MEMO(Sanitized) FROM A. W. MARSHALL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A000900030001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 93
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 10, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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Product Improvement -2
Consumer Needs
NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED, Subject
7/2/03.
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Memo from Chief, PRG to D/DCI/IC, Subj: Conversation
with Messrs. Ernst i I? OER, re Economic
Intelligence, Z/16/72 NIS Program: Memo from D/OBGI to DCI, Progress Report 2
on Proposal to Phase Out Detailed Sections, 4/17/72;
Comments froml I to ; memo from Thomas
to Tweedy, 5/10/72 (IC 72-0330)
Report on Bill Hyland's Suggestion for Obtaining Guidance, 3
memo for Chief, PRG, from Andrew Marshall, NSC, 9 May 72,
and reply from Chief PRG to Marshall, 16 May 72
Memo for from A. Marshall, 19 May 72,
Subj: Further Thoughts on Obtaining Guidance (IC 72-0420)
Suggestion for DCI Organization f
or
SALT Verification, 29 June 72
Conversations with Andy Marshall on MBFR (re consumer 5
needs for intelligence on MBFR problems), T1 August
1a7-7 M110 .,
President's needs for intelliagence in Southeast
Asia memo for IC Staff from Mr. Parrott, 11/9/70
OMS/PSS contacts with Andy Marshall re possible studies 7
for Dr. Kissinger
Andy Marshall's interest in decision making processes of 8
foreign countries - Working Group papers
Andy Marshall's staff's ideas on polling consumers g
Memo to 0 from Marshall, 11/10/72
Army, DIA, DOS, ONI, NSC and USAF
review(s) completed.
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED,
7/2/03.
November 10, 1972
After our October 26 meeting, Chip and I discussed your
plan to review NIEs and to develop techniques to poll con-
sumers. Both ideas are good and I would like to be kept
informed as your plans progress. Chip wrote me a short
paper presenting our initial ideas on polling consumers.
ATTACHMENT
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SUBJECT: R&D In Analysis and Presentation
R&D efforts need a two fold approach. First, there must be a
continuous effort to develop new or find old methods to analyze
problems and test their applicability to intelligence situations.
Second, research needs to investigate how. the results of analysis
can be best communicated to the consumer. The first deals with
improving the intrinsic quality of the analytical effort. The
second recognizes that products not sensitive to, or not aimed
at, needs are lost in the noise of-the input streams that policy-.
makers are confronted with in reaching decisions.
R&D In '..nalytical Techniques
Research in exploring new analytical techniques is -insufficient
in the community. Some attention is given to the use of new
methods of analysis now, but the rate of innovation is low.
Effort is needed in introducing analysts to rigorous, alternative
approaches to replace their present and, perhaps, overly -
individualistic intuitive methods. Organizational behavior,
models of decisionmaking processes, psychological-evaluative
approaches, and the Bayesian techniques are examples of immediate
relevance,jbut these are only a sample of what may be available
in the academic and business community as methods to view problems.
The process of finding and using new methods involves four
distinct stages:
--The search effort to locate methodologies.(Intellectual)
--The test phase in which a method is applied to specific
intelligence problems, or is evaluated in some other fashion, to
assess its value in analysis. (Intellectual),.
--The dissemination phase when the method is catalogued,
entered into doctrine and passed to analysts through training and
other methods. (Managerial)
--The implementation phase when the new method is employed
and its employment and effectiveness is monitored. (Managerial)
Each stage involves different people in different levels of the
organization and demands different levels of competence. For
example, the search effort requires individuals experienced in
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intelligence but also having an appreciation for research
techniques. The empha is-here is not'-on people who are good
at research per se but on'thosc who can find techniques for
research. They must visit organizations outside the community,
review literature and exploit other sources of assistance
(eg. ARPA can provide. some funding; intelligence training
units may provide motivated manpower). Testing a methodology
requires bringing a method to bear on a problem and may involve
having analysts learn and use the method, finding,i.ssues on which
it can be used, developing experimental products.and checking
with consumers for their -opinions. Having established the'
validity of a 'new approach the effort moves from the more
intellectual tasks to the managerial problems of implementation
and operation. At this point it-may be more appropriate to
use a group of managers rather than'research oriented individuals.
Considering that present community effort in this area is very
small I think DCI level action is initially needed to give
visibility and support to the task. I realize that there are
disadvantages in that lower level managers may be antagonistic
to upper level initiatives and that analysts are farther away
from the effort. A lower (DI and DDI) approach would bring the
R&D task closer to those daily concerned with products. -However,
what might result is the loss of top level exposure 'and - the
increased cost of fragmented efforts in different organizations.
I would prefer to see such involvement grow gradually from the
DCI activity as experience is gained irn what is available and
hor; it can be used.
Initially a four - five man team of expert intelligence hands
could be formed to conduct liaison with outside organizations
(schools, research organizations, etc.) and?to research literature
in order to isolate approaches and develop their potential for
intelligence. Subcontracting might be used to have specialists
examine problems testing potentially useful methodologies. ARPA
is one source of funding, and this would be an understandable
technique since the community is unlikely to be familiar with
a new approach. Testing could also be done internally by task-
ing agencies to examine problems using specific methods.
Innovative products resulting from both efforts could then be
provided to users for their reaction. If favorable, these
methodologies could become doctrine in training curriculum,
papers and analyses.
