MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT/SECRETARY OF STATE ON LIKELY INCREASED LEVELS OF FIGHTING IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01082A000500140002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 21, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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IC 74-2156
21 November 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Wilson
SUBJECT; Message to President/Secretary of State on Likely Increased
Levels of Fighting in South Vietnam
1. Apropos of my memo concerning NVA/VC intentions in South Vietnam,
attached is the draft of the message on this subject which will be dispatched
to the President and Secretary of State at noon today.
2. I think this three and a half page summary hits just about the
right note and is a judicious appraisal of the meaning of the COSVN resolu-
tion. While by no means saying "the sky is falling" it makes clear the
degree of threat which heightened levels of fighting represent to South
Vietnam.
3. The DCI has seen this draft and has approved it with very minor
word changes.
Colonel, US14C
Attachment
IC/PRD/PFCA
Distribution:
Original Addressee
.-SIC Registry
1 - PRD Subject
1 - PRD Chrono
1 - PFCA Chrono
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COMMUNISTnELAN FOR HEAVY MILITARY ACTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
The Communists are preparing to launch a new round of heavy fighting
next monthlaccording to a reliable source. Recently issued COSVN instructions
for 1975 outline a Communist dry season campaign running through June which
could amount to the most serious military test for Saigon since the cease-fire.
These instructions call. for widespread and heavy action, apparently to
achieve a maximum shock effect, throughout much of the South Vietnamei&
countryside during the "first days" of the campaign. Subsequent action is
to be concentrated in a relatively few "vulnerable" areas. The instructions
emphasize that the campaign must get underway as soon as possible --
between early and late December -- in order to maintain the element of
surprise and preempt any possible government dry season attacks.
The COSVN guidelines appear to prescribe a level of fighting
during this initial phase below that of the 1972 offensive. They suggest,
however, that the Communists may be prepared to commit the forces and fire-,
power already in the south more fully than they did during last summer's
fighting in the hopes of achieving some quick and dramatic victories.
Specifically, the instructions call for "intense" fighting in
central South Vietnam and the commitment of all Communist units in Military
Region 3 to offensive action in the provinces around Saigon. The Communists
hope this will force the government to pull one of its divisions out of
the Delta and thus enable the Communists to substantially expand their
holdings in 4t~t '--a"'"j
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The guidelines do not spell out Hanoi's military plans for
northern South Vietnam, an area where Hanoi's strategic reserve could
be brought to bear with relatively little warning. Although the bad
weather conditions that persist in this area during the winter do not
favor heavy enemy action, the Communists could mount enough pressure in
the north to prevent the redeployment of government forces to more
active battlefronts. They may be prepared to strike hard once the weather
improves in order to follow up the Communist campaign further south or to
exploit any major government reverses that might occur.
The sudden intensification of military pressure called for in the
COSVN instructions would probably result in numerous tactical reverses for
the government, especially if the Communists make full use of their tanks
and artillery._ We do not believe, however, that such a campaign, utilizing
forces at hand in the South, would decisively change the present strategic
balance in South Vietnam.
The Communists probably would be able to make and sustain major
gains in only one area -- the central highlands. The North Vietnamese could
probably isolate and quickly capture Kontum City and bring heavy pressure on
Pleiku City, should they choose to make the.effort. Communist forces else-
where in central South Vietnam could tie down government forces by threaten-
ing-population centers along the coast. The North Vietnamese could also use
their firepower to capture additional territory in the provinces around
Saigon, but they do not appear to have the forces necessary to sustain a
protracted drive. After some initial losses in this area, government
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resistance would probably stiffen and Saigon would retain control over the
bulk of the people and the economically important land. The Communists
could further expand their holdings in the Delta, but the government
has the edge militarily in this sector and should emerge from the fighting,
there. retaining control of most of the population.
Fighting of the magnitude described in the COSVN guidelines would
appear to be within the framework of the strategy Hanoi adopted toward
South Vietnam following the cease-fire. Past North Vietnamese Central
Committee resolutions and the party's propaganda line indicate that this
strategy assumed that the Thieu government could eventually be forced into
making significant political concessions to the Communists. It was fore-
seen that this would stem in part from the'6*4 ?.:~in American material
A par t
support and interest in Vietnam lan from carefully measured Communist
military pressure-on government forces -- pressure below the level which
would risk.American military reinvolvement.
The COSVN instruction and an analysis of current North Vietnamese
propaganda strongly suggest that Hanoi still hope s
- s to -_ - use the cease-fire
accords to its ultimate advantage rather than return to a total war posture
and commit strategic reserve forces to .an all-out offensive in the South.
The COSVN instructions make it clear that the Communists are still affirming
the gradualist approach described above. They present two options open to
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Hanoi, a "political" track which feature sees alation military pressure -:or
a "military" track involving a major offensive. The guidelines clearly come
down in favor of the former.
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Lying behind this reaffirmation appears to be a judgment by the
leaders in Hanoi that their post-.ceasefire strategy is finally beginning
to show signs of success. Hanoi,$ropaganda has been vigorously touting the
recent public manifestations of opposition to Thieu in South Vietnam, and,
as might be expected, has been egging it on. The North Vietnamese leaders
have almost certainly decided that a further, if still measured, increase
in military action would serve to encourage popular agitation in the south.
North Vietnamese propaganda has indeed begun to talk about the need for
"encouragement" of the "urban struggle" through military victories. The
COSVN guidelines do not forecast that victory in the south can be achieved
in 1975. They do, however, state that "the objective in 1975 is to funda-
mentally defeat the enemy's rural pacification program and bring about
the conditions to help us achieve total victory in 1976."
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