COUNTRIES. THE OBJEC-
TIVES THEY PURSUE, AND THE ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL
POWER THEY CAN BRING TO BEAR AGAINST US.
I PROPOSE. THEN, TO START WITH A DISCUSSION OF
THE POSTURE AND POLICIES OF THE USSR AND COMMUNIST
CHINA. AFTER WHICH I WILL TAKE UP THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE SOVIET. THE CHINESE. AND THE CUBAN COMMUNISTS
IN AFRICA AND IN LATIN AMERICA. THEN THE MIDDLE
EASTERN SITUATION, AND FINALLY THE WAR IN VIETNAM
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THE SOVIET UNION
THIS PAST SUMMER, THE SOVIET UNION PASSED A
BENCH-MARK IN THE MILITARY RIVALRY BETWEEN EAST
AND WEST, t~JHEN IT MATCHED THE UNITED STATES IN
NUMBERS OF OPERATIONAL LAND-BASED INTERCONTINENTAL
BALLISTIC MISSILES
THIS WAS A GOAL THE SOVIET LEADERS HAD SET FOR
THEMSELVES EARLY IN THIS DECADE OF THE SIXTIES. AT
A TIME WHEN U.S. SUPERIORITY IN STRATEGIC DELIVERY
SYSTEMS LEFT THE SOVIET UNION AT A MILITARY. POLITI-
CAL. AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DISADVANTAGE
IT CAN. OF COURSE. BE ARGUED THAT THE SOVIETS
STILL LAG IN STRATEGIC OFFENSE. BECAUSE THEIR MANNED
BOMBER FORCE IS FAR INFERIOR TO OURS, AND BECAUSE
IT WILL TAKE THEM ANOTHER THREE OR FOUR YEARS TO
MATCH OUR POLARIS PUNCH IN SUBMARINE BALLISTIC MIS-
SILES
P~EVERTHELESS, AS THE SOVIETS FORGED AHEAD IN
THE ICBM COUNT, THEY UNDOUBTEDLY FELT THAT THEY HAD
ARRIVED AT THE STAGE KNOWN AS AN NSSURED DESTRUC-
TION CAPABILITY--THAT THEORETICAL STATUS IN WHICH
A NATIONS STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS CAN ABSORB
AN INITIAL ATTACK. AND STILL RETALIATE WITH SUFFI-
CIENT FORCE TO INFLICT UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE ON THE
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PEOPLE. THE FORCES. AND THE RESOURCES OF THE AT-
TACKER, IF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION
EACH HAVE THIS CAPABILITY. IN THE CONCEPT OF MUTUAL
DETERRENCE IT BECOMES ACADEMIC TO ARGUE ABOUT THE
FINER POINTS OF ti.411 MUCH STRATEGIC OFFENSE EACH
SIDE HAS,
THE SOVIET LEADERS. THEN. HAVE BEEN PLAYING NU-
MERICAL CATCH-UP IN THEIR MILITARY PLANNING THROUGH
THE SIXTIES. BUT THEY FACE DIFFICULT AND SIGNIFI-
CANT DECISIONS FOR THE NINETEEN SEVENTIES,
EVEN AS THE SOVIETS PULL AHEAD IN NUMBERS OF
ICBMs. AND INVEST HEAVILY IN MISSILE SUBMARINE CON-
STRUCTION. THE UNITED STATES HAS BEGUN THE MINUTEMAN
THREE AND POSEIDON PROGRAMS. WHICH WILL MORE THAN
DOUBLE THE NUMBER OF RE-ENTRY VEHICLES AND WARHEADS
THAT COULD BE USED AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION, WE ARE
DEPLOYING SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS THAT CAN OVERWHELM
OR PENETRATE THE LIMITED CAPABILITIES OF THE ABM SYS-
TEM THE SOVIETS ARE BUILDING AROUND MOSCOW, WE ARE
BEGINNING TO ESTABLISH A FAR MORE MODERN ABM SYSTEM
OF OUR OWN,
THUS THE SOVIETS ARE CONFRONTED WITH THE NEED
FOR NEW DECISIONS ON THE FUTURE SIZE AND COMPOSITION
OF THEIR OWN STRATEGIC FORCES,
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A CONTINUED INCREASE IN THE SHEER AIUMBERS OF
THEIR PRESENT WEAPONS WOULD MAINTAIN A MEASURE OF
MUTUAL DETERRENCE. BUT IT WOULD OFFER LITTLE IMPROVE-
MENT BEYOND THEIR PRESENT LEVEL
WE KNOW THAT THEY ARE WORKING HARD FOR QUALITA-
TIVE IMPROVEMENT OF THEIR STRATEGIC SYSTEMS THEY
ARE TESTING NEW ELEMENTS FOR DEFENSE AGAINST BALLIS-
TIC MISSILES THEY ARE DEVELOPING MULTIPLE RE-ENTRY
VEHICLES FOR THEIR ICBP1 WARHEADS. ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE
AS YET SHOWN NO CAPABILITY FOR MULTIPLE WARHEADS
WHICH CAN BE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETED. LIKE OUR MINUTE-
MAN THREE AND POSEIDON
THESE QUALITATIVE ADVANCES COME HARD. AND THE NEW
ADVANCED WEAPONS ARE EXPENSIVE--PARTICULARLY FOR THE
SOVIET UNION ADVANCED WEAPONS PROGRAMS DRAW HEAVILY
ON JUST THOSE HIGH-QUALITY RESOURCES IN MEN, MATERIAL.
AND PLANT WHICH ARE IN SHORT SUPPLY IN THE SOVIET
UNION, AND ARE BADLY NEEDED TO SUSTAIN ECONOMIC GROWTH
AND TO RAISE THE STANDARD OF LIVIN G
ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS ALMOST CERTAINLY WERE
AMONG THE PRINCIPAL REASONS FOR THE SOVIET DECISION
MORE THAN A YEAR AGO TO TAKE UP THE U.S. OFFER TO
DISCUSS THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS WE KNOW
THAT THIS DECISION CREATED FRICTION IN THE SOVIET
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LEADERSHIP, BECAUSE THERE ARE STILL SIGNS OF UNHAP-
PINESS IN SOVIET MILITARY JOURNALS AND IN ARTICLES
BY MILITARY LEADERS WHATEVER THE COURSE OF THE
ARMS LIMITATION TALKS. THIS ISSUE IS GOING TO CON-
TINUE TO CAUSE STRAINS IN THE MOSCOW POWER STRUCTURE
IT WOULD BE WELL. THEN. TO TAKE A LOOK AT THE
NATURE AND THE POLICIES OF THE PRESENT SOVIET LEAD-
ERSHIP. AND THE PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE MEN IN THE
KREMLI N
THE ELEVEN MEN WHO MAKE UP THE CURRENT POLIT-
BURO--AND INCIDENTALLY. THEY ARE ~ CIVILIANS--
ARE IN A SENSE A NEW BREED FOR SOVIET RUSSIA THEY
GREW UP UNDER THE HARD FIST OF STALIN: THEY SEIZED
POWER FROM KHRUSHCHEV IN REACTION TO HIS MERCURIAL
ADVENTURES: AND AS A RESULT THEY ARE PUBLICLY COM-
MITTED AGAINST A REVERSION TO ONE-MAN RULE IN RUSSIA
THIS IS A COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP. AND IT INTENDS
TO REMAIN ONE, SOME OF ITS MEMBERS--BREZHNEV IN
PARTICULAR--ARE "MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS.~~ AS ORWELL
PUT IT. IN OUR ANALYSIS. HOWEVER. ALL OF THEIR DE-
CISIONS SINCE KHRUSHCHEV WAS DEPOSED FIVE YEARS AGO
HAVE PROBAB LY REFLECTED A CONSENSUS OF AT LEAST THE
FOUR MEN WHO FORM THE INNER CIRCLE: THE PARTY BOSS.
BREZHNEV; PREMIER KOSYGIN; PRESIDENT PODGORNY: AND
THE PARTY IDEOLOGIST. SUSLOV~
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ONE OF THE CENTRAL QUESTIONS FOR A COLLECTIVE
LEADERSHIP. OF COURSE, IS HOW WELL IT CAN ARRIVE
AT AN EFFECTIVE CONSENSUS, THE RECORD OF THE PRES-
ENT KREMLIN COLLECTIVE TENDS TOWARD COMPROMISE.
