LETTER TO THE HONORABLE ROBERT D. MURPHY FROM W. E. COLBY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A000900160037-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: November 7, 1973
• Content Type: LETTER

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20303
November 7, 1973
The Honorable Robert D. Murphy, Chairman
Commission on the Organization of the Government
for the Conduct of Foreign Policy
2025 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20506
Dear Ambassador Murphy:
I n response to your letter of October 15 1 have de-
veloped the attached statement which provides an overall
response to the matters you suggested for coverage in my
presentation to the Commission in November. I developed
this in unclassified form, as I believed it the most useful
vehicle to stimulate future questions and thoughts by the
Commission members in the actual hearing. I am certainly
prepared to go into classified matters during the hearing
itself, or in any follow-up studies of more detail which might
be needed as you proceed toward your final report.
Sincerely,
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 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503.
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November 7, 1973
The Honorable Robert D. Murphy, Chairman
Commission on the Organization of the Government
for the Conduct of Foreign.Policy
2025 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20506
Dear Ambassador Murphy:
In response to your letter of October 15 1 have de-
veloped the attached statement which provides an overall
response to the matters you suggested for coverage in my
presentation to the Commission in November. I developed
this in unclassified form, as I believed it the most useful
vehicle to stimulate future questions and thoughts by the
Commission members in the actual hearing. I am certainly
prepared to go into classified matters during the hearing
itself, or in any follow-up studies of more detail which might
be needed as you proceed toward your final report. -
Sincerely,
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STAT LiENT BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL 'INTELLIGENCE
let me "confirm your assumption about what the
national intellicerice program is. Our intelligence process
includes the collection and analysis of information in or-
der to produce what we call "finished intelligence." We
use overt, covert, technical, human, passive, and active
collectors. The information collected is then "processed"---
that is, it is -recorded, compared with other information,
and subjected to the appropriate techniques of scientific
examination such as photographic interpretation, electronic
analysis,- and decrypt-ion. This -"processing" of information
is follo;qed by what we :call the "production" of "finished"
intelligence .-- in the form of reports,- studies,- and estimates
which reflect the highest intellectual evaluation which
we can bring to bear upon all the bits and pieces of . fact
and 'impression at :our disposal. The 'entire 'intelligence
process which *1 have described relates 'to "foreign -intelli-
gence and counterintelligence, although a number of steps
in the process -obviously have to take; place in the* United
States. In addition to collection, processing, and produc--
tion,._from time *to tire 'CIA also conducts. other activities
related to inteIl igence `affecting the national security, as
directed by the National Security Council.
The current organization of the Intelligence. 'Community
is reflected in the President's directive of 5" November
1971. It called for the folloaing:
-- That :the Director of Central Intelhigerice '(DCI)
provide leadership to all foreign intelligence
activities'-of the United States Government.
-- That there be established a National Security
Council Intelligence 'Corlmittee * (NSCIC) The
purpose of the NSCIC is to give direction and
guidance on national substantive intelligence-
. r11'er,~hars are : The Assistant to the President for
11ationaZ Security Affairs (Chairman), the-Under Secre-
tary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the
Chair,;:wr> of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI.
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reeds and to provide for the continuing evalua-
tion of intelligence products from the vie..r-
point of the intelligence consumer-
That the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee
IP.AC be formed. * This Committee is advisory
to the DCI in his management role.. It helps hint
develop the annual National Foreign Intelligence
Program Budget RecoT endations which are sent
by the 'DCI to the President--Recommendations
which may concern any of the foreign intelligence
expenditures of the United States' Government.
-- That the United States Intelligence Board..(USIB) ** .
be reconsti tuted to include a representative.
of the Secretary of the 'Treasury, and that it
continue 'to advise and assist the. DCI in his. sub-
stantive leadership role With "respect to the. - In- -
telligerice 'Coim-nunity_
Not addressed by that directive but continuing to operate'
is '-the *so-called Forty Col-znittee.X** This body provides policy
guidance 'on activities -related to intelligence affecting the
national secu ty, as directed by the National Security Council.-
*Members are: the DCI (Chairman), and one senior repre-
sentative each from the Department of Defense, the Depart
meat -ofState,the 'Offi.ce of Management and Budget, and
CIA..
..**Members are: - The DCI (Chairman); the DDCI;. the Director
of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, State' Department;
the. Director of the National Security Agency (NSA); the.
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); repre--
sentatives of the Secretary of the Treasury, the' Federal
Bu_rec?1 of Investigation, and the Atomic Energy Commission.
