LACK OF PROGRESS IN IMPROVING CURRENT INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01082A000800020011-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2004
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: July 29, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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IC 74-1724
29 July 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Graham
SUBJECT: Lack of Progress in Improving Current Intelligence
Production
5X1
1. I do not think I am the only one who is dissatisfied with the
intelligence community's effort in the field f current intelligence
production. Recent events in underscore the poverty 25X1
of our performance, and I see lizzle eve ence that much, if anything,
h
b
l
as
een
earned from the lexperience.
2. I think it unlikely that much progress in this state of af-
fairs will occur unless someone is willing to talk to the production
community pretty bluntly.
3. There are-some fundamental matters which are at the. heart of
our production problems. They need airing. These are:
a. Inadequate attention is being paid to the most important
problem of current intelligence --- short term forecasting and
analysis.
b. Over the years, there has been a great deal of rhetoric
on this subject and precious little action. The fundamental rea-
son for this state of affairs is that senior managers have never
devoted sustained attention to the problem, i.e., production mana-
gers are managing inadequately.
c. Identifying "insufficient personnel resources" as the key
factor in the failure to improve current intelligence performance
is a red herring. Save for the occasional international crisis,
there are many underemployed professionals in the production of-
fices.
d. Concluding that managers have insufficient time to manage
is also a red herring. There is always enough time to ask the
right questions, challenge conventional wisdom, etc. once the senior
partners of the intelligence firms demand this of their production
supervisors.
25X1
Z, 1,37,
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e. If top management placed as much emphasis on the prob-
lem of analysis and the finished intelligence product as it does
on examining collection systems and manipulation of resources, I
am confident we would see measurable progress in the world of pro-
duction.
4. All of the above judgments are, of course, liable to attack.
(They will be considered libellous in certain circles.) However, while
you can quarrel with detail there is enough fact here that it warrants
real exposure.
5. I do not recommend that another 'st
intelligence performance over the past year
should be prima facie evidence that we aren' " era our pro-
fession. I therefore recommend that the DCI take on this problem person-
nally with the key production officials of the intelligence community.
6. Attached is a draft paper which addresses some of the salient
issues the DCI should table in such an airing of the problems of produc-
tion.
25X1
Co lone , USMC
IC/PRD
Attachment
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5X1gEMORANDUM FOR:
5Rghn:
prepared for
to send to the DCI. It is our
understanding that it went forward to the
DCI exactly as d r a f t e d
5X1
FORM (01 WHIPCH MAY BE USED10-101
.
apham
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11 July 1974
ME`iORANDU i FOR- Director. of Cen moral Intelligence
SUBJECT Comment on the Memorandum "The State of
Soviet Analysis in CIA"
The memo makes some misinformed assertions,- dispenses
some overly-casual generalizations, and tends-in places to
the platitudinous-superficial. It is, at the: same time,.,
one-sided in its concentration on OPR's. Soviet. effort_ I
would note, too, that many of the issues raised are by no
means breaking the surface for the first time here..- Having
said this, Iwould agree that they are for the mos t.part
legitimate and vital issues. I would like to see some, of
these exposed. even more fully. Some of the points touched
on -- and I have in mind particularly the reference to the
problem of determining intentions and predicting behavior-
are central to the whole business of intelligence analysis,.
not just in the Soviet area. I think all levels of the
Agency would profit greatly from a close, hard look at this
whole question. We will be trying to take at least one step
in this direction in an OPR paper scheduled later this year
on the subject of defining Soviet "intentions" in the context
of detente.
The issue of "cross-fertilization" -- and what is
really a part of the larger issue: how to allow play for
informed and reasoned dissent -- is still another which is
of concern across the whole spectrum of intelligence anlalysis
I do not recall the time when we have not felt uneasy about
our deficiencies in this area and sensed that ways could be
found to cure some of them. At the same time, I do not
think it helps much simply to say that these is not enough
cross-fertilization. It is almost by definition something
there is never. enough of; who could possibly set himself 25X1
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against the idea teat there should be more of. it? But it is
not a measurable commodity: it is an abstraction, and j gm tints
as to ho: much it is in short sup_ ly are necessarily highly
subject? Ve. ~
My o:,? judy ent is that t1 e notion that it is at
present seriously lacking is exaggerated. There is, indeed,
a great deal of co partmentation and specialization with n
the Agency. To some extent this is necessary and unavoidable-
At tie same tiI_m, we have any mechanisms for insuring and
even requiring an exchange of views, though these admittedly
are not always maintained in perfect order. The basic one
is the coordination and consultation process, .y_- .c, all-
intelligence end products go through. Perhaps for many
analysts this is more a burdensome routine ~ha_n . anythi rig -
else, but. it is nonetheless a regular form of opinion exchange-.