CAUTION. AND POSTPONEMENT OF THE HARD DECISIONS
THE ATMOSPHERE IS NOT ONE OF BOLD NEW PROGRAMS,
BUT ONE OF '~DON~T ROCK THE BOAT~u
THESE LEADERS. AS I JUST NOTED, HAVE BEEN IN
POWER FOR FIVE YEARS IN ALL THAT TIME, THEY HAVE
NOT PRODUCED A NEW CONSTITUTION, WHICH HAD BEEN
PROMISED FOR NOVEMBER OF 1968 IT TOOK THEM SEVERAL
YEARS TO AGREE ON A NEW COLLECTIVE FARM STATUTE
AS FOR THE ALLOCATION OF CRITICAL RESOURCES, BY AND
LARGE THEY HAVE MADE NO MAJOR CHANGES IN THE POLICIES
THAT PREVAILED BEFORE THEY CAME TO POWER THE MILI-
TARY STILL HAS AN OVERRIDING PRIORITY THE CONSUMER
GOT A SOMEWHAT BETTER BREAK BUT AGRICULTURE FOR
THE PRECEDING THREE YEARS KEPT PACE WITH ITS PROB-
LEMS ONLY THANKS TO EXCELLENT WEATHER THE INDUS-
TRIAL PLANT HAS BEEN SLIGHTED IN INVESTMENTS TO THE
POINT WHERE A DAY OF RECKONING IS NOT FAR OFF IN
TERMS OF BASIC ECONOMIC GROWTH AND GROSS NATIONAL
PRODUCT. UNLESS THERE IS A NEW DEAL IN DIVIDING UP
RESOURCES
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THE LEADERSHIP HAS FACED UP ONLY TO ONE HARD
DECISION: THE INTERVENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE
RECORD IN 1968 WAS ONE OF HESITANCY AND TEMPORIZING
FROM THE BEGINNING OF DUBCEK~S REFORM PROGRAM IN
.JANUARY UNTIL THE ACTUAL INVASION IN AUGUST, WHILE
WE DO NOT KNOW EXACTLY HOW THE POLITBURO WAS ALIGNED
FOR AND AGAINST INTERVENTION. THE FRICTION WAS UN-
DOUBTEDLY THERE. AND HAS BEEN REFLECTED--EVEN AFTER
THE INVASION--IN THE CONTINUED PULLING AND HAULING
ABOUT HOW TO GET THE CZECHS BACK ON THE MOSCOW PARTY
LINE,
THESE SOVIET LEADERS ARE ORGANIZATION MEN. UN-
COMFORTABLE WHEN CONFRONTED WITH THE UNFAMILIAR AND
THE UNEXPECTED, THEY CONSORT TOGETHER AS MUCH FOR
MUTUAL SAFETY AS FOR UNITY,
IN .JULY 1968, FOR EXAMPLE, THE WORLD WAS TREATED
TO THE SPECTACLE OF NINE OF THE 11 POLITBURO MEMBERS
TROOPING OFF TOGETHER FOR THE TALKS WITH THE CZECHS
AT CIERNA ON THE BORDER, PART OF THE APPEAL OF
THIS TOGETHERNESS IS THAT NEITHER BREZHNEV NOR KO-
SYGIN APPEARS TO BE STRONG ENOUGH TO RISK THE RESPON-
SIBILITY FOR A SERIOUS MISTAKE, AND EVEN IF THESE TWO
HAD A GREAT DEAL OF TRUST AND RESPECT FOR EACH OTHER--
WHICH IS DOUBTFUL--THEY ALSO NEED TO KEEP AN EYE ON
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OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COLLECTIVE, THERE ARE YOUNGER
MEN IN THE POLITBURO--SHELEPIN SHELL-YAP-PEEN) AND
POLYANSKY. FOR INSTANCE--WHO ARE READY AND WILLING
TO ASSUME LEADERSHIP,
COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN TRIED IN RUSSIA
BEFORE. AND THESE MEN ARE ACUTELY CONSCIOUS OF THE
FACT THAT IN THE END. IT HAS ALWAYS GIVEN WAY TO
ONE-MAN RULE, HISTORY DOES NOT HAVE ZQ REPEAT IT-
SELF. BUT THE MEN IN THE KREMLIN TODAY WILL HAVE TO
OVERCOME THEIR INCREASING TENSIONS AND THEIR UNSOLVED
PROBLEMS TO AVOID IT,
I DON'T WANT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE
GOVERNMENT OF RUSSIA IS IN THE HANDS OF BUMBLING
SECOND-RATERS, THESE MEN GREW UP UNDER STALIN. AND
THEY HAVE NO WISH TO RETURN TO HIS MANIC TYPE OF
DESPOTISM. BUT THEY ALSO GREW UP UNDER COMMUNISM
AND THE SO-CALLED "DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT."
AND THEY ARE FIRMLY COMMITTED TO ITS PRINCIPLES AND
GOALS, MOSCOW'S TACTICS MAY HAVE BECOME MORE CAU-
TIOUS. MORE GRADUAL. AND LESS BLATANTLY AGGRESSIVE.
BUT THE OBJECTIVES OF THE KREMLIN REMAIN UNCHANGED,
WHEN KHRUSHCHEV UNDERTOOK HIS CUBAN MISSILE
ADVENTURE IN 1962, HE OVEREXTENDED HIMSELF. INTO A
POSITION WHERE HE EITHER HAD TO RUN A GRAVE RISK OF
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GLOBAL WAR. OR BACK DOWN, THIS. AS MUCH AS ANY
OTHER FACTOR, COST HIM HIS JOB, ALTHOUGH IT TOOK
ANOTHER TWO YEARS FOR THE AXE TO FALL, THE MEN
WHO TOOK HIS PLACE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN PROJECTING THE
POWER AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE USSR BEYOND THE SO-
VIET BORDERS, BECAUSE THEY HAVE DONE IT IN SMALLER.
MORE GRADUAL PROBING STEPS,
TODAY A SUBSTANTIAL SOVIET NAVAL SQUADRON OF
MODERN MISSILE SHIPS. AMPHIBIOUS CRAFT AND SUBMARINES
PATROLS THE MEDITERRANEAN, OTHER SOVIET NAVAL CRAFT
SHOW THE FLAG IN AFRICAN PORTS. IN THE INDIAN OCEAN,
AND EVEN IN THE CARIBBEAN, SOVIET PATROL BOMBERS
OPERATE FROM EGYPTIAN AIRFIELDS, WHERE THERE WAS
ONCE AN ALMOST PATHOLOGICAL SUSPICION OF RUSSIA IN
THE NORTHERN TIER OF THE OLD BAGHDAD PACT. TURKEY
HAS WELCOMED A SOVIET PREMIER ON A STATE VISIT. AND
RESTRICTS U,S, ACCESS TO THE BLACK SEA. WHILE IRAN
BUYS WEAPONS FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND HAS ACCEPTED
SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC AID, SOVIET DIPLOMATIC AND
TRADE MISSIONS ARE PROLIFERATING IN AFRICA. IN ASIA.
AND IN LATIN AMERICA, SOVIET AIR LINES HAVE PUSHED
FARTHER INTO AFRICA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, EVEN THE
CHINESE NATIONALISTS ARE RECEPTIVE TO CAUTIOUS CON-
TACTS WITH THE SOVIETS,
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IRONICALLY, THESE SOVIET ADVANCES ON ABROAD
FRONT OUTSIDE THE COMMUNIST ORBIT HAVE BEEN A000M-
PANIED BY SETBACKS INSIDE THE BLOC, WHERE I~OSCOW~S
MOST CASUAL WORD USED TO BE LAW. THE PRESENT KREM-
LIN LEADERSHIP FINALLY SUCCEEDED THIS PAST SUMMER
IN SUMMONING A WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE. BUT THE
COMMUNIST DELEGATES TO THESE MEETINGS NO LONGER JUST
COME TO CHEER AND RUBBER-STAMP MOSCOW~S RESOLUTIONS
IN EASTERN EUROPE. YUGOSLAVIA HAS FIRMLY ESTABLISHED
ITS INDEPENDENCE CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS BROUGHT BACK
INTO LINE ONLY BY FORCE THE RUMANIANS STILL ACT AS
MAVERICKS I N THE ~r~IARSAW PACT AND I N TH E COMMUNIST
ECONOMIC COUNCIL. SHOWING JUST A BIT MORE DISCRETION
TO AVOID THE CZECH FATE THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT AP-
PEARS TO BE IRRECONCILAB LE, AS LONG AS THE PRESENT
LEADERS REMAIN IN CONTROL IN PEKING
AT HOME, THE KREMLIN HAS HAD TO CRACK DOWN ON
A SURPRISING AMOUNT OF DISSENT WHERE PREVIOUSLY
ONLY A HANDFUL OF ARTISTS AND WRITERS HAD MAINTAINED
AN INDEPENDENT ATTITUDE. THE HABIT OF CRITICAL THOUGHT
NOW IS SPREADING IN SCIENTIFIC CIRCLES
THIS DICHOTOMY BETWEEN KREMLIN PROGRESS IN THE
FREE WORLD AND KREMLIN PROBLEMS AT HOME MAY WELL BE
A REFLECTION OF A GENERATION WHICH HAS LIVED ITS
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ENTIRE LIFE UNDER COMMUNISM. AND HAS LEARNED IN THE
PROCESS THAT ANY CREED HAS TO HAVE A CERTAIN AMOUNT
OF BUILT-IN FLEXIBILITY AND ACCOMMODATION TO SUR-
VIVE AND PROSPER
BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN & COMPANY ARE MORE PRAGMATIC
THAN THEY ARE DOGMATIC, THEY ARE COMMUNISTS FIRST
AND FOREMOST, DEDICATED TO THE CREED CREATED BY MARX
AND LENIN, BUT THEY ARE ALSO SUFFICIENTLY REALISTIC
TO RECOGNIZE THAT AS LONG AS THERE ARE STRONG UNBE-
LIEVERS IN THE REST OF THE WORLD, THAT WORLD IS NOT
ALWAYS GOING TO CONFORM TO THE DIALECTICAL BLUEPRINTS
DRAWN UP SO AND lOO YEARS AGO BY LENIN AND MARX, THEY
ARE WILLING TO TEMPER THEIR BELIEFS TO ACCOMMODATE THE
NON-COMMUNIST WORLD. WHENEVER THIS CAN LEAD TO AN
AGREEMENT WHICH SERVES THE INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET
UNION ON OCCASION. THEY HAVE SACRIFICED THE INTER-
ESTS OF LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE PROCESS
TO SUMMARIZE THE STATUS OF THE SOVIET UNION.
THEN, COMMUNIST RUSSIA WILL BE OUR ENEMY--THE SPLIT
WITH PEKING NOTWITHSTANDING--AS LONG AS THIS COUNTRY
BELIEVES IN DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM. AND IS PREPARED
TO HELP OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH SHARE OUR BELIEFS
RUSSIA HAS MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH AN ECONOMY WHICH IS
LESS THAN HALF THE SIZE OF OURS. BUT IT HAS MILITARY
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POWER WHICH CONSTITUTES A DETERRENT TO GLOBAL WAR.
AND WHICH INCREASINGLY CAN BACK UP A DYNAMIC SOVIET
POLICY IN VITAL WORLD AREAS OUTSIDE THE USSR, FI-
NALLY. IT HAS A LEADERSHIP WHICH SUFFERS FROM SOME
BUILT-IN CONSTRAINTS OF HESITANCY, FRICTION. AND
IMMOBILISM, BUT WHICH MOVES EFFECTIVELY AND REALISTIC-
ALLY TO ADVANCE THE CAUSE OF THE SOVIET STAT E
COMMUNIST CHINA
!~'~HILE THE QUESTION IN RUSSIA IS WHETHER ONE-MAN
RULE CAN BE AVOIDED, THE QUESTION IN COMMUNIST CHINA
IS HOW LONG THE RULE OF ONE PARTICULAR MAN WILL CON-
TINUE
MAO TSE-TUNG IS ~5 YEARS OLD, AND HE SUFFERS
FROM PROGRESSIVE CEREBRAL ARTERIOSCLEROSIS--HARDENING
OF THE ARTERIES IN THE BRAIN--WHICH IS USUALLY A000M-
PANIED BY INCREASING MENTAL RIGIDITY, IN MAO~S CASE.
