INTERVIEWS OF NSC/WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A000900040002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 6, 1973
• Content Type: MF

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
rul /i^ T
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SECRET/SENSITIVE February 6, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR BRONSON TWEEDY
FROM: A. W. Marshall ct
SUBJECT: Interviews of NSC/White House Staff Members
NSC REVIEW
COMPLETED,
6/26/03
Over the course of last year I interviewed members of the NSC and
White House staffs concerning the intelligence support they and the
President's Assistant for National Security Affairs receive. Eight
senior staff members were involved, plus several of their assistants.
Three major issues were discussed:
-- What intelligence support does Kissinger need?
-- How well satisfied are you with the intelligence
products received?
-- How could you better be served? In what directions
would you like to see improvements? ' t
I have paraphrased their comments and attempted to summarize their
feelings as accurately as possible. Most of those interviewed were
reasonably well satisfied with the support they get. A few clearly were
not. All had suggestions for improvements. The focus of the. interviews
tended to concentrate on eliciting these.
My hope is that this memorandum is an effective way of conveying the
major themes that emerged. At a later date I will send you a memo-
randum-containing my reactions to the entire interviewing record,
I. General Observations
A. ?Sensitivity to Consumer Needs
- - "... the energy and devotion of the intelligence community
had gone downhill recently... are now routine producers of fairly
routine products.
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"CLL. is basically passive, but responsive. The passivity
is reflected in the lack of energy devoted to finding out what particular
customers really do need, what they think of the product. On the other
hand, if one asks them for information, for help, they are very responsive
within their limits.... The Agency's perception of what is at issue, what
the relevant questions are,.-what the most relevant and useful insights and
information are is rather poor. The CIA often misses a chance to pro-
vide useful inputs. In particular, (I note) the importance of negotiations
with other governments as an area and as a focus of NSC interest. The
CIA people do not seem to perceive this as a major problem area for the
NSC staff and/or for Kissinger. They do not show any imagination in
tailoring their products to the special needs of particular negotiations.
-- "... intelligence analysts assume an awful lot of background
on the part of the readers ... They write on things of interest to them,
rather than trying to understand the needs of their consumers and doing
what is required to communicate with them. "
-- It ... with respect to the China trip, the preparation by the
community was fairly good and there were no surprises*. The bio-
graphic reporting was good and the I I studies 25X1
were useful. " NSC
_-." ... 'last year, that is 1971, a great deal off' effort was spent
at the White House examining the analytical basis of our information on
Vietnam ... the validity of the techniques of analysis, the data and con-
clusions drawn from the data ... the community ought to have sorted all
of this out earlier ... it
-- " ... what intelligence is really paid for (is) to get the message
through, but the fact is that the uncertainties, the incentive system, analysts'
training and organizational writing styles lead to very hedged and muffled
statements of conclusions in most intelligence products."
B. Communication
tried to communicate critical comments and ... views
derived from contact with Kissinger or other staff members to people
in the CIA, usually at high levels ... In many cases, the response has been
one of a certain amount of bristling hostility, and an unwillingness in some
cases to listen to the criticism."
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there is a good deal of fuzziness in the expression of
the results of intelligence analysis in typical products . . . I go over many
pages in a typical report and put a few sentence summary on the top of it
for Henry's use. I try to distill the essence of the document from Henry's
point of view. What is in the document that. he needs to know? Partly the
problem is the CIA. style of writing, partly it is that the analysts ... do
not have enough of a picture of what Kissinger wants and needs ... analysts
never ask themselves what Henry really needs; the documents are never
specifically tailored to a particular audience. Analysts should ask them-
selves in some cases, if I had five minutes with Henry Kissinger on this
subject, what would I say to him? ... this would cover only one kind of
communication need ... there is a very. significant place ... for much
lengthier in-depth analyses. The main point is not that all products
should be brief, but that there should be first-rate sumrraries. The
typical intelligence product does not have one ... If (I) can regularly
squeeze down. what is needed onto one 5X8 note-size page ... the typical
summary is much too long. Moreover, it is not hard-hitting enough
whatever its length. In addition (I) had a discussion with ... (an individual
on Kissinger's personal staff) in which (this individual's) response to a
particular document was to exclaim. 'they won't come out and say what
they really mean! '
C. Who Is the Consumer?
it is very important that the intelligence community be
more responsive, and ... not have an unrealistic view of its readership ...
primary readership is the staffs of people like Kissinger, the Secretary
of State, etc. ... have got to stop thinking that Kissinger, or the President,
is going to read their products. They may in very selective cases, but
they cannot be viewed as the primary readers.
