AN OVERVIEW OF THE EAST EUROPEAN SCENE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01082A000500140005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 12, 1974
• Content Type: MFR

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 CIA-RDP80MO1082A000500140005-1
IC 74-2123
12 November 1974
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: An Overview of the East European Scene
REFERENCE: OPR Informal Memorandum Re Subject
1. On 7 November OPR hosted several East Europe and USSR watchers from
this building, to address the 25X1
attached talking paper. a au ors, said they 25X1
intended to provoke discussion rather than offer a definitive assessment.
It is a testimony to the turbulence of East European history,. as well as to
the drafting skills, that people can be provoked by the message
that "equilibrium has emerged" (paragraph 1). Indeed the NIO for USSR/EE
considered the message important enough to justify sending the paper.in its
present form to the NSC Staff..
2. There is no point in attempting to summarize the authors' concise
treatment of such a broad topic, nor in repeating their amplifying remarks
on the main points. The discussion lasting two hours produced no overall
to the USSR, or turned to China for oil? No one had clear answers to such
would meekly, tolerate a situation otherwise encouraging "East and West
.Europeans to look to joint cooperation in solving their mutual fuel problems"
(paragraph 10). And what would happen if in response to higher Soviet nricaa
synchronized with the Soviets'. Others questioned whether the Soviets
consensus but at least clarified some differences of opinion.
3.. On the economic portions of the paper (paragraphs 6-11), Bill
of OPR, for one, challenged the thesis that integration within
a become "depoliticized." He thought it likely the East European
regimes would continue to resist Soviet demands that their economic plans be
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this paper looked about right the way it was. But omment arose 25X1
in the course of discussion on the Yugoslav portion of the-paper, and I
said this portion seemed internally inconsistent. That is, the judgment
that "Moscow's preferred course of action... appears to'be cultivation of a
stable Yugoslavia and a stable Yugoslav leadership" did not seem to fit
with. the paper's (.proper) attention to the "active support of the Soviets"
for establishing an opposition Communist Party in Yugoslavia. (I pursued this
point in a later telephone conversation with Dean, who is working on a much
onger paper dealing with the Yugoslav succession problem.)
4. With regard to the political . paragraphs, of OCI
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suggested that in view of the Cominformist plot in Yugoslavia it made sense
to assume the Soviets were trying the same thing in Romania--whether or not
the Romanian regime knew about it. I remarked that the Romanian portion of
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5. I also entered a mild plea at the seminar for more attention to
the "revisionist" sentiments creeping back into some Soviet journals (e.g.,
articles by CPSU official F. F. Petrenko). These thoughts, after all, could
have interesting reverberations in neighboring countries. The issue being
raised by such Soviet writers Is Party control--which was one issue raised by 25X1
the reformers in Prague in 1968.
6. Near the end of the discussion
expressed their feeling that it was still proper to stress the "fragility"
of existing political and economic arrangements in Eastern Europe, rather
than "equilibrium" and "parameters." Aside from what they had read in this
paper and heard in the discussion, they argued that it was logical to assume
that at least some of the problems now evident in Western Europe must obtain
in Eastern Europe also, even if signs ,are not as visible. In the sharing-
of problems, not just opportunities, implied, the
two parts of Europe continue gradually to erase the Ines o the Cold War.
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