INTERIM REPORT OF THE AD HOC INTELLIGENCE GROUP ON EXCHANGES (IGE)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01082A000400080011-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: May 21, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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CONFIDENTIAL
USIB-D-43. 1/4
21 May 1974
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOAR D
SUBJECT Interim Report of the Ad Hoc Intelligence
Group on Exchanges (IGE)
REFERENCES a. USIB -D-43.1 / 3, 11 March 1974
b. USIB-M-663, 14 March 1974, Item 5
1. The enclosed memorandum on this subject from
contains the Interim IGE Report and Attachments A through I . The
Report was prepared in response to USIB action in reference b.
2. It is anticipated that this subject will be placed on an agenda
for Board consideration at an early date. Based on the IGE report and
the Chairman's memorandum, it is requested that the USIB consider
action along the following lines at the Board meeting:
a. That the IGE be constituted as the Committee on Exchanges
of the United States Intelligence Board.
b. That the Board Members review and comment on the
attached draft DCID (Attachment A) prior to its promulgation by the DCI.
c. That the Board endorse in principle the IGE recommenda-
tion that additional personnel resources may be required and note that the
Committee on Exchanges will be expected to make specific recommendations
to the DCI regarding minimum intelligence community manpower require-
ments to carry out the functions stated in the draft DCID, and
d. Note the Report and the draft DCID and agree that the
Committee on Exchanges should proceed along the lines outlined therein.
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Confidential
Report by the Ad Hoc Intelligence
Advisory Group on Exchanges
Confidential
U S I B -D -43.1/4
May 1974
Copy No.
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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Enclosure
15 May 1974 USIB D-43. 1 /4
SUBJECT Interim Report of the Ad Hoc Intelligence Group on
Exchanges
1. In accordance with the 14 March 1974 minutes (USIB-M-663)
of the Intelligence Board, the ad hoc Intelligence Group on Exchanges
(IGE) has met on five occasions. This memorandum forwards its
interim report and supporting documentation and contains recommenda-
tions in paragraphs 5. and 6. The IGE has focused principally to
date on the implications of increasing exchange and commercial contacts
between the US and the USSR. Eastern European nations have not been
considered specifically and the special problems posed by US-PRC
relationships have been put off for later discussion.
2. The US-USSR General Exchange Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges
and Cooperation and the eight specialized cooperative agreements
between the US and the USSR have as their central purpose the improve-
ment of overall relations. The US-USSR commercial agreement is designed
to facilitate trade and contribute to the broad policy objective of
improved relations. The effect of these agreements is to expand
greatly the number of mutual visits. As a consequence, there are
increased opportunities for loss of US technology to the USSR and
improved US intelligence collection against the USSR, and intensified
internal security and counterintelligence problems. It is in the
interest of the US to prevent collection of information and material
by the USSR which would have an adverse effect upon US national
security objectives and to minimize other collection activities by
the Soviets while taking advantage of opportunities to increase US
intelligence collection against the USSR.
3. Many US Government mechanisms continue to function, at least
in part, to control exchanges and commercial relationships. There
are operational problems of organization, staffing, coordination, and
communication, however, which present obstacles to improvement in
these mechanisms.
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Enclosure
'SIB-D-43. 1/4
4. Several problem issues have not yet been satisfactorily
resolved in IGE discussions:
A. The degree to which the IGE can assist US
Government efforts to control the loss of technology
during commercial contacts needs more study but there
is agreement that the IGE should provide assessments
when tasked by the Departments of Commerce, State, or
Treasury, or by other elements of the US Government
through the Department of State, and support collection
efforts against the opportunities afforded by commercial
contacts.
B. Department of Defense participants in the IGE
feel strongly that a major effort should be mounted to
perform a "damage assessment" of the degree to which
technology has actually been lost as a consequence of
expanded contacts between the US and the USSR. Further
discussion on this issue is necessary to determine how
IGE efforts can be coordinated with assessment studies
being done or contemplated elsewhere in the US Government;
and
C. The relationship of the IGE and its Secretariat
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation is still undetermined.
Because the FBI was not a participant in the work of the
IGE's predecessor organization, it has separate channels
to the Department of State. It is believed that these
separate channels should continue because of the FBI's
focus on internal security and counterintelligence
matters. FBI participation in the IGE, however, has
already proved very useful.
5. There is urgent need to revitalize the Intelligence
Community contribution to and exploitation of US exchanges and
commercial contacts with the USSR, Eastern European countries, the
PRC, and such other nations as may from time to time be designated
by the Department of State. It is recommended that the IGE be
constituted as the "Committee on Exchanges" of the Intelligence
Board for the purpose and with the-functions outlined in a revised
draft of Director of Central Intelligence Directive 2/6 which
accompanies the IGE report as Attachment A.
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Enclosure
USIB=D-43. 1 /4
6. If the Intelligence Board approves the IGE's work to date
and accepts the recommendation in paragraph 5., there is much
remaining for discussion and resolution. In order for the Intelligence
Community to contribute to the solution of the problems caused by
exchanges and commercial contacts, however, the operational problems
mentioned in paragraph 3. must be resolved. The most serious problem
is insufficient staffing. If Intelligence Community personnel
resources devoted to this effort continue at present levels, the IC
contribution will actually degrade; if they are further reduced,
organized IC support will be precluded and exploitation programs
will suffer additionally. It is recommended, therefore, that
personnel resources be increased to:
A. Improve support to the Department of State and
other participating US Government departments and agencies;
B. Enhance monitoring to accomplish early warning,
better control and reduced technology loss; and
C. Expand intelligence collection.
7. The intent of the effort should be to restore better balance
in exchange relationships and commercial contacts, particularly
between the US and the USSR.
