LETTER TO THE HONORABLE JAMES R. SCHLESINGER FROM W. E. COLBY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A000500010026-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 21, 2009
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: April 26, 1975
• Content Type: LETTER

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Copy 7 Of 11 C"opisss
2 6 APR 1975
The Honorable James R. Schie.- I1. ,der
The Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C. 20301
Last Jung I suggested to ov that we mould try a pilot study
on the tactical/national intelli.g z ; interface to size the problem, develop
procedures, and get some iinsi.glwa into possible payoffs. Our represent-
atives then worked out terms of r+ a tnce for a pilot study on ttatiotsal
intelligence support to field corn lnie:rs
My representative, , USAF,
IC Staff, has just given me the ti; tacked status report on the pilot study.
We a good summary of where tb t study stands now and what's yet to
be done.
I'm also sending informatk a copies to Bill Clements, George Brown
and Al Hall.
JCS review completed.
Attachment:
As stated
cc: Honorable l illiam P. Clemeaa s, Jr., f $ec3Jef
General George S. Browns rCS
Dr. Albert C. Hall, ASD(I)
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Distribution:
Orig - Addressee, w/att
4 - DCI, w/att
5 - DDCI, w/att
6 - ER, w/att
IC Registry, w/att
8 - MPRRI) Reading, w/att
9 - MPRRD Subj . , w/att
10 - 0 Chrono, w/att
11 - DepSecDef, w/att
IC/MPRRDX 16A ?r75)
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I=' SPORT TO TI IE DIRECTOR ('F :Ei T.RAL INTELLIGENCE
STATUS OF THE PILOT STUDY ON N. INTRLLIGENCI SUPPORT
TO FIELD COMM AN. t "RS
Background
The President's meniar nci'u, or 5 November 1971 highlighted
the D responsibility for all iuteilir c r ce pro, rams, including "tactical"
intelli hence. With few exceptior s , t.ac ? cal intelligence assets fall outside
the NFT.P. They include the int:e]ligztn.- units and activities organic to
or in. support of the cperating military .,rces, and also strategic warning
systems, military department and t'- ei ..c irte.lligence staffs, and R&D projects.
Soon after getting the Presi.?_ -n''s memorandum, Mr. Helms
agreed that Dr. Hall should. take tl t 1--, d -,a non--NFIP Defense intelligence.
In FY 1.974, in the DGI's objectives b r he Intelligence Comrrnu.zity, we
told the President thrt, jointly with Dc;l aacd the JCS, we would review
military intelligence needs and look ft:, ways that national assets could
support the forces. The DCI contint.ue,1 this objective for FY 75.
JCS and Service Concerns
L_] As intelligence buying pow,: decreased, management interest
in the relationship between NFIP and rc n-1\1!'IP programs and activities
increased. This interest focused on ac reeving savings by eliminating
needless redundancy and by impro%,ino metual support. The resource
implications reinforce legitimate, sl, o : ;ly held JCS and Service fears.
U They believe they can't be .re of national intelligence support
in wartime because national needs wvilb ake priority over combat intelligence
needs, many national systems are vul_ F rable, NFIP systems can't
report fast enough for combat support, and communications may be
inadequate. They are, therefore, ver?, concerned about their force
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support intelligence assets. They 3elieve that unless judged in context
with the forces they support, these assets:
Could be diverted from their primary missions to work
on national intelligence tasks.
U Could be subject to centralized funding, taking from the
Services responsibility for r3source decisions for them.
Could be traded for national systems incapable of supporting
the forces in a timely and u; able way, and unresponsive to
the combat commanders in the field.
Memorandum of Agreement
L_] Against this background, in November 1973, you and Secretary
Schlesinger appointed representatives who worked out an agreement
for studying the tactical /national in elligence interface. This agreement
called for the JCS to do six things:
25X1 - Determine with reasonable precision the tactical
intelligence assets to be inn luded in the study.
Identify all tactical intelligence assets that
contribute significantly to Loth national and tactical
intelligence.
25X1 - u Identify the peacetime. crisis and wartime require-
ments to which these asset. respond.
25X1 - U Compare these requirements with support available
from national sources.
25X1 - u Identify military force equirements that could
be satisfied by national assets.
Identify the contributio.i to the national intelli-
gence effort that can be made by tactical intelligence
assets.
