PROPOSED REVISION OF THE PERSPECTIVES PAPER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A000800090019-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2004
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: February 12, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Depi.zty to the DCI for National Intelligence
Officers
SUBJECT: Proposed Revision of the Perspectives
Paper
1. Attached for your review are proposed changes to tins)+~:i's
Perspectives for Intelligence 1975-1980 which, in our view,, are .all - .t
~+...~+wa it Sri ..r i n. wr? .
for as a result of world developments- since July 1974. To be t-
maximum value in the community's planning cycle, the revision of
this document should be produced in March.
so extensive that a full new -craft of tart I is attached. They, ar: des
2. The changes proposed for Part l- Maior World Problems
sets of intelligence targets - t'estera Europe and regional coni
particularly in the Middle East.
to make more explicit three aspects of the world situation whitali in id-
sight appear to as to have been underplayed in the original 6ocu.r:-uent---
the likely economic and political repercussions of the energy crisis
(particularly in 14 ester s Europe), the prospect of further disru Live
economic /political initiativ?s by Third World powers, and tie
t-jfoct
of these developments on detente and the strategic balance bete e,cn t}:::
US and USSR. The changes : ccur in paragraphs 1, Z, 4, 7, 8, and 9,
3. Changes in Part 11 - The Role, of Iateliisence are limite . end
occur only in paragraphs 2, 4, and 7. They are designed... s Iog t
follow-on to the changes in : wrest 1--to provide stronger focus or. two
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4. Afar you have had an opportunity to re
appreciate mooting w you to 4tacuss them.
/s/ V. VrII18r.n
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D/ DCI/ IC
Attachments
Proposed changes
Distribution:
Original - D/DCI/NIO
1 - D/DCI/IC (w/o att)
C- IC Registry
I - PRD Subject
1 - PRD Chrono (w/o att)
1 - JHL Chrono w /o att)
DCI/IC /PRD
(10 Feb 75)
Retyped for changes
(11 Feb 75)
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Part I--Major World Problems
1. General. The balance of power between the US and USSR is
unlikely to change fundamentally. But the power of the US to influence
international developments will continue to decline, as the power of
additional nations possessing nuclear weapons or having significant
control over critical economic resources continues to increase. The
use of this new power by smaller nations will appear to impinge more
heavily on US strategic interests than on the strategic interests of the
USSR. Many will thus perceive the balance of power as tilting in
the USSR's favor.
Assumption by the OPEC countries of near-monopoly control
of the free world's oil resources has already critically strained the
economies of most of the world's industrial (and less developed) n _tior.._
and the fabric of international finance and trade, while leaving the
USSR and other communist nations relatively unaffected. These and
other strains ar'e helping to undermine the political stability and change
the foreign orientation of many nations. NATO cohesiveness is in
jeopardy.and America's traditional friends and allies are less disposed
than in the past to accommodate US strategic requirements. These
trends are likely to continue. They will provide the USSR with
tempting opportunities, even within the constraints of detente, to
expand its influence in world affairs at the expense of the US. Detente
will at times be severely strained but is likely to hold together.
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2. The USSR. Notwithstanding the probable continuation of
detente and an absence of armed conflict, the USSR will continue to
seek a measure of strategic superiority over the US both in its weapons
systems and in its influence over international developments. It will
regard the US as its major security threat, and act accordingly.
In foreign policy, it will continue to seek ways to expand its
international influence and reduce that of the US. In Western Europe,
it will continue to attempt to undermine the concepts of both Atlanticisrn
and Europeanism, employing both political action and trade policies
for this purpose. Its primary aim in the Middle East will be to achieve
at least equal status with the US in efforts to control and defuse the
Arab/Israeli confrontation. It will also attempt to weaken the special
relationships the US has enjoyed with Turkey and Iran. Soviet political
action in South Asia, the Far East, and Latin America will be more
limited and directed as much to counteracting Chinese as American
influence. In its economic policy, Moscow will continue to give high
priority to the kinds of growth which increase national power and its
projection abroad, but will also fashion its trade policies to achieve
specific foreign policy objectives.
The circumstances which commend detente to the USSR,
however, have complicated this picture. These are: the need to
control local crises lest they lead to general war; the burden of the
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Sino-Soviet conflict; and the desire for economic and technological
assistance from the West. The Soviets will have to deal in the coming
years with a number of dilemmas as they attempt to square traditional
attitudes with the requirements of a detente posture.
