PAPERS ON NSCIC PROJECT 'TOPICS OF IMPORTANCE TO HIGH-LEVEL CONSUMERS'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A000800110001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 24, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.G. 20506
October 24, 197',
FROM: George F. Picket
SUBJECT: Papers on NSCIC Project "Topics of Importance
To High-Level Consumers"
Attached are the papers you requested containing material relating
to the Working Group's project to identify topics of importance to
high-level consumers.
As reflected in the memoranda during June, Mr. Marshall discussed
a variety of topics with the Working Group's sub-committee. Four
were selected as being of interest to the policy level in the next twel''c
to twenty-four months:
-- Soviet strategy
-- Foreign policy implications of present trade and
monetary problems
-- Foreign policy implications of the energy crisis
-- Impact of different outcomes to law of the sea discussions
In the next two months drafts were prepared for three topics, althoulrli
none -were staffed out of the Net Assessment Group to the sub-group.
The questions on Soviet strategy received the most attentim, includirg
one meeting of the sub-group to hear a CIA/DIA/INR discussion of the
present level of understanding about the subject (AWM memorandum,
July 11). The presentation was not fruitful and a draft paper was assembled
in the Net Assessment Group. A draft of a paper on the monetary arc trade
subject was prepared following interviews with several members of the NSC
staff, CIEP and CIA/OER. Two drafts of the energy topic were writ en
based upon the Net Assessment Group's experience with NSSM 174.
One topic was never drafted, the implications of alternative outcome
to negotiations on the law of the sea. Discussions were held with NSI-=
staff members and the CIA representative to the task force. Work
halted, however, pending the return of the task force and negotiation:
State Department review completed NSC review(s) completed.
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from Geneva in late August. Also, it was apparent that the law of
the seas issue was very complex and required more interviewing
and studying to identify the essential issues in which intelligence
could be expected to make a contribution. The inter-agency tr:Lsk
force on law of the seas is chaired by the State De artm ; the
CIA representative is
As they stand, the drafts of the topics are very preliminary and dc, trot
fully meet the objectives set for the effort; that is, to provide to thf
intelligence community a significantly improved perception of top-1-=vel
needs with respect to these few selected topics. The idea was that they
should complement other guidance as to needs with broader coverac
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 WASHINGTON. D. C. 20505
DCI/IC
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Office of tho Director 29 May 1973
tlti1ORANDU,'?1 FOR: ;,'.embers of the l1SCIC Working Group
SUBJECT: Identification of Topics and Issues of Importance
to High Level Consumers of Intelligence
1. Identification of topics and issues of such significant near-
term r interest to high level users of intelligence that they should be
the Focus of special estimates and studies could be one of the more
important activities of the NSCIC Working Group.
2. Accordingly, I have requested Andrew Marshall to chair a
committee of representatives of the user members of the Working Grou:o
whieht ili1'1.-prepare--.I=or-wits-ideration by the group:
a. A'listing of the significan . topics or issues--perhv:ps
five or six in number--ihich intelligence users consider should
be given particular attention during the balance of this year
by offices involved with production of national intelligence; ar=cj
b. For each topic or issue, a fp??1 paces of grIPqi i nnc arri
guidance which would be helpful to the intelligence community
in the development of detailed terms of reference and study
outlines.
3. flr. Marshall will get in touch. with members who represent
intelligence users for nomination of representatives for his coiririttee.
4. It is hoped that the results of the cotmittee's work will be
available for consideration by the Iorking,Croup at an early date.
`"Daniel 0. Graham
Major General, USA
Chairman
STAT
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WASHINGTON, D.C. Z0506
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR
6 June 1.973
VICE ADMIRAL JOHN P. WEINEL
PATRICK J. PARKER
SEYMOUR WEISS
A. W. MARSHALL
SUBJECT:.. ,. _ NSCIC Working Group Committee: Topics
aiid Issues of Importance to High Level
Intelligence Consumers
This memorandum describes the objectives of the effort General Graham
asked me to chair, a proposed mode of operation for the committee of
'i--er representp}1TTPC and raisec sec Teral ice,-Ac which 17, p-
at an early meeting.
The task of this NSCIC Working Group Committee is to:
-- Prepare a selected list of topics and issues which
top level intelligence users consider should be given particular
attention during the coming year.
-- Prepare for each topic or issue guidance to the intel-
ligence community as to its importance and questions related
to the topic or issue top policy makers would most like answered(.
I believe that we should emphasize improvement in communicating top
level needs for the selected topics as against trying to decide upon the
priority of the selected items as a group or among each other.
The Working Group will review the report we produce. A Working Gr,-, p
report will be passed to the NSCIC principals for comment prior to be-r
sent to the DCI and the intelligence cominuni.ty.
CONFIDENTIAL - GDS
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CONFIDENTIAL
Next week I will provide you with an initial list of a half dozen topic.
with a paragraph or two on each describing its nature. After obtaining
your preliminary comments and additions, I will call a meeting at which
the committee can focus on a revised list of topics, and on issues .5 'ch
as those raised in the next paragraph. We should be able to meet bb,,fore
the end of June: Then each of us can obtain in their own way the reactions
and additions of consumers in his organization. In subsequent meetings
we could agree on the items we wish to submit to the Working Group and
formulate the background information and guidance for each one.