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Chairman
Intelligence Group on Exchanges
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REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD BY
THE AD HOC INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY GROUP ON EXCHANGES (IGE)
15 May 1974
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Page
I. The Situation 1
II. US Policy and Intelligence Implications -- The 2
USSR and Eastern Europe
III. US Policy and Intelligence Implications -- The 4
PRC
IV. Current Capabilities 5
V. Current Operating Problems 7
VI. Special Problem Issues -- Commercial Contacts 9
and Technology Loss
VII. Special Problem Issues -- Net Assessment 11
VIII. Special Problem Issues -- Internal Security and 12
Counterintelligence
IX. Recommendations 13
ATTACHMENTS
A Director of Central Intelligence Directive 2/6 (Revised Draft)
B US-USSR Exchanges and Commercial Contacts
C Informal History--US Intelligence Involvement in the East-West
Exchanges Program
D Procedures for Handling Soviet Scientific and Technical
Visitors Under the US-USSR General Agreement on Contacts,
Exchanges and Cooperation and the Eight US-USSR Specialized
Cooperative Agreements
F Technology Transfers to Communist Countries; Form on Comment
by the Office of the Export Administration on Proposed
US/USSR Exchange
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ATTACHMENTS (continued)
C Weekly Listing of Soviet Commercial Travel to the US
H FBI Points for Inclusion in IGE's Interim Report to the
US Intelligence Board
I Minutes of IGE Meetings of 5 April, 18 April, 1 May, and
8 May 1974
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1. The Situation
A. The US Intelligence Board has created the ad hoc Intelligence
Group on Exchanges (IGE) and directed it to study the overall scope
of the problems involved in exchanges and commercial contacts and
to make pertinent recommendations. Testimony at initial IGE meetings
confirmed that there are valid grounds for concern and identified
specific problems. There is agreement that a "Committee on Exchanges"
should be established as a permanent committee of the United States
Intelligence Board (see paragraph IX.A.). A revised draft of Director
of Central Intelligence Directive 2/6 (Attachment A) delineates its
functions and responsibilities.
B. There has been a remarkable expansion in East-West contacts
resulting from the overall improvement in US relations with the USSR,
Eastern Europe, and the PRC. (See Attachment B for statistics
reflecting the scope of expansion in US-USSR contacts.) The expansion:
(1) has strained the capacity of US Government
mechanisms for coordinating the intelligence aspects of
official exchanges and bilateral cooperative agreements
(hereinafter referred to as "exchanges") and commercial
visits and other related activities (hereinafter referred
to as "commercial contacts");
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(2) has enhanced the potential for net loss of US
r_ientific, technological, and industrial data;
(3) has intensified internal security and
,counterintelligence problems; and
(4) has created important new opportunities to
collect intelligence.
C, The personnel resources of the US Intelligence Community (IC)
save not expanded to keep pace with the significant increase in the
3e.ve1 of exchanges activity and commercial contacts and, in tact,
tve been reduced in some departments and agencies. As a consequence,
t:.e C's ability to monitor and exploit exchanges and commercial
contacts from an intelligence standpoint and to contribute to their
rig--velopment has been significantly hampered.
tl. US Policy andIntelligence_Implications -- The USSR and Eastern
F,urope
A. The US-USSR General Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges and
Cooperation and the eight specialized cooperative agreements with
the USSR have as a central purpose the improvement of overall
relations with the USSR through balanced and mutually beneficial
development of contacts, exchanges and cooperation. The US-USSR
Commercial Agreement is designed to facilitate trade between the two
countries and to contribute through commercial contacts and exchanges
to the broad policy objectives outlined above.
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B. The President said at the outset of his Administration that
our policy would be to move from an era of confrontation to an era of
negotiation, and through negotiation and joint effort to create a
stable structure of world peace. The ten agreements are important
building blocks in that structure. By providing for stable, long-term
forms of cooperation in fields of mutual interest, they are intended
to create a network of durable links between important sectors of our
two societies. These links, and the benefits flowing from them, are
intended to create a vested interest in cooperation which can have a
moderating influence on Soviet conduct during periods of short-term
stress or crisis.
C. The Administration expects that contacts and activities
under the agreements may lead to a more accurate mutual understanding
of the nature of our societies and systems, and that exposure to the
US and to US citizens may serve to mitigate some of the misconceptions
of the US purveyed by Soviet media. The United States has been able
through these programs to establish a continuing intellectual
"presence" in Soviet universities and research institutions. Finally,
the programs afford opportunities which otherwise would not exist for
US researchers to pursue their specialized professional interests,
and produce direct scholarly and scientific benefits which add to
the common store of knowledge in these fields.
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D? in concluding the agreements, the Administration did not
?atend to imply any willingness on the part of the US to release
ii;tlitary technology or to relax existing safeguards for its protection,
.ud none of the agreements is designed to exchange such information.
of Soviet research. It is in the interest of the US to prevent
Collection of information and material by the USSR which would have
::1n adverse effect upon US national security objectives and to minimize
other collection activities by the Soviets, while taking advantage
of opportunities afforded by exchanges and commercial contacts to
increase US intelligence collection against the USSR.
III. US Policy and Intelligence Implications -- The PRC
Although there are no inter-governmental exchanges agreements
between the US and the PRC, cultural and scientific exchanges have
been arranged since 1971 on the basis of informal agreements. The
problems of US-PRC commercial contacts appear to be analogous to those
caused by US-USSR and US-Eastern European commercial contacts (see
paragraph VI) but the IGE has not been able, in the time allowed,
to consider the special US-PRC situation in depth.
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