These dilemmas may take an acute form in the strategic field.
While continuing to modernize its ground, naval, and tactical air
forces, the USSR is vigorously pursuing the opportunities left open
by SALT I. Except to the extent restrained by arms limitation
agreements, the Soviets will make substantial improvements it
their missile forces, including lMIRVing, improved accuracy, increased
throw-weight,,, and better survivability. At the same time, they will
continue to maintain and to improve their defenses. They will be workir-L_
to develop effective weapons and supporting systems in such areas as
ASW, satellites, and lasers. Expecting strategic equality with the US,
the USSR gives indications of angling further for a measure of strategic
superiority, if that can be obtained at reasonable risk.
In attempting to exploit the Arab /Israeli confrontation and
other international crises, Moscow will be confronted with similar
dilemmas, will be similarly inhibited, but will take reasonable risks
to obtain advantages. As noted above, some Soviet advantages will
result from actions taken by third powers rather than from Soviet
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Domestically, the pressure for modernizing reforms of the
Soviet system, and particularly its economic administrative structure-
will grow. Prolonged detente may also eventually have some effect
on the Communist Party's ability to wield its authority effectively in
all areas of public life. But these are long-term possibilities, and
over the next five years the essentials of the Soviet domestic system
are not likely to be substantially altered.
3. China. Almost certainly, China will undergo a change in
leadership. The succession could see an initial collegial unity followed
by an authoritarian, aggressive and xenophobic leader. The initial
period could also be followed by fragmentation into a variety of contestirc
military, party, and provincial elements. For planning purposes, how,ver,
it would seem most appropriate to assume that the follow-on leadership
in China will maintain the unity and authoritarian discipline imposed by
the Communist Party, that it will be primarily concerned with internal
unity in meeting the social and economic problems within China, and than
it will retain a somewhat paranoid attitude toward the outside world and
particular suspicion of countries on its periphery.
No change from July 1974 edition.
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China will continue gradually to develop its strategic forces
and will present a retaliatory threat to the Soviet Union. By 1980,
it will have the capability of threatening the United States with a
demonstration (or desperation) strike by a.small number of ICBMs
and SLBMs. China will maintain large general purpose forces capable
of operations on its periphery but will be unlikely to commit them in
the absence of major provocation or concern.
Internally, China will continue its authoritarian economic
programs, which are likely to keep agriculture abreast of population,
to enable industry to expand capacity and output, and to support an
increasingly modern defense establishment. Internationally, China
will endeavor to become the ideological leader of the Third World.
It will participate in aid programs and similar political gestures with
other Third World powers but will not establish substantial authority
over Third World countries.
4. Western Europe. Most W estern European nations will be
subjected to increasingly severe economic strains and some will
resort to more radical political means to ease them. Both develop-
ments will reduce prospects for closer European integration, as
individual nations seek salvation through bilateral arrangements with
the US, the USSR, and Third World producers of food, energy, and
other critically needed raw materials.
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The concept of Atlanticism is likely to fare even worse. Economic
competition between the US and Western'Europe is likely to become
more severe and add strains to trans-Atlantic relationships. Western
Europe will increasingly take for granted its ultimate dependence on
US support against the USSR and tend to accommodate US strategic
interests only in exchange for US support of its immediate, chiefly
economic, needs. As noted above, the USSR will engage in political
and economic action to encourage these divisive trends. So will
the LDC producers of raw materials.
5. Eastern Europe. While Eastern Europe will continue to be
under Soviet control, recurrent pressures for some loosening of ties
with Moscow will complicate the picture. The five-year period could
see an explosion from within one or more Fast European countries
against Soviet dominance, but Moscow would quickly reestablish its
hegemony (by force if necessary), whatever the price in terms of
other policies. Internal discipline may be alleviated somewhat in
these countries so long as they adhere to Soviet guidance in diplomatic
and security matters. Economic relations with the West and with the
Third World will grow in quantity and in independence from Soviet
*No change from July 1974 edition.
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control. The passing of Tito could open' an arena of difficulty and
contest over the succession internally and over the future orientation
of Yugoslavia externally.
6. Japan. Japan will continue to play a major economic role and
as a participant in international economic affairs generally, expar_din?
its contacts and relations with other countries, including the USSR and
China. It will probably still place priority on cooperative relations
.with the United States although, on issues it considers vital to its
own well-being, it will be less amenable to American influence. The
internal Japanese scene is not apt to change so substantially as to
affect Japan's role abroad.