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Reach_ng the goals of this scenario poses difficult problems in
deali-n,j with analysts locked into old approaches and with managers
who sc: no wrong with past or current analytical methods. In the
long-term diversifying the approach to problems requires altering
the manner in which we handle prople -- whom we select, how we
train and what we reward. In the short run, however, it is
important to give alternate approaches visibility so that motivated.
analysts will see and test them, aggressive managers will encourage
experimentation, and policymakers will:see their possibilities.
Consequently, I favor DCI level action. Also this will probably
encourage other agencies to develop their-own efforts, as DOD
elements have been doing. Experimental products for Kissinger
resulting from this type of work will probably give less willing
agencies a signal to what is needed:
Presentations
Service to consumers is the principal job of the community; yet
its output is frequently insensitive to consumer needs because
(a) there is inadequate awareness.of what users need or
(the s. :~sitivity issue), and (b) products are not designed with
an appreciation for the time consumers have to study them
(the communication issue). Let me caveat my comment by recognizing
that the community serves a number of consumers ii addition to
those at the highest level; however, this problem probably exists
with most customers of community products. Also getting consumers
to give guidance is a problem; yet the community is not making
enough of an effort on its own to use presently available contacts
and sources to define what user needs are.
Improvements in both sensitivity and communication should at least
come from some present work, provided the community takes action.
The NSCIC reviews should highlight communication problems between
user and producer. The community needs to take these to heart
and develop techniques to prevent their reoccurrence. Research
in analytical methods will affect presentations--for example,
examination of Bayesian techniques gives ideas on how to best
communicate to users the level of uncertainty associated with
analyses and conclusions. The DCI staff in its examination of
community output-,could generate both economies and improvements
in presentations.
Additional techniques which could be used to study the sensitivity
and communication problem include:
--Development of experimental products (which we are doing).
--Wider distribution of speculative papers attributable.
to analysts and caveated as non-agency positions (both INR
and DIA have provided thought provoking material).
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--Research on consumer-_' needs by reading their papers,
studying their speeches, and examining their actions and needs
in the past (we are doing ?a form of this for Kissinger).
--Using interviews and developing innovative techniques to
get feedback from consumers.
--Conducting product reviews.
Developing a unified overall approach to improve. presentations is
more difficult in my view- than for R&D in ,analytical methods.
One encouters'the same problems in resistance to change, cor-.nart-
mentalization and community size. Additionally, however, good
products are tailored to the needs--of each user, whereas._
new analytical methods probably would have more common use across
the community. To understand each user's needs requires an intimate
study o- what types of decisions he makes, what forces act on
him, what information he does or does not have and what catches
his attention. This knowledge must then be combined with an under-
standing of the resources availab '.:e in the community to serve him.
This critical need to tailor products to individual users leads
me to believe that a development effort in presentation techniques
would best be centered at lower than the DCI level, probably at
the DDT or DI echelon. DCI level interest and concern, plus
encouragement from the NAG, could create a high level interest and
instigate a sense of competition which would motivate less innovative
managers. Given the present resources probably available, I would
suggest an approach in the near term with three elements:
--Using the results of NSCIC studies and other projects being
undertaken at DCI and NSC level to develop guidance to pass to
program managers.
--Loosening restrictions on speculative products and
experimental outputs at DDI and DI.
--Conducting reviews of the needs of specific policymakers
(the President, Kissinger, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of
State) by reviewing their writings,speeches and past actions; this
could be done at the level responsible for the support (ie.--INR
study Secretary of State, DCI study. the President, DIA study
Secretary of Defense).
A final point is that thought must be given to the overall question
of the community's implicit perception of meeting consumers needs.
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,One needs tc ask who is the- consumer==what is he-'reading, how
frequently, in what context, etc? From a general description
of the types of consumers, one could then examine present outputs
to see if they fit needs. For example, my impression is that
many outputs are smorgasbord documents, written for everyone and
giving each less than is needed. It would be more valuable to
prepare analytical documents for analysts to communicate with
each other, policymaker outputs which take intelligence and
apply it to policy issues for decisionmakers, position documents
in order to give intelligence people a place frog which to make
improvements,-and newsy documen.ts"to satisfy peripheral consumers
seeking background data. Each type of document requires different
analysis, review procedures, formats and distribution.
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13 November 1972
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Herbert Jenne
SUBJECT 13 November 1972 Meeting With
Mr. Andrew Marshall, 302A, Executive
Office Building
1. The above and undersigned CIA officials met
with Mr. Marshall at his request. The purpose of the
meeting, according to Mr. Marshall, was to set up a
working group to stimulate research on the decision
making processes of foreign countries. He suggested
that this group meet at monthly intervals.
2. He proposed that the initial tasks of this
working group should be to address the following three
questions; (1) what are the relevant data, (2) what
is the current availability of these data, and (3) what
steps can be taken to fill in the detected gaps
3. Mr. Marshall indicated that Dr. Kissinger and
members of the NSC Staff wanted detailed analyses on
government behavior and decision making as a framework
to understand military, political and economic develop-
ments in the Soviet Union and other countries. Mr.
Marshall said that he needed more "illuminating,
interesting, speculative" hypotheses on decision
making to provide a context for the available data
and to alert collectors and analysts to concentrate
on the behavior of organizations.
4. He asked the members of the working group to
think about the relevant data question and propose
topics for the next meeting. After the meeting, members
of the group informally decided to meet in Mr. Jenne's
office (7G00) at 0900 on 15 November (Wednesday) to
respond to Mr. Marshall.
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19 October 1972
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Product Review Group,
Intelligence Community
SUBJECT : Andy Marshall's Request for
Information on Foreign Decision
Making
1. This is in response to your request of 17 October
for the names of individuals to be passed to Andy Marshall
so that he can discuss with them the processes of decision
making in countries of major U. S. intelligence interests.