. members are:' The Assistant to the President -for National
Security Affairs. (Chairman), the Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, the Deputy ,Secretary of Defense, the
C3;a ir--an of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI..
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In his letter to r,-,2 of 1- October, Chairman Nun W out
lined a number of specific subjects which he wished me to ad-
-0110;q-up studies -of the Com ?i s-
dress i n my s gate .ent and in
sion. I have generally keyed the following remarks to the
numbered sections of. that letter.
(1) Authority
The National Security Act of 1947,' certain additional
legislation, and the National Security Council Directives
provided for in law are the authorities under which the
national intelligence program operates.-: The legislation
is 'currently being re=evaluated by the 'Congress-, and it
ma_y be. that some -modifications will be made. To the -extent
that. any changes further limit the national intelligence
activities -in which '.the DCI is interested to the field of
'forei'gn intelligence, and to the extent that.they require
the reporting of foreign intelligence 'activities on a
regular basis to certain me hers of the Congress; I. would
welcome them.. The 'public should be as -free as possible
from concern about the operations of our national foreign
intelligence'program-
The 'National. Security Council Directives which :I men-
tinned are currently under evaluation to, determine cahether
an unclassified version can be 'written. This would help to
eliminate -any possible' misunderstanding about -the. existence of
a "secret charter" for CIA or the Intelligence--Community. At
the 'same time,, some. classified directives will be 'necessary
to specifically- implement the- unclassified, guidance of the
open directives'.'
I do not vie 'su'bordination to the NSC as -different
from subordination to the President. The NSC historically
has played different roles in foreign policy and rational
.security affairs under different Presidents.' But no Presi-
dent in recent times has been willing to function without
access to good intelligence -- whether by direct contact
with. appropriate agencies or through -the NSC system_
The responsibilities of some of the -agencies of the
Intelligence Community to produce both "departmental"
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and "national" intelligence are not in conflict- In fact,.
they are mutually supporting. The military services, for
instance, have 'intelligence arms i-,hich provide the tactical
intelligence necessary to support the operational forces.
They also contribute information and analysis to those in
the Co=unity who work on "national" level problems- A
study is now underway to determine how these programs can
better support each other for both substantive benefit
and possible resource savings.
The,DCI's responsibility to "protect intelligence.
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure" is
basically a responsibility without authority. I do not
view it as giving any authority beyond the 'right to cal].
the 'attention of the appropriate prosecuting authority
to any cases -of. unauthorized disclosure.' In this regard
I confess great concern at the absence "of any effective
statutes- 'to prevent 'or punish 'the unauthorized disclosure
of sensitive intelligence matters _ It was only. by civil
action based upon his pre 'employment secrecy agreement
that an ex-employee was prevented from revealing a number
of"delicate matters in' a book which 'he had written. (U.S.
vs. Marchetti.:, 466 F. 2d 1309, 1316). This decision is
being tested again.
Aside 'froza this particular weakness -of the statutes,- I
see 'no need for particular new authority to carry out an
effective "intelligence "program. The "services -of common con-
tern"'. mandate 'in' the current law is adequate, though of course
there 'are always' minor negotiations between a_ gencies about the
kind and quality of service to be 'performed.
You have asked whether section 102"(d) (5) of the Na-
tional"Security Act, which provides that the CIA shall per-
form such other functions and duties related to intelligence-
affecting the 'national security as. the'NSC may from time to
time direct,. .is -too broad and open-ended. This is currently
being considered in Congress. I world offer that this pro-
vision, has beeri used only when specifically directed by the
NSC under Presideritial.authority, that every President
since 1947 has-used it, and that the shape of the world
today seems to require its use much less `often than in the
more critical of the' cold war years. I do not believe that
this weapon should be lightly discarded. from our national
arsenal.
Section 102 (e) of the 1947 Act, which gives the. CIA the -
right to sea the foreign intelligence of all of the departments
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and agencies , is a key factor in molding a group of i ntell-
cn_1ce agancies .into a co a.nity. Without that rigat, mere
could be no single source of intelligence advice which ac-
counted for the variety of available facts, and the
Policy-1r would be buried in a confusii on of unco-relat..edeports
and analyses about major problems and events.
(2) "Require -.ents
The principal customer of our national intelligence pro-
gram. is, of course, -the President. But his key advisors
and officers -need also to be informed (i.e.', the Assi s ta~? t
to the President for National Security Affairs, the Secre-
taries. of State, Defense, -Treasury, and so on) Their re-
aui rements are a compilation both. of their expressed needs
and of the Intelligence Co: unity's judgment about what
they might need-
There are a variety of technique s for refining such re-
quirements The USIB and the DCI have established and con-
tinually revi eti a formal .list of relatively constant. major .
requirements.- Crisis-'requirements are'generally conveyed
to the proper action arm. of the' Community as a result of try
participation in the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG)
which 'meets regularly and keens' me informed of activities
which night ben' it front intelligence support.
