ISSUE OPTIONS AND ACTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 13, 2004
• Sequence Number: 52
• Content Type: PAPER

Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4
ISSUE: In what manner should a strengthened Executive Branch
oversight of intelligence activities be exercised?
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE POSITIONS:
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE: No indication
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE: No indication
OPTIONS
1. Oversight exercised by a special counsel or other
officer in the White House who reports directly to the
President. Such an officer would be supported by a small
staff, but have no management or resource responsibilities
over the Intelligence Community. He and his staff would
essentially be in an inspector general role.
2. Oversight would be exercised by a permanent joint
executive/legislative commission (one-half of the members
selected by the President and one-half by the Congressional
leadership). Presidential appointees would be from outside
the Government; Congressional appointees would be either
Congressmen or from outside the Government. The Commis ion
would report simultaneously to the President and to the
Congress. A commission staff would be created.
3. Enlarge the responsibilities of the NSCIC to include
Community oversight, with responsibility to report periodically
to the President. The PFIAB role would remain essentially as
proposed in DCI comments of 3 October on a proposed new
executive order on PFIAB. The 40 Committee responsibility
-,would be absorbed by the NSCIC. This would require establish-
ment of a separate NSCIC Staff.
4. Expand the responsibilities of the PFIAB and enlarge
its staff to enable exercise of an oversight role, with the
role of the NSCIC remaining essentially as it is. The 110
Committee also would continue to exist.
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4
 Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4
PROPOSED ACTION:
A memorandum for the President should be prepared setting
forth the recommendations of the DCI as representing the view
from inside the Intelligence Community as to how oversight
could be most effective.
ACTION RESPONSIBILITY: D/DCI/IC
Approved For Release 2004/06/14 Y'--CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4
 Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4
ISSUE OPTIONS AND ACTIONS
ISSUE: By what mechanism could Congressional oversight of
the Intelligence Community best be exercised?
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE POSITIONS:
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE: Senator Church has publicly
opted for a permanent joint
,Congressional committee; some
sentiment for separate committees
is believed to exist in the
committee.
The Government Operations
Committee of the Senate has
taken up the question, and will
report by 1 March 1976 its
recommendation.
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE: Gong. Pike reportedly has agreed with
OPTIONS
Sen. Church on a joint committee with
rotating membership.
NOTE: The DCI has testified that how Congress organizes
itself for intelligence oversight is a matter for the Congress
to decide and that the Intelligence Community will respond fully
to whatever oversight mechanism is created.
The key problem is not whether joint or separate
committee oversight committees are formed, but the relation of
whatever new oversight mechanism is created to the committees
which now exercise Congressional oversight.
It can be assumed the intelligence subcommittee
of the two Appropriations Committees will continue to exist.
The key options are:
1. A joint Executive/Congressional commission is formed
to provide oversight of the Intelligence Community and becomes
the single entity so involved, other than the Appropriations
Subcommittees which deal with the intelligence budget.
2. The new congressional oversight committee/committees
.replace(s) the Armed Services Subcommittees now exercising
oversight, and ~alllaother Congressional committees agree to
forcg~6vr- F~f~/i1~n Get'i-R~iJ$`~~11~3fA0~3~e e
activif'es w i.ch w th_ n their comm t ee charters.
 Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4
3. The new oversight committee/committees will function,
but with the Armed Services Subcommittees continuing something
like their present role. If this should occur, there is less
likelihood that other Congressional committees would cease
inquiries into aspects of intelligence activities which they
consider come within their charters.
PROPOSED ACTION
Against the likelihood that the DCI will be asked to
discuss the impact of various oversight arrangements which
one of the other select committees would have under consideration,
a position paper should be developed for the DCI's use.
ACTION RESPONSIBILITY: OLC/CIA in coordination with the OGC/CIA
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4
 Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4
AND ACTIONS
ISSUE: How should the Intelligence Community
developed, reviewed and approved?
budget be
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE POSITIONS:
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE: Some staffers have indicated
interest in giving greater
authority to the DCI,
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE: One staffer has expressed surprisfe
the DCI has so little actual authority
in this area.
OPTIONS
NOTE: The mechanics of the programming and budget process
.can be varied in numerous ways., but the essential options concern
the distribution of authority to provide concrete directive
guidance and to decide what is to be submitted to the President
for approval. The key actors are the senior U.S. intelligence
officer (whether or not he is the DCI), the DCI,'the Secretary
of Defense and his ASD(I), and OMB.
1. Give the senior J.S. intelligence officer in whatever
new organizational structure evolves authority to issue detailed
budget guidance and responsibility for recommending to the
President the budget for the entire Intelligence Community. In
essence, this.would.put a fence around the. intelligence budget
and take it out of departmental hands.
