INTELLIGENCE PANEL OF THE NSCIC WORKING GROUP FIRST MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01082A000200080004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 26, 1974
• Content Type: MIN

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rs Present: Lt. Gen. Samuel V. Wilson, D/DCI/IC
AD/DCI/IC
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Dr. Edward W. Proctor, DDI/CIA
Mr. William McAfee, DD/INR/State
NSA/CSS
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IT.
en.
Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., DD/DIA
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or
r. George Carv
er, D/DCI/NIO)
(Ret), DCI/IC/CS
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Gen. Wilson, as Chairman, outlined the membership and
structure of the NSCIC Working Group, emphasizing its "con-
sumer/user/customer" orientation and the need to focus its
agenda on user-oriented problems.
Dr. Proctor saw this as posing problems if the NSCIC
was to be advisory to the NSC on intelligence matters which
were not "user-oriented." He wondered whether the NSCIC
might not need three subordinate agencies - a Working Group,
an Intelligence Panel, and a Requirements Advisory Board for
economic intelligence. (The NSC Staff favors making the RAB
a subordinate element of the NSCIC.) Gen. Wilson indicated
he would seek to lock the Working Group into matters of
direct interest to them and later discuss with Gen. Scowcroft
the role of other NSCIC sub-groups.
Gen. Wilson said that if the Panel is to be "the engine
which pulls the NSCIC process it will need some automony,"
but he emphasized the Working Group will need intelligence
support and the Intelligence Panel will be the principal
vehicle for this. He wanted to keep the Panel "ahead of the
curve" and would ask the Panel to meet before each Working
Group session.
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26 October
IGENCE ANEL OF THE NSCIC WORKING GR,
F rs eeting, 1500 hrs, 25 October 1974
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Gen. Wilson recognized that Terms of Reference were
important but he wanted to get a work program underway
before there was any consideration of the details of Terms
of Reference. There was general agreement.
commented that a problem deserving considera-
tion was the extent the NSCIC considers intelligence should
target US'overseas enterprises. He noted there were both
juridicial and moral problems involved in monitoring communi-
cations between US commercial interests and foreign govern-
ments but important economic intelligence is involved.
said that presently the Attorney General must
give specific authority.
Discussion then turned to a CS/ICS memorandum on "A
Program for the Intelligence Panel of the NSCIC Working
Group," dated 25 October.
Gen. Wilson emphasized the importance of (1) identifying
matters the Intelligence Community wants guidance on, and,
(2) learning from the NSCIC the major policy problems con-
cerning which intelligence support is specially needed.
Dr. Proctor urged that the Working Group be a forum for
"unloading gripes on a non-authoritative, even intuitive
basis." He would ask them "What are your problems with
intelligence? Give examples." He noted that too often such
reports are off-hand or misreported and he would hope Working
Group members could be frank and direct. greed
and emphasized that what was needed was iniorma-ul n to
what was wrong, not how to correct it. He felt that "guidance"
invited being told how to do the job.
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I noted that asking the customers of economic
intelligence what they wanted was his job, but they just
didn't know. Dr. Proctor said customers know what they want
when a problem arises and the information they need is not 25X1
there. He suggested it would be great if the Panel members
could sit in the back while the Working Group members ex res-
sed themselves on what was wrong with intelligence.
said the Working Group represents only "consumers o
a sor ' but others could feed into them.
Gen. Wilson wondered whether it would be better to pose
the problem at the first Working Group meeting and seek ad
hoc spontaneous response, or merely raise the matter and
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request comments for the following meeting. He favored the
latter. Dr. Proctor said that on the chance the "gripe
session" might "peter out" it might be well to have prepared
a check list to get reactions on specific NIEs, on current
intelligence. on situation reports in crisis situations,
etc. felt that since "thoughtful bitches" were
desired it would be better to raise the question and ask for
responses at a follow-on meeting.
It was generally agreed that what was wanted was a
clear picture of what the users wanted and needed, and a
feedback as to the extent to which they are being satisfied.
In discussion of the Working Group role re the KIQs, it
was agreed the best course would be to have the Intelligence
Community prepare the KIQs (particularly in order to keep
the list from getting too long) and then have the Working
Group comment on the drafts.