-In non-crisis situations,- reguirerients- for information
come to the intelligence :Com uunity in a wide. 'variety of effec-
tive'but not necessarily orderly ways. On a daily basis,
policy-oriented analysts are in' contact with intelligence
analysts and make their needs known in that context. Through.
the requirements staffs -of each i n_telligerice 'agency, collec-
tion co zpon`nts can ba 'tasked. Formal* rec=uests- for specific
facts or analyses also come by letter or telephone fro:; US-t3
.Principals, Cabinet members, and the'NSC/National Security Ad-
visor level. . Polic "a' e'r feedback to. the 'Intelligence Com-
munity on intelligence probleth below the .first level of
p riorit."y, ? -or in non--crisis situations ' generally does not
give a clear enough signal about ho-..7 much 'collection and
analytical effort the Intelligence Community should expend
on a specific subject_ The Community tasks -itself when this
is the case.
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(3) '(12) Performance and Resources , Budgets
The DCI has no authority to determine the budget 2nd i an_-
nower needs of the various agencies 'in the Intelligence Con
m'un, i ty. Each component goes through an i ndepende_2t _progra
and budge t development process (in the case of State and DOD
intelligence programms there are department-:"T? de guidances and
constraints apply apart from intelligence consideratio-Is)-
-Each component has an independent review by the O:VLB. Each
component receives -from. the Congress an appropriation which
is under its -full control . The program proposed by each co::,-
ponent to the Congress is review.aed, however, by the intelli-
gence .Community (IC) Staff of the 'DCI.. From IC staff sugges-
t-ions,- .IRAC deliberations ,- and USIB .regui repents, the DCI .
f orm.ula tes his National Foreign intelligence Progra_-;t Budget.
Recommendations "for the President.
The 'major resource problem -facing the Community is
inflation; first in manpo.'ier costs, but in all other aspects
of our profession as well." The problem can be 'stated in this
.way:
a. assuming level manpower, level program .
size, and continued inflation, the =resources "for
intelligence "would have to "i"ncrease- "bv nearly :25
perceri~ -may 1978. This alternative would be .unac-
cepta.b_Le -Lo the Congress .
b.. assuming level dollars,- a level program,
and inflation .of:Ese t by manpowwie?" reductions; a
'40 percent "cut '1n_' 'rtaripo:?ier would be required by
19 78 . The Community could not take such 'a cut
and continue 'to meet its' obligations; c. ass'uning level dollars, lever man_po?;er,
and continued-inflation, -there would have to be 'a
drastic and "u_ne cce~table It in our investment in
teclnHical systems for the fi'ture and in procurerent.
The " solution to the *dilema posed above lies i n the
hands of the President and the Congress: We can help by
_6_
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reducing our breadth of coverage -- by keying on the F:ost i; -
portan_t issues and cutting activities and area coverages which
do not contribute directly - to the resolution of Sze higL-yes`
or? tI pro le''s. It is the job CL the DCI to advise t'Ze
gcvern_..ent as to what constitutes a sufficiency of resources -?
in dollar terms, in terms of the systems the dollars ~ i 11
'.~
support, and most importantly in terms of major substantive*
need.
(4) Evaluation
Evaluation of the perforilance of the Intelligence Coin-
?':uni ty. is a relatively untapped ii eld. For vears evalua-
t eVe of forts ha*-e been made, within the CO n-tunity .itself ,
- but as "I have 'suggested above, we have not had a strong
standard of pre-established user require-r:ients against
which- 'to' measure ourselves.. As a consequence, measure
men ts. of effectiveness have usually been taken during or
following some -crisis which might or might not have been of
prior concern to policymakers. Our reviews under such -
circuins tances have been mixed. At the 'same 'tire, on such
"constants as SPIT verification and MBFR support we would
get high marks .? '
I have askezl rra Intelligence Community Staff to con-
centrate. 'heavily on the 'development of a method. to eval-=
uate our performance : I hoPe to establish -standards
and to have regular measurement of the 'effectiveness of :all-
aspects _ot the profession underlay within a year-
(5) Other 'In telligence~ -Activities
Foreign coun`erintelligence.activity is designed to pro-
tect the U.S.'. government and the private 'sector from penetra-
tion or manipulation by the 'intelligence services -of other
L
countries It is our defensive a mm, and in this respect
it is an important adjunct to the conduct 'of foreign policy-
In general, intelligence 'activ.ities in support of opera-
ti onal' riLL
litary forces' 'are -subject to direction from the -
Joint Chefs of Staff (JCS) and the Unified and Specified CoiZ-
man tiers in the field. The information collected by these ac-
tivities is of use mainly to the forces in the field. It
-7-
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updates their contingency planning for waran affects thei r
state Of readiness. There is some spin-offl value to foreign
nol_cy intelligence needs from L_ activit es, ho ever.
