COMMENTS ON 24 MAY DRAFT, 'REVITALIZING THE USIB WATCH MECHANISM'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01082A000200020017-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: June 6, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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CONFIDENTIAL DCI/IC 74-1632
When Separated from Attachment 6- JUN 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
OCI/INDICO
SUBJECT: Comments on 24 May draft, "Revitalizing
the USIB Watch Mechanism"
1. As we have indicated to you orally, IC/PRD generally agrees with.
your proposal. memorandum (attached) reflects maximum objec-
tives in reforming the Watch mechanism, but we will support your proposal
in its present form as a useful first step.
2. We have these specific comments for whatever considerations you
choose to give them:
a. The distinction between the DCI's responsibility for
providing a warning message, and the role of ASD(I) and DIA in
supporting NCA is valid, but the argument for a separate mechanism
based on the need for a "devil's advocate" seems weak. (The task
of devising better challenge procedures is in any case broader than
the watch/warning responsibility Moreover it would be wise to
recognize that in itself the shift of the operation to CIA could
aggravate, rather than ease, the problem of insufficient J-3 type
information (pp. 1-2, 7, 20-22).
b. The defenders of the status quo will argue that the
product has only shifted "focus" because the nature of the
attack threat has shifted over the years. Instead of the
theoretical possibility of direct all-out war between the USSR
and the US, the Watch specialists have seen over the years actual,
lower-scale attacks in various parts of the world--i.e., in the
countries mentioned. The status quo advocates will ask why in
principle the existing mechanism cannot readjust its "focus" on
its own. Offhand, we do not have a ready answer to that question
(pp. 3-4, 8-9).
c. The existence of the collection program you mention argues
strongly for having a capability for warning more often than once
a week. But the collection program is still at least several months
short of operational status. Since nobody can judge precisely what
form(s) of reporting may be required, and on principle there are
strong pressures against new products--especially daily products--
we urge that you offer, as a first option, inclusion of the daily
temperature report in an existing product, the NIB or the NID. As
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a second option you might advocate publishing a formal warning
report only when events justify, plus issuing a daily SWC "work
sheet" (no cover, typed and Xeroxed, strictly informal, limited
dissemination) in order to maintain discipline (pp. 5, 10, 14-16).
d. You do not say how the new mechanism will improve the
collection of warning intelligence (other than to provide a forum
for discussion). In view of I _J concerns, we suggest you
indicate the need for the SWC to be able to task the collectors
(p. 11).
e. We agree with the point others have made that the problem
of updating the night shift personnel at the Operations Center does
not deserve mention in your proposal (pp. 15-16).
f. Since a goal of your proposal is to narrow the focus of
the warning function, we suggest you delete Czechoslovakia as a
possible enemy attack" scenario (p. 18).
3. We are forwarding these comments--and -to the D/DCI/IC
for his reactions.
Chief, Product ~Review Division L-dp am
Att
cc: D/DCI/IC
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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DCI/IC 74-1633
6 June 1974
SUBJECT: What To Do With the National Watch Center
And the Watch Committee
25X1'EFERENCE: Draft of
1. Once again the question of what to do with the NIC/WC has been
raised. The referenced draft paper proposes to introduce the concept of
warning instead of merely continuing the watch function. This is an
admirable step, but it has implications which must be clearly understood.
Unlike the watch function, the warning function implies that decisions
and actions are associated.
2. As a result of the Middle East post-mortem exercises, one of the
tasks was to examine the alerting* mechanism within the intelligence com-
munity. Here is an excellent opportunity to combine the watch function and
the alerting function as applied to the intelligence community. By so doing
the same procedures would also generate warning inputs to the consumer.
These inputs would now have a greater credibility because of the alerting
._mechanism functions generated by the community warning procedure.
3. By inclusion of J-3 inputs the warning function does become
"national" in character, paralleling the functions of the NOIWON and NOIAN.
Thus, in effect, one could have a National Warning Center and a National
Warning Committee. These terms are much less confusing than the use of the
term "strategic" which means too many things to too many people.
4. Instead of a periodic product (daily, weekly, monthly) the warning
product should be generated by events themselves. This way the product will
receive the attention it deserves. The product should also be put in prob-
abilistic terms so that the "temperature" changes can be noted.
5. The scope of warning should be tuned to detecting "changes of state"
of any political or military activity which could conceivably lead to a con-
frontation of major powers.
_y alerting we mean the decisions and actions which concentrate intelligence
resources to respond to a particular tension or crisis situation. Examples
would be: (1) uttin NPIC on a three-shift basis
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(3) changing collection targeting priorities
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6. To summarize: Warning is not warning unless decisions and actions
are implied. By applying this principle to the process of alerting the
intelligence community, the warning function will have a greater credibility
when applied to outside consumers.
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