There are also numerous forums for multilateral exchange,
finished intelligence and some not.. It should also be pointed. -
out that there is an active informal network of Soviet anal-
ysts in OCI, OPR, 0 OER, OSR, DD0/S3, CRS, INR and DLL
that is in constant communication on Soviet developments.
There are, in addition, the many programs of the Office of
Training which bring. together Agency people, some of them
in the status of students and others as guest lecturers., for
the discussion of a whole range of substantive and managerial
topics. And, finally , the opinions of others, expressed .in
the fort. of published reports, are general? t' available to
everyone. . -
Unquestionably, bureaucratic barriers-and gaps between
disciplines within the Agency remain. The memo proposes as
one way of reducing this inherent problem a policy of increased
rotation between components. This, too, is a notion. which
has come up again and ?gain over the ,Tears. It is lard to
1
object to it in principle, and, of course, there are quite a
good number of rotations now occurring, an. and from, CCU, for
example. it will certainly be desirable to devise a means
of allowing people to take rotational assign ~_tents in 0PR
6T' ??? it appears . that they. can and want to do a
? e: e of
p
research tailored to OP -s needs. (Lew !.lap =, b r L e ;?TaV
r
will shortly be sending along his thoughts on your suggestions
in this regard.) But there are rotations and rotations. I
believe that -- speaking of the situation as I see it' in-
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this Directorate -- there might be as ?many drawbacks as
benefits to an extensive, systematized program of rotation.
For.one thing, political specialists are, for the most part,
political specialists and not economic experts (and vice
versa) because that is where their interests and talents
lie.._ The great majority of the best of them want it that
way. To take an analyst out of OCI, say, and assign him to
one of the specialized working components of OER, for a
longish period of time will in many cases, especially if the
analyst is not keen for such experience, produce negligible
results in terms-. of expanding his horizons, and at the same
time involve no.little cost in terms of his. time and the
host_.office's time. I could, however, foresee benefits
resulting from an arrangement under which, for example, an
experienced political analyst was assigned to the Office of
the.-Director of Economic. Research and under his auspices-
given wide familiarization with the sources, methods of
analysis.and personnel of the office as a whole, over a
period of something like 3 to. 6 months. External-training
in other disciplines, either via governmental. or academic
programs, is another useful route. In either-case, however,
the number of people who can be accommodated is limited by
budgetary and practical considerations.
This suggests a further point, an important-one I
believe, and one which is neglected in the memo. This is
that there are considerable possibilities for broadening our
thinking and sharpening our insights available to us outside
the Agency. This is not -Co depreciate the expertise contained
within our walls but to say that there is a rich external
fund which, I suspect, we are not making as much use of as
we should. In the first place, this means no more than
staying abreast of the academic literature in our various
fields of interest. But we should continue to place value
on establishing and expanding direct contacts wits academic
specialists, on both a multilateral and bilateral basis-
Attendance at professional conferences is one wav. Still
another is the specially organized informal seminar bringing
academics and Agency people together periodically for dis-
cussions focused on a particular subject or paper. I should
point out, however, that this device, valuable as it is,
needs to be used selectively because, security considerations
apart, there is always the danger that we could wear out our
welcome in-the academic community.