IT IS OBVIOUSLY ALSO ACCOMPANIED BY A DEEP-SEATED
SUSPICION OF ALL AROUND HIM,
COMMUNIST CHINA HAS GONE THROUGH THREE YEARS OF
CHAOS CALLED THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. VIRTUALLY DE-
STROYING THE COMMUNIST PARTY APPARATUS WHICH HAD
BEEN THE MAIN INSTRUMENT OF POWER, MAO WAS INSPIRED
TO LET LOOSE THIS UPHEAVAL. AS FAR AS WE CAN DETERMINE,
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BY HIS CONCLUSION THAT THE PARTY OFFICIALS WERE BE-
COMING STODGY AND SET IN THEIR WAYS--THAT THEY NO
LONGER HAD THE REVOLUTIONARY FERVOR OF THE FAMOUS
"LONG MARCH." AND COULD NOT BE COUNTED ON TO CONTINUE
HIS DOCTRINE OF PERMANENT REVOLUTION WHEN HE WAS GONE,
IN PART. HIS SUSPICIONS WENT BACK TO THE DAYS OF
THE DISASTROUS ECONOMIC COLLAPSE AT THE CULMINATION
OF THE "GREAT LEAP FORWARD" PROGRAM, AT THAT TIME
THE OTHER CHINESE LEADERS. TRYING TO SALVAGE THE
CHINESE ECONOMY. REVERSED SOME OF MAO~S PROGRAMS WHICH
HAD LED TO THE COLLAPSE, MAO APPARENTLY DECIDED. THEN
AND THERE. THAT MEN WHO OPPOSED AND REVERSED HIS POLI-
CIES MUST BE HIS ENEMIES, WHEN HIS SUSPICIONS HAD
REACHED A BOIL. HE UNLEASHED THE RIOTOUS RED GUARDS.
THE UNCONTROLLED JUVENILE GANGS WHO WERE TO PURGE
THE PARTY MACHINERY AND EITHER RE-MAKE OR REPLACE IT,
THE RESULT WAS A TURMOIL WHICH BROUGHT GOVERN-
MENT ADMINISTRATION TO A HALT. WRECKED PUBLIC ORDER
AND EDUCATION. AND EVENTUALLY DID SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE
TO THE ECONOMY, CHINA VERGED ON CIVIL WAR. UNTIL THE
ARMY STEPPED IN TO RESTORE ORDER AND CONSTRAIN THE
RED GUARDS,
IdOW. THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS HAVE COMPLETED A
PARTY CONGRESS WHICH PURPORTS TO HAVE RESTORED SOME
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MEASURE OF STABILITY AND ORDER. ALTHOUGH THE NEW
CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS A MIXTURE OF ARMY MEN, CULTURAL
REVOLUTION LEADERS, AND OLD GUARDS WHICH SO FAR RE-
SISTS ANY FIRM ANALYSIS,
THE EXTENT OF THE PURGE IS SHOWN BY THE FACT
THAT TWO OUT OF EVERY THREE MEMBERS OF THE OLD CENTRAL
COMMITTEE WERE MISSING ON THE NEW LIST BUT NONE OF
THE VARIOUS COMPETING FACTIONS HAS MANAGED TO ACHIEVE
DOMINANCE OF THE NEW EXPANDED BODY, AND THE EVIDENCE
WE HAVE STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL
OF CONTINUING DEBATE IN THE SECRET SESSIONS OF THE
CONGRESS
ABOUT ALL THAT CAN BE SAID FOR SURE. IN FACT.
IS THAT THE MORE MODERATE GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRATS,
EXCEPT PERHAPS PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI, HAVE LOST INFLU-
ENCE CHOU HIMSELF HAS RETAINED HIS NUMBER THREE
RATING, THE MILITARY ELEMENT REMAINS VERY STRONG,
WITH MARSHAL LIN PIAO FIRMLY IN THE NUMBER TWO SPOT
AS THE DESIGNATED SUCCESSOR TO MAO MAO HIMSELF IS
IN UNCONTESTED POSSESSION OF THE TOP SPOT. SURROUNDED
BY LEADERS WHO PUSHED THE RADICAL GOALS OF THE CUL-
TURAL REVOLUTION,
SINCE THIS SUMMER, PEKING HAS BEEN TRYING TO
RESTORE SOME SEMBLANCE OF NORMALITY TO THE COUNTRY,
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THE FACTIONAL FIGHTING HAS TAPERED OFF IN ALL BUT A
FEW ISOLATED AREAS, A NATIONAL ECONOMIC PLAN IS BE-
ING WORKED OUT, EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE TO REBUILD
THE SHATTERED PARTY AND ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY,
THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE PARTY. HOWEVER. IS IN
TROUBLE BECAUSE OF PEKING'S INSISTENCE THAT NEW LOCAL
COMMITTEES HAVE TO INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES BOTH OF
THE RED GUARDS. AND OF THE OLD PARTY OFFICIALS WHO
WERE THE TARGETS OF THE RED GUARD RAMPAGES,
I~VERSHADOWING THE ENTIRE PROCESS IS THE THREAT
THAT MAO MIGHT DECIDE TO REVIVE THE TURMOIL, HE HAS
DEMONSTRATED THAT HE WILL PROBABLY NEVER BE SATISFIED
WITH STABILITY ACHIEVED AT THE EXPENSE OF HIS DESIRE
FOR A PERMANENT STATE OF REVOLUTION, AS LONG AS MAO
RETAINS CONTROL, THERE IS A LIKELIHOOD THAT THE INTER-
NAL CONFLICT WILL BE REVIVED. AND THE FORCES OPPOSING
HIM WILL BE UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE TO UNITE IN AN
EFFORT TO STOP HIM,
CHINESE ADVANCED WEAPONS
IF I MAY TURN NOW TO CHINA'S MILITARY CAPABILI-
TIES. THE INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT OF PEKING'S HUGE
CONVENTIONAL MILITARY FORCES IS THAT THEY CAN OVER-
RUN ANY OF THEIR SMALLER ASIAN NEIGHBORS. BUT ONLY
IF THEY DO NOT ENCOUNTER OPPOSITION FROM A MAJOR
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MILITARY POWER--MEANING THE UNITED STATES ~ THE
SOVIET UNION THE LIMITATIONS IN THIS ASSESSMENT
WILL HAVE TO BE RECONSIDERED, HOWEVER. AS COMMUNIST
CHINA PROGRESSES WITH ITS ADVANCED WEAPONS PROGRAMS
WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE DISRUPTIONS
OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, DESPITE EFFORTS TO
SHIELD THE HIGH PRIORITY MILITARY PROGRAMS FROM THE
TURMOIL. HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO DELAYS AND SETBACKS IN
THE ADVANCED WEAPONS FIELD,
ACCORDING TO OUR ESTIMATES, PEKING COULD HAVE
BEGUN DEPLOYMENT OF A 1,000-MILE BALLISTIC MISSILE
TWO YEARS AGO. AND IT COULD HAVE STARTED PRODUCING
ITS VERSIONS OF THE MIG-21 JET FIGHTER AND THE TU-16
MEDIUM JET BOMBER EARLY LAST YEAR WE HAVE YET, HOW-
EVER, TO DETECT ANY MISSILE DEPLOYMENT, OR I~IG-21
ASSEMBLY, PRODUCTION OF THE TU-16 FINALLY BEGAN THIS
SUMMER AS FOR THE NUCLEAR WEAPON PROGRAM. THE CHI-
NESE HAVE DISPLAYED A THERMONUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN THE
LOW MEGATON RANGE. BUT THERE ARE LONG GAPS BETWEEN
SHOTS THEIR FIRST TEN TESTS HAVE BEEN SPREAD OVER
FIVE YEARS
A LAUNCH PAD LARGE ENOUGH TO HANDLE AN ICBM was
RUSHED TO COMPLETION AT SHUANG-CHENG-TZU, CHINAS
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REMOTE MISSILE TEST CENTER. EARLY IN 1967. BUT BE-
FORE IT WAS USED, THE CHINESE BEGAN MAJOR MODIFICA-
TIONS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SECOND LAUNCH PAD
AT THE SAME COMPLEX
WE KNOW THAT CHINA IS WORKING ON AN ICBM. BUT
THE EVENTS AT THE TEST RANGE LEAD US TO BELIEVE THAT
THEY HAVE ENCOUNTERED PROBLEMS WHICH REQUIRED MAJOR
CHANGES IN THE SYSTEM ONCE THEY BEGIN FLIGHT TESTS
OF ICBM COMPONENTS, THE EARLIEST CONCEIVABLE DATE
FOR AN INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY WOULD BE THREE
YEARS LATER THAT DATE HAS NOW SLIPPED TO EARLY 1973
AT LEAST. AND THE PROCESS COULD TAKE TWO OR THREE
YEARS MORE IN THE LIGHT OF CHINAS INEXPERIENCE, ITS
LIMITED SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL BASE. AND THE CON-
TINUING POLITICAL DISRUPTIONS ASSUMING THE EARLIEST
POSSIBLE DATE IN 1973 FOR AN INITIAL CAPABILITY, IT
IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE CHINESE COULD ACHIEVE AN OPER-
ATIONAL FORCE OF MORE THAN lO TO 25 ICBMs WITH THERMO-
NUCLEAR WARHEADS BY 1975,
COMMUNIST CHINA HAS NO INTERCONTINENTAL BOMBERS,
AND WHILE THERE IS ONE BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE--
A COPY OF THE SOVIET G-CLASS--THERE IS AS YET NO
MISSILE FOR IT, AND THE CHINESE NAVY HAS NO EXPERIENCE
WHATSOEVER IN SUBMARINE OPERATIONS BEYOND COASTAL
WATERS
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IF WE ARE SPEAKING, THEN, OF A CHINESE COMMUNIST
MILITARY THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES, IT COMES DOWN
TO A POSSIBLE HANDFUL OF ICB~~S IN MID-19%5, BY NO
STRETCH OF THE IMAGINATION AN ASSURED DESTRUCTION
CAPABILITY, OR EVEN ENOUGH FOR A REALLY CRIPPLING
BLOW IN A SNEAK ATTAC K
IHRUSHCHEV ONCE SAID THAT ~~IAO 1SE-TUNG WOULD
WELCOME GLOBAL NUCLEAR WAR BECAUSE CHINA IS THE ONLY
COUNTRY IN THE WORLD THAT COULD ACCEPT 3OO MILLION
CASUALTIES AND STILL HAVE A NATION THE SOURCE IS
SUSPECT, AND THE THOUGHT APPEARS TO BE IRRATIONAL,
PEKING HAS, AS A MATTER OF FACT, ALWAYS TALKED A TOUGH
GAME, BUT WE CAN TAKE SOME COMFORT FROM THE CHINESE
COMMUNISTS RECORD OF EXTREME CAUTION IN SITUATIONS IN-
VOLVING A DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH THE UNITED STATES,
NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS MUCH IN ~IAO~S RECORD ON
DOMESTIC MATTERS THAI' PROVES HIM CAPABLE OF RASH AND
ILLOGICAL DECISIONS THAT IS WHY THE CHINESE THERh10-
NUCLEAR IC.ui PROGRAM WILL CONTINUE TO BE WATCHED VERY
CLOSELY AS A POTENTIAL THREAT TO U,S, INTERESTS.