. the CIA Office of Current Intelligence refuses to perceive
that their product is not read by Kissinger and the President ... The OCI
people should really think of themselves as ... feeding the real current
intelligence process in the White House. They could get feedback and fit
into the system if they were willing to do it on that basis. They refuse to
do so ... The CIA has tended all along to cultivate the notion that it writes
directly for the national leaders. Their real audience ... is almost
always the staffs and not the decisionmakers."
in general, readership of longer studies, or in-depth
studies, is chancy, at least if you think of your audience as Kissinger
or the President."
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D. Kissinger as the Consumer
Note: The recurring theme in my discussions concerning Kissinger's
reading habits was that he read material which was recommended by-
the NSC staff or friends and. on topics of current in~`-erest. Few people
really know what he reads beyond the daily package assembled by the
White House Situation Room, but it was obvious that intelligence products
were screened by the staff and condensed because of the limited time he
had available.
-- ". . . (Kissinger) does not read the NIE's, indeed, does not
read much.. beyond current reporting, except for occasional items put
in his briefcase for reading on weekends or in preparation for special
trips, assignments, etc. "
-- ... no information on his reading habits... nor of his specific
reaction to products. Indirect evidence suggested... that he did read a
good deal, especially things other people sent him with a recommendation...
-- ". , ,had no feedback on his reaction to the intelligence he
receives, nor information on what he reads... He read all of the China
trip material and also a number of books.
II. Current Intelligence Products
A. Quality of Analysis
-- "The CIB is all right for spot reporting, but it tends to over-
dramatize individual events... it provides no real feel for what is really
happening... one receives an erratic picture of the movement of events,
of major trends, etc. ... "
the current style of reporting, which emphasizes short
newsworthy items, gives an exaggerated picture of the instability, the
conflict in a particular area. It leads to an image of the political situation
in a country being more vulnerable and unstable than it is because of the
bias of such reporting, which highlights change, or incipient change.
-- "... (I am) considerably less happy with the OCI reporting...
generally give the material... poor marks as to the level of analysis that
it displays. "
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-- (Reference to Indo-Pak crisis) "Something was definitely
wrong. We were far too relaxed until too late... the message with
regard to what was happening, even if correct, would not have gotten
through... (the) tendency (is) that once events start moving, as in the
later part of the Indo-Pak crisis, (one) receives a steady stream of
factual intelligence reportisig.. But the analytical stuff just quits...
Maybe there are some good analytical pieces produced, but they are
not attended to... they either drown in the flow or are reduced to a
trickle.
B. Volume of Current Production
a general injunction should be given to keep the
-- "Current intelligence needs are met, indeed... there is
an oversupply... The resources in OCI could be devoted to much better
uses. There is a need to understand that Kissinger's focus is crisis-
oriented, highly focused at any one time on the problems that he faces.
He does not need OCI to try to keep monitoring the world and giving him
daily news... adequate alternative sources are cables, ta. NSC staff
materials, the Situation Room current intelligence effort. The alternative
uses (OCI) could be put to are... to alert top-level staffs to new and
emerging problems.
C. Economic Intelligence
-- ". . . collection of economic intelligence abroad is poor, and
we do not effectively exploit the information that could 'be available to us
through business corporations."
-- "... the White House really needs more information on
economic and financial intelligence than it now gets. . . (I) receive the
State Department Current Economic Issues publication. CIA should do
a comparable job and they probably have a superior capability.
-- " , , in the area of (estimating the) economic performance
of (a certiin nation)... there were considerable problems; especially
after having been there. . . (I am) dubious as to the accuracy and validity
of the estimates of... economic output in 1971 (by intelligence. These
were) not very thoughtful.
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-- "In the area of economic, financial and commercial
intelligence, the Economist is the best single source, , . Other good
sources are the New York Times financial pages, the Financial Times
of London, etc. , . in terms of overall appraisals and insights into what
was really happening, the publicly published materials are significantly
superior to the CIA products.
III. National Intelligence Estimates
A. Readership_
-- "There are relatively few NIE's that are specific (to
my area, . I) read all of the NIE's. "
--- "(I do) not read NIE:'s, none in the last two years... (and
have) no urge to ask for SNIE's... (Kissinger) initially did read some
NIE's, but for the last 2-1/2 years has not read any."
-- "(I) keep tabs on the NIE's and keep them.. , long enough
to go through them, at least to turn the pages... very interested in
estimates in the military area... estimates of other sorts are
essentially of no value."
B. Quality
_7 ", ..'the NIE's are spotty, too terse and muffled in. their
presentation... too narrow in their focus and there is no longer-term
trend analysis. " .
-- ". . . there is an ONE philosophical bias not to over-react
to events. A good position in general, but it has been pushed too far
in important- cases, rc
-- "... generally like the NIE's... and the special subject
reports included in the Intelligence Memoranda, .. (1) find these useful,
and sometimes send them to Kissinger in the hope that he will read them."