2. This is a subject which Andy has discussed with
me and with a number of people in this Directorate and
DDS&T, including and Bruce Clarke and members
of his staff, as well as John Huizenga and members of his
staff. Given the extent of all these discussions, I really
don't understand what the new inquiry is about. It may be
that Andy wishes to discuss some facet not previously
covered. If this is the case and Andy will contact me, I
will be able to identify the people with whom he could talk.
In
EDWARD W. PROCTOR
Deputy Director for Intelligence
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17 October 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT: Targeting Information on Foreign Decision Making
1. During d conference last week with Bronson ,Tweedy, Andy
Marshall of the NSC Staff discussed his interistin getting a
dialogue underway with CIA analysts on the problems involved in
obtaining and analyzing information which relatet.to the manner,
in which important decisions are reached in countries of major
U.S. intelligence interest. He asked Bronson to arrange for h
to be put in contact wit CIA personnel who were interested in or had
some experience with identifying the kinds of information which need
to be targeted to provide basis for evaluation of a decision-making
process.
2. I already have given Andy the name of of
who worked with Andy on a related matter-several years ago.
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3. Bronson asked me to pass along his request. that you provide
me with the names of any DDI personnel with whom Andy could talk on
this subject.
Chief, P
JET:vdm
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- PRG subject (filed Product Imp -1)
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SUBJECT: Meeting with Andrew Marshall, 10 October 1972
The following points were discussed with Andy Marshall at
a meeting in his office:
a. Marshall found the two PRG studies very useful
and wants to give some thought to possible follow-up. He will make
some suggestions, which we can discuss, and we would then be in a
position to recommend action to the Working Group.
b. Marshall discussed Jeanne Davis, who heads up
the NSC Secretariat, pointing out she had had some qualms about copies
of memoranda to Kissinger being laterally disseminated. In the case
of the Indo-Pakistan study, Mrs. Davis will send a memorandum to
the other addressees asking for their written comments by 15 November.
;
Marshall and I agreed that a useful future procedure with memoranda
to Kissinger stemming from Working Group activities would be for ) 5~
to
me to call Marshall, who after all is closest to Mrs. Davis, so that
he can inform her what we plan to do with other dissemination and he
can get her advice and concurrence.
c. Marshall discussed the situation on his various
studies. The Fedayeen/Jordan study is going all right. The Middle
East study is "staggering along, " as the study chairman is being a
bit superficial. Marshall said he would try to apply some pressure
to get a deeper analysis. On LAMSON 719, thinks it
will be a useful study and can be done (Proctor to the contrary).
is off on two weeks' leave and is going to return to the subject in early
November.
On the subject of studies, Marshall felt we ought to
be able to stay away from total reliance on experts, who more often
than not also turn out to be the authors of the studies under considera-
tion. He asked whether it wouldn't be possible to make greater use
of the consumer community, agreeing with me that it was probably
out of the question and probably inefficient to attempt to get these things
studied by people outside the Government. I promised to talk to
Ed Proctor on this.
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d. On Dr. Post's psychological studies, what
Marshall hopes to do is to have Post make himself free enough to
prepare a couple of sample studies expressly for Kissinger.
Marshall would consult with Post on selecting the target individuals
and the type of study wanted, and would then show the final product
to Kissinger. I will inform
I raised with Marshall the problem of the intelligence
community getting no feedback at all from Kissinger's unique experiences
in his various foreign negotiations (Soviets, Chinese, North Vietnamese,
etc. ). I pointed out that if he should leave this world tomorrow or
even leave the Government at some point, there would be a large
vacuum to represent all that he had experienced. I pointed out this
was not a question of finding out what the President was offering
Hanoi to get the war finished but rather the totality of his experience
with the North Vietnamese hierarchy; the same being true of the Soviets
and the Chinese. One of these days, you can bet your hat, he will ask
why we don't know more about Brezhnev and we will be in a nice
position to come back and say because he never told us! Marshall
agreed it was a major problem and promised to address himself to it.
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f. Marshall again brought up the problem of whether
the DCI could bring his NSC-type briefings into better coordination
with State and DJA. I said I thought it would be better to address this
question if this could be made one of the points from Kissinger or the
NSCIC as a result of Working Group submissions to them. He agreed.
g. Finally, we discussed briefly what sort of intelligence
product Kissinger, and thus the President, sees. Marshall made it
clear this was basically the product of the White House Situation Room
and this is apparently a real dog's breakfast--any type of current
intelligence reporting (including the CIB and the DIA daily, NSA reports,
miscellaneous cables from around the world, selections picked out
by the NSC staff, sometimes including a letter from the Secretary of
State with highlights of overseas reporting, and bits and pieces from
the PDB). Although I never was fully able to pin it down, I didn't
gather that either Kissinger or the President very often saw the PDB
in the form in which it leaves this building. Marshall concluded by
saying that Kissinger himself was necessarily crisis oriented.
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USE OLT_
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0CVIC 7a_ es ff
J U L 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller
SUBJECT : Andrew Marshall's Major Interests in intelligence
1. The views in this memorandum are based on Mr. Marshall's
talk to the Advanced Intelligence Seminar (see attached excerpts
of student comments on his talk), questions received in the last
few months in OTR/SIWA from the Intelligence Community Staff which
relate to requests from Mr. Marshall, and Mr. Marshall's questions
and.comments during my briefing on OTR on 14 July. It is also based
on consultation with several SIWA faculty members.