F;S FOR THE PRESENT STATUS OF SINO-SOVIET RELA-
TIONS, WHEN THE GREAT RIFT BECAME PUBLIC IN 1960 IT
TOOK A LONG TIME FOR THE EXPERTS TO CONCLUDE THAT
THE DISPUTE HLAS REAL, DEEP-SEATED, AND DURABLE, IT
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HAD LASTED FOR MORE THAN lO YEARS, CULMINATING IN
SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY CLASHES ALONG THE BORDER, WHEN
S UDDEPJLY PRIME i'I I N I STER KOSYG I N, FLYING HOME ACROSS
SOUTH ASIA FROM HO CHI ~INH~S FUNERAL, VEERED EAST-
t^IA RD, CHANGED PLANES AT IRKUTSK? AND FLEW TO PEKING
FOR A DRAMATIC MEETING WITH CHINESE PREMIER CHOU
~N-LAIC
WHY? WELL, BOTH COUNTRIES FOUND THEMSELVES
BEING IMPELLED 1~OWARD A LEVEL OF CONFRONTATION WHICH
THEY DID iJOT SEEK, WHICH THEY MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO
CONTROL, AND WHICH APPEARED DANGEROUS ENOUGH TO MAKE
ACCOMMODATION AN URGENT REQUIREMENT
WE NOW KNOW THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN
CONCERNED THAT THE FREE WORLD MIGHT BE ENCOURAGED BY
A HOTTER SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE TO SEEK A DIPLOMATIC
ADVANTAGE OVER A PREOCCUPIED iIUSSIA~ THE SOVIET
LEADERS DID NOT WANT INTENSIFIED BORDER FIGHTING TO
UNDERMINE THE SUPPORT WHICH THEY HAD SO PAINFULLY
WON FROM THE OTHER WORLD COMMUNIST PARTIES ON THE
CHINA ISSUE, BY CASTING ZUSSIA IN THE ROLE OF AN
"AGGRESSOR" BULLYING A WEAKER NEIGHBOR AND STRANGE
AS IT MAY SOUND TO OUR EARS, THE GREMLIN ALSO AP-
PEARS TO BE CONCERNED THAT CHINESE FEAR OF A SHOW-
DOWN WITH THE USSR MIGHT DRIVE PEKING TO SEEK SOME
MEANS OF DETENTE WITH THE UNITED STATESI
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THE CHINESE, FOR THEIR PART. ARE IN NO SHAPE TO
UNDERTAKE MAJOR BATTLES WITH THE SOVIETS IN THE RE-
P10TE BORDER REGIONS
THE ~{USSIANS. IRONICALLY, STARTED THE COOLING-
OFF PROCESS BY HEATING THINGS UPS ~Y A NUMBER OF
CAREFUL AND INTENTIONAL "INDISCRETIONS," THEY LET
THE CHINESE KNOW THAT ~'~OSCOW WAS DISCUSSING WITH A
FEW COMRADELY GOVERNMENTS THE CONSEQUENCES OF A POS-
SIBLE PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE AGAINST THE CHINESE ADVANCED
WEAPONS FACILITIES
THIS, TOGETHER WITH A CONTINUING RUSSIAN BUILD-
UP WHICH HAS DOUBLED SOVIET FORCES IN THE FRONTIER
AREA OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS, WAS APPARENTLY ENOUGH
TO CONVINCE THE CHINESE THAT THE SITUATION WAS IN-
DEED DANGEROUS, AND THEY AGREED TO THE CHOU-KOSYGIN
MEETING WHILE THE RUSSIAN PREMIER WAS ACTUALLY IN
MID-AIR.
NEITHER ~`^OSCOW NOR PEKING IS PREPARED UNDER
PRESENT LEADERSHIP TO GIVE GROUND ON ANY OF THE PO-
LITICAL ANU IDEOLOGICAL ISSUES WHICH ARE BASIC TO
THE SPLIT, THE TWO SIDES WILL EVEN BE HARD PRESSED
TO FIND THE FLEXIBILITY NEEDED TO RESOLVE THE LESS
FUNDAMENTAL BORDER DISPUTES i'~OSCOW, JUDGING THAT
IT NOW HOLDS BOTH A MILITARY AND A PGLITICAL ADVANTAGE
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OVER THE CHINESE, WANTS SETTLEMENTS OF SPECIFIC TER-
RITORIAL ARGUMENTS WHICH WOULD--IF REACHED--ELIMINATE
BORDER QUESTIONS FROM THE LIST OF SING-SOVIET PROBLEF1S~
THE CHINESE, HOWEVER, HAVE A MORE LIMITED OBJECTIVE
THEY WANT TO PREVENT' FURTHER BORDER CLASHES WHICH THEY
FEAR MIGHT GIVE THE SOVIETS PRETEXT FOR A MAJOR AT-
TACK~ TO THIS END, THEY ARE INSISTING ON AGREEMENT--
BEFORE ANY OTHER SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ARE DISCUSSED--
FOR f1UTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM THE IMMEDIATE
i30RDER AREA GIVEN THESE DIFFERENCES IN VIEWPOINTS
AND OBJECTIVES, IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT THE BORDER
TALKS IN PEKING APPEAR TO BE STALEMATED
THE CHINESE ARE COMPLAINING IN ~IONG KONG THAT
THE RUSSIANS ARE TRYING TO NEGOTIATE FROM STRENGTH
THE SOVIETS, IN TURN, ARE DROPPING HINTS THAT THE
CHINESE DO NOT APPEAR TO WANT TO NEGOTIATE ANYTHING
JO THE SING-SOVIET DISPUTE CONTINUES--ALTHOUGH SOME
OF THE HEAT MAY HAVE GONE OUT OF IT FOR THE TIME BEING
COMMUNISTS IN HFRICA
I MENTIONED EARLIER THE PROLIFERATION OF BRANDS
OF COMMUNISM--THE SOVIET, THE CHINESE, THE CUBAN,
AND EVEPJ THE YUGOSLAV MODELS, ALL OF WHICH ARE PLAY-
ING RIVAL ROLES IN THE COMMUNIST BID FOR INFLUENCE
IN THE THIRD WORLD THEY ARE COMPETING, ANU IN MANY
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INSTANCES IT IS A CUTTHROAT COMPETITION, BUT FROM OUR
VIEWPOINT, THE EFFORTS DO NOT CANCEL EACH OTHER OUTS
~~ATHER, THEY ARE CUMULATIVE IN THEIR EFFECT AS FAR AS
PROBLEMS FOR THE FREE WORLD ARE CONCERNED THIS IS
A NECESSARY PREFACE TO DISCUSSION OF COMMUNIST AC-
TIVITIES IN AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA
OrJ THE AFRICAN CONTINENT, COMMUNIST AS AN IDE-
OLOGY HAS MADE FEW INROADS. THERE ARE, OF COURSE,
GRO1~lING NUMBERS OF t`iFRICANS WHO HAVE BEEN EXPOSED TO
COMMUNIST INDOCTRINATION, i7ORE THAN S,COO AFRICANS,
FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE BEEN TRAINED IN THE SOVIET UNION,
AND SOME OF l'HEM ATTENDED PARTY SCHOOLS THE NEW
riFRICAN GOVERNMENTS GIVE THEM IMPORTANT JOBS BECAUSE
THEY HAVE A DESPERATE NEED FOR ALL WHO HAVE RECEIVED
ANY FORM OF TRAINING THESE GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR
PEOPLE, HOWEVER, ARE OVERWHELMINGLY NATIONALIST IN
THEIR ORIENTATION--MANY OF THEM TO THE EXTENT OF
A STRONG DISTRUST OR HOSTILITY TOWARD ALL FOREIGNERS
THIS FACTOR WILL PREVENT COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY FROM
h1AKING MUCH HEADWAY IN AFRICA FOR A LONG TIME
~'~OSCOW AND PEKING LEARNED THIS THE HARD WAY.
THE PUSSIANS HAVE BEEN THROWN OUT OF THE CONGO TWICE
FOR h1EDDLING IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS, AND ARE NOW ON
THEIR BEST BEHAVIOR SINCE THEIR RE-ADMISSION BY
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PRESIDENT ~IOBUTU~ THE CHINESE HAVE HAD SOME SUC-
CESS ~dITH A RACIAL APPEAL THAT ALL COLORED PEOPLE--
BLACK AND YELLOW--SHOULD WORK TOGETHER AGAINST THE
WHITES, BUT THEY MADE THE MISTAKE OF OVERDOING THEIR
EXPORT OF SAO'S THOUGHT AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION,
AND HAVE BEEN CALLED TO ACCOUNT FOR IT BY SEVERAL
NFRICAN GOVERNMENTS
KENYA, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS SO INCENSED OVER THE
WHOLESALE MAILING OF CIAO TSE-TUNG BADGES AND "MAO
THOUGHT" LEAFLETS THAT A LAW WAS PASSED IN 1967 TO
PROHIBIT THE DISPLAY OF POLITICAL BADGES KING
F~ASSAN OF MOROCCO COMPLAINED PUBLICLY ABOUT WHAT HE
CALLED "TONS OF SUBVERSIVE LEAFLETS WHICH ENTER
`'MOROCCO UNDER CHINESE EMBASSY COVER " EARLIER, WHEN
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION APPEARED TO BE PERSECUTING
THE ~``~OSLEM MINORITY IN CHINA, THE MOROCCAN AMBASSA-
DOR WAS RECALLED FROM PEKING, AND A MEMBER OF THE
CEYLON PARLIAMENT TRIED TO DELIVER A PROTEST NOTE
TO THE CHINESE COMMUNIST EMBASSY IN CEYLON, THE
CHINESE IN BURUNDI WERE EXPELLED FOR THEIR EXCESSES
IN SUPPORTING THE REBELS IN THE CONGO,
THUS THE MAIN EMPHASIS IN THE ACTIVITIES OF
BOTH '~OSCOW AND PEKING HAS BEEN ON OPEN ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE, ON MILITARY SALES, ON CULTURAL CONTACTS
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AND ON TRAINING OFFERS. BOTH COUNTRIES IN RECENT
YEARS HAVE BEEN EXPANDING THEIR DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS
WITHOUT PAYING TO0 MUCH ATTENTION TO THE POLITICAL
LEANINGS OF THE AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED.