IV. Types of Products Needed
A. In-Depth Analysis
the need (is) for more focus on long-term trends, rather
than on snapshots of specific happenings or events... In-depth intelligence
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studies should provide new intellectual furniture, provide special new
insights and hypotheses, etc. They should not be just general background
histories of events, but analytically focused on particular policy problems,
or issues, that can be useful to decisionmakers."
from time t;o time special requests for in-depth studies
could prove very useful... occasionally a specialized study drawing on
the full depth of information and analytic capabilities of CIA and the
intelligence community has had significant payoff. "
-- "There do not seem to be any really in-depth studies, that'
is, the equivalent of a book on China, or some major figure. "
-- "What role is there for in-depth, analytic studies? ... if
they were more relevant and focused on key problems, they could be
very valuable... most research currently is on out-of-date topics,
people are going back and looking at an historical event and researching
it in considerable depth. But the analysis of a past event does not profit
from the standard kind of historical treatment... the topics are out of
date, and also the analysis does not focus on particular issues or problems."
-- "In-depth analysis of problems is almost totally lacking... the
function of in-depth analysis is to suggest what to look fob, how to interpret
the fragmentary information that one receives in the daily reporting. For
example, after the Egyptians had pushed out the Soviets, one might have
speculated: what is going to happen now? A possible Soviet shift to Syria
or Iraq presented interesting scenarios. These scenarios then provide a
context within which one looks for clues in the stream of data... They allow
one to interpret pieces of data that otherwise are meaningless."
-- "... more effort should be devoted to something like Hal
Ford's special research group. Kissinger needs in-depth and trend
analysis.."
-- "... there is a need for more long-range studies... focused
on political, economic, sociological trends... ought to be more attention
given to Latin America viewed as an area... for the interaction of the
separate countries, (and) considering the role of external nations, the
French, the Germans, the Soviets, the Chinese, etc... There is... a
tendency to treat Latin America as a U. S. province and to think... in
terms of U. S. and a particular country's bilateral relations. IT
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B, Speculative Analyses
would very much like to see more speculative
material... that would be useful in approaching major policy issues.. .
academics attempt to do it, but with much less information. Top-level
staffs attempt to do it for their bosses. . . (but) the result is to put the
intelligence community into a role of supplying only the facts."
another problem with... intelligence (is) the unwilling-
ness to hazard opinion, to speculate. "
would like to get more of the internal... product which
is current, uninhibited, and... contains discussion of alternative inter-
pretations of new data,
-- Agreed to the need for speculative products and noted "such
speculation will not itself be risky. The policymakers are not going to
hit the speculators over the head later if it has been made clear that these are
alternative and speculative hypotheses... only the intelligence people have the
time, and in some cases the background, to put forward sophisticated hypo-
theses about the significance and meaning of the things that are observed...
they currently are missing a chance to provide a significant service to the
top leadership. "
C. Different Interpretations
on complex, difficult issues the decisionmakers do not
want a consensus view, unless in the exceptional circumstance where
everyone in the community really agrees. What is needed is well
exposited views of the conflicting positions, a sorting out of the points
of agreement, a presentation of the relevant disagreements, a clear
separation of facts, opinions and judgments. The worst possible situation
is one in which a consensus is forced and brought to the top. "
D. Intelligence Should Emphasize Its Comparative Advantage
"(Intelligence) has to focus more clearly on areas where they
have a significant comparative advantage... they... need to perceptively
take account of what the competitive sources of information have to offer
(to decisionrnakers, and) capitalize on the strong points of their particular
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sources of information... (and) the kinds of analyses that only they
have the capability and the time to do... For eample, as an administration
learns and develops sources of information, especially as regards political
information, the character of its need for certain kinds of intelligence and
background information shifts. At the very beginning, it needs to be
brought up to speed, and background provided for many of the top leader-
ship. But that as it progresses through time, it doesn't need the same
C> 1~
sort of things. In that respect, the character of intelligence products
ought to be cyclical and tied to the time in office of the key leaders it is
serving.
-- (Reference Egypt's expulsion of Soviet forces) "... suggested
that (AWM) get Le Monde and compare it with the intelligence analysis.
Le Monde has done a significantly better job than any U. S. intelligence
organization, first in being alert to the onset of the crisis, and then in
its coverage after it happened.