TI C1r.y;?ry'
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L__] The IC Staff was to use the JCS report to develop recommendations
to increase mutual support and eliminate duplication. The JCS, however,
found these tasks controversial. The main problem was the degree of
visibility to be given to force support intelligence assets. As an interim
step, their report on non-CDIP assets that contribute to national intelligence
was sent to' you by Secretary Clement:: in May 1974.
The Pilot Study
As a follow-on, youproposeti to Secretary Schlesinger, in
June 1974, that the next step should be a study to develop specific
recommendations for mutual intelligence support between the national
level and the operating forces. You suggested starting with a pilot
study to size the problem, develop pri cedures, and gain insight into
the payoffs that are possible. By August 1974, we had approved terms
of reference for this pilot study. Thi.. is our current effort and the
focus of the report that follows.
Other Related Studies
L_] You should bear in mind th=t this pilot study is only one
of many linked to the tactical /national interface. So far, we have identified
over 50 related studies, reviews and uxercises, some completed and
some in progress. For example, here are a few of the more interesting:
An IRAC/IR&D Council study to identify R&D
programs related to tactical SIGINT, and to recommend
possibilities for inter-agency integration of effort.
A NSC Staff examination of tactical applications
for national reconnaissance as ets .
L
___] We are building a working 'aibliography of these related
efforts. It will be attached to the final pilot study report.
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Pilot Study Organization
The study group for the pilot study has a member from
each of the military Services, DIA, NSA, NRO, CIA, US European Command,
the Joint Staff and the IC Staff. It has observers from the Defense Investi-
gative Service and DMA. Rear Admiri l Robert P. Hilton, USN, Joint
Staff, and I co-chair the study group. We each have executive officers
appointed from our staffs to support u,;.
L_] Two working groups, with members from the same organizations
as the study group, work under the s-`udy group's direction and guidance.
The National Working Group postulates national priorities and assesses
the capabilities of NFIP assets to meet the intelligence needs of theater
commanders in light of those priorities. The Theater Working Group
looks for gaps in theater intelligence 'Li) be matched against national
system capabilities. To do this, it de-'ines theater intelligence needs
and assesses the capability of theater 'orces to meet them. It also
broadly assesses theater capabilities tc meet national needs.
L__] The study group will integrate the working group assessments
and put together a final study report. That report will go to the Chairman,
JCS, and to General Wilson for comment before we send it to you and
the Secretary of Defense.
Study Scenario
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The study group agreed to use this plan. For the pilot study,
however, it decided to limit the scenario to the last ten days of the
defensive phase and the conventional Offensive operations phase (C+25
to C+48). This will meet all of our study objectives. It permits assessment
of a broad range of national intelligence assets against representative
combat intelligence requirements. It forces consideration of competing
intelligence priorities between the national and theater levels.
Intelligence Assets
L__] Both working groups have Irawn up lists of intelligence
assets for this pilot study. For the National Working Group, this includes
the assets in 'the NFIP, except those under wartime operational control
of theater forces. It also includes selected non-NFIP assets, such as
SR-71's. The Theater Working Group has a more difficult problem.
J The Services questioned whether force support intelligence
assets beyond those already in the NFIP, or listed in Secretary Clements'
memorandum, should be made visible. Clearly, without this visibility we
would have a distorted picture of the theater's capability to satisfy
its own and national requirements.
The Service Operations Depties discussed this problem in
the JCS arena. They agreed that the Theater Working Group would
develop its set of theater assets from ?,he forces assigned in the contingency
plan and from other forces the theater commander might identify for
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the pilot study. Intelligence capabilities below the Army brigade,
Air Force wing and Navy task group levels will be considered in the
aggregate. The Theater Working Group report won't identify specific
assets below those levels. This decis on should let us do the job.
We will see how it works out as we progress.
Intelligence Needs
L__] At first, we started to deve'op a -full set of theater intelligence
needs--essential elements of information, or EEI, for each level in the
scenario from theater command on down. This would have resulted
in thousands of EEI--too many to handle in this pilot study.
U The study group decided to limit theater EEI to a vertical
sample, cutting across all command le ' els . Working in Europe with
officers from the theater and component commands, the working group
chairmen developed 82 sample EEI. These EEI represent information
needs of units from each of the Servicas. They can be played against
each of the national and theater intelligence assets.
The pilot study also has to consider national information
needs. They support assumptions about the availability of national
intelligence assets for employment against theater EEI. The working
groups also need them to broadly assess how well theater assets committed
in the scenario can meet national requirements for the area of operations.