2. As a member of the NSC Intelligence Committee's working
group, Mr. Marshall's main interest is in improving finished intelli-
gence so that it better meets the needs of the policy maker. Within
.this major interest, one of Mr. Marshall's concerns is to develop
superior analytical capabilities in the Intelligence Community.-"`He
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b. that the remaining detailed sections be drepped from
the NIS progran at the and of FY 72. Some of them are of very
limned use; and a number are being produced at the rate of only
one or two per year. ` -rious thought mutt be given to identification
of especially and widely useful data in the detailed sections that
could be integrated iaato the General Survey in ieee detailed form.
(Annex C lists and appraises briefly the detailed sections
scheduled for FY 72.)
11. To at sipt me inn rethinking and roshapin a the P~,'IS program, I
have organised an IS Policy Advisory Panel of the following senior
intelligence tine officers David E. Mark fl )
Richard Lehman (OCI), (iii' R)
and
,
(DDP). The enlightened coaentary and aufgeetions from m?mbern'
of the panel have helped me in evaluating the strengths and weaizneseeO
of Lite program., in identifying. its proper audience, and in planning
what I believe to be a iea ible and broadly useful program for the
future. However, the observation.o and proposals contained in this
m ernorasndum are my own and have not been formally reviewed or
endorsed by the Panel. Neither has the memorandum been reviewed
by the NIS Committee. I reek first to find. if this asc eamment and
plan of action is in accordance with-your sense of the ci i tinA.
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JOHN KERRY KUNG
Director . -
Basic and Geographic Intelligence
and
Chairman, NIS Committee
Attachments:
Annex A: Proposed new Format for the General Survey
Annex B: Mock-up, of a Country Profile
Anne C: NIS Detailed Sections Scheduled for FY 72
Distribution:
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1 -JDDI
1 Ch/ED%BGI
2 - D/BGI
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I(9 September 1971)
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 ATTACHMENT C
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RESPONSES FROM N I S COMMITTEE MEMBERS
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Washington, D.C. 20520
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, NIS COMMITTEE
8 February 1972
SUBJECT: National Intelligence Survey Program -
Assessment and Plans.
I refer to your memorandum of 10 September 1971 to the
Director of Central Intelligence. We have reviewed the
changes and recommendations therein and are confident that
the resulting General Surveys will contain sufficient detail
to satisfy 'the needs of almost every conceivable State reader.
Should some specialist happen to require yet more basic facts
on some narrow topic, we are.,also sure that such material will
be available either elsewhere in the intelligence community or
in public print.
This memorandum thus is designed to express the Depart-
ment's concurrence in the revised program and to reconfirm our
continuing desire to maintain the support role that we play
at present.
- r
A. Sidney Buford III
State Member
NIS Committee
CONFIDENTIAL
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 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
r .1972
C-0066/DI-lA
Subject: 'roposed Changes in National Intelligence Survey (NIS)
Program (U)
To: Chairman, National Intelligence Survey Committee
Central.Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. .20505
1. (U) Reference your memorandum for the Director of Central
.Intelligence, 10 September 1971, subject: National Intelligence
Survey Program--Assessment and Plans.
2. (C) This Agency agrees to your proposal to eliminate the detailed
supplements of the NIS program at the end of FY 72 and to
incorporate selected data from these sections in the General Survey.
Expansion of the General Survey should be pursued on a selective
basis, by country and subject, as the need arises.
3. (C) Review of the detailed supplements currently in work
reveals several that are scheduled for delivery during the first
half of FY 1973 and should be considered for publication by CIA,
a. The section 23, Weather and Climate, on NIS 85/86/95,
scheduled for delivery in July 1972, is now approximately 50 percent
completed.
b. The following units, scheduled for delivery as indicated,
would complete coverage for the respective areas:
(1) This unit
has been completed through CIA edit; however,. further production has
been suspended pending receipt of new source materials needed to resolve
reference material differences.
(2) .
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WFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENC
and September 1972,' respectively.
(3)
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(4) NIS 43C, Section 35, Ports and Naval Facilities,
Minor Ports, July 1972.
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20310 '
7 FEB 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: CHAIRMAN, NIS COMMITTEE
SUBJECT: Discontinuation of Production of Detailed Sections of
National Intelligence Survey (NIS) (C)
1. (C) At the 12 January 1972 meeting of the NIS Committee, you requested
that for the-next meeting each Member have prepared a?memorandum indicating
his Department's position on the subject stated above. This memorandum
is submitted in response to your request.
2. (C) The Army Staff and commands -- other than those which are com-
ponents of Unified Commands -- were informed of the proposed discontinua-
tion of production of detailed sections of the NIS. This was accomplished
by forwarding as an'inclosure a copy of DIA message, Number 6363 dated
.012259Z October 1971. The Army addressees were requested to review the
message and advise the OACSI, Directorate of Foreign Intelligence if the
proposed changes were acceptable. If the changes were not acceptable, the
addressees were requested to submit a statement indicating the adverse
impact that the changes would have on their operations.
3. (C) In general, the proposed changes were acceptable to the Army
Staff and commands. There were, however, several notable exceptions.
a. The US Army Intelligence Command's US Army Imagery Interpretation
Center wants. Section 24 continued in its present format.
b. The Directorate of Military Engineering, Office of the Chief of
Engineers indicated that Sections 24, 25, 31, 32, and 33 are of particular
value as detailed supplemental sources for area analysis research in sup-
port of military topographic mapping.
c. The US Army Foreign Science and Technology Center (FSTC) strongly
objected to discontinuation of the Armed Forces detailed sections for
NIS 26 and NIS 39A, and further questioned the advisability of dropping
the detailed sections.in the Geography and Transportation and Telecommun-
ications subject areas for NIS 26 and 39A and other high priority areas.
