PERSPECTIVES, PART III
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110018-7
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
13
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
May 6, 2004
Sequence Number:
18
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 9, 1974
Content Type:
NOTES
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110018-7.pdf | 384.64 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80MO1082A000800110018-7
9 May 1974
25X1
25X1
SUBJECT: Perspectives, Part III
Attached is a suggested draft for Part III, Management
Implications, to the Perspectives. The draft has been reviewed
I'm available to discuss the draft if you desire, at your
convenience.
25
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110018-7
SECHET
Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110018-7
8 May 1974
III. Management Implications
A. Collection vs Exploitation
1. Over the past decade, management focus and the
allocation of resources has been directed primarily to the
application of advanced technology to the collection and to a lesser
degree, the processing of intelligence data. This has been highly
successful, resulting in major substantive advances in our
knowledge, particularly with regard to the military capabilities
of the Soviet Union. Without this investment we would not now be
able to enter confidently into the negotiations required for detente.
3. Within the time frame of this document, the most
important and pervasive problem facing the intelligence community
will be to ensure efficient exploitation of the enormous amounts of
data we will be collecting. Exploitation is defined here to mean
not only the problem of sifting, selecting and processing the most
Approved For Release 2004/in CTA-RDP80M01082A000800110018-7
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80MO1082A000800110018-7
relevant data, but also the application of advanced techniques
to transfer of data to the point of ultimate use, to analysis and
to the production and presentation of end products for whatever
purpose: finished intelligence, current intelligence, or crises
management.
4. Coping with this problem will require increased
management attention and more imaginative use of existing
advanced techniques of information handling.
B. Demands vs Resources
5. Another problem of great magnitude facing the
community over the next five to ten years will be changing (and in
all probability increasing) demands for intelligence while available
resources decrease in real terms.
6. In the past we have necessarily devoted the major
portion of our effort. toward the military capabilities of the Soviet
Union and our other adversaries, actual and potential. Even
assuming a period of genuine detente, we will probably need to retain
most of our military focus, simply because the range of military
interests and the need for information on the quality of enemy
weapons systems. We must not only remain alert militarily, but
also to support negotiations and verify arms limitations agreements.
At the same time, the demands for other types of intelligence are
growing, shifting not only area coverage but subjective targets as
Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80MO1082A000800110018-7
2-
rr
Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110018-7
well. The result is a probable net increase in demand with
a new mix among military, political, technical and economic
target objectives.
7. This simultaneous shift and increase in requirements
is occurring now--in a period of serious resource constraint
and continuing inflation. Until very recently we have had the freedom
to invest in a number of functional areas simultaneously without
undue difficulty. This is no longer true. We will have to accomplish
our objectives without the benefit of significantly greater resources.
How we do this will be crucial. We can no longer afford to
accommodate the resource squeeze with large, relatively
indiscriminate manpower reductions and other marginal reductions.
We must instead find trade-offs in the systems we use, the areas
we cover, and the depth of the data we seek.
8. One area that should hold promise for greater efficiency
is the national /tactical interface. Our current studies seek to identify
ways by which national programs can more directly support tactical
requirements, or vice versa. Some economies should be achievable
as more capable and flexible systems such as near-real time imaging
come into the national inventory. Modernized systems and
procedures which, by their design, permit greater mutuality of effort
between national and force support activities should enable trade-offs
achieving net resource savings.
-3-
Approved For Release 2004/05/~E E DP80M01082A000800110018-7
S EC:ET
Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110018-7
C. Technical Systems
9. Because of past major investments in technical systems
we have today a significant collection capability against our most
important targets. We must maintain this capability in an environ-
ment of increasing technological sophistication worldwide and in
particular in the Soviet Union and the PRC. This will require
constant vigilance and modernization of certain systems, but we
must be more selective in our choices for major investment.
Modernization must be highly focussed rather than governed by a
desire to apply resources to all systems in the pursuit of improvement.
10. On balance, greater emphasis will have to be applied
to maintaining our technological superiority through research
leading to upgrading current systems and prototype development
for future systems rather than the full scale acquisition of new
generations of technical sensors.
D. Evaluation
11. Taking advantage of potential trade-offs will require
a much more.systematic evaluation of our total effort, and the forging
of a much tighter link between the allocation of resources and the
substantive intelligence result. We have made a small start in this
direction with the KIQ/KEP, but success will require an increasing
commitment from the entire community.
-4-
Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110018-7
S.-I. '"
Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : IA RDP80M01082A000800110018-7
12. A critical dimension to better evaluation and more
efficient use of resources will be a far better definition of
intelligence requirements, both short and long term (the latter
in particular with regard to R&D). Today the community has a
confusing variety of means, methods, and vehicles and even
language to determine and state requirements. Ways of restructur-
ing the machinery for reviewing requirements in order to rationalize
and sharpen overall requirements will require high-level attention
and far more time of the USIB.
E. Manpower Implications
13. The overall direction of the intelligence effort implies
a need for reviewing the manpower talents, disciplines and language
capabilities that will be required.. This will be particularly true in
human source collection, where great depth of cultural knowledge
plus a greater capability in both scientific and economic disciplines
will be needed. Also in the analytic field where the tools in use will
be increasingly different; the analyst of the future will have to be
comfortable in an electronic age. In our preoccupation recently with
manpower reductions, investment in new talent, training and career
development, and exposure abroad may have suffered. This cannot
be permitted to continue.
