STUDY OF THE JORDANIAN CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A000800110008-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2006
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 8, 1973
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NSCIC WORKING GROUP
4vyj
FROM: A. W. Marshall C
SUBJECT: Study of the Jordanian Crisis
March 8, 19"'::;
The Executive Summary of the Jordanian Crisis raises most of the
essential issues. The study itself gives, in my opinion, an accurate
picture of most of the major interests of the policymakers and the
performance of the agencies of the community in meeting their needs.
In this memorandum I want to highlight some major issues as I see
them and to raise questions about passible actions for the Working
Group to discuss.
I agree completely with Bronson Tweedy's recommendation that a smtal
task force consider the three crisis studies and prepare recommendaions
for action. A variety of problems in such areas as communication, the
uality of analysis and sensitivity to consumer needs have appeared ir_ all
three studies. We now have a reasonable body of evidence to doe um(nt
them, examine them in different contexts, and discuss feasible solut:ons.
Some recommendations will warrant review and action by the Pxsncil} -is;
others can be cammunicat- etc 'more informally to-the DCI staff and the
appropriate intelligence community managers.
In other cases--wwe are faced with a situation in which an important issu?.a
has been raised (e. g., the problema_in._us.iag third r _intelligence; at
the studies have not been able to provide a detailed enough understand:: i
of the nature and causes of the problem to allow the formulation of
recommendations. Even in the case of the-communications problem I
believe that we may need to undertake some additional studies. 1~tud'- w
the complex common cation processes and their problems two years
after the event probably cannot provide the detailed diagnosis of the
problem needed to design appropriate solutions. I believe that the ta_3~,-
force ought also to be tasked with developing proposals for further sttic if s,
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DECLAS - IMPDET - H. A. Kissinger NSC review(s) completed.
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perhaps of a different character, focused on those problems the three
studies indicate are important, but for which they do not provide an
adequate basis for recommendations.
Dominance of Current Reporting
The Jordanian study accurately. points out that the intelligence cornmui ity
became oriented towards producing factual reports of events during the
crisis. While a timely flow of factual reporting is necessary, the po?izry-
maker also ne dja..,. roducts with a wider perspective and more in-dept}
analysis.
This insensitivity to consumer needs reflects both an absence of cons aner
guidance and problems in intelligence management. In some cases, .such
as monitoring of Soviet and other government reactions to U, S. force
deployments, policymakers must insure that more information on U. S.
moves is provided to intelligence. -Iowever, the more general and co:tiruing
interests of policymakers are not so obscure, and intelligence nuznag>> rs
should be able to direct the efforts of analysts to meeting these needs ':,'ith-
out waiting for detailed guidance. For example, concern for Soviet
intentions and actions, for the Middle East balance, and for the longe H
term impact of various crisis outcomes are not unusual topics. The
study contends that some relevant analyses of these issues had been
completed prior to the crisis, but since they were not new they were
ignored by the decisionmakers and their staffs. It is unrealistic to ex_
pect policymakers to maintain a library of all past reports. Some
mechanism is needed to call attention to still relevant reports or to
rep 'gage and reissue their substantive judgments' and findings;
To seek an antidote to the dominance and volume of current reporting-
the Working Group might consider recommending several possible
actions. For example:
-- The assembling of wrap-up assessments at the beginni] ,,
of a crisis.
-- Periodic assessments during the crisis of the current arc,.
prospective roles of the SU and PRC and the impact of alterzativr>
crisis outcomes.
-- The separating of intelligence into products for sununari7....ng
events and products for presenting analyses.
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Difference of Pers ective between Intelligence Analyst, and Policyn:a. leers
There is a major difference in perspective between top-level decisini makers
and analysts that appears to significantly affect the capability of the i?itelli-
gence community to serve these-decisionmakers. The problem is mc:n:ioned
on pages 10 and 11 of the study report, but is considered to be iTatra .:able.
In my view it is a very serious and important problem that deserves :.much
more study and discussion.
The Jordanian crisis is replete with examples:
-- The top-level people saw the Jordanian civil war as
part of the much bigger, more complex situation involving the
U. S. and the Soviets as the major players. However, the ana-,tags
involved were Middle Eastern or Jordanian experts who focus . d
on the problem more narrowly.
-- The top-level people were more concerned than the
analysts with the intangibles of the situation, including the
longer-term impact of particular outcomes, the precedents
that might be set, the perceptions by other countries of U. S.
performance, etc.
-- The policymakers believe that changes in deployment and
level of alert _of U. S. military forces can be used to influence
foreign decisionmakers' perceptions of the consequences of their
actions, U. S, level of concern, etc. , and to improve the outcome
from the USG's point of view. There is some evidence that
typical intelligence analysts do not share this view.
The difficulty in analysts' perceiving what the game looks like from te
top, what the nature of the game is, is a significant barrier to their doing
a better job. Some suggestions which the Working Group might con: der
are:
-- Urging more extensive DCI debriefings after WSAG
and other meetings with top-level decisionmakers.
-- Assignment of responsibility to someone on the staff of
the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs to
communicate a top-level view of the issues of most interest, to
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monitor community responses and supply corrective
guidance when required.
-- Development for training purposes of a few highly
classified case studies on political /military crises which
explore how the crisis management problems look to key
decisionmakers.
I consider the perspective problem to be more complex and deeper
than can be solved with a few procedures to improve corrununications.
The working-level analyst and manager now seem unable to appreciate
the policymakers' perspectives. Something has to be done to change
this.
The Role of Intelligence in the Use of U. S. Military Forces for
Demonstrations
In most crises U. S. military forces are involved in preparations to takf
care of contingencies that could arise, and these preparations and other
movements of these forces are conceived as moves designed to inf]uen":!
the calculations cif the decisionmakers in other involved governments. As
pointed out above, U. S. policymakers indeed tend to view these moves rk.s
among the most important instruments they have in influu ;.icing the outcoaae
of the crisis. The intelligence community appears to play a surprf.sin ),r
small role.
I tend to be skeptical of the conclusions reached in the study that no
reactions to U. S. force deployments occurred in the Jordani.n crisis.
The intelligence community may not have recognized any reaction, but,
given their lack of awareness of U. S. moves and other barriers to
perception and involvement, I do not find that judgment convincing.
Other studies confirm the striking degree to which intelligence agencies
are uninvolved in the design and carrying out of what top-level people
believe are the major moves in the crisis. An effort perhaps ought to
be made to examine how intelligence could:
-- More effectively assist in the design and carrying out
of military demonstrations.
-- Increase its monitoring of the effects of U. S. crisis xnovc
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Third Party Intelligence
The increasing cost and political liability of some overseas collecticr..
efforts may force U. S. intelligence to rely more and more on third
party intelligence of various sorts. Unfortunately, examining this
question in the NSCIC studies has not been very fruitful, The Workint;
Group may wish to consider studying the issue itself or directing the
DCI to do so. Questions which may be relevant include:
-- What various arrangements with third parties are row
in existence? How could these change?
-- What new arrangements are likely to be made?
-- What is the impact of using third party sources on such
issues as: timeliness of data; types of subject covered; coafidrt~-ice
in data.
-- What guidelines can be established for managing third
party relationships?
After-Action Studies
None of the crises studied to date were followed by an immediate formal
or informal investigation of how intelligence performed. Some institul i.onal
learning occurred between the crises of 1970 and 1971 at least on the i\tiC
staff. Support obtained for the Indo-Pak crisis reflected lessons prev..t-,usly
learned. The Working Group may want to recommend that the DCI, in the
future, perform such after-action evaluations as the NSCIC has E.tteniE,t.ed,
but immediately following the event.
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