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DAMI-FI . I? FEB W,2
SUBJECT: Discontinuation of Production of Detailed Sections of
National Intelligence Survey (NIS) (C)
d. Of the continental armies, schools, and centers of the U.S. Army
Continental Army Command (CONARC), only two objected to the proposed
changes. The J. F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center expressed continuing
need for in-depth coverage of all aspects of targeted countries in sup-
port of deployment and predeployment planning and contingency planning.
In the past, the NIS has been used as the basic source document and the
reduction would hinder acquisition of the required in-depth knowledge.
The Center also recommended that Section 57 (Subversion and Insurgency)
be restored to the program since the treatment in the General Survey does
not provide adequate in-depth coverage. CQNARC's Continental Tactical
Intelligence Center (CONTIC) stressed its interest in subjects falling
within the Geography, Transportation and Telecommunications, and Economy
chapters and the sections on Armed Forces and Intelligence and Security:
However, CONTIC's concern appeared to'stem from the belief that reduction
of NIS production meant also that the data base on these subjects would
no longer be maintained.
4. (C) a. Apart from the specifics discussed in paragraph 3, above, the
undersigned is concerned over a less obvious problem -- that of reducing
NIS production at the very time that there is a concurrent reduction orf
departmental hard-cover production.
b. CIA and DIA are the principal producers of intelligence;i.e., that
-is is produced as harnc~,\published intelligence for general distribution
to all agencies which have expressed a need for intelligence on the sub-
ject or geographic area. DIA has already purged its programmed production
of a wide variety af.hard-cover products such as the logistical studies,
LOC studies, health and sanitation studies,. and the like. This action
was predicated upon priorities, duplication of other products, and con-
tinued coverage in other publications -- the -latter two -justifications
may-have referred to NIS coverage which was expected to,continue -- e.g.,
Health and Sanitation Studies vis-a-vis NIS Section 45.
c. It appears that production of programmed hard-cover publications
is being phased-out by the producers unilaterally whereas the net total
loss in on-the-shelf, hard-cover, published intelligence should first be
determined. A cessation of programmed production of a given product may
be acceptable so long as there are other publications/products available
and programmed for continued production. Conversely, subsequent discon-
tinuation of the latter may create a void so that the user who has come
to depend upon published intelligence will find that none is available at
the very time he needs it. All too frequently a need arises suddenly,
and there is insufficient time to produce, publish, and distribute the
intelligence product.
II
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DAMI-FI
SUBJECT: Discontinuation of Production of Detailed Sections of
National Intelligence Survey (NIS) (C)
d. It is the belief of the undersigned that product elimination must
be based ona plan coordinated by the producers rather than-by unilateral
action taken in the name of economy. The net loss of reduced production
by the several agencies should be assessed somewhere at the national level
to determine the total cumulative loss in the published intelligence in-
ventory. Otherwise, the program runs the risk of creating voids that
could be critical in times of crisis or emergency. It is a basic truism
that intelligence should be produced before rather than after it is needed.
This was the concept that underlay the establishment of the NIS Program.
BRUCE R. GRANT
Army Member
NIS Committee
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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVAL INTELLIGENCE COMMAND
CONFIDENTIAL
-rte ill ~~G, FISENHOWER AVENUE
! L~,-~' /~ w+~~ - _ - 'N RELY F-E-
f ALEXANDRIA. VA. 22314
Ser C150/NIC-34
% Date 7 February 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRiMAN NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY COMMITTEE
Subj: Proposed Reformatting of National Intelligence Survey (U)
Ref: (a) Dir.OBGImemo toODir197Central Intelligence of 10 Sept 71
(b) DIA msg 012259Z 1. (C) The Navy position to the proposed reformatting of
the National Intelligence Survey (NIS) is one of strong
opposition unless it will accommodate the` comprehensive
coverage of naval subjects now included.
2. (C) References (a) and (b) indicate that separate sections
containing detailed data will no longer be produced on suchasts
subjects as merchant marine, naval ports and facilitie, sides
and landing beaches, oceanography and climatology.
immediately depriving Navy planne1s and operational commanders
of the most ready source of such information, eliminating the
requirement to publish it in the NIS could lead in the long
term to atrophy of the whole world-wide maritime data base
through lack of emphasis at the national level on collecting
and maintaining such information.- If anything, we will need
greater efforts in this area as the tempo of operations slows
and ship visits to many areas of the world become less fre-
quent.
3. (U) The proposals of reference. (a) and (b) appear to
eliminate that production on the ocean areas of the world.
The Naval Oceanographic office currently compiles and produces
Section 2 (Ocean Areas) and Section 7 (Evaluation) of the NIS.
These Sections, in addition to being utilized as an input to
the NIS, provide information in satisfying other validated
requirements assigned to that office. The current format of
Section 2 satisfies not only the NIS requirements, but also
of
the requirement for Oceangraphic Atlases. Although a part
the NIS, the oceanographic sections, are utilized byTmanSec-
naval interests outside the intelligence community.
tions.provide the only source in this format of environmental
information to operational and planning personnel. They serve
in lieu of the oceanographic Atlas Series, discontinued in
1967 as an economy measure.