2. Continue what is essentially the present system,
including a requirement for submission of an NFIP by the DCI
or whoever is the senior officer of the Intelligence Community,
but with the departments also submitting budgets for their
intelligence elements.
3. . Eliminate the requirement for an NFIP from the DCI,
and leave intelligence budget development and review strictly
a departmental or agency responsibility. This would markedly
enhance the role of the ASD(I) in the Defense Department.
21. Strengthen the role of the Office of Management and
Budget by charging it to provide detailed program guidance,
down to specific elements of the intelligence budget, rather
than limiting guidance, as now, to an overall ceiling figure.
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4
 Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4
PROPOSED ACTION:
Develop a position paper which the DCI could present to
the White House or to the Select Committees, when the timing
appears appropriate.
ACTION RESPONSIBILITY: MPRRD/ICS in coordination with CIA/
Comptroller
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4
 Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDPBOM01133A000600200052-4
ISSUE: What structural changes are needed to improve the
effectiveness of the Intelligence Community?
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE POSITIONS:
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE: No indication as yet.
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE: No indication as yet.
OPTIONS
NOTE: Current consideration of possible structural
changes in the Intelligence Community revolve around the
future of CIA, the kind of staff structure that a senior
U.S. intelligence officer outside of CIA would require,
whether certain of the large intelligence collection programs
now within the DoD should be assigned elsewhere, and the future
of DIA.
1. Retain the present structure, but add a strong
staff to support a senior U.S. intelligence officer who is
other than the Director of CIA. Size and composition of
this staff would depend on whether the new official is charged
with:
a. the production of NIEs or of all national
intelligence
b. the development of the budget for the entire
community
c. the exercise of an inspector general function
for the community
2. Depending on whether the foregoing option is exercised
and what responsibilities are charged to the new senior intelli-
gence officer, the CIA would:
a. remain organized essentially as at present
b. lose its production elements, and become
essentially an organization of the Clandestine Service
and communicators
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80M0l133A000600200052-4
 Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4
3. The new senior U.S. intelligence officer, or the
DCI, is made Executive Agent of the Government for the conduct
of SIGINT activities, which will make the Director, NSA,
directly responsible to him.
14. The new senior U.S. intelligence officer, or the
DCI, is made Executive Agent of the Government for the conduct
of the national reconnaissance programs, with the directors
of these programs reporting directly to him.
5. The Defense Intelligence Agency could be disbanded
and its functions reassigned to a revived J-2, Joint Chiefs
of Staff and to the military services.
6. The departmental headquarters intelligence staffs
of the military services could be markedly reduced in size
and their function, with their current responsibilities being
absorbed in large measure by the DIA.
PROPOSED ACTION:
Without question, the DCI is going to be asked to present
his views to the Executive Branch on possible changes in the
structure of the Intelligence Community and, in all likelihood,
the Congressional Committees will make a similar request He
should have a position paper in which he expresses his
preferences and outlines the pros and cons of various proposals.
ACTION RESPONSIBILITY: D/DCI/IC
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4
 Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4
ISSUE: What is the future of covert action? Where should
responsibility for conduct of covert actions reside?
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE POSITIONS:
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE: Not known, but is expected to
support retention of a capability,
but require Congressional approval
for operations.
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE: Not known, but likely to be sam?
as above.
OPTIONS
NOTE: It can be assumed that the Executive and Legislative
Branches will reach some agreement with respect to
the existence of, the basis for, and the control of
covert actions conducted by the U.S. Government.
The essential element is the preservation and natur:>
of the clandestine collection and foreign counter-
intelligence functions--for the organization having
responsibility for such will possess the potential
capability for the Government to undertake covert
action when approved by appropriate authorities.
The key element of this issue, therefore, is where
should the capability for clandestine collection of
foreign intelligence reside.
The options for location of the Clandestine Service
are:
1. Within the DDO as part of a CIA organized basically
as at present.
2. Separation of the Clandestine Service from the central
intelligence organization charged with production of national
intelligence, with the Director of the Clandestine Service
responsible directly to the White House.
3. Transfer of the Clandestine Service to the Department
of State.
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4
 Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4
4. Transfer of the Clandestine Service to the Department
of Defense.
5. Transfer of the Clandestine Service to the Department
of Justice.
PROPOSED ACTION:
Develop a memorandum which the DCI could present to the
White House, or to the Select Committees, when the timing
appears appropriate.
ACTION RESPONSIBILITY: DDO/CIA
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4
 Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4
ISSUE OPTIONS AND ACTIONS
ISSUE: How should national intelligence estimates be
produced?
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE POSITIONS:
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE: Senator Mondale ha, publicly
argued for resurre: Lion of
the Board of Natioriai Estimates.
The SSC Staff has been exploring
the history of estimates production
and reviewing NIEs.
