INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01082A000100100001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 12, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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12 September 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Wilson
THROUGH : Dr. Clarke
SUBJECT : Intelligence Requirements
1. The purpose of this memo is to give you some considerations
and possible talking points on the broad subject of "requirements"
which may be useful in your 19 September meeting with the USIB
Committee chairmen.
2. In my view, the problem of overall intelligence requirements
has never been effectively addressed or structured as a system to
which the necessary actions controlling the totality of intelligence
endeavor can be related. As we now move into a period of
severely constrained dollar and manpower resources for intelligence,
r
the need for strict discipline in the requirements process becomes
essential. No longer can the intelligence community do everything
for everybody who has a demand or desire for responsive intelligence
support.
3. The USIB, as a corporate intelligence community body,
is responsible, under NSCID No. 1, for identifying and assigning
priorities to all intelligence requirements. While this can be viewed
as a national requirements responsibility, there is a multitide of
departmental and "tactical" requirements which compete to a very
large extent for responsiveness by the same intelligence resources
which are tasked with national requirements. We cannot afford
the luxury of dedicated resources for all different levels of require-
ments. Alternatively, the majority of intelligence resources are
capable of responding to various levels or sources of requirements.
The National /Tactical Interface Study is an effort specifically
directed to this end.
4. As General Graham observed, "we are still making resource
decisions without an audit trail back to the fundamental requirements
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to be served. " This observation applies equally in the national,
departmental and "tactical" arenas. And the constrained resources
simply will not stretch to cover effectively all these requirements.-
It appears, therefore, that USIB must take a more active role in
identifying, stating and prioritizing all intelligence requirements.
As a further step, USIB should then determine the essentiality of
action against these requirements by the various resources and
collection disciplines available.
5. The current USIB committee structure is reasonably well
geared to accomplish this latter task, but has no identifiable
arrangement for dealing with the overall requirements problem.
Thus, the major collection committees -- SIGINT, HUMINT, and
PHOTINT (COMIREX) -- struggle continually to apply the full range
of resources and activities with which they are concerned. This is
a relatively simple task in the photo area (maintenance of target lists
against which photosensors can operate), somewhat more complicated
in the HUMINT area, and extremely complex in the SIGINT area
where the widest range of requirements are tasked on highly technical
systems operating in a technically sophisticated and secure environment.
6. Most, if not all, requirements are stated initially without
regard for satisfaction capability, feasibility, complexity or cost.
There is little or no effective mechanism for priority ordering all
requirements or even those tasked within one collection discipline.
There is no formal mechanism for determining which collection
discipline can operate most effectively against a given requirement
or where there may be trade offs among the different discipline
capabilities. Director, NSA, has made the point, for example,
that reductions in SIGINT resources have now reached a point where
there must be a determination of the essentiality of the SIGINT source
against a given requirement, rather than simply recognizing the
existence of a SIGINT capability to respond as the basis for tasking.
7. In summary, the elements of the requirements problem
confronting USIB include:
-- No focal point in our community structure to "staff"
requirements for the USIB.
-- No effective prioritizing of all requirements regardless
of source or application.
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U 3e,
-- No overall requirement evaluation or validation
system which would enable us to reject less important or
less meaningful requirements.
-- No procedure whereby the essentiality of one "INT"
source or another can be clearly associated with a given
requirement.
-- There is a "process" for requirements generation
and application, but it is not designed as a total system.
8. Several remedies to these problems have evolved from
recent rather superficial considerations:
-- Establish a new USIB committee on requirements.
-- Create an ad hoc committee made up of the Chairman
of the SIGINT, HUMINT, and COMIREX Committees, possibly
under the chairmanship of the D/DCI/NIO.
-- Constitute the NIOs as a requirements committee.
-- Constitute all collection and substantive USIB
committee chairmen as a larger ad hoc committee on require-
ments.
9. None of these propositions has been studies in detail, nor
in fact has the overall requirements problem been addressed. There
is a compelling need to do so. The IC Staff, with cooperation of
certain USIB committee chairmen and perhaps D/DCI/NIO, should
take the lead in this effort.
10. Appended hereto are some of the papers which have been
developed during recent months as various IC Staff officers considered
and commented on the requirements problem.
rs)
AC/CPAD/IC
Attachments: (4)
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Memo for Gen. Wilson dtd 12 Sept 74
Subject: Intelligence Requirements
CPAD/IC/ h (12 Sept 74)
Distribution:
O - Gen. Wilson/Dr. Clarke
1 - D/CS/IC
1 - C/MPRRD/IC
1 - AC/PRD/IC
1 CPAD Subj
1 - CPAD Chrono w/o att
1 -IC Reg
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 DCI/IC 74-084
3 June 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr_ Clarka
SUBJECT:
Piece on Requirements ("The Intelligence
Requirements Process" previously distributed)
D
1. I intend to work r.up into a paper to be coordinated
with key USIB agencies. I _J is getting at a fundamental question
that has to be answered in order for USIB and for us to do the intelli-
gence job correctly. We are still making resource decisions without an
audit trail back to the fundamental requirements to be served. The
KIQ/KEP process is going to help, but as of now it is primarily useful
in pointing up the lack of a proper requirements system in the total
intelligence process. Even with the KIQ/KEP process operating on a
steady.basis, we still have USIB failing to address its responsibilities
effectively in the requirements area.
2. I have some problems with approach to the ordering of
requirements. To me, a first-order requirement is one that states a
fundamental need for intelligence as seen by the user. DCID 1/2 and
JSOP Annex A don't quite meet this criterion. They are more on the
order of broad guidance and prioritization of effort. The KIQs as
presently constituted don't quite fit the criterion either. Some do;
don't. Examples of first-order requirements would be: j
- Monitor Soviet adherence to SALT agreements.
- Monitor the development of Chinese advance weapons programs.
- Keep Soviet SSBNs under surveillance.
- Provide forecasts of worldwide basic food commodity avail-
ability, etc.
Perhaps I am speaking here. of a better set of the old PNIOs.
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Ur. Chalmers
Dr. Lanham
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3. As far as the KIQs are concerned, it may be that they should
all, in fact, be second-order requirements rather than first, since
first-order requirements tend to be so broad that precision in resource
expenditure against them is not feasible. Second-order requirements
should be a breakdown of first-order requirements into sub-questions
that must be answered in order to meet the first--order requirements.
In looking over the list of KIQs presently on the books, a number of
them fit in this category.
4 The third order of requirements is as =has stated, those
specific elements of information which allow you to answer the second-
order questions.
5. Naturally'enough,"is not delving deep into the parallel
problems of requirements levied on human and overt sources. This
ne " to he flesbad of .n the paper. I would appreciate the views
of and Lew Lapham's people on this matter.
6. When we float the paper to the Pentagon we need also to -
address the separation of peacetime and wartime requirements. A good
deal of confusion arising across the board (not just with SIGINT) in
the requirements business is the admixture of wartime and 'contingency requirements with the peacetime requirements. Once we have established
a requirements hierarchy and system for the peacetime requirements
process, we should ask our Pentagon brethren to establish a parallel
set for wartime contingencies the major commands as required.
Such-an approach will help efforts in the tactical/
nationa? intelligence interface game.
7. I would like to get together on this problem Wednesday after-
noon. (It might be useful for the 10:30 meeting on Thursday with the
DCI and the N10s reference the KIQs.)
(Sianea)
DANIEL 0. GRAHAM, LTG. USA'
Daniel 0. Graham
Lieutenant General', USA
D/DCI/IC
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