BOTH r`~OSCOW AND PEKING, OF COURSE, LOOK TO THEIR
ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID PRUGRAMS TO BUILD CONTACTS
AND INFLUENCE, PUTTING THEM IN A POSITION TO TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF ANY OPPORTUNITIES THAT MAY COME ALONG
TO ADVANCE COMMUNIST INTERESTS. THE MILITARY AID
~'iOSCOW HAS BEEN GIVING THE -`JIGERIANS IS ONE EXAMPLE,
AND BOTH RUSSIA AND CHINA GIVE MODERATE ASSISTANCE
TO AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS TRYING TO OVERTHROW
THE REMAINING WHITE REGIMES IN AFRICA. UNTIL vKRUMAH
WAS OVERTHROWN IN uHANA IN 196, THE SOVIETS AND EAST
EUROPEANS RAN A MAJOR INTELLIGENCE AND SUBVERSION
CENTER IN GHANA, WHILE THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS HAD A
TRAINING CAMP UPCOUNTRY FOR REVOLUTIONARIES.
CUBAN COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN LIMITED TO
THREE MAIN CATEGORIES; TRAINING AND ADVICE FOR SUB-
VERSIVE GROUPS OPERATING AGAINST KINSHASA CONGO AND
GORTUGUESE AFRICA; SUPPORT FOR THE BRAZZAVILLE CONGO
GOVERNMENT; AND DEVELOPING FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH
;ALGERIA. CASTRO BEGAN LIMITED GUERRILLA TRAINING
FOR A FEW AFRICAN EXTREMIST GROUPS IN 1961. CHE
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SUEVARA WAS INVOLVED IN THE CONGO REBELLION IN 1965
AND EARLY 1966, BUT SINCE THEN CUBAN INSTRUCTORS WHO
HAD BEEN WITH THE CONGO REBELS HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN
IN THE PAST, EARLY COMMUNIST AID EFFORTS WERE
GOOD FOR A FEW LAUGHS, LIKE THE SOVIET TRACTORS WHICH
TURNED UP IN UGANDA WITH FULLY WINTERIZED SIBERIAN-
STYLE CABS, OR THE MOUNTAINS OF CHINESE CEMENT THAT
SAT IN THE RAIN ON THE BURMESE DOCKS UNTIL THEY
TURNED TO CONCRETE THE COMMUNISTS HAVE BEEN IN THE
AID BUSINESS LONG ENOUGH NOW, HOWEVER, TO MAKE IT A
PROFESSIONAL OPERATION THEY HAVE LEARNED, FOR ONE
THING, THAT THE MOST A NATION SHOULD EXPECT FOR ITS
AID IS INFLUENCE OR AT LEAST ACCESS--THAT GRATITUDE
IS A WINDFALL, AND CONTROL AN OUTRIGHT MIRACLE, THEY
HAVE ALSO LEARNED TO RESIST THE SPLASHY, SHOWY AID
PROJECTS THAT DONUT PAY FOR THEMSELVES IN THE LONG
RUN, ALTHOUGH THEY STILL SEEK PROJECTS WITH HIGHLY
VISIBLE EFFECTS
THERE IS ONE FUNDAMENTAL FACT TO BE KEPT IN
MIND IN CONNECTION WITH THE COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE
IN AFRICA; THIS IS THE EXTREME SHORTAGE OF COMPETENT
NATIVE LEADERSHIP IN THE NEW AFRICAN NATIONS ON THE
EVE OF INDEPENDENCE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE ENTIRE BELGIAN
CONGO WAS REPORTED TO HAVE LESS THAN 2O NATIVE UNI-
VERSITY GRADUATES
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WITH SUCH A THIN VENEER OF LEADERSHIP. AFRICA
CAN ILL AFFORD THE BITTER TRIBAL ANIMOSITIES AND
POLITICAL RIVALRIES WHICH DIVIDE THE NEW NATIONS
AND KEEP POTENTIAL TALENT SITTING ON THE BENCH,
THERE IS EVEN GREATER DANGER, HOWEVER. IN THE FOR-
EIGN RIVALRIES WHICH MAKE ONE COUNTRY~S CANDIDATE
FOR OFFICE ANOTHER COUNTRY~S TARGET FOR DESTRUCTION,
THE COMMUNISTS MAY BE LESS CONCERNED ABOUT THIS
PROBLEM IN THE SHORT RUN, IF THE SOVIETS CAN DESTROY
A UGANDANS POLITICAL CAREER BY ACCUSING HIM OF SUB-
VERSIOPJ ON CHINAS ACCOUNT, SCORE ONE FOR THE SOVIETS,
IF AN ADMINISTRATOR IN ~ANZANIA CAN BE BROUGHT DOWN
BY LABELING HIM A STOOGE OF THE COLONIAL POWERS, ILL
OF THE COMMUNISTS BENEFIT, THE ONLY REAL LOSERS ARE
THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND THE FREE WORLD, THE AFRI-
CArJS i`JEED EVERY CAPABLE LEADER THEY HAVE; THE FREE
`~IORLD~S MAIN INTEREST IN AFRICA IS TO ESTABLISH OR-
DER AND TRANQUILITY; AND WHEN THE THIN LAYER OF
AFRICAN LEADERS IS EXHAUSTED, THE RESULT IS CHAOS,
FROM 4^1HICH ONLY THE COMMUNISTS CAN GAIN,
CO[`ZMUNISTS IN LATIN AMERICA
THE SITUATION IN ~ATIfd AMERICA IS DIFFERENT IN
SEVERAL ASPECTS, IN f~IOST COUNTRIES, THERE ARE PLENTY
OF CANDIDATES READY AND WILLING--WITH OR WITHOUT THE
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APPROVAL OF THE PEOPLE--TO EXERCISE LEADERSHIP IN
VIRTUALLY EVERY COUNTRY SOUTH OF THE RIO GRANDE,
THERE ARE ALSO WELL-ESTABLISHED COMMUNIST PARTIES--
ALTHOUGH MOST OF THEM ARE ILLEGAL
SEVERAL COUNTRIES, IN FACT, HAVE NOT ONE, BUT
THREE COMMUNIST FACTIONS, LOOKING RESPECTIVELY TO
'.''MOSCOW, TO PEKING, AND TO ~IAVANA FOR INSPIRATION,
SUPPORT, AND DIRECTION, Ifv SEVERAL OTHER COUNTRIES,
THERE ARE ONE OR MORE PARTIES OF THE EXTREME LEFT
WHICH ARE SO MILITANT THAT THEY HAVE BEEN FAVORED
BY CASTRO IN THE PAST OVER THE MORE ORTHODOX COM-
MUN ISTS--FOR EXAMPLE, THE I`1I R, OR ~~IOVENiENT OF THE
EVOLUTIONARY LEFT, IN VENEZUELA,
THE SOVIET UNION PURSUES ITS GOALS IN LATIN
AP~1ERICA AT PRESENT THROUGH A GRADUALIST POLICY EM-
PHASIZING STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS THE ORTHODOX
LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTY IS OPENLY URGED BY MOSCOW TO
SEEK A PARLLAMENTARY ROAD TO POWER SUBVERSION IS
DEEPLY CLANDESTINE, AND THE REVOLUTIONARY APPROACH--
WHILE STILL A LONG-RANGE OBJECTIVE--WOULD BE EN-
000RAGED AND SUPPORTED ONLY IF MOSCOW WERE VIRTUALLY
CERTALN OF EARLY SUCCESS,
IHE SOVIET UNION AT PRESENT HAS RELATIONS WHICH
PLACE ITS MISSIONS IN NINE LATIN ,AMERICAN COUNTRIES,
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INCLUDING CUBA, AND PROSPECTS FOR ADDING MORE IN THE
NEXT YEAR OR TWO, TEN YEARS AGO--WHEN ONLY i'~EXICO,
URUGUAY, AND ARGENTINA HAD SOVIET MISSIONS--THERE
WERE 131 SOVIETS ON OFFICIAL DUTIES IN ALL OF LATIN
AMERICA BY THE BEGINNING OF THIS YEAR, THOSE 131
HAD BECOME Z54--AND vJE CAN IDENTIFY MORE THAN HALF
OF THEM AS INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, THIS LATTER FACT
SHOULD BE AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT THE RESTRAINTS MOSCOW
HAS IMPOSED ON THE ORTHODOX COMMUNIST PARTIES ARE
NOT DICTATED BY ANY PERMANENT DEVOTION TO DEMOCRACY
IN LATIN AMERICA
IT COULD BE THAT THE KREMLIN IS IN NO HURRY TO
ACQUIRE A BATCH OF CLIENT STATES IN THE WESTERN HEM-
ISPHERE, ALL LOOKING TO MOSCOW TO SOLVE THEIR ECO-
NOMIC PROBLEMS, CUBA HAS BEEN A BURDENSOME LIABIL-
ITY A~dD FIDEL CASTRO AN UNMANAGEABLE HEADACHE EVER
SINCE HE JOINED THE COMMUNIST CAMP IN ANY EVENT,
LATIN AP~IERICA DOES NOT APPEAR TO RANK HIGH IN SOVIET
WORLD PRIORITIES
THE PRO-PEKING COMMUNISTS IN LATIN AMERICA ARE
LONG ON GOALS AND SHORT ON ASSETS, IN MANY LATIN
AMERICAN COUNTRIES, THERE IS EITHER A PRO-PEKING FAC-
TION IN THE REGULAR COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION, OR A
MIfJUSCULE SEPARATE PARTY FAVORING CHINA, BUT THESE
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GROUPS ARE SMALL AND RELATIVELY UNIMPORTANT, A PRO-
CHINESE COhMUNIST FACTION TOOK PART IN THE DOMINICAN
REVOLT, AND THERE IS ONE PRO-PEKING GUERRILLA GROUP--
THE POPULAR LIBERATION FORCE IN COLOMBIA PEKING
FURNISHES A VERY SMALL AMOUNT OF TRAINING AND FINAN-
CIAL SUPPORT TO GROUPS LIKE THESE, BUT IN MOST CASES
THE LATINS HAVE ALIGNED THEMSELVES WITH PEKING NOT
SO MUCH BECAUSE THEY PREFER ~~AO~S THOUGHT, BUT BE-
CAUSE MOSCOW FOR THE MOMENT IS NOT ENCOURAGING VIO-
LENT ACTION, AND PEKING IS.