7. New Powers and Blocs. The phenomenon of small powers,
singly or in combination, exerting influence on world affairs out of
all proportion to their intrinsic power will grow apace. The example
of OPEC's disruption of the free world's energy situation is likely
to be followed by further cooperative efforts by small nations to
exert greater control over other important raw materials, such as
copper, bauxite, and phosphates, to the disadvantage of the leading
industrial powers. As this process develops, the newly rich nations
,No change from July 1974 edition.
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will seek to use their economic power for political purposes- Iran
and Saudi Arabia are already doing so. Brazil, Venezuela, Nigeria, and
Zaire are also becoming at least regional great powers and are playing
more substantial roles in world international forums. Aside from
these, several nations having considerable influence within regions
and whose ties to the US have traditionally been close will display greater
independence in their relations with the US. This will be particularly
prevalent in the economic field but may also adversely affect certain
US strategic interests. Examples of such powers are Canada, Mexico-
Panama, Australia, and Thailand.
8. The Third World will present other major problems to US
policy-makers. The existing confrontations between the Arabs and
Israel, North and South Vietnam, and North and South Korea hold the
potential of unravelling detente at a time when the power of the US to
influence their outcome is declining. Other regional disputes--betweei
China and Taiwan, India and Pakistan, Greece and Turkey, and blacks
and whites in southern Africa--could also rekindle and threaten the
tenuous equilibrium between the great powers. The newly rich powers
will rapidly expand their military capabilities; some will develop
nuclear armaments, however primitive. Some Third Worl d nations
will seek outlets for their frustrations in assaults on their economic
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relationships with great powers and in hamstringing the effectiveness
of a variety of international forums. A few may resort to blackmail
through terrorism--of a conventional or nuclear variety.
9. Social change will cause turbulence and possibly create power
vacuums in a number of areas. These will stem from increased
expectations and a perception of the growing economic gap between
less developed countries (and classes within countries) and the developed
world. Areas particularly susceptible to this process will be the Persian
Gulf, certain other Arab states such as Morocco, India, possibly
Indonesia, the Philippines, and, in Latin America, Argentina, Peru,
Colombia, and possibly even Brazil. Internally this turbulence may be
temporarily stilled by some authoritarian governments, particularly
those benefiting from increased oil revenues, but these will have
difficulties in maintaining themselves over the longer term and
transferring power to successors. The resulting turbulence can
present temptations to neighboring states to exploit long-standing
differences or to great powers desirous of extending their influence.,
Such turbulence will also exist within advanced nations, as economic,
racial, ideological, or regional minorities turn to violence and
terrorism to press their claims against more and more delicately
tuned and interdependent societies.
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10. The acceleration of events will be characteristic of the years
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ahead. This will come from improved co.rhmunication and transportation,
sharply reducing the time available to reflect on, negotiate, and resolve
international problems. It will also raise many local events to inter-
national prominence and inflate national or political pride, posing
further handicaps to successful negotiations. There will be a resulting
tendency towards shorter attention spans for individual situations and
a need for simultaneous perception and management of a multiplicity
of international relationships. Mazy national or international institutions
are simply not structured to cope with accelerating change. Such change,
will occur most conspicuously in the fields of science and technology,
but the pace there will have substantial effects on the pace of sociological,
industrial, and institutional change, with resultant political and econornic
impacts. Identification and accurate assessments of such changes and
their effects will be needed on an increasingly rapid or even immediate
basis.
*No change from July 1974 edition.
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Part II--The Role of Intelligence ,
1. General. No change.
.2. The USSR. Change final sentence to read as follows: The
Soviet role abroad, either directly through diplomatic or economic
means or indirectly through party or subversive means, will be a
matter of special attention, particularly with respect to Western
Europe and the Middle East.
3.. China. No change.
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c. Split off last sentence and rr}ake into separate
section headed Eastern Europe.
5. Economics. No change.
6. Other Priorities. No change.
7. Add, as the first and second sub-paragraphs, the following:
"(a) Developments in critical regional confrontations:
(1) Arab /Israeli
(2) North Vietnam/ South Vietnam
(3) North Korea/South Korea
"(b) Indications of a resurgence of other confrontations:
(1) Pakistan /India
(2) Greece/Turkey
(3) China/Taiwan
(4) Black Africans /White Africans
(51 China /USSR"
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