DRAFT RESPONSE TO PFIAB LETTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01082A000900200016-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: May 17, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SP - 63/74
17 May 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Colby
SUBJECT: Draft Response to PFIAB Letter
1. We have received comments and suggestions from the several agencies
and components whose assistance was requested. There was general concurrence
that the approach is about right. Many of the suggestions were helpful, and
the attached draft reflects their accommodation.
2. Two major suggestions of substance were not accommodated. Both
pertain to paragraph 4.
--DIA believes we should say flatly that the Soviets "desire to
achieve a margin of superiority" (not by opportunism but by
design, and not just if they can), and agrees with PFIAB that
the Soviets perceive themselves as "approaching the threshh=aid
of overall superiority in strategic power."
--INR believes the Soviets may view such programs as Trident and
B-1 as threatening to widen the qualitative gap, and believe-
we should say "it is too early to judge whether their current
active strategic weapons development efforts are intended to
keep up with the competition or whether they hope to surpass;
the US eventually and achieve a margin of superiority."
3. The DIA and INR suggestions obviously pull in completely opposite
directions, so I think we should stick with our original language. I have
introduced mention of US improvements, tinkered with the "margin of
superiority" expression to make it word-for-word from the NIE, and left
your expressed difference with PFIAB exactly as previously drafted.
4. Please note that the convention of using "ticks" for ease of
reading, a good suggestion from Ed Proctor, forced me to move your own
additional sentence, about Soviet policy gains in the eyes of other nations,
from paragraph 2 to paragraph 3. The reason is that the sentence is not a
part of the estimate from which the ticked-off points were drawn.
FILE COPY
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ase 2004/O !cjE.RDP80F
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 Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CT&--DP80M01082A000900200016-8
SP 63/74
SUBJECT: Draft Response to PFIAB Letter
5. This draft is being sent to General Walters, Dan Graham, George
Carver, Ed Proctor, and Carl Duckett, so that if you want to have a final
discussion of it at your morning meeting they will have the text.
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'Howard Stoertz, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic Programs
Attachment:
Draft
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SUBJECT: Draft Response to PFIAB Letter
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - Gen. Graham (IC)
1 - Dr. Proctor (DDI)
1 - Mr. Duckett (DDS&T)
1 - D/DCI/NIO
1 - ER
1-NIO/SP
1 - NIO/RI
NIO/SP:HStoertz:mat
(17May74)
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D R A F T
17 May 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
The White House
SUBJECT: Report on the Strategic Threat by the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
1. Admiral Anderson has made available to me a copy of his'letter to
you dated April 30, 1974, containing PFIAB's annual assessment of the !trategic
threat. It would not be appropriate for me to comment on the Board's
recommendations about US strategic policy and the public presentation of it,
or about the priority which should be accorded to certain US R&D programs.
I would, however, like to comment on three other aspects of the Board's
conclusions--the prospects for Soviet strategic superiority, inteTligence
requirements to support US strategic policy, and the uncertainties in
intelligence estimates.
. 2. In the estimate of "Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack"
(NIE 11-8-73) which I submitted to you with the concurrence of the United
States Intelligence Board in January of this year, a distinction was
drawn between two different measures of strategic power. One involves
equality or superiority in quantitative terms. The second considers deterrent
and war-fighting capabilities. The message of NIE 11-8-73 is that:
--The US faces very substantial improvements in the USSR's
strategic attack forces.
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--By the early 1980's these improvements are likely to convey
an image of superiority to those who ascribe significance to
quantitative measures.
--While through these improvements the Soviets will increase their
counterforce capabilities--notably against the US Minuteman,
force--they are not likely to be able to negate the US deterrent
under any circumstances we can foresee over the next ten years.
3. The forecast in the NIE assumed the future development of US forces
along the lines now programmed and assumed no SALT constraints other than
those of the existing agreements. An important corollary of this forecast,
in my view, is that Soviet policy could gain considerable additional weight
in the calculations of other nations despite the continued ultimate effective-
ness of the US deterrent.
4. The SALT agreements placed a ceiling on certain largely quantitative
aspects of the growth of the strategic forces of the two sides. The
qualitative improvement of strategic forces, unconstrained by SALT 1, has
proceeded unabated. This is an area in which the US retains a substantial
lead. I believe that Soviet actions since the signing of the SALT agreements
reflect, not only an attempt to keep up with the competition--out of concern
for such US programs as B-l, Trident, and Minuteman improvement--but also an
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opportunistic desire to press ahead and achieve a margin of superiority if
they can. In my view, the Soviets perceive themselves as essentially equal
in overall strategic power today. However, I do not believe (as does the
PFIAB) that the Soviets perceive themselves as approaching the threshhuld
of overall superiority in strategic power. How far they will press any
attempt to achieve superiority will depend to a considerable degree on JS
negotiating and defense policies, in particular on our ability to persuade
the Soviets that:
--they cannot continue indefinitely to have both substantially
improving strategic capabilities and the benefits of detente;
--non-restraint on their part will produce offsetting US reactions;
--restraint on their part will be reciprocated.
5. I have reexamined the possible impact of Soviet strategic developments
on the credibility of the US deterrent, and I continue to believe, as
indicated in NIE 11-8-73,that under no foreseeable circumstances in the next
ten years are the Soviets likely to develop and deploy forces of the magnitude
and quality necessary to reduce damage to themselves to acceptable levels by
a first strike against US strategic forces. I believe the Soviets would have
to calculate that the US would be able to make a devastating reply to any
Soviet surprise attack. In reaching these conclusions in the NIE and in my
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reexamination of them, I have considered possible damage levels on the wo
sides as revealed by engagement analyses between US and Soviet strateg=tk
forces, including all three elents of the US strategic triad. There are
obvious uncertainties in such analyses, but in reaching my judgment I lave
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6. I agree fully with PFIAB's concern over the need to improve the
substantive intelligence required to support US policy objectives, especially
in areas of significant Soviet R&D effort or potential. In the three
critical areas the Board mentioned--accuracies of Soviet missiles, prospects
for detection of US missile submarines, and the strategic implications f
Soviet laser developments--we currently have intensive interagency study
efforts underway in order to provide policy officials with a definitive as
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possible an understanding of Soviet programs and capabilities. These
three subjects are listed among the Key Intelligence Questions toward
which I have directed the enti a intelligence community to focus its
attention.
7. I appreciate and will pursue the Board's suggestion that CIA
participate in the preparation of the "RISOP" (Red Integrated Strategic
Operations Plan) used in wargaming the SIOP. DIA participates now and
uses intelligence community estimates, but as the gaming becomes more
complex with more STOP options, CIA may be able to contribute more thar
hitherto to development of the RISOP. I will undertake to explore with
the. Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff how CIA can best
contribute to this aspect of operational planning for our strategic forces.
8. Finally, I agree with the PFIAB findings that intelligence estimates
require the keenest possible technical evaluations. To that end we are
experimenting on ways to communicate more precisely the degree of confidence
we have in our judgments, particularly on technical data. One of our
interagency studies is addressing the prospects for determining the
accuracies of Soviet ICBMs in the period about five years from now, in
effort to narrow the uncertainties as well as to alert users of inte.llic;ence
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to them. The strategic relationship over the next decade is likely to be
increasingly sensitive to uncertainties in such qualitative factors as
missile accuracies, which are more difficult to measure than quantitative
elements such as the numbers of launchers or weapons.
W. E. Colby
cc: Admiral Anderson, Chairman PFIAB
Hon. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs
Hon. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of
Defense
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