~0 LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY EXCEPT CUBA MAINTAINS
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH PEKING THE ONLY OTHER
COMMUNIST CHINESE PRESENCE IN LATIN AMERICAN CONSISTS
OF A SMALL TRADE MISSION IN CHILE, AND BUREAUS OF THE
JEW CHINA ~~IEWS AGENCY. MANNED BY NATIVE CORRESPOND-
ENTS, IN CHILE AND URUGUAY TRADE BETWEEN COMMUNIST
CHINA AND LATIN AMERICA IS NEGLIGIBLE
FIDEL CASTRO HAS h1ODERATED CUBAN EFFORTS TO
EXPORT REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA SINCE THE DEATH
OF CHE JUEVARA IN BOLIVIA IN LATE 1967, THE LEVEL
OF CUBAN SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARIES IS PROBABLY
LOWER TODAY THAN IT HAS BEEN AT ANY TIME SINCE 1960,
CUBAN PROPAGANDA HAS BEEN TONED DOWN AND REDUCED,
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FRONT GROUPS LIKE THE LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY OR-
GANIZATION ARE VIRTUALLY DORMANT, AND THE THEME OF
REVOLUTION HAS DISAPPEARED FROM CAS1~ROrS SPEECHES
THIS CHANGE APPEARS TO BE IN PART A RESULT OF
SOVIET URGINGS, BUT PRINCIPALLY IT IS AN OUTGROWTH
OF CASTRO~S REAPPRAISAL OF THE PROSPECTS FOR REVOLU-
TIOfv IN THE HEMISPHERE, AND OF CUBAN ABILITY TO IN-
FLUENCE ITS
IPJ THE CASE OF GUEVARA~S BRIEF CAREER IN BOLIVIA,
U,S, SPECIAL FORCES INSTRUCTORS HAD GIVEN 000NTERIN-
SURGENCY TRAINING TO THE BOLIVIAN TROOPS WHICH FINALLY
ELIMINATED THE GUERRILLAS,
~~HAT HAD HAPPENED WAS THAT CHE AND SIXTEEN
OTHER CUBAN GUERRILLA EXPERTS CAME SWAGGERING INTO
BOLIVIA AND ANNOUNCED THAT THEY--THE CUBANS--WERE
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GOING TO RUN THE REVOLUTION FOR THE BOLIVIANS, THEY
OFFEPJDED THE BOLIVIAN COMMUNISTS, AND GUEVARA WOUND
UP WITH JUST A RELATIVE HANDFUL OF BOLIVIANS ON HIS
SIDE--A FEW PRO-CASTRO TYPES, AND NONE WHO WERE CAP-
ABLE OF WINNING THE SYMPATHIES OF THE PEASANTS
TELLS US THAT CASTRO, AFTER
STUDYING GUEVARA`S DIARY, HAS REACHED AT LEAST ONE
DECISION: PJEXT TIME--IF AND WHEN THERE IS A NEXT
TIME--THE CUBANS WHO JOIN GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS ELSE-
6^~HERE WILL JOIN AS COMMON SOLDIERS, AND NOT AS LEAD-
ERS UNLESS THEY CAN EARN THE LEADERSHIP IN THE EYES
OF THE LOCAL GUERRILLAS
CASTRO HAS NOT ABANDONED HIS HOPE FOR VIOLENT
REVOLUTION IN OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, BUT
FOR THE TIME BEING, HE WILL NOT COMMIT CUBAN MONEY
OR PERSONNEL UNLESS HE CAN DETECT FAR BETTER CHANCES
FOR SUCCES S
LIKE AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA ALSO HAS BASIC LOPJG-
RANGE PROBLEf~1S OTHER THAN COMMUNIST ACTIVITY WHICH
ARE CAUSE FOR CONCERN THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
FABRIC OF THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES IS SNOT
THROUGH. WITH VULNERABILITIES WHICH GIVE RISE TO
VIOLENCE, WHETHER OR NOT THERE ARE COMMUNISTS THERE
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TO EXPLOIT THEM, BANDITRY HAS BEEN A WAY OF LIFE
ON THE COLOMBIAN MOUNTAIfJSIDES SINCE THE DAYS OF
THE CONQUISTADORES, THE DESCA~,IS,~D.QS--THE "SHIRT-
LESS" POOR--I^JHO BROUGHT PERON TO POWER IN ARGENTINA
ALMOST 2S YEARS AGO, STILL HAVE MANY OF THE SAME
GRIEVANCES THE DESCENDANTS OF THE INCAS WHO ONCE
RULED PERU LIVE IN ABJECT POVERTY AND DEPRESSION
THE SMALL FARMERS AND THE HINTERLAND INDIANS IN
COUNTRY AFTER COUNTRY ARE GIVING UP AND MOVING TO
THE CITIES, WHERE THEY FILL MISERABLE, REBELLIOUS
SLUMS IN 1940, THERE WERE ONLY FIVE CITIES IN
LATIN AMERICA WITH POPULATIONS OVER ONE MILLION,
IN 1960, THERE WERE NINE; NEXT YEAR THERE WILL BE
1S: ANU WE ESTIMATE THAT IN 1980 THERE WILL BE 26
CITIES IN LATIN AMERICA WITH MORE THAN A MILLION
PEOPLE
(HIS IS AN EXPLOSIVE SITUATION, IN OUR ESTI-
MATI01'J, IT AFFORDS THE POSSIBILITY OF REAL REVOLUTION
IN LATIN AMERICA--AND BY THAT I MEAN A MAJOR UP-
HEAVAL TO CHANGE THE SOCIAL ORDER, NOT JUST A COUP
OR AN OCCASIONAL GUERRILLA OUTBREAK THE LEADERS
OF THIS REVOLUTION WILL PROBABLY BE YOUNG MEN FROM
THESE URBAN SLUMS THEY WILL NOT NECESSARILY BE
COMMUNISTS, OR PRO-CASTRO~ BUT THE SITUATION IS ONE
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WHICH THE COMMUNISTS ARE ALREADY EXPLOITING, AS WE
HAVE SEEN IN THE RECENT WAVE OF RIOTS IN MANY LATIN
AMERICAN CITIES,
THE ~~~IDDLE EAST
SEVERAL YEARS AGO, COMEDIAN STEVE ALLEN IN-
VENTED A QUIZ GAME IN REVERSE, SUPPLYING THE AN-
SWERS AND ASKING CONTESTAPJTS FOR THE QUESTIONS IF
THE ANSWER WAS "GEORGE WASHINGTON SLEPT HERE," THE
QUESTION OBVIOUSLY HAD TO BE "WHAT ARE THOSE CHERRY
PITS DOING IN MY BED?"
THIS IS APPEALING TO THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES,
IF ONLY BECAUSE CONGENITALLY WE HAVE SO MANY MORE
QUESTIONS THAN WE HAVE ANSWERS BUT SERIOUSLY, I
THINK THIS REVERSE PROCESS DEFINITELY HAS SOMETHING
TO OFFER ON THE SUBJECT OF COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN THE
l~~ORLD TODAY ,
START WITH THE ANSWER THAT OVER THE PAST DOZEN
YEARS OR S0, THE COMMUNIST NATIONS HAVE COMMITTED
MORE THAN 11 BILLION DOLLARS IN ECONOMIC AID, AND
SOME SIX BILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE
..............
TO THE UNDERDEVELOPED NATIONS OUTSIDE THE COMMUNIST
BLOC, THE BEST QUESTION I CAN POSE FOR THIS ANSWER
IS: "WHAT ARE 1"HE COMMUNISTS ~EA~LY UP TO?"
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TAKE A CLOSER LOOK AT THE DETAILED FIGURES FOR
THIS AID, AND YOU WILL FIND THAT 6c?~ PERCENT OF THE
ECONOMIC AID AND ALMOST 95 PERCENT OF THE MILITARY
AID HAS GONE TO THE AP,ABS, SOUTH ASIA, AND INDONESIA
THE EMPHASIS IS NOT ON BLACK AFRICA, NOR ON
LATIN AMERICA INSTEAD, THE THRUST OF MOTHER ~~USSIA
IS TOWARD THE WARM WATERS TO HER SOUTH JUST AS THE
CZARS OFFERED TO PROTECT THE MUSLIMS AND THE HINDUS
AGAI~JST THE BRITISH RAJ, THEIR COMMUNIST SUCCESSORS
BELLEVE THAT THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE GIVES THEM A
GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY TO BECOME THE PROTECTORS OF ALL
THE ARABS.