Several issues need to be clarified in our first meeting, for examp
:comprehensive should each topic be? If we request
analyses on very broad, complex issues the response from intel-
ligence will require great effort'over long periods of time. A
more narrowly focused question reduces the work and time
involved.
-- What should be the role of the NSCIC after providin-_?
the tonics to the DCI? The topir.s rmild hP r~a.ccPd with nn f,,vther
follow-up; the NSCIC could set deadlines and/or monitor:- the
stages of work on the topics; or the NSCIC could require th(:
DCI to provide a timetable and plan.
-- How should our subgroup consult with the inteli.igen -e
producers in developing the topics? What role, if any, should
representation of intelligence production organizations play --i
our meetings?
-- What information should be provided to the DG)_ with,
each topic? (e. g. , specific questions, relevant U. S. policies,
descriptions of the problem as presently seen by cons urzerS-_ }
-- Should topics be provided to the DCI as prepared or
in one package?
CONFIDENTIAL
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. Z0506
SECRET June 14, 1973
(With Attachment)
MEMORANDUM FOR
VICE ADMIRAL JOHN P. WEINEL
PATRICK J. PARKER
SEYMOUR WEISS
A. W. MARSHALL
Topics
Attached is a first partial list of topics. I will be in contact
with each of you to get reactions, possible additions, etc.
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A BEGINNING LIST OF TOPICS
The purpose of the following list is to serve as a basis of discussion.
Other members of the group can suggest deletion of items or additions.
Later we will have to develop appropriate guidance for each topic. For
the present, I have included only enough of a description to suggest ttLC
general purpose of including the particular topics.
1. Sino-Soviet Military Interactions, Calculations and Possib,l:
Conflict Outcomes
While an NIE is now in preparation focused primarily on likely
Sov es,_asges.sments,;4kha. prospects of a nuclear surgical strike and!or a
ground invasion of China, this topic could he usefully included in an=JSCIC
list. The NIE will not cover all of the aspects of the Sino-Soviet nil-terry
situation that top leaders would be interested in. These include am,-rsis
of the interaction in the build-up and positioning of military forces Long
the border areas since 1965 in the hope of understanding more clear-7 the
purposes and military plans of both sides. Moreover, it would he t';eful
to have an assessment of what sort of burden is now placed on the Sc?riet
Union by the build-up. What proportion of its forces are now postur d
against China? How can one best measure the overall resource. stra__rl
given the'lo-gistic and other'-problems involved?
If the Soviet leadership asks for the evaluation of its options it
attacking China, what sorts of calculations, what sort of advice will :hey
receive from the Soviet military? On the Chinese side, how are the,- likely
to view the military situation? What are the likely future trends in `tie views
in both countries? If various sorts of attacks are undertaken, whai 'vi.ll be
the outcomes? What sort of warning might the U. S. obtain?
2< National Security Im
While there has been considerable work on the direct national. security
impact of interruption in oil imports, the more indirect and mere c.: :use
impacts of the energy crisis have been relatively little explored. Ir,
particular, the energy crisis will have a significant impact on i:he behavior
of major actors on the international scene, including many U. S. all:-.s, the
various oil producing states, their less fortunate neighbors, etc. We need
answers to questions such as, what is the impact on the poll ' ?. ;ca-1s,
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ambitions of the leadership or interest groups in countries in the
Middle East? What role might the Soviets play in the changed
situation? What will be the impact on Japan, in particular to what
extent will a Japanese attempt to diversify sources of energy push
them closer to the Chinese? To the Soviets? Away from the U. S. ?
What are the most likely Mid-east political /military contingencies
that may arise because of the energy crisis? How is the U. S. likely
to become involved? What will be the objectives and stakes of the othe
3. Soviet Long-Term Strategy
We..may be in .a_period of significant change in Soviet policy. S}:'.~e
allege tlia 'maj 'i policy-decisions were taken a couple of years ago. It
would be useful to have a first-rate analysis of the basi s for that judgra.ent.
What are the factors that pushed the Soviet leaders toward the change.,?
How do they see things coming out ten to fifteen years down the road? What
are their political and economic strategies for the next decade?
A related set of issues arise from analysis of trends in Soviet military
strategy and thinking. There may be a too casual tendency to conclude, that
there is significant convergence in U. S. and Soviet military strategy a.=id
thinking. - What-are the differences between that and the U. S. ? What are
the implications of the different assumptions and doctrinal tenants? W-rat
role do the Chinese now play in forming Soviet conceptions as to milit.Lry
strategy and doctrines?
Both we and the Soviets may see ourselves as settling down to new
phase in our continuing political/military competition. How do the Soviets se_
this competition? What are the areas of comparative advantage and ei--
advantage they may perceive? How do they view their geo-political si-:u.atior_
as compared with that of the U. S. ? What are their perceptions as to their
prospects in this continuing competition? What do they see to be the key to
maximizing their chances of success? What does an objective asses.rrient
of the strength of the Soviet position show? What can be said of Soviet
institutional constraints and bureaucratic politics as either limits or
advantages they may have in competing with the U. S. ? With the We_ t
Europeans? With the Chinese? How do the top leaders in the Soviet L:zion
view the economic and social constraints that limit their courses of action'
What impact do they have on Soviet foreign policy? On Soviet military
programs?
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SECRET
4. Soviet Military Assistance
A major aspect of U. S. policy as enunciated by the Nixon JJoctr.ne
is that allies and friendly nations will be supported through military ,Lid
in efforts they make to pursue their objectives.. The Soviets have b