This is particularly true, for example, during negoti a-
tions for peace, for detente, and in the T'?S-R context- Data
,ro i ded by some basically force-re l ated systems becomes
oart o- a larger data base used by analysts who Pus L _urnish
back-ground to negotiators.
(6) 'Special rO
The cptologic programs of the various agencies are
coordinated by the.. National Security Agency (LISA) . Each of
the. military service cryp tologi c agencies receives -a budge t
Co support a progre ti :.thick it plate s an response in two sets
of guidances: - one essentially related to support of the .
operational -forces , - and the other. designed to satisfy "na-
tional"- needs The. Director of NSA i -responsible for tech---;
ni cal direction and support to the service 'cryptologic
national
f
s '
or
agencie
agencies,- for th tasking of those
level objectives; and for the production of cryptologic in-
telligence in support of national security and foreign.pol-
icy objectives:
ther advanced technological collecti Oz
l
r
; o
a
In gene
programs are rtaxtaged jointly by the DCI and the 'Secretary
concern for both 'substan-
i s
th
ere
of Defense. 1Vaturally
nstraints
'
tive require rents and resource co
Studies are r_ow unde?tray to determine the degree to
-
ible for intelligence=related technical
i t is poss
h
n ic ~,T
collection systers to support similar but non-intelligence
information needs :elsewhere in the government. In cite
past some systezras; such 'as the u-2 aircraft, have been
used to support snoYrpack studi es i n the American west and
to photograph hurricane, earthquake and flood damage for
national e-:terge?icy relief and econo_rnic planning purposes-.
(7)-.- Reports -arid -EstiTates =
Virtually all of the major questions -of concern to
American foreign policy today involve political, economic,
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military and other factors _ It is essential for good in-
telligance"assessments to reflect this variety. In the
oa , the ultimate analytical, medium was the National IP_-
telligence Estirttate: In recent years there have been a
variety o other NSC-inspired forms which also required
.-- e best analysis. In an effort to account for thi s change
and to make the intelligence p rocess which I described
earlier more responsive to policy-maker information requ? re-
metlts, I have recently established a new group of "Na-
tional Intellige-rice Officers" (NIOs)' for specific subject
areas. Their job "w- ll be to enlist all elements of the
Intelligence Community in the development of the best pos-
sible assessments of the intelligence questions facing the
gove?'iurtent. 1 have "instructed that Community reports and
bjective
estimates be ir_depe ndent of policy pressure and'.
in tone, and content. The' will also incorporata minority.
or adverse 'views when these exist.
I do not believe that agencies should handle research
and analysis-entirely apart from collection and operations,
or in ignorance of the pol icy formulation and implementation
process If anything, the ?interdeperiderice of policymaking,
analysis; and collection should be increased so that col-
lection and analysis -are-'focused more precisely on user
needs and profit more. from user experience. Foreign policy-
i
i
c env
ron-
and national security concerns arise in a dynam
ment -- one 'in 7?7hich 'collectors and decisionttakers are ac-
tive.' .To divorce 'analysis from this environ:tent-would re-~
it
i
i
i
s
ze
m
n
duce and slow 'its -lo;-7 of information and m
At the 'same time,' "control over the substantive
utility
.
content of. analytical responses to policy questions should
'riot be :ves tea in the ?policyrtiaker except with respect to sub-
stantive *requirements and the "timing and format of re-
sponses . From time *to time analysts remind policymakers
of this distinction.
(8) " Eriergisig Needs
Any answer to this question must, of courser be-given
in classified testimony. It is "clear, however, that the ?irz-
telli gence "questions facing our nation in the 70s are dif-
ferent from those 'of the more extreni_ 'days of the "Cold War-
I,-' needs are arising which require intelligence support
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i n the -fields of econo:ni cs,- narcotics,' and international ter-
rorism. These new "needs are reflected -in the -overall guid-
ance being. developed for the Community. -
(9) ' Oversight 'end _