IT MAY NOT BE AN OVERSIMPLIFICATION TO SAY THAT
THE SOVIETS ARE BARGAINING IN HELSINKI AND PEKING SO
THAT THEY WILL BE FREE TO CST IN THE ~?~IDDLE EAST
THE I'IIDDLE EASTERN CRISIS BEGAN SOME ~,3CC YEARS
AGO WHEN THE HEBREWS--CULMINATING A MIGRATION WHICH
HAD BEGUN IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA--FOUGHT THEIR WAY
INTO PALESTINE THE LOCAL INHABITANTS, SUBJECTS OF
THE EGYPTIANS, APPEALED TO THE PHARAOH FOR HELP, BUT
NONE CAME, AND THE HEBREWS TOOK OVER
ABOUT 6OO YEARS LATER THE ARABS, ALSO ORIGINATING
IN THE ARABIAN DESERT, PUSHED INTO BABYLONIA--PRESENT-
DAY IRAQ THUS THE "HEBREWS AND THE ARABS ARE CLOSELY
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RELATED BY ORIGIN, BY RACE, AND BY LANGUAGE--AND THEY
HAVE BEEN NEIGHBORS FOR 2~ CENTURIES--BUT THERE IS NO
RECORD THAT THEY HAVE EVER GOTTEN ALONG TOGETHER
PALESTINE IN TURN HAS BEEP) RULED BY THE HEBREWS,
ASSYRIANS, BABYLONIANS, GREEKS, ROMANS, PERSIANS,
ARABS, CRUSADERS, TURKS, AND FINALLY BY THE BRITISH
IT WAS THE BRITISH, SEEKING HELP IN THE FIRST WORLD
WAR, WHO PROMISED BOTH THE .JEWS AND KING HUSAYN OF
~EJAZ--THE GREAT-GRANDFATHER OF THE PRESENT KING HU-
SAYN--BRITISH SUPPORT FOR THE CREATION OF AN INDEPEN-
DENT STATE IN THE HOMELAND, THE TROUBLE IS THAT
BOTH THE ARABS AND THE JEWS TOOK THE WORD "HOMELAND'r
TO MEAN PALESTINE,
IPJ ANY EVENT, THE NATION OF ISRAEL WAS CREATED
BY THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE IN 1948, THE ISRAELIS
HAD TO ESTABLISH THEIP, NEW STATE BY FORCE OF ARMS,
THEY SUSTAINED IT LN 1956, AND THEY ENLARGED IT IN
1967 WITH OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES ABOUT THREE TLMES
THE SIZE OF ISRAEL ITSELF
IT IS OUR ESTIMATE THAT THE ISRAELIS TODAY ARE
STILL MILITARILY SUPERIOR TO ANY FORCE THE COMBINED
ARAB STATES CAN BRING AGAINST THEP1, DESPITE SOVIET
RE-ARMAMENT AND TRAINING OF THE DEFEATED ARABS
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THE ARABS--HOWEVER--AND PARTICULARLY THE MILI-
TANT TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS--CONTINUE TO REFUSE TO
RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL. AND TALK UNREAL-
ISTICALLY OF PUSHING THE ISRAELIS BACK INTO THE SEAS
TENSION HAS BECOME ENDEMIC ALL ALONG THE ARAB-
ISRAELI FRONT THE ARAB LEADERS ARE UNDOUBTEDLY
AWARE THAT A RENEWAL OF GENERAL HOSTILITIES WOULD
BE SUICIDAL UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT PUBLIC
OPINION REQUIRES THEM TO MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE LEVEL
OF DEFIANCE THE TERRORISTS. WITH NO TERRITORY OR
ECONOMIC RESOURCES TO LOSE. DON'T CARE WHAT HAPPENS
AS LONG AS THERE IS NO SETTLEMENT UNTIL ISRAEL IS
DESTROYED SO THE EGYPTIANS KEEP SHELLING AND
PROBING ACROSS THE SUEZ CANAL: THE FEDAYEEN. SUPPORTED
BY SYRIA AND IRAQ, KEEP UP A STEADY RATE OF RAIDS,
SABOTAGE. SHELLING, AND OUTRIGHT TERRORISM; AND THE
ISRAELIS--HAVING FOUND NO OTHER DETERRENT--CONTINUE
TO INTENSIFY THE SCALE OF THEIR REPRISAL OPERATIONS
THE ISRAELIS, WHO WANT PEACE AND RECOGNITION
BY THE ARAB STATES~SAY THEY ARE PREPARED TO BE
REASONABLE--BY THEIR STANDARDS--IN REACHING A SET-
TLEMENT THE LONGER THEY HAVE TO WAIT. HOWEVER. THE
MORE HARDNOSED THEY ARE BECOMING ABOUT TERMS IT
IS ALREADY APPARENT THAT THEY INTEND TO KEEP ALL OF
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.JERUSALEM, THE GOLAN HEIGHTS THEY TOOK FROM SYRIA,
A POPULATED AND FORTIFIED DEFENSIVE BELT ALONG THE
WEST BANK OF THE JORDAN RIVER. AND PROBABLY A LINE
OF COMMUNICATION DOWN THE EAST COAST OF SINAI TO THE
STRAIT OF TIRAN, WHICH CONTROLS ACCESS TO THE PORT
OF EILAT~
THE ISRAELI CASE IS THAT THEY ARE OUTNUMBERED
2O TO ONE, THEIR COUNTRY IS BARELY lO MILES WIDE AT
SOME POINTS, AND THEY DO NOT PROPOSE TO LIVE FOREVER
IN AN ARMED CAMP ~'~ITH EACH WAR. AS THE ARABS GET
MORE FOREIGN SUPPORT AND THE ISRAELIS GET LESS, THE
ISRAELI MARGIN OF VICTORY GETS SLIMMER
THEY DO ~, HOWEVER. WANT AN IMPOSED OR MEDI-
ATED U,iV, OR FOUR-POWER SETTLEMENT. SET FORTH IN TWO
COPIES SO THAT THE ARABS WILL NOT HAVE TO PUT THEIR
SIGNATURES ON THE SAME PIECE OF PAPER WITH THE IS-
RAELIS,
ISRAEL INSISTS THAT THIS TIME, THE ARABS MUST
FINALLY END THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCY, RECOGNIZE THE
EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL, AND SIT DOWN AT THE TABLE AND
BARGAIN FACE TO FAC E
ISRAEL WILL SETTLE FOR NOTHING LESS THE ARABS,
HOWEVER, INSIST THAT THE ISRAELIS MUST FIRST AGREE
TO WITHDRAW FROM ALL OF THE ARAB TERRITORY OCCUPIED
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IN 1967. AND THEN SOME WAY WILL BE FOUND TO WORK
OUT A SETTLEMENT IN WHICH THE ARABS MIGHT OR MIGHT
NOT ACCEPT A FORMULA INVOLVING RECOGNITION OF
ISRAEL THE ARABS BELIEVE THAT THEY CAN COUNT ON
SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THIS STAND: THEY FIGURE FRANCE
IS IN THEIR CORNER: AND THEY HOPE THAT THE NEED FOR
MIDDLE EASTERN OIL AND A RE-OPENING OF THE SUEZ
CANAL WILL ULTIMATELY INDUCE THE UNITED STATES AND
BRITAIN TO BRING PRESSURE ON ISRAEL I MIGHT ADD
THAT AN ADDITIONAL FACTOR STIFFENING THE ARABS IS
THE WELL-JUSTIFIED DOUBT OF SOME ARAB REGIMES THAT
THEY CAN REMAIN IN POWER AGAINST THE GROWING APPEAL
OF THE FEDAYEEN IN THE EVENT OF ANY SETTLEMENT WITH
ISRAEL,
THERE SEEMS TO BE ALMOST NO PROSPECT FOR A RA-
TIONAL SETTLEMENT IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE
THERE REMAINS THE QUESTION OF RUSSIANS OBJEC-
TIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST A LONG LINE OF RUSSIAN
CZARS SOUGHT A WARM-WATER OUTLET FOR RUSSIA: THE
SOVIETS HAVE ACCOMPLISHED IT. THE SOVIET NAVY SAILS
THE MEDITERRANEAN. THE RED SEA. AND THE INDIAN OCEAN.
AND MAKES FRIENDLY PORT CALLS AT THE HEAD OF THE
PERSIAN GULF THE NORTHERN TIER BELOW THE BLACK
SEA AND THE CASPIAN HAS BEEN PENETRATED. AND THE
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SOVIETS ARE BUILDING A PRESENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
WHICH IS DISPLACING AMERICAN AND BRITISH INFLUENCE,
IT SUITS SOVIET PURPOSES TO KEEP THE MIDDLE EAST IN
A STATE OF TURMOIL AND UNREST,
AT THE SAME TIME, MOSCOW RECOGNIZES THAT THERE
ARE DANGERS, ANOTHER WAR AND ANOTHER ARAB DEFEAT
COULD DESTROY REGIMES ON WHICH MOSCOW HAS LAVISHED
A GREAT DEAL OF MONEY, MATERIAL. AND EFFORT, AND
THERE IS ALWAYS THE DANGER THAT ANOTHER WAR. WITH
RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES BACKING OPPOSING SIDES.
COULD LEAD TOWARD DIRECT INVOLVEMENT AND CONFRONTA-
TION OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS--AN EVENTUALITY WE BELIEVE
THE SOVIETS ARE DETERMINED TO AVOID,
MOSCOW, THEN, WILL TRY TO KEEP THE TENSION BE-
LOW THE BOILING POINT. BUT IT WILL DO LITTLE TO AD-
VANCE ANY SETTLEMENT WHICH DOES NOT CONFORM LARGELY
TO ARAB TERMS--AND ON THAT BASIS, THERE CAN BE NO
SETTLEMENT, THERE ARE REPORTS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE
DOING WHAT THEY CAN TO RESTRAIN THEIR ARAB CLIENTS
FROM ACTS WHICH COULD TOUCH OFF RENEWED GENERAL
HOSTILITIES--BUT THIS INVOLVES A VERY DELICATE
BALANCE BETWEEN A SIMMERING TENSION AND FULL-SCALE
WAR, IN MAY, 1967. THE SOVIETS FED THE ARABS IN-
FORMATION ABOUT ALLEGED ISRAELI MILITARY PREPARA-
TIONS, THE SOVIET AIM MAY HAVE BEEN TO MAKE THE
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ARABS MORE DEPENDENT ON RUSSIA. OR MORE ATTENTIVE.
BUT THE RUSSIANS GROSSLY MISCALCULATED BOTH THE ARAB
REACTION, AND THE ULTIMATE ISRAELI RESPONSE. MOSCOW
CERTAINLY DIDN'T WANT A WAR AT THAT POINT. BUT UASIR
ORDERED THE U~ PEACE-KEEPING FORCES AWAY FROM THE
BORDER, MOVED HIS TROOPS FORWARD INTO THE SINAI.
AND CLOSED THE STRAIT OF TIRANA EVEN BEFORE THE
FIGHTING STARTED. IT SEEMED INCONCEIVABLE TO US THAT
THE RUSSIANS DID NOT KNOW THAT CLOSING THE STRAIT
WOULD BE TAKEN AS AN ACT OF WAR BY THE ISRAELIS.
AND THAT TEL AVIV BELIEVES ITS CHANCES TO BEAT THE
ARABS DEPEND ON STRIKING THE FIRST BLOW IF THERE
IS TO BE WAR. THE RUSSIANS ARE BEING SOMEWHAT MORE
CAREFUL NOW IN HANDLING THE ARAB ARMIES. BUT THERE
IS STILL NO GUARANTEE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE MAKING
ANY MORE ADEQUATE ALLOWANCES FOR 2,700 YEARS OF
FANATICAL HATRED
VIETNAM
FINALLY. THE SUBJECT OF VIETNAM
I WANT TO CONCENTRATE THIS MORNING ON WHAT THE
COMMUNISTS ARE TRYING TO DO IN SOUTH VIETNAM, AND
WHAT THEY ARE TRYING TO DO IN PARIS
THESE ARE TWO FACETS OF A SINGLE POLICY THE
COMMUNISTS. AS THEY DID IN INDOCHINA IN 1954. AND
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AS THEY HAD DONE IN KOREA BEFORE THAT, ARE TRYING TO
OBTAIN--BY GRIM, BLOODY STAYING POWER. AND BY THEIR
"FIGHT-TALK-FIGHT" STRATEGY--THE OBJECTIVES WHICH
THEY NOW KNOW THEY CANNOT WIN BY SHEER MILITARY
MEANS
IN SOUTH VIETNAM LAST YEAR. THE COMMUNISTS LOST
ALMOST A QUARTER OF A MILLION MEN KILLED IN ACTION.