14. The future impact of advanced information processing
and presentation capabilities on how the community functions will be
Approved For Release 2004/05/21 igIA-RDP80M01082A000800110018-7
nr T
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80M01082A00'0800110018-7
great. Indeed, the intelligence community should be in the
forefront in placing these new technologies to the service of the
users. New methods of analysis, forecasting, coordination and
presentation of information must be energetically explored and
applied where appropriate. Care must be taken in the application
of such new methods and systems to insure they are designed for
the people who will use them and that adequate training in their use
be active and integral to the process.
F. Specific Planning Guidance
15. As one of our major means of achieving better manage-
ment we must begin with a series of overall plans that will guide
program development and budget decisions at all levels. These
should cover, as a start, the total SIGINT field; the total imagery
field; and, in some comparable way, the Human Intelligence efforts
of the entire community. These plans should set forth: 1) the
purpose and objectives of the community's efforts in these fields;
2) state clearly the requirements which determine the capabilities
we need; 3) explain methods and techniques; 4) assess the nature,
extent and cost of current and programmed capabilities; and 5) offer
alternatives along with costs for filling gaps in meeting stated
requirements. Clearly, they must be prepared by the community
with all interested parties participating, but the responsibility for
leadership in their formulation must also be clear.
Approved For Release 2004/05/21-:6GIA-RDP80MO1082A000800110018-7
SECIET
Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80MO1082A000800110018-7
16. These plans should be approved by USIB and IR.AC and
concurred in by NSCIC in time to influence the development of the
FY 77-81 NFIP, beginning with the issuance of the appropriate
guidance documents early in CY 1975.
-7-
Approved For Release 2004/05/21 : CIA-RDP80MO1082A000800110018-7
~~ T
SEltiE
raWWrcweu rc~r r~eiease cuu~+ivaic i wra-r~urournu ivocrauuvouu i iu ~
nu e ~m --e.E
-:.
PERSPECTIVES
I. TRENDS IN THE tiVORLD SITUATION.. (no change)
II. KEY LONG-TERM INTELLIGENCE CONCERNS (new)
III. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS (a proposal)
Approved For Release 2004~~/~,a~~l~-RDP80M01082A000800110018-7
25X1 gpproved For Release 2004/05/21 :CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110018-7
Next 14 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2004/05/21 :CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110018-7
Approved For Release 2004/05/21 :CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110018-7
21. ~E~growing world population is making ever increasing claims
on resources, especially food and water. At the- same time, the US is
becoming increasingly vulnerable to other resource shortfalls--e. g. ,
in energy and metals. The Intelligence Community is thus likely to find
itself pushed ever more deeply into the relatively unexplored area of~_
economic intelligence. Certain key questions occur: Will scarcities lead
to political and social unrest in areas and situations of particular interest
to the US? Will growing US dependence on foreign suppliers significantly
affect political relationships? Will resource-rich nations enter into
bilateral supply arrangements tivith other states which damage US economic
or political interests ? Will foreign countries comply with agreements to
decrease degradation of the natural environment?
'"
Approved For Release 2004/051~Tfi~'G~~-~DP80M01082A000800110018-7
t. ~:~:.~
Approved For Release 2004/05/21 :CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110018-7
22, Science and technology tivill also play a larger role in inter-
national affairs during the decade ahead, and this, inevitably, will
require further accommodation by the Intelligence Community, There
,;,
M1
will be specific interest in developments in particular field of technology-
e, g. , integrated circuits, telecommunications, energy, ocean mining
and other''resource-extraction enterprises, genetic engineering, weather
modification, and nuclear engineering, And there will be questions of a
more general (and more novel) nature: Will foreign powers seek to bind
other nations via technical linkages; i. e. , to augment or replace political
influence with technological dominance? Will particular technological
breakthroughs or the attainment of technological supremacy in given areas
provide individual states with new routes to international eminence? A.nd
will the process of technology transfer hurt or help US national interests?
23. Finally, a grim note concerning the apparent inclination of much
of the world to try to break apart even while the resources of science and
technology provide the means to pull it together: There are today only
-some 135 states but there are thousands of distinct ethnic or political/
cultural groups which form minorities within those states, l~/Iany of
these minorities, in advanced countries as well as backward, are becoming
increasingly aware of their discrete identities and more and more disposed
to seek their own independence, The disruptions such awareness. and such
separatist urges might produce could become a growing international
p roblem, one with many implications for the Jntelligence Community-
Approved For Release 2004/0 'W-~G-I~-F~P80M01082A000800110018-7
~,
4- ~-; ~ ~
Approved For Release 2004/05/21 :CIA-RDP80M01082A000800110018-7
Societies once thought to be stable, allies once throught to be reliable,
countries and areas once thought to be calm, all could beconne the
victims of a persistent and pervasive unrest,
:.
Approved For Release 2004/0~~'I~;~~I-~DP80M01082A000800110018-7