PERSPECTIVES FOR INTELLIGENCE 1975 - 1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110014-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: June 11, 1974
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 20 1-4 CIA-RDP80M01082A0008001
Ecacuri.a Registry
i A UN 10/4
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Perspectives for Intelligence 1975 - 1980
1. I do not have any real problems with the substantive
estimates of the nature of our intelligence problem in the years
1975 to 1980, except that I noted on page 4 the absence of any
mention of the Soviet political offensive in Europe and possibly
NE and WH. It seems that the Soviets are making unprecedented
attempts to strengthen their political action thrust, particularly
in Europe, a move that is largely unnoticed and uncontested by this
government.
2. In Part III - Implications for Intelligence Planning - the
paper becomes more difficult to follow. The paper appears to recommend
advanced technical systems for analysis and production to the ultimate
users of intelligence, designed to handle increasingly large amounts
of raw intelligence. While new methods may indeed be needed, it has
seemed to me the problems in this regard in the past few years have
stemmed not so much from a lack of gimmicks and systems in presentation
as they have from the lack of courage to make decisions and warn policy
makers on the basis of information available. No new systems nor methods
will help to any measurable degree, unless the people employing them have
the courage to disregard preconceived ideas and concepts when available
intelligence indicates this is necessary.
3. In paragraph 8 of Part III there is a discussion of possible
greater efficiencies in the field of national/tactical interface. The
paper says current studies seek to identify ways by which national
programs can more directly support tactical requirements and vice versa.
It would seem to me that we have long passed the day when the assets of
this Agency's Stations will ever be realistically employed under tactical
commanders. I would hate to see the operational focus this Directorate
has finally achieved after years of diffusion of effort thrown out of
gear by being required to satisfy tactical requirements.
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4. Paragraph 9 of Part III makes the point that costly and
risky clandestine techniques must only be employed if overt sources
cannot be successful in obtaining needed.information. This. is one
of the first times I have seen this obvious need highlighted in a
paper of this type. Obviously, I agree very strongly, for I feel
one of the greatest weaknesses in the tasking and requirements
system today is the absence of any body or group to make this
distinction when serving requirements on the overt as opposed to
covert collectors.
William E. Nel on
Deputy Director for operations
25X1
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