L__] The study group found no statement of national level information
needs for wartime. The KIQs, DCID 1/2 and JCS intelligence objectives
and priorities all cut off at the period of tension leading to hostilities.
The National Working Group has the job of developing criteria
and assumptions for national information needs and for determining
the availability and capabilities of nati rnal assets. (National requirements
for crises and wartime needs more discussion. It might be a good
subject for the NSCIC Working Group.
Pilot Study Status
Here's where we are now:
The study and working gi oups are organized.
A scenario that gets us down to the combat
intelligence level has been selected.
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J National intelligence assess, are listed; theater
assets are hopefully under control.
A good sample set of theater EEI has been developed.
A set of criteria and assumptions for national
intelligence needs and for determining the availability
and capabilities of national assets is close to completion.
Analysis has started where we have the data.
-1 Briefly, here's what we still have to do:
Analyze theater capabiliti e; to meet theater
EEI and find the gaps.
= Analyze national capabilities to meet theater
EEI and fill the gaps.
Broadly analyze theater capabilities to meet
assumed national information needs for the scenario
area of operations.
Collate these analyses.
Study Methodology
U The working groups will desine criteria for assessing national
and theater collection and reporting ca )abilities. They will use these
criteria, and assumptions for the area of operations, availability, priorities,
timeliness and weather, to estimate how well assets can satisfy needs.
These estimates will be stated as confidence factors--high (60% or greater
chance of meeting the need), moderate (40% to 59% chance), low (less
than 40% chance), none and unknown.
Expected Study Results
L_] Bearing in mind the limited purpose of this pilot study,
here's what you can expect to get from it:
Insight into the scope and complexity of the
tactical /national intelligence interface. This is
a basic need for planning.
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One methodology for analy.-Iing interaction between
tactical and national intelligerr.e needs and capabilities.
By comparing this to other m4:thods, we can develop
our approach to future studies .
A model for looking at iii elligence relationships
between the theater and national levels. This should
give insight into the areas where mutual support
between NFIP and force support intelligence assets
has the best payoff potential.
Recommendations for possible improvements that
can be made now.
J And, hopefully, intelligence support options
that the JCS and our forces in Europe can crank into
their current contingency plar.-.ning.
Study Limitations
L___] Limitations that the study group deliberately imposed on
itself will condition the scope and depth of these study results. Briefly:
25X1 - Theater forces are limited to units designated
in the contingency plan.
The operational environrimnt is limited to
conventional warfare.
EEI for theater forces are limited to a repre-
sentative sample.
National information need: are limited to study
group assumptions.
25X1 - L The political situation is "imited to actual
conditions during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.
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Completion Date
The study group still holds to July 1975 for submitting the
final study report to you and the Secrt tary of Defense. This date
could slip to later in the summer.
I will keep you informed.
Tnn 1cnrrT
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.~, APR 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: I): rector of Central
)r te:lligence
S atus Report on the Pilot
;S udy on National Intelligent
S ipport to Field Commande
1. You asked whether, with some slight
editing, it would be wort:l:while to share the status
report with the SecDef, t:epSecDef, CJCS, and
ASD(I). I think it would I e.
2. I've reviewed the attached edited version
of the report. It smootbE over those candid
passages that were written specifically to high-
light problem areas for v=.)u. It shouldn't ruffle
any feathers.
3. Working copies of the original report are
in the Pentagon, one with Joint
Staff counterpart and ano=her with the Theater
Working Group chairman They haven't been
circulated.
4. Recommend you ign the letter to the
Secretary of Defense.
'tenant General, USA
D/DCI/IC
ACTON
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IIN 1 GLLIVGIVLC ..L!MMUIVI 17 M I Al- I-
Status Report on the
Pilo Study
1. The Director ;asked whether, with
slight diplomatic editing, he should share
the status report with The SecDef,
DepSecDef, CJCS and ASD I). I think he
should and it does requ.re editing.
The original report was written for the
Director and was delibe::ately candid.
2. An edited verhion of the report,
a DCI letter to cover it., and a note from
you to the Director are attached.
3. Please note that my counterpart,
the Joint Staff study group co-chairman, and
the DIA chairman of the Theater Working Group
have working copies of the original report.
They haven't been circulated.
,G --~~
,t: sic TI ON - k,
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