4. (C) The proposed reduction in scope of the NIS could have
GIB T 1 ,. CONFIDE ~NT>L
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Ser C150/NIC-34
Date 7 February 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
grave affects on the responsiveness and success of fleet opera-
ting forces in contingency situations. Despite the advent of
automated intelligence systems, the NIS remains the only ency-
clopedic compendium of world-wide data on the aforementioned
subjects of naval interest. It appears that changes to the
program outlined in references (a?) and (b) might result in
cursory treatment of these subjects of naval interest and
would completely eliminate other information which could be
vital to the success of combat operations.
J. JL ' RYAN
Copy. to:
NIS Committee Member Dept of State
NIS Committee Member DIA
NISCommittee Member Army
NIS Committee Member Air Force
CA-PT'-- USN"--J
Deputy Commander, Naval
Intelligence Command
CONFIDENT1 1':-
2 CONFIDENTIAL
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 REPLY TO
ATTN OF: INAKB
8 February 1972
SU13JECT: Proposed Reductions in NIS Program (C)
TO: Chairman, NIS Committee
1. (C) This letter is submitted pursuant to your request
of 12 January for a letter from each NIS Committee Member
on his organization's position in regard to subject
proposal.
2. (C) Air Force users of NIS products were queried as to
the acceptability, from their viewpoint, of the proposed
reductions as outlined in DIA message #6363 dated 012259Z
October 1971. In?general, the res.ponses were that the
proposed changes were acceptable. Several users had
specific reservations as to the proposal, including:
a. The Electronic Systems Division of the Air Force
Systems Command wants Section 23 continued in its present
format even if consolidated into the General Survey.
b. The Air Force Communications Service wants the
substance of Section 36 incorporated into the G.S. or
Section 36 continued.
3.
(C) In addition to the objections raised
in
paragraph
2
above, the general position of acceptance
of
the proposal
by
the Air Force must be tempered-by overall Air Force
intelligence requirements. There is a need for assurance
that any reduction of hard cover production by any one of
the intelligence producing agencies be assessed at the
national level. Only by so doing can the community as a
whole, and Air Force as a member of that community, avoid
the risk of creating gaps.in the published intelligence
inventory which could be critical to mission requirements
in time of crisis.
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
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Air Force Member-
,r Committee .
PRIDE !N THE PAST r~ y FAITH IN THE FUTURE
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? SECRET ?
SUMMARY OF REVIEW OF.DETAILED SECTIONS
NIS coverage plan
The USIB-approved NIS Coverage Plan. now in
effect is dated 15 March 1968. A few other countries
have since been added.
Current production schedule
For each NIS element the 1968 USIB-approved
coverage plan indicates an annual production rate intended
to provide an adequate revision cycle for the countries
requiring coverage under that topic. Lack of resources
during. recent years has resulted in actual production rates
considerably below the planned maintenance rate.
Rankings in user surveys
Two User Surveys are relevant to this study. The
first is the 1969 NIS User Survey, in which 30 different NIS
products were ranked according to usefulness on the basis
of responses from 1, 000 users. The second was a DoD
User Survey, concluded in June 1970 by the Finished Intelli-
gence Products Review Committee, in which the 131 DIA-
produced items in the category of general intelligence -- the
category in which NIS products fall -- were ranked.
NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED,
7/2/03.
DCID intelligence priorities
Refers to the priorities assigned in DCID No. 1/2,
effective 21 January 1972. Military Geography and Trans-
portation were not divided into the various subtopics that
comprise the NIS sections so that some subtopics might be
expected to rank higher or lower than the overall subject.
A cutoff of priority 6 was established as the break between
intelligence of importance and intelligence of interest.
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FE
PORTS AND NAVAL FACILITIES (Section 35)
Producer: DIA
NIS coverage plan: USSR; China; 6 countries in East rn
Europe; 111 in 25X6
the Middle as in Alrica; 4 in Latin America 25X6
Current production schedule: 9 for FY 72; 3 or 4 for FY 73 NSC
Rankings in user surveys: NIS -'- 7th of 30; DoD -- 32nd of 131
. DCID intelligence priorities (for transportation as a whole)
as related to NIS coverage plan: USSR -- priority 5; 12
countries with priority 6; 5 with priority 7; 1 with priority
8; and 8 unranked. Eleven additional countries not on the
coverage plan carry a priority of 6.
Proposal: Discontinue Section 35 as a separate study. For
those countries having a DCID priority of 5 or 6 and having
significant ports,. the general -coverage provided by the port
sheets (now comprising a Section 35) would be retained for
inclusion in the General Survey. A few lower priority
countries with ports of international significance should
also receive fairly comprehensive treatment. For the
remaining countries, coverage in the General Survey at
its present level of detail would continue. The value of
the recent change in format to individual port sheets, as
opposed to a single-volume study on all ports, has been
established, and such sheets should continue in annex form
to the General Survey.
Rationale: There appears little justification for retaining the
Section 35 as a disparate entity in the NIS Program when
essentially the same coverage can be accommodated in the
General Survey. The need for fairly detailed port data has
been established and although inclusions of the port sheets
will add to the bulk of the General Survey, the coverage should
be continued to meet this need.
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MERCHANT MARINE (Section 36)
Producer: Navy 25X6
NIS covera e plan: USSR; China: 5 East NSC
Cu sc e u e: 4 per year
Rankings in user surveys: NIS -- 27th of 30; DoD -- not ranked
DCID intelligence priorities (for transportation as a whole) as
related to NIS coverage plan: USSR -- priority 5; 11 countries
with priority 6, 3 with priority 7; 1 with priority 8; and 6
unranked. Eight additional countries are ranked 6.
Proposal: Discontinue Section 36. For countries with DCID
priority 5 or 6 and for a few others where the merchant
marine is particularly important but would not be reflected
in the overall category of transportation in the priority
listing, the outline for merchant marine in the General
Survey would be expanded to include some of the more
,broadly useful data now in the ,Section 36.
