PERSPECTIVES: 1975-1995

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A000800090016-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2004
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: April 12, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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12 April 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Perspectives: 1975-1995
1.
Attached are notes from
which mark beginning responses to your urging that we endeavor
to peer a little further into the more distant future than the five-
year span we currently consider in Perspectives. I am assuming
the central part of your concern is that we -- the Intelligence
Community -- could come to the realization along about 1985 that
some fundamental (and expensive) programmatic and resource
decisions of a far-reaching nature had been made, say, in the
summer of 1975 which have turned out to be short-sighted and off
the mark. And for this reason you would like to come up with some
reasonably logical, albeit highly speculative, assumptions as to what
the world could look like 20 years from now. (My father used to say:
"If my front sight were as good as my hindsight, I wouldn't do the
things I do by a damn sight! ") Obviously a tough order, and I'm
afraid have not even dented the problem yet -- ley
alone penetrate it.
2. This clearly is a problem for the NIO's, and they, too, will
need all the help they can get. A possible concept could be for each
NIO to take three or four of the major problems/trends/issues in his
respective area, add 20 years and simply speculate what these
problems/trends/issues could look like at that time. Add a separate
paragraph or so on possible technological breakthroughs and one on
the universal issues of energy shortage, pollution, and food vs over-
population, and we probably will have gone as far as we dare. The
result may still be something we cannot use, but we will only know
after we have tried.
3. 'May I suggest this as a subject for your upcoming meeting
with the NIO' s this Monday afternoon?
Sa ilson
Lieute an eneral, USA
Depu to the DCI for the
Intel ence Co t 00
OrM 01133A0 16-5
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Enclosure
As stated
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`S
18 March 1975
NOTE TO:
General Wilson
herewith the initial draft of, the longer.
range Perspectives requested by Mr. Colby.
It was prepared by
I do not concur with all of
estimates and. indeed, see no need to in
this sort of paper. In general. I would see
this as more optimistic in tone and less
radical in its specific prognostications than
I would personally sanction, but I think it is
a very good starting point.
We are requesting comments from ICS
section chiefs and the NIOs. %k e are also
passing a copy informally toy
Chief. P1 D/IC
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 Approved For 10/28: CIA-RDP80M01133A000800090016-5 211 D R A FT/ 18 March 197E
Perspectives for Intelligence: 1975 - 2000
1. Over the next twenty-five years, the distribution of povre r
Y
and the pattern of relationships among the nations of the world iE
if unlikely, in gross terms, to change significantly. US and Soviet
strategic military capabilities will remain in balance and continuz
to overshadow the military capabilities of any other nation or
combination of nations. US relations with Western Europe and
Soviet relations with Eastern Europe will be subjected to continuing
tensions and adjustments. And relations between the two blocs Vvill
become more deeply interwoven and complex, economically and
culturally. But in a strategic sense the two blocs will remain
internally cohesive, identifiably separate, and in cwairrit~#i, _.
2. China's nuclear weapons capability will increase substar-dally
during this time frame, as will its industrial base. It will aspire-
to super-power status but will continue to lag well behind the US=
and USSR. As a dynamic society undergoing rapid change, Chitk:tts
initiatives on the international scene are likely to be less predict.tble
than those of maturer societies. As it matures and gains conficrc:nce
from its increasing strength, however, China may well tend to 1?F! ty
a less strident and disruptive role than in the past.
r) r
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3. Major changes are likely to occur in the relative power
and influence of a number of secondary powers. Iran, Brazil,
and Nigeria are strong candidates to play more forceful roles`
both regionally and internationally. Traditional animosities, as
between Greeks and Turks, Indians and Pakistanis, and Arabs and
Israelis will persist. And new bilateral. confrontations will develop.
From all these factors, tt^e_ibnal;: stc''ll~cl"srri'al; sra`rs"are likely
to persist and perhaps increase in frequency. -Wa*ienalistic, con>>i-3erationss.
will be the primary cause of most of these confrontations; ideolo;;,r will
play a minor role.
4. Instability in the relationships among the smaller powers is
torupset.,tk~e bask quilibr.ium,of.the great powers.
The latter will continue to try to exploit regional confrontations n
their own national interests. But the risk of small wars escalating
into big, nuclear, wars will weigh heavily on the major powers and
will be likely to continue to induce discretion on their part. Ohv.arL
of=.p;r.:ev-entiigg small wars from dev'eloping,into:b.ig. wars, will, thui,
be further developed and refined. The process is likely to-be xrcl ed
Intt~. ~he>:corktiriu ng?e`fferts of "tTie' super>pow rs`''ti`o' agree to"the limitation
and perhaps even the eventual,~x_eduction.s.off4,r, aments.
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5. As with political developments, world eae?er i4....de. op^-ients
over the coming quarter century will be characterized by relative
stability among the highly industrialized nations, extraordinary
growth in a number of secondary powers, and continued acute
pomer,tr-acrd et-agnatioiT"in.;`M-6? of",t'he'='Latin'-Azrn' ri~ari African,- -and
Soo kz~ 6l;siara;:n tions. be T-rca?trotral-c-a:rrangements for the more or=erly
exchange of capital, raw materials, goods, and services will pr -)`iferate
and deepen and result in a more complex and shock-resistent inte.?-
dependence among the world's major trading nations. Serious
imbalances and tensions will from time to time strain the intern