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I take more seriously than the observations about
cross-fertilization in general the complaint about the
impediments to flexible and original thinking- It is a
longstanding problem, but one which, to my knowledge, has
never been attacked in earnest. The analytical environment
does not in fact encourage the rethinking of established
wisdoms and comfortable verities. To some extent this lack
is in the nature of the bureaucratic beast, and of life in
an organized community with its group pressures, fear of the
consequences of isolation and error, etc. And, as is well
known, coordination, though it discourages wild. swings and
helps to cull out the merely eccentric, also inexorably
drives opinion toward the well-trodden. middle ground-
Thought might perhaps be given to keeping formal, full-dress
coordination -- which strictly speaking means equal rights
for the originator and the commentator -- to a minimum and
allowing more room for the kind of informed and responsible
consultation which academic scholars, by and large, practice
among themselves. There is also some appeal in a notion
which has been discussed recently within the Agency -- the
notion of some form of "devil's advocacy," not too for-gal
and institutionalized, but a device or even just a shared
attitude that would help to insure that novel ideas and
unconventional opinions get a fair hearing- In any_.case,
the subject is worth further thought.
I am also in sympathy with the suggestion that our
analytical, as opposed to our managerial, resources sometimes,
in the end, are treated as our least prized assets. This is
not to say that once a Sovietologist or Sinologist always a
Sovietologist or Sinologist. Some people with experience in
these fields move to other things, sometimes simply because
their interests and enthusiasms have shifted. But where
.this is not the case and ..here- people have demonstrated
their capacities for top-flight intelligence analysis, there
ought to be ways of insuring that they continue to be rewarded
coamensurately. It is Directorate policy to promote our best
analysts to GS-15 and we have done so where possible- Per-
sonnel ceilings and grade restrictions have moo- permitted as
many such senior.analyst-jobs as we would like, but the op-
portunity is clearly there. Furthermore, our branches and
divisions are small and the chiefs of these organizations
are intimately involved in the analytical process often doing
the original drafting ofmajor intelligence items. In effect,
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our branch chiefs are senior analysts devoting the over-
whelming amount of their time to substantive -tatters. But
needless to say, since there are only so many of the higher
grades to go around, any attempt to make these more widely
available to substantive personnel would ultimately entail
reduction of administrative-managerial and staff positions-
Over the years I have found that good analysts come to
us in a variety of disguises, some as Ph.D's,- some as BA's.
Some.of these, usually those who gravitate. to Soviet foreign
affairs, have the journalist temperament and itchy feet and
like to be where the most action is. It is these people we
must persuade. to tarry a little.- Others wish to dig out
their little specialist hole and bury themselves. in it. It
is these we must persuade to spend some time in the outside
world occasionally. I think we need both kinds and both new
and old blood,: where possible in a state of creative tension-
Finally," some comments on the.references'to-OPR, its
objectives and reflexes. I take the observations.about.the
relevance of its work program to be largely gratuitous. In
any case, they are too off-handed to be helpful-- We are all-
I think keenly aware of- the necessity of making and keeping
the research effort relevant. Neither I nor the members of
OPR foresee their becoming a community of bearded monks in
dusty. cassocks. sitting atop. their own Mt. Athos. Nor do I
or they want to slip into the business of, as one member of
OPR put it, churning out Ph.D theses with SECRET stamps on
them. But, at this stage, I have no misgivings on that
score.
As for the participation of OPR's experts.in Agency-
wide or interagency enterprises (NIEs,. NSSDYTs, etc..) , it is
of course untrue to imply, as the memo does, that this does
not occur. How much is desirable, at this point in the
quite short life of'. the office, is a matter of judgment.
would expect this aspect of its work to grow, especially
since the 'staff that has been assembled possesses considerable
versatility.. We will also want to provide opportunities for
the staff members to express their thoughts from time to:
time in forms other than the full-blown research report-
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But the creation of OPR was the result of a belief that
there was a gap to be filled in the area of research in
depth. Until it has been demonstrated that this is not the
case -- and eight. months have hardly been enough to do
that I. an, convinced it would be a mistake to begin thinking
about changing course. It would especially be a mistake to
send OPR down the road of current support-, including making
regular contributions to NID. While there can be no precise
delimitation of the sphere of current intelligence, and OPR
must also. concern- itself with the irsnediate and the topical,
not just the historical or futuristic, .to follow such a course would. be. to blur the legitimate distinctions between
the missions. of OCZ:?and OPR beyond .recognition__ I would.
note here-, parenthetically, that I find it ' curious that the
author,. perhaps.. inadvertently, at no point in.-his memo
acknowledges. that OCI, like OPR, is the: home base for a body
of well-trained and experienced Soviet experts.
25X1
Acting. Deputy Director for Intelligence
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