COMIREX COMMENTS ON CYPRUS POST-MORTEM REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A000800100026-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: February 13, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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13 February 1973
Copy v2 of L' .
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman. COMIREX
SUBJECT: COMIREX Comments on Cyprus
Poet-Mortem Report
REFERENCE: COMIREX Memorandum 0 C/ PRD
10 February 1975
1. Thank you for your njernorandum of 10 February 1971,
concerning our post-rnortern report on Cyprus. We very nuc i
appreciate comments from our readers and welcome the insii =its
of those with perspectives different from our own.
Z. We understand your general concern that some of ou -
coverage will confuse readers who have not been initiated intt
the world of PHOTINT. But I doubt that many of our readers
would misinterpret some of our remarks in the manager you
--Thus. concerning your comment on paragraph 7 (1
of the Principal Findings section of the post morte) a to ti=e
effect that readers would be confused by our description of
the built-in and policy-imposed limitations of PHOTINT. we
would argue that our general description is clear and our pint t
Your suggested rewrite adds a level of detail.. Which its* Lf
might prove confusing or at least raiser new questions. to
simply ask the reader to take our word for it that. becae s
of limitations of the system itself, and because of certai
policy decisions. PHOTINT could not be a very active
source during the crisis. Your expansion of this ;judgment
refers to "a delay between satellite camera operations
and the availability of fii-.-n for exploitation, " whic, to u -
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would probably prorTipt the consumer to ask, "V9li the
delay?" And your reference to "manned recoi an ,-e
systems" is, in fact, virtually duplicated in qt r'ti t _b
paragraph 54 (p. 14).
--You find our paragraph 34 (p. 14) xnislesadin.
it states that "lox priority was accorded photggraplx
the Greek-Turkey-Cyprus area before the -soup'.-" You-
interpret this as a judgment that it should have been other-
wise. Our feeling is that this is simply a flat statement
of fact; we intended no judgment whatsoever. and Am doubt
very much that our consumers would advocate a high priorit
for this area (almost all of which belongs to two NATO a? lint: )
in normal times.
--We concede your next point--that the post-mortem
report implies that there was something to be gained fro=m
reorienting the satellites, but that actually there was not--
assuming, as you imply, that the images actually obtained
could not have been improved significantly through reorientation
--Reference our paragraph 54 (p. 14). we do not share
your view that our assertion that film taken on 24 July was
not available at NPIC until 39 July would lead readers to
conclude that the community failed to recognize the ixnportarice
of the film. Again., we simply intended to state the facts.
Perhaps some readers would wonder about the delay, and
perhaps we should have anticipated this with an explanation
of it. And we certainly have no specific problems r th your
suggested rewrite of this paragraph. We'll try harder acxt
time.
3. Were glad, though, that our principal conclusion in rc
PHOTINT appear to you to be sound. And please be assured than
we did not intend to rite any critical or confusing judg -neents abxout
the role of PHOTINT in this (or any other) crisis.
Chief, Product Review vision
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Distribution:
O - Addressee
D/DrI/IC
5 - IC/Registry
4 - Cyprus PM
i - PRD Chron
to- RWS
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10 February 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
1e Product Review Division
Intelligence Community Staff
SUBJECT COMIREX Comments on Cyprus Post-Mortem
Report
REFERENCE USIB-D-15.2/127, January 1975.
1. The Cyprus Post-Mortem report quite justifiably gives
little space to the contribution of photography during the crisis. Al
best, photography was a secondary source. Despite the limited value
of imagery during 'the crisis, the two references in the report to photo-
graphic reconnaissance are imprecise and could mislead a reader who
was not familiar with photographic reconnaissance systems and planning.
2. For example, in paragraph 7, page 5 the description of
PHOTINT as not a "very active source" because of "built in limitations"
and policy decision is at best confusing. A suggested re-write of the
sentence follows: "Timely photography of the crisis area was not
available. because of the delay between satellite camera operations and
the availability of film for exploitation and the policy decision not to
use the more responsive manned reconnaissance systems."
3. Paragraph 54, page 14 is misleading. The statement that
"low priority was accorded photography of the Greek-Turkey-Cyprus
area before the coup" implies that it should have been otherwise. A
photographic base in fact existed at the time of the coup and it had been
obtained by "low priority" coverage. The paragraph contains other
inaccuracies. For example, the implication that there was a need for,
and something to be gained from, "reorienting" th
satellites that were on orbit in mid-July. These missions were nearing
the end of their operational life at the time and it was possible to obtain
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 imagery without orbit adjust. I Icamera operations were conducted
a ainst the crisis-related targets on four revolutions between 17-21 July.
I perations were attempted 20-24 July. Thc::was recovered
on 21 July and the on 24 July. u
4. The last sentence of paragraph 54 states that the imagery
taken on 24 July was not available until 29 July. A raardcr whn .lire ?r,+
e commune y did not recognize the
importance of photography of the crisis area and was slow in handling
it. This was not so.
5. The following re-write of paragraph 54 is suggested:
54. "Some base photography of the crisis area
was available when the crisis broke out in mid-July.
Two photographic satellites were in orbit at the time
of the coup and attempts were made to obtain photog-
raphy of the crisis area. Imager taken during the
period 17-24 July, however, was available to the
photographic interpreters only after the required
film recovery and development processes and it had
little direct bearing on intelligence analysis of the
crisis. Manned photographic reconnaissance of the
crisis area was proscribed by national policy-makers.
Consequently, the photogra by that was available did
little more than confirm ormation alread ob-
tained
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alrm nana
Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation
ILLEGIB
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