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE: Not known.
OPTIONS:
NOTE: Options concern the organizational structure, the
organizational location and the coordination and approval
process.
1. Structure options:
a. Use the individual expert approach--the NIO
concept.
(1) With a staff of sufficient size actually
to produce the NIEs.
(2) Without a support staff, with a requirement
for draft inputs from production organizations of the
Community.
b. Use the generalist approach--reconstitute a
board comparable to the old BNE.
(1) With a staff of sufficient size to
produce the NIE drafts.
(2) Without a support staff, and consequent
dependence on Community inputs.
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4
 Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4
c. Use an ad hoc approach--with NIE drafts
prepared by task groups formed to produce individual
estimates.
2. Location options:
a. Create a special NIE staff for the senior
U.S. intelligence officer if he is other than the head
of the CIA.
b. Maintain as a special staff of the DCI,
whichever structure option (NIO/BNE or other) is adopted.
c. Locate within the production organization of
the CIA.
3. Coordination/approval options:
. a. Approval by the senior U.S. intelligence officers
a personal responsibility.
Approval by the NSCIC.
c. Approval through the USIB structure as at
present.
d. Issuance by the production organization, with
clear indication as to differing views (NIO, BNE, or
other) with clear indication as to differing views of
any dissenting production elements.
PROPOSED ACTION:
It can be expected that before the Select Committee
hearings are over the matter of production of national
intelligence will be a subject of committee consideration,
and the DCI should have a position paper which he can use
to present his views.
ACTION RESPONSIBILITY: D/DCI/NIO
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4
 Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4
ISSUE: How can the Executive and Legislative Branches best
be assured that CIA's foreign intelligence activities are
conducted with due respect to the constitutional rights of
American citizens?
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE POSITIONS:
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE: The focus on "abuse" areas
is strong indication that
corrective legislation is
contemplated.
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE: Concern about intelligence
"abuses" is expected to result
in legislative proposals.
1. Issuance of an Executive Order by the President
titled, "Establishing Restrictions on Foreign Intelligence
Activities."
(Several drafts of an E.O. on this subject have
been reviewed, and it can be expected that an
E.O. will be forthcoming in the near future.
This option appears, in fact, to be in process
of execution.)
2. Despite issuance of an E.O. (or even because of it)
the Congress will write into statute specific restrictions
on intelligence activities which may be the same as, or more
stringent thank the E.O. It cannot be expected that any
legislation will be less restrictive than the E.O.
9
3. Because of the issuance of a Presidential E.O.,
the Congress will desist from legislating on specific restrictions
concerning foreign intelligence activities which could impinge
on the constitutional rights of citizens. (This option is
considered quite unrealistic.)
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4
 Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4
.PROPOSED ACTION:
In the light of restrictions contained in the Executive
Order now approaching final form, the DCI should be prepared
to comment on legislative proposals which would extend or
augment provisions of the E.O. In particular, he should be
prepared to comment on the impact which various possible
restrictions could have on the effectiveness of the foreign.
intelligence effort. To this end, a position paper should be
prepared for his use.
ACTION RESPONSIBILITY: OGC/CIA in coordination with the
General Counsels of the various elements
of the' Intelligence Community and the
Department of Justice.
Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4
 Approved For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4
ISSUE OPTIONS AND ACTIONS
ISSUE: How can the Congressional need for substantive
foreign intelligence best be accommodated?
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE POSITIONS:
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE: Unknown
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE : Unknown
OPTIONS
1. Provide intelligence to the Congress by a program
of on-call briefings designed to address the interests of the
requesting congressional committee. (This is essentially the
present system.)
2. Design a special series of unclassified publications
for distribution to the Congress as a means of coping at least
in part with congressional interest in being kept informed
of developments. (This would not be intended as "current
intelligence" coping with the daily newspaper, but would be
special memoranda summarizing background information.)
3. On the basis of identified needs and formal requests,
provide each committee of the Congress, for retention, classified
documents relating to the work of the committee.
)4. Provide a security facility in the Capitol in which
national current intelligence publications and national i_ntelli-
gence estimates could be made available to all members of the
Congress.
5. Provide all members, on an equal basis, all national
intelligence products, e.g., establish an all-source classified
intelligence library in the Capitol, staffed by intelligence
personnel.
PROPOSED ACTION:
Form a community task group to develop a proposal which
the DCI could present on his initiative to the Senate and
House Select Committees.
ACTION RESPONSIBILITY: bDI/OLC/OGC
(NOTE: The order of listing of the options is as seen from
the viewpoint of the Executive Branch. As seen by the Congress;,
the listing probably would be in reverse order.)
Approvd For Release 2004/06/14: CIA-RDP80M01133A000600200052-4