DEAD OF WOUNDS, OR PERMANENTLY DISABLED THE BLOOD-
IEST LOSSES WERE IN THE 1968 TET OFFENSIVE AND THE
SUBSEQUENT CAMPAIGN IN ~IAY~ THESE WERE DESIGNED
TO BE KNOCK-OUT PUNCHES. BUT COMMUNIST LOSSES WERE
SO SEVERE THAT CAPTURED INDOCTRINATION DOCUMENTS
AND PRISONERS OF WAR WERE SPEAKING IN TERMS OF "ONE
LAST TRY" OR "ONE FINAL EFFORT "
IN THE 14 MONTHS FROM THE TIME THE BUILD-UP
FOR THE 1968 TET OFFENSIVE BEGAN, THROUGH THE END
OF 1968, THE ENEMY STARTED MORE THAN 300,000 MEN DOWN
THE LONG INFILTRATION PIPELINE RUNNING FROM NORTH
VIETNAM TO THE BATTLEFIELDS IN THE SOUTH THIS WAS
ENOUGH TO REPLACE COMBAT LOSSES. BUT IT IS A FEARFUL
DRAIN ON A COUNTRY WITH A POPULATION OF LESS THAN
2O MILLION IT REFLECTS A CASUALTY RATE WHICH CANNOT
BE SUSTAINED IN THE LONG HAUL. AND WHICH EVEN IN THE
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SHORT TERM HAS LOWERED BOTH THE FIGHTING EFFECTIVE-
NESS AND THE MORALE OF THE FORCES IN THE FIELD
THE "FIGHT-TALK-FIGHT" STRATEGY. HOWEVER, RE-
QUIRES THAT THE ENEMY MAINTAIN STRONG MILITARY PRES-
SURE ON THE BATTLEFIELD HANOI'S BELIEF THAT THE
NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE WON BY WAITING FOR AMERICA TO
GROW SICK OF WAR AND GIVE UP SIMILARLY DICTATES THAT
THE COMMUNISTS MUST DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO MAIN-
TAIN A HIGH RATE OF AMERICAN CASUALTIES
THE COMMUNISTS HAVE ACCORDINGLY DEVELOPED NEW
"ECONOMY OF FORCES" TACTICS. DESIGNED TO LIMIT THEIR
OWN LOSSES WHILE THEY CONTINUE TO INFLICT CASUALTIES
ON OUR TROOPS
THIS INVOLVES KEEPING THE MAIN ENEMY BATTLE
FORCES UNCOMMITTED IN BASE AND SANCTUARY AREAS TO A
SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE. SO THAT THE AMERICANS WILL HAVE
TO SCATTER AND SEEK THEM OUT. WHILE EXPERIENCED
SAPPER UNITS AND ARTILLERY, MORTAR. AND ROCKET FORCES
CARRY OUT SHARP HIT-AND-RUN ATTACKS ON ALLIED MIL-
ITARY INSTALLATIONS AND SELECTED TOWNS
THE COMMUNISTS FIRST TRIED THESE TACTICS IN
THEIR FINAL 1968 CAMPAIGN OF AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER
BY AND LARGE. IT WAS A BUNGLED ATTEMPT THE ENEMY
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TOOK HEAVY CASUALTIES, AND ACCOMPLISHED LITTLE ON
THE BATTLEFIELD, IN PARIS, OR IN WASHINGTON
THIS YEAR`S TET OFFENSIVE. FROM LATE FEBRUARY
THROUGH MARCH. WAS MORE PROFESSIONALLY EXECUTED
THERE WAS HEAVY RELIANCE ON ROCKETS AND MORTARS,
ALTHOUGH A FEW LOCAL ENEMY COMMANDERS TRIED TO OVER-
RUN SOME OF OUR MOST EXPOSED POSITIONS, WITH DIS-
ASTROUS RESULTS FOR THE COMMUNISTS
SINCE THEN, THERE HAS BEEN A CONSISTENT PATTERN
OF SPORADIC AND LARGELY LOCALIZED "HIGH POINTS," AS
THE ENEMY CALLS THEM--MAINLY STAND-OFF ARTILLERY AND
ROCKET ATTACKS DESIGNED TO INFLICT CASUALTIES, SOME-
TIMES THERE ARE ACCOMPANYING SAPPER INFILTRATIONS, AND
AN OCCASIONAL ATTEMPT AT GROUND ATTACK,
ONE OBJECTIVE IS CERTAINLY TO SUSTAIN ALLIED
CASUALTY RATES FOR THEIR EFFECT ON DOMESTIC PUBLIC
OPINION, BUT RECENTLY THERE IS SOME PATTERN OF A
CHALLENGE TO THE CONCEPT OF VIETNAMIZATION~ ONE EX-
AMPLE IS THE CURRENT SUSTAINED PRESSURE ON THE CAMPS
NEAR THE CAMBODIAN BORDER ALONG THE TWO CORPS--THREE
CORPS BOUNDARY. WHICH ARE MANNED LARGELY BY CIDG VIET-
NAMESE. BUT DIRECTED BY SPECIAL FORCES AND SUPPORTED
BY U,S, ARTILLERY UNITS
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THERE HAS BEEN NO REAL EFFORT TO STORM ANY OF
THESE CAMPS, AND THERE MAY NOT BE. OUR INTELLIGENCE
INDICATES THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE INTEND TO MAIN-
TAIN THIS TYPE OF STAND-OFF PRESSURE THROUGH DECEM-
BER, AT WHICH POINT THE MAIN FORCE UNITS ARE TO BE
WITHDRAWN FOR REINFORCEMENT AND REFITTING, BEFORE
RETURNING TO THEIR OLD KONTUM-PLEIKU OPERATING AREA
FOR A SPRING OFFENSIVE--PROBAB LY OF THE SAME TYPE
THE PRESSURE ON THE CIDG CAMPS HAS CAUSED SOME
INCREASE IN SOUTH VIETNAMESE CASUALTY FIGURES--AND
TO A LESSER EXTENT IN U,S, CASUALTY FIGURES--BUT AT
A CONSIDERABLE COST TO THE ENEMY AS WELL. THE NORTH
VIETNAMESE HAVE HAD MORE THAN 1,000 KILLED IN THE
AREA IN A PERIOD IN WHICH ALLIED FATALITIES HAVE
AMOUNTED TO LESS THAN ZOO,
IN THE FACE OF THIS CONTINUING DRAIN ON ENEMY
MANPOWER. IT IS INTERESTING THAT INFILTRATION FROM
NORTH VIETNAM WAS VIRTUALLY SUSPENDED FROM MAY
THROUGH OCTOBER OF THIS YEAR IT IS ALMOST AS
THOUGH HANOI HAD TOLD ITS FIELD COMMANDERS: "YOU
WILL HAVE TO MAKE THE ECONOMY-OF-FORCES TACTICS
WORK. BECAUSE THERE WILL BE NO REPLACEMENTS "
IN CONTRAST TO THE QUARTER OF A MILLION MEN
INFILTRATED IN 1968, ONLY ABOUT 1OZ,000 HAVE BEEN
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SENT IN DURING THE FIRST 11 MONTHS THIS YEAR--MAINLY
IN THE FIRST FOUR MONTHS, THERE WERE SOME INDICA-
TIONS IN NOVEMBER--AS THE ROADS IN THE LAOTIAN PAN-
HANDLE DRIED OUT--THAT THE INFILTRATION RATE MIGHT
BE RISING AGAIN, AS IT DID LAST DECEMBER WHEN 28,000
MEN WERE SENT IN DURING THAT MONTH ALONE, WE HAVE
NOT YET BEEN AB LE TO CONFIRM ANY SUCH SUBSTANTIAL
INCREASE. HOWEVER, AND THE ESTAB LISHED PATTERN HAS
BEEN THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE START MOVING THEIR
REPLACEMENTS SOME TWO TO THREE MONTHS BEFORE A
MAJOR OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN IN WHICH THEY EXPECT TO
INCUR HEAVY CASUALTIES,
FOR ALL THAT. THE iVORTH VIETNAMESE MAIN FORCE
UNITS REMAIN LARGELY INTACT IN BORDER AREAS AND
OTHER SANCTUARIES, THEY CAN LAUNCH WIDESPREAD HEAVY
ATTACKS WITH LITTLE ADVANCE NOTICE. AND IF THE IN-
FILTRATION PIPELINE IS FILLED AGAIN IN DECEMBER. A
MAJOR OFFENSIVE COULD BE UNDERTAKEN AS EARLY AS
MID- OR LATE FEBRUARY IF THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
IN HANOI SO DIRECTS,
~^IHAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE TRYING TO D0. IN EFFECT.
IS TO ROCK THE CONFERENCE TABLE IN PARIS FROM THE
BATTLEFIELDS IN SOUTH VIETNAM,
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AS FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. HOURS CAN BE DEVOTED
TO DISCUSSION OF THE SIX POINTS OF PRESIDENT THIEU,
THE TEN POINTS OF THE P~IATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT. AND
THE EIGHT POINTS SET FORTH BY PRESIDENT NIXON~
I BELIEVE IT IS LESS CONFUSING AND MORE INSTRUC-
TIVE TO CONCENTRATE ON THE TWO POINTS WHICH WE BE-
LIEVE CONSTITUTE THE ROCK-BOTTOM OBJECTIVES OF THE
COMMUNISTS. BOTH ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND IN THE PARIS
NEGOTIATIONS IN THE LONG RUN. HANOI WILL TRY TO
INSIST ON AGREEMENT ON THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL
AMERICAN FORCES WITHIN A SPECIFIED TIME PERIOD IT
WILL TAKE MUCH MORE HARD BARGAINING TO ARRIVE AT ANY
UNDERSTANDING IN REGARD TO A RECIPROCAL WITHDRAWAL
OF NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES. BECAUSE HANOI WILL MAIN-
TAIN THAT NO VIETNAMESE ANYWHERE IN VIETNAM. NORTH
OR SOUTH. CAN BE CONSIDERED FOREIGN TROOPS
AND SECONDLY. HANOI WILL INSIST ON A POLITICAL
SETTLEMENT GUARANTEEING THE COMMUNISTS IN SOUTH
VIETNAM SOME KIND OF STATUS WHICH DOES NOT PRECLUDE
AN EVENTUAL BID TO TAKE POWER AND COMPLETE HANOI~S
FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE--THE REUNIFICATION OF VIETNAM
UNDER A SINGLE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP
THEY BELIEVE THAT THEY WERE PROMISED THIS IN
GENEVA IN 1954. AND WERE THEN SOMEHOW TRICKED OUT
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OF WHAT THEY HAD WONT THEY ARE NOT LIKELY TO SETTLE
FOR LESS THIS TIM E
THE ANSWER. OBVIOUSLY. MUST BE TO HAVE A SOUTH
VIETNAM WHICH IS STRONG ENOUGH--POLITICALLY. ECONOM-
I CALLY . Al~.p M I L I TAR I LY--SO THAT WHILE TH E COMMUNISTS
MAY BE ASSURED OF THE RIGHT TO B1p FOR POWER AND
CONTROL. THAT BID WILL FAIL,
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