COMMENTS ON INTELLIGENCE AND POLICYMAKING IN AN INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT BY WILLIAM J. BARNDS (NOVEMBER 18, 1974)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A000900160077-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 77
• Publication Date: December 18, 1974
• Content Type: MF

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16 December 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/IC
SUBJECT : Comments on Intelligence and Policymaking
in an Institutional Context by William J.
Barnds (November 18, 1974)
I
1. On the whole the paper is a very good primer on US
intelligence and its relationship to policymaking, although there
are a few parts that are out of date or wrong.
3. There are serious problems with the economic aspects
of the paper. I agree with the comments on this subject presented in
the memorandum from OER which I am sending along as a tab to this
memo.
4. Barnds could use a little education on the so-called
information explosion as regards his discussion beginning on the
bottom of page 5. Our study of the flow of information shows that
over the past few years the amount of paper which is disseminated
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to production analysts in CIA has not increased. The amount of
raw information collected by technical means has certainly
increased, and the burden has fallen primarily on the processors
of the raw take mainly from SIGINT and photographic collectors.
Although the flow of new information to the production analyst has
not grown, the inventory of information upon which he can draw
continues to increase at about a constant rate.
5. What follows are several specific comments or
suggestions on the text:
--The underlined statement at the bottom of page 7
dealing with the use of intelligence in planning and
decisionmaking would benefit from the addition of
the concept that intelligence is also used in the
implementation of decisions.
--I don't see any particular benefit from introducing
the archaic distinction between strategic and tactical
intelligence in the last paragraph on page 9.
--Barnds impressions of the relative importance of
various kinds of information to intelligence production
(beginning on the bottom of page 9) are quite different
from our statistical studies on the subject. This
question can be viewed from at least two different
perspectives: the relative volumes of information
received from various types of collection, or the
relative importance of various collection programs
to the production of finished intelligence. Furthermore,
I don't believe that Barnds discussion of sources makes
clear enough the important differences that exist among
the relative importance (or volume) with regard to country
or topics. Whether we should educate Barnds on this I
leave to you.
--On the top of page 14 Barnds says RADINT is a type
of ELINT. This is not true.
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--On page 17 he says that the intelligence services
concentrate largely on tactical intelligence matters
of interest to their particular service. Certainly
this is true in the field and with respect to technical
characteristics of weapon systems, but since the
creation of DIA. most of the intelligence work on
orders of battle, military posture, and the like is
done by DIA.
--The description of the contribution to national
current intelligence publications presented on the
bottom of page 17 is not as good as that presented
on the top of page 43.
--Perhaps some of the material in the OER memo
on briefing services to economic policymakers should
be added to the top of page 19.
--To characterize NR's role as managing the external
research program of the Intelligence Community is very
'misleading. At most, it surveys and monitors work
related to foreign affairs. Most of the external
intelligence research (measured in reports, manhours,
or money) of the CIA and DoD, especially on technical
and military subjects, is not even registered in INR's
reporting.
--I don't agree with Barnds characterization (page 26)
that there has been a trend toward increased emphasis
on current intelligence reporting and the downgrading of
longer-range analysis and estimates.
--I read the last third of page 29 as being Andy Marshall's
views. I would advise Barnds to investigate whether this
is a true reflection of what people really close to policy-
makers (e.g., NSC Staff people) think about these
generalizations.
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--In the middle of page 32, Barnds suggests that the
NSCIC might examine whether the Intelligence Community
is devoting the right percentage of its resources to various
topics. Your views on whether the NSCIC is the proper
forum for this matter might be helpful to Barnds.
STA
EDWARD W. PROCTOR
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Attachment:
OER Memorandum
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT Comments on Murphy Commission
Paper on Economic Intelligence
1. The summary, para. 9, does not provide a fair
description of how foreign economic policy is formulated
and coordinated. While it is essentially correct that
the process is relatively unstructured and still in a
state of flux, CIEP and the NSC do not dominate the
scene. The leading policymakers in the field of foreign
economic affairs are, in fact, the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Director of OMB, the Chairman of the
Council of Economic Advisers, and the Executive Director
of CIEP. This group meets daily as the Executive
Committee of the President's Economic Policy Board. All
of these' officials and their respective organizations
are free to, and do on a continuing basis, task the
intelligence community and CIA's Office of Economic
Research. Moreover, the recently established Economic
Intelligence Subcommittee of the National Security
Council Intelligence Committee -- chaired by an assistant
secretary from Treasury and with representation at this
same level from State, Commerce, Agriculture, Export-
Import Bank, STR, CEA, CIEP, NSC, and CIA -- is specifically
designed to provide a forum for economic intelligence
consumers to express their needs.
2. The fact that many departments with economic
policy responsibilities are not members of USIB does not
pose a barrier to intelligence support. CIA's Office of
Economic Research is tasked directly by consumers through-
out the Washington economic community and all members of
this community are represented as either members or asso-
ciate members on the Economic Intelligence Committee of
USIB. In addition, economic intelligence studies prepared
by CIA are given wide distribution to interested policy
officials and working-level analysts throughout Washington.
CIA economic analysts and managers as well as the National
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Intelligence Officer for Economics maintain extensive
contacts with policy officials to ensure that CIA's
product is responsive to consumer needs. The Office of
Economic Research also has two officers who daily brief
the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce,
the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, and
the Executive Director of CIEP on current economic
intelligence developments.
3. With respect to intelligence support of govern-
ment agencies responsible for licensing the export of
U.S. technology, CIA works closely with the Office of
Export Administration in the Department of Commerce.
CIA representatives participate as intelligence
consultants on all of the interagency committees that
deal with the problems of trade controls.
Acting Director
Economic Research
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