Gen. Tighe asked how the Working Group would get its
staff support, and Gen. Wilson said that ICS would provide
secretarial support to the Group as a body, but each member
would have to be supported by his own Staff.
Dr. Proctor said there was need for a mechanism for
circulating Working Group papers to the NSCIC for endorsement.
The remaining topics in the CS memorandum were disposed
of as follows:
Means of establishing and sustaining policy-
maker/intelligence dialogue in time-urgent situation --
Dr. Proctor said, "this is where we start."
Needed improvements in the system of flagging
warning information -- Gen. Wilson said this was
procedural.
Involving intelligence consumers in post-mortems
of the functioning of the Intelligence Community in
particular crisis situations - Gen. Wilson said, "this
is where we get to."
Procedures for keeping the Community appraised of
US policy objectives which should influence the focus
of intelligence collection and analysis in crisis
situations -- Both Drs. Proctor and said this
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Identification of the most intelligence inputs
needed by military force planners and weapon systems
designers for the period 10-15 years in the future --
Gen. Wilson said this would have to be approached on a
gradual basis.
Dr. Proctor felt the Working Group should be asked to
identify what intelligence products are not needed and can
be eliminated.
raised the problems involved in getting
line organizations outside the Intelligence Community to
study problems on a contingency basis. He cited as an
example: What if Saudi Arabia converts its dollars to marks
or francs? What would that mean to the US? The problem is
larger than intelligence alone. OER shouldn't do it, but
Treasury isn't interested.
Gen. Wilson said he wanted to make the Working Group a
"dynamic instrument" providing it seems responsive. If
barriers arise, another forum would be developed. He wanted
the Group to deal with "gutty" things and invoke interest,
and to do that he needed the help of the Intelligence Panel.
He also hoped that the Panel could develop an autonomous
role and thought that it might become involved in matters
which would not go to the NSCIC. He asked the members to
think about an "optimum role" for the Panel. There was
general approval of the concept of an active Panel from the
members.
Gen. Wilson, illustrating his point that the Panel
could consider other than NSCIC matters, passed out a draft
DCI letter to the Director DIA regarding revision of the
Watch mechanism.
Considerable discussion ensued regarding the difference
between Warning with a big "W" (dealing with nuclear attack
or action involving US combat forces and to be handled by a
Strategic Warning Committee) and warning with a small "w"
which would be handled by Alert Memoranda produced under
direction of the NIOs.
I emphasized NSA's interest in warning actions
based on thel and mentioned the display devices which
will nterf,ce six operations and intelligence centers.
Gen. Wilson said the new committee arrangement in the NMIC
would not interfere with such a net.
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Mr. McAfee asked if the Watch Committee and the NIC
would continue, and Gen. Wilson said he saw the NMIC taking
over their functions.
Dr. Proctor saw)"combat risk" as the key differential
between large and small "w" in the warning mechanisms.
preferred reference to "senior representative"
instead of senior analyst."
It was agreed that on the basis of comments by Panel
members the letter would be amended and re-disseminated.
Panel members were to provide comments by close of business
29 October. (Copies were LDX'd to DIA, NSA and State and
hand-delivered to Drs. Proctor and at 1730 hours,
Gen. Wilson also passed out copies of a draft DCI
letter to the Chairman, NSCIC, on "Intelligence Warning" and
indicated it would be a future Working, Group agenda item.
He asked for comments from Panel members within two weeks.
Gen. Wilson said he was considering a second meeting of
the Working Group within ten days or so after the 30 October
session. Both Dr. Proctor and Mr. McAfee counselled against
"pushing too hard" and suggested that a meeting at regular
intervals be avoided.
Gen. Wilson said the Panel would be aseembled only when
he had something useful for it to do.
The meeting adjourned at 1620 hours. No date for the
next session was set.
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irector, Coordination Staff
DCI/IC/CS/ is (10/29/74)
Distribution:
Orig. - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - Each participant
1 - IC Registry
1 - CS subj
1 - CS chrono
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rove
1 -
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