Rationale: Although of special interest to the Navy, the ranking
in the NIS User Survey does not justify continuation as a
separate study.
CIVIL AIR (Section 37)
Producer: DIA
NIS coverage plan: 9 countries owning significant civil air
fleets, including the USSR and China
Current production schedule: 1 per year; none for FY 73
Rankings in user surveys: NIS -- 20th of 30; DoD -- 81st of 131
DCID intelligence priorities (for transportation as a whole) as
related to NIS coverage plan; USSR -- priority 5; 5 countries
with priority 6; 3 with priority 7.. Seven additional countries
have a priority of 6.
Proposal: Discontinue Section 37. Continue the level of treatment
now accorded civil air in the General Survey.
Rationale: DIA seems disinterested in producing the section;
recent survey produced no special requests for continuance
of the studies beyond a plea to retain transportation data;
and much of the material contained therein is available in
open sources.
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25X6
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lit-ID intelli ence priorities as related to NIS coverage
TELECOMMUNICATIONS (Section 38)
Producer: DIA
NIS coverage plan: USSR: can countries;
1 on the Middle
East; 6 on Africa; 8 on Latin America
Current production schedule: 12 for FY 72; 4 for FY 73
Rankings in user surveys: NIS -- 12th of 30; DoD -- 42nd of 131
Proposal: Discontinue Section 38. For all countries with a DCID
intelligence priority of 6 or higher, the General Survey outline
would be expanded to include the more important aspects of
the topic. For all other countries, the present degree of
detail in the General Survey would be retained.
Rationale: The telecommunications material in Section 38 is
suitable for incorporation into the Terrain, Transportation,
and Telecommunications chapter of the General Survey.
Communications are assigned a relatively high priority,
and the recent survey taken to assess the effect of dropping
the Section 38 indicates need for treatment of the subject at
a level of detail somewhat higher than is now provided in the
General Survey.
HEALTH AND SANITATION (Section 45)
Producer: DIA
NIS coverage plan: Worldwide
Current production schedule: 12 per year
-Rankings in user surveys: NIS -- 25th of 30; DoD -- 80th of 131
DCID intelligence priority: Topic not ranked
Proposal: Discontinue Section 45.
Rationale: Preliminary results of a recent survey of DIA's medical
production indicates that the Surgeon General's needs are not
being met by the level of detail contained in the Section 45. It
would appear that the type of coverage required can best be pro-
duced departmentally by some component of DoD. An overview
of the health and sanitation situation is included in the social
characteristics discussion in the General Survey, and this seems
adequate. - .
25
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NSC
INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY (Section 56)
Producer: DDP
NIS coverage plan:
Current production schedule: 9 per year
Rankings in user surveys: NIS -- 4th of 30; DoD -- not ranked
DCID intelligence priorities
25
25X6
NSC
Proposal: Discontinue Section 56 as a separate study, but create
a new Intelligence and Security chapter to the General Survey
for priority countries or when the internal situation dictates.
Rationale: Topic is too important .to drop from the program and
can be satisfactorily included in the package that comprises
the General Survey. Inclusion in the Government and Politics
chapter would be infeasible because of the limiting classifica-
tion/control normally assigned intelligence and security
coverage.
ARMED FORCES (Sections 1 through 7)
Producer: DIA
NIS coverage plan: USSR (includes, general discussion and sections
on.ground, naval, air, air defense, and missile forces, and
military space systems); China (includes general discussion
and sections on ground, naval, and air forces)
Current production schedule: 1 per year
Rankings in user surveys: NIS -- 3rd of 30; DoD -- 15th of 131
DCID intelligence priorities as related to NIS coverage plan: 2 to 4.
Twelve additional countries have a priority of 4; 17 have a
priority of 5; 17 have a priority of 6.
Proposal: Discontinue the Armed Forces sections as separate
entities of the NIS Program, but the Armed Forces chapter
of the General Surveys on the USSR and China would be expanded
to include the most important and useful data now contained in
the separate sections. Revision would occur every 3rd year
25
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 Approved FeleasQ
DRAFT
17 April 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT Restructuring of the National Intelligence Survey
(NIS) Program
REFERENCE : USIB-D-51. 1/8, 28 August 1963
1. The NIS Committee recommends that the remaining topical
detailed sections be discontinued as part of the NIS Program and
that emphasis and resources be directed toward production of a
restructured and top-quality General Survey, augmented on a highly
selective basis by some of the- more broadly useful material from the
detailed sections.
Rationale
2. Gradual attrition of the detailed-sections over the years has
produced a melange of topical coverage (see attachment). Shifting
requirements for basic intelligence, a more realistic appraisal of
what the NIS Program can achieve, and dwindling resources have
each played a role in eroding the original concept of worldwide,
up-to-date, and well-integrated topical coverage. Discontinuance
of topics was in each case agreed to only after careful consideration
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ATTACHMENT E
SPOUP t
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da"grealag >d
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of identifiable user requirements and availability of alternative
coverage, but it is now becoming evident that the cumulative effect
of the attrition is a program lacking coherence and focus.
3. Although NIS programming has adhered to the USIB-approved
NIS plan for country priorities, for many of the detailed sections still
being produced,' area coverage has also been markedly curtailed.
Transportation and Armed Forces sections, as examples, are now
being produced for only a few countries. The result is a disparate
and confusing pattern of coverage.
4. User surveys have indicated that some of the more special-
ized detailed sections have quite limited, albeit steadfast, readership.