"Analysts should try to perceive the.real life market for
their products, understand... the decision processes into which their
products go, and on this basis seek an area of comparative advantage..
top-level decisionmakers feel they know the essential aspects of policy
problems... They know key items of information or aspects of the situation
that analysts are not privy to... (but) the analyst knows things they don't
know. However, analysts... discredit themselves by trying to compete
where they have no comparative advantage. For example, they may in
some cases try to guess the whole story of.a particular episode as a
prelude to their analysis, rather than contributing distinctive insights
based on what they do know. The natural tendency is to want to give the
whole picture rather than give partial insights based upon specialized
in-depth studies. However, the latter may be the area in which intelli-
gence analysts in fact have the comparative advantage. "
E. Periodic Wrap-Ups
deplore the fact that there is no end of the month survey
which would wrap up and analyze events, "
"... rather than current reporting, there are needs for materials
focused on trends, wrap-ups, more analytic pieces putting daily events in
perspective. "
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... eve need an antidote to the daily reporting, perhaps in
the form ofaweekly or monthly roundup, that is focused on major, systemic
trends and on basic indicators of the state of nations, governments, etc.
every arew'desk should put out a roundup every ten days.
CIA, though selective, provides... interesting publications that do make
some attempt to tie things together, plus giving some view of the interaction
between various actors on the international stage.
like to see much more exploration of long-term consider-
ations related to . ' . developing trends, policy implications, etc. '.1
F. Products Which Flag Issues of Impending Importance
there is no effort to flag impending issues. For example,...
at a conference on Majorca which a number of people from the oil
companies (attended)... all... agreed that oil production was already at
its highest possible level. . . if there was a cold winter in Europe, we would
have the first of... a series of European oil crises... there had been no
news of this in any of the intelligence materials I had seen. "
-'. . , one of the most important improvements could come from
an early focus on potential issues, enough in advance sd that in-depth intelli-
gence analysis... can be done... it would be important if we could forecast
issues and problems, then have some procedure for getting analysis done
on them. "
some special alerting to important events in the future
is also useful. "
G. Personality and Organizational Analyses
even after someone like Kissinger knows particular leaders,
he still has aoneed for and would welcome tactical information that would
allow him to deal better with a particular leader. This might include recent
information about him, about his health, or insightful material from first-
rate psychological personality studies. All this additional information is
aimed at giving him a better chance of influencing the.behavior of particular
leaders in directions required by U. S. policy. Along this line it would be
useful to have in-depth studies of the forces at work on foreign leaders,
within the top-level Soviet decision processes, etc."
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-- ". . . an analysis of key elites... would be very useful. In
particular, a generational analysis, somewhat like the study Whitson
has done on the Chinese military, would be useful in a number of
countries. An important focus of such studies would.. be the common,
decisive experiences these key elites had together, for example, the
Castro people who had been up in the hills with him... understanding
elites, their common background, the sources of cohesion, common
experiences that have shaped their thinking, etc. , are extremely impor-
tant... most of the biographic material... (is) not really... good enough.
. The DIA biographic materials. .
25X1A
are not very useful and contain only isolated facts. The State biographic
material seems 'to be confined... too much to describing what a particular
person likes, the sports he plays, etc. Studies of personalities should
focus on the likely motives, on the amount of weight or clout of a partic-
ular individual. "
-- ... improved exploitation of materials from the Soviet
press... or other materials to do more detailed studies of the Soviet
bureaucracy (would) provide new background insights for top-level
people. . . it would be of special interest to have an analysts of the
efforts and actions of Dobrynin, other Soviet spokesmen, and Soviet
visitors who attempt to influence U. S. domestic opinion."
4
-- ", . , the UK and Japanese appear to have developed a sophis-
ticated view of U. S. decisionmaking processes, interest groups, etc.
We do not have a comparable view of their decision processes, or
interest groups.
-- "...In periods of crisis, one needs to understand (explain)
the actions, behavior, and the motives of another government... our own
government, when acting under pressure, cannot be characterized by any
simple clearcut model of decisionmaking... there is a consistent problem
of oversimplification in our attempts to describe and analyze the behavior
of other governments. "
H. Special Study Suggestions
R
-- Studies of issues with a longer-term focus: "... an example
would be the... major changes in Soviet society over the next decade
that may limit Soviet capabilities to pursue external affairs -- nationality
problems, birthrate decline of Russian ethnic groups, etc. What do the
Soviet leaders worry about? What surfaces in their long-range planning
studies? "
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-- China: ", , would like to see, in addition to an attempt
to understand upper-level decision processes and policies: (1) a
better feel for the state of the country, especially as regards a
better picture of regional affairs, (2) delineation of the interest
groups in Chinese society and in the Chinese governmental structures,
(3) more speculation of whys things happen and likely future trends.
-- Military aid programs: ", o o claims put forward by foreign
governments for increased military aid, or for different technology than
we are currently giving them, , Jake up a good deal of NSC staff time...
This is not at all reflected in the character of the CIA product, "
-- .", , publish collections of key telegrams and items on areas
of on-going interest. For example, items they have picked up regarding
some of the past Presidential trips. These could provide a working
document for people... to use as a handbook of reference material,
sources."
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