LETTER TO MR. FISHER HOWE(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A000900160083-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 83
• Publication Date: December 18, 1974
• Content Type: LETTER

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SCI/IC~74-2409
~~C 3s74
Mr. Fisher t~iwe
~1wtY Executive tNrector
ConmissiAn on the Organization of the
Governeent for the Cenduct of Foreign #'oligr
2425 M Stmt, N. ~I.
~tashin#~tsn, ~. C.
2tI506
Gear fisher:
In vier of our converxetlan on atY. 9 ~e~ber, I
think you and fran gay find the enclosed Papers useful.
~~ ~~~ s
Assoc ate Detnrty to the t1CI
for the Inteiifgence City
~nclosaras
Distribution:
0 - Adsee., w/encs
1 - AD/DCI/IC, w/o att
,~+I?-~ IC Registry, w/att
i - CS Chrono, w/att
1 - CS SUb~eCt, W/dtt
1 - 0 Chrono, w/dtt
DCI/ICS/CS
(12 Decem er
ST
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LYASi-IINGTO.`7, d.l.? L~7CJ
OGC 74-2285
4 December 1974
STAT
Enclosed are my comments and those of IV1r . Cary, the Agency's
Legislative Counsel, on your draft entitled "Legal Authority for the
Conduct and Control of Foreign Intelliger_ce Activities." You wiL note
that our corimants are quite general and deal with only what eve consider
to be the major issues in your paper. We appreciate the opport?: city to
preser_t our views and feel that your work on this subject is most
Slgt7.].f1Callt.
I understand that you will be in Washington on to December for a
meeting of the Commission and that you plan. to tall: to other Agency
officers on 1$December. If you have time, i would li':e to meet ~;~ith you
then .so ~v~ can discuss your paper in greater detail.
Sincerely,
John S ~ Warner
General Cour_sel
cc: OLC
IC
E
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Comr!ents by General COt1215?l zl-ic Le~i~latire
Gour_sel, CL ~ den ~ ~r c IerlSl#iil`:'E'.l~I
o_? tL?ansnation~l i2_~~__i f,en~~ l,e sa, uardod J~ ( ) _
7S?~_id2t2d Se2.1'.^..ti! ~,L'al'iaTitS Of COi22"tS Di COii.pEtt~Ilt }urISCi1CtLC?l;
~i }7atie-? of sta~Ida2-ds for forei =n ir_telli~er~ce
(b) e:ecu:_ve pro:ru-~~, _._. ____ ?~ .
collection; (c) legislatively mandated pl'ctection from up blic
disclosure, and/or crii.ilnal ScI~CtI.OnS fOr abuse of domestic,
transr_ational ox foreign iltelligence; or (d) legislatively
mandated stand=_rds fOr domestic collzction of forei ;n intelligence?
4. It car. be persuasively argued that present practices and procedures
concexnir_g domestic collection of foreign intelligence ar_d ~.ransnational
intelligence are bo'tli adequzte and lawful. See United States v. BLtenko,
4?~? F. 2d 5?3 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. (157c}. Suff_cient
star_dards and procedures, established tivithin the Executive b-ranch, alrezdy
exist. Involve~mer_t of the judiciary in. the propriety of determinations in
this area is unnecessary , un~var-ranted and unwise. If cla-rifica`c.ion of
procedures pertaining to what t_~e paper terms tran.snational ir_telli;ez3ee is
needed, trz;s would be more appxopriately accomplished by a specific l`TSC~
than by lejislation.
Issue L4: Should the Co:~-linission recommend neti=r legislative
authority for CL~ or other USIE agencies to collect, disseminate
and protect forei n intelli, e~ ?zce of com.:-ercia]. value?
5. The Natior_a1 Security Act of 197, as arrer_ded, does not. exclude
or prohibit the collection of commercial or economic intelligence. Indeed, the
collection of such inteiLgence -- critical in today's climate -- is ~?,ithin t_ue
a^.:blt Oi the Agency's mission. Intellige-n_ce of commercial or technological.
value is currently made available to the Departments of Commerce and
Treasury amor_g others. The Agency's concerr_ aoout their dissemi: anon
prac`ces pertail~s er_ly to p'ratection of intelligence sources and ; ethods.