Faltering interdepartmental interest in certain topics raises the ques-
tion of their continued suitability in a national intelligence program.
As is conceptualized in the Reference, this specialized detailed basic
intelligence was designed for the most part to meet military require- -
ments. Much of it might appropriately be produced departmentally.
5. Continuing and increasing budgetary restrictions have taken
and are taking heavy toll on the NIS Program. However, what remains
can be made to meet important needs of the national security policy
community by placing full emphasis on community production of a
coordinated, high-quality, and broadly based General Survey which
CONFI EN TJAL
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1 :F s A
would better utilize the available resources than the present disparate
program. Also, the production structure and organization of a new
General Survey would enable the program to meet any future require-
ments for an expanded national. basic intelligence effort.
6. Programmed production of the topical detailed sections would
be discontinued by the end of FY 72.
7. The General Survey, slightly expanded and restructured in,
a bound-by-chapter format, would become the body of the program.
In addition to providing greater efficiency and flexibility in maintenance,
the new format will enable the NIS to selectively incorporate into the
appropriate chapters -- or as separate annexes -- some of the more
widely useful data now.contained in the detailed sections. This will
apply particularly to DoD-produced information which cannot be
adequately produced and published departmentally.
8. The semiannually produced Basic Intelligence Factbook
would continue to be published in both the classified and unclassified
versions.
9. * The special NIS on oceanography would be continued for
another year pending the completion of an assessment of interagency
requirements in this field.
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Impact
10. Total elimination of the remaining detailed sections would
reduce NIS production by about 30%. Some of the manpower saving
implicit in the cutback would have to be redirected to implementing
the production of the enhanced General Survey. Although precise
figures on anticipated money and manpower savings have not yet
been determined, it is estimated that the overall NIS resources
saving would be about 20%, much of which has already been realized
through imposed reductions in the NIS effort.
Action Requested
11.. The NIS Committee requests that USIB, in accordance with
its responsibility for providing policy direction to the NIS Program
as outlined in the Reference, approve the plan to discontinue production
of NIS topical detailed sections by the end of FY 72? and to integrate
on a selective basis broadly useful material from those sections, as
appropriate, into the new General Survey.
JOHN KERRY KING
Chairman, NIS Committee
Attachment:
Attrition of NIS Detailed Sections
CONFIfEN TJAL
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110 N N A
ATTRITION OF NIS DETAILED SECTIONS
Intrcdaaticn ....................
Military Geogr. Negi,ns.........
Coasts & Landing Beaches ........
Weather & Climate ...............
.ccpcgraphy ........................
Urban Areas ...................
Introduction ....................
Railroads ........................
Highways ........................
Inland Waterwayr ................
Ports & Naval Facilities ........
Merchant Marine .................
Civil Air .......................
Telex_rr= nications ..............
Introduction ....................
Population ......................
Character. of the People........
Relig., Educ., Pub. Info........
Manpower ................... ..
Health S: Sanitation .............
Welfare .........................
Introduction ....................
Constitutional Sy.zre:r ............
Structure of the Govt ...........
Political Dynamics ..............
Public Crder & Safety...........
National Policies ...............
Intelligence & Security.........
Subversion & Insurgency.....:...
Propaganda ......................
Key Personalities ...............
Introduction ....................
Agr., Fisheries, Forestry .......
r7_;els & Power ....................
Minerals & Metals ...............
Manufactaring & Construction....
Trade &.Finance .................
Introduction ....................
Electronics .....................
Air, Ground, Naval Weapons ......
Atomic Energy ...................
.Biological Warfare ..............
Chemical Warfare ................
Fhy.Sci.,Math.,Medicine .........
Introduction ....................
Ground Forces ...................
Naval Forces ........... .... ...
Air Forces ......................
Map &'Chart Appraisal...........
Ports & Naval Facilities........
Coasts & Landing Beaches ........
Tel cc .cm,lnications..............
Petroleuc.........
..............
C,:miunism .......................
Internati?,nal Communism.........
Marino Climate ..................
Oceanography....... .
Effects of Climate & Ocea .......
Straits .........................
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16 February 197Z
MEMORANDUM FOR: D/ DCI/ NIPE
Conversation with 25
OER, re Economic Intelligence
1. As you had advised me they would, Mr. Ernst and Mr.
OER, met with me this morning to discuss NSCIC
activities in the economic field. I described the discussions at the
NSCIC Working Group meeting which led to Dr. Proctor's
volunteering to prepare a study describing how intelligence was
responding to U. S. needs for economic intelligence.
2. They were primarily interested in being informed on what
the NSCIC is and what it does, what the IRAC is and what it will do,
and how the new NIPE staff will function.
3. We also discussed in some detail the proposed work program
for the EIC requirements working group which chairs. 2
This is a study which may well prove of interest to the NSCIC Working
Group because it involves a large number of non-USIB agencies and
calls upon them to indicate their requirements for information. The
study will examine how these needs are being met and identify problem
areas. An unusual aspect of this work is that those elements of the
intelligence community which deal with economic intelligence repre-
sent only a small part of the resources of the U. S. Government
involved in foreign economic information. This may pose some
unusual questions when it comes to recommendations as to what may need
to be done to improve the acquisition of economic data since, undoubtedly,
there are many U. S. Government elements that have their own informal
means of acquiring foreign data without using formal intelligence channels.
4. This EIC requirements study might provide a model which would
be helpful for requirements studies in other areas of intelligence. I
intend to stay in close touch with OER as the study develops.
Chief/PRG
Distribution:
orig - addressee
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