Issue rlb: Should the Commisszon support enactment of
leislation to rp otect foreign intelligence sources and
rr,etiloca.s frcr_^_ un:~uthorized disclosure? [See Appzndi=~ J
o . It is encouraging to rote the paper`s support for legisla~ion to
prOtG'Ct i nielll~eT'_Ce SG111"CeS 2nCi FC'iPtl30d5 . T ;1e SL1ogeSTI022 Of an aYLaIyS1S OT_
t!Z=. ;' a: rCy~s propOSed lea~sljil0:1 l1?2d::"t ti?P First F~mend~?"~ent II'iay be
v_ ~-
~pj'ir'O.~' i~_~C.', but O~:?ZY 5~~~~ESi1U1IS SeET:; i0 1riC:~C:_'.`~ SO:Pc 7='IISCOiLCe~TJt10T?S
2_~.~OI;;E i:f?i SCGp~: O_ ~C'i,_ bl__ 1_ ~c ~.~ ?7 tC:e fi. Si, F~cCe, 1~ C:~JeS I70`L apT~:Oci
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Mat a:1y "freec:om Of t''ie pYtsS'~ 15SUZ5 t'~ e raked ~y ze jillil. I30i'fI t:Ie 1n~S,~C_
F;VO c'.I2d CYii Final prO~:iS30I7S of L'_^_t_. ~io0?nCj?lS ~-'op OS?~ 1o~1S13ilOI? 2p~1~% Gili j
~ ' ers0?"?5 '.vI?O 11aV? S1~L 2 flduCi3r~j' relatlOT25iLIp
to a lii:li+`.?d, i.2YY'Jce ~~~b'_ic
~_CC`SS to iilii.~;l~l,?2?1Ce ii?:Q-t;?~`~.iG'_~, Z.t?d cCCi'1cYi:i.Ed
declassific~ tio~. of p:lblic _Yeco~ ds by reform of the resgo?l-
sibility of the 1~1reCiOr of Central I~:te1_lger~ce to rotect
"sensitive intelligence sources as?d methods" but also to
r_:andate "declzssi`ication of such fo_ ei gn intelligence
informaton as is conslst:.nt UIi`~l7 these duties.' /See
~?ppendix 1, at pages AiQ-AT1~ ,
3. The Freedom of Irfo~-matior_ Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552, provides a
means ~vhe-reby individuals car_ seek to obtain intelligence information. A
recent amen dnent to the Act, over a Presider_tial veto, is likely to en'nance
public access to information and bring about f~.:.rther voluntary declassirica-
ti~n of r_~ar_y requested ir_telliger_ce documents. In addition, of course,
Executive-Order lIbSZ provides a"General declassification schedule fo-r all
0
classified materials. Thus, a proposal to sp~cirically mandate deelassitica-
tion cf ir_form2tion consistent L~Jith t_he statutory duty Of the Iairector of Cenft:al
Intelliger_ce to protect intelligence sources and methods does r_ot zpp~ar to be
~z~arrar_ted .
4. I`ot ma.r_y would argue ~vitr the statement that ~.?ajor tT.S. policy
decisions should be made only: after full, open, and irfcrr_-~ed debate. ~Io~vever,
ir_telligenee activities Car.1ZCt be conducted in a fishbowl. Proposals to increase
thz flow of information relatir_g ?o these policy decisions should therefore r_ot
focus upon CiA. Furthermore, it must be -recognized that there are ini:erent
dange-rs iii placing trle ultimate power to decide what inte'_Iigence information
will be disclosed ii-z u'~e i~.ands of a court, a body not attu_~ed to classificaticl~
co?~sidera~ons. This is especially true of foreigr_ intelligence raztte~.=s.
Additio~~ally, constitu`uonal questions r!ay be -raised by such attempts to
iorc e disclosure from the E.,ecu.tive i~~ this a~ ea .
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