SUMMARY MR. WILLIAM E. COLBY, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A001000050013-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2003
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: November 19, 1973
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Mr. William E Colby, Director of Central Intelligence 11/19/73
1. Introductory Remarks
Mr. Colby began his informal remarks by addressing the
dilemma of maintaining, secrecy in a free society: "we are
going to have to run an American intelligence service," but
it must be "different from others." It has no domestic re-
sponsibility, and it is more open than its counterparts in
Britain, France, Sweden, or anywhere else. Indeed, the
CIA's constant exposure in the press makes it difficult to
conduct liaison with foreign intelligence services and to
recruit agents. It can also %ffect our use of such technical
collection methods as cryptography and photography.
Colby then traced the history of intelligence in the
U.S. He pointed out that the government invariably con-
structed an intelligence system in wartime, then dissolved
i t a f terward s . Tt i_(-).-%k thc: adty ^nt of the Cold War to pro-
duce.a-peacetime intelligence apparatus. The National
Security Act of 1947 established the CIA and gave it the
responsibility to draw together information collected by other
services and Departments. In addition, the CIA was given
the authority to conduct certain services of common concern
and, as directed by the National Security Council, "other
functions related to intelligence", such as clandestine
collection operations abroad as well as paramilitary and
political operations.
According to Colby, intelligence has come of age but
must prove its usefulness in a period of detente and lessened
tensions overseas. He believes that intelligence has become
an essential part of the conduct of foreign policy but that
those in the intelligence business must work hard to make
the system work. Colby explained that his responsibility
for coordinating and managing the intelligence community
was important, but less so than his responsibility for pro-
ducing substantive intelligence... "to be able to inform the
President, the NSC, the appropriate committees of Congress
and so forth, of what is happening in the world." He
added that, if he could focus on the substance and get the
entire community also focussed on substantive questions,
he would be in the best position to allocate resources and
to measure the effectiveness--of different techniques of
collection, processing, and analysis.
~.r
Dept of State review(s) completed.
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NSC Referral Not Required
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Colby pointed out that the intelligence community must
develop a systematic way to evaluate the usefulness of its
products to its customers. He said that he would put his
major effort into identifying the key substantive problems
and evaluating how well the community handles them.
Colby added some general remarks about the entire in-
telligence process. Collection of information includes
listening to Radio Moscow, planting bugs, etc. Processing
the information is also very complicated, sometimes involving
highly technical work. "You really wouldn't believe what some
of those engineers can get out of small little squiggles that
come out of the airwaves." The last part of the process is
"the production or presentation problem... It doesn't do any
good for the intelligence community to know the answers and
even to write a very learned tome giving the answers, if the
tome is in a fashion that cannot be absorbed and actually
used by the fellows making the decisions."
II. General Discussion
a. The Reputation and Image of Inte-Lligence
"Chairman Murphy asked what was being done, or should
be done, to give the word "intelligence" a better reputa-
tion. Mr. Colby replied that a full scale public relations
campaign was not the answer. Rather the CIA should concen-
trate on doing its work well and, whenever possible, on
educating people about the real nature of. the intelligence
process.
Mr. Casey pointed out that the public should be told
about the importance of the research and analysis function
and about the number of Ph.D's and other specialists who
work on intelligence. Colby replied that the CIA en-
courages its personnel to belong to professional societies
and to attend conferences, and that it is moving in the
direction of producing more unclassified publications.
He added that the CIA should do more work in an unclassified
form.
b. Congressional Oversight and Substantive Briefings
Senator Mansfield asked Colby whether he favored
creation of a Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence
to throw a protective shield around the CIA and to keep
Congress informed about crisis situations.. Colby replied
that the CIA "has always taken the position that we will
handle our relations with Congress in any way that Congress
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wants us to." He later remarked that the Congressional
oversight committees have been very responsible and "have
been given the most sensitive kinds of information... We
have never had a leak from them."
Colby explained that the CIA handles its relationship
with Congress on three levels: unclassified briefings;
substantive briefings, with classified material, for
a number of committees and for individual members; and
a discussion of operational matters with the r_med
Services and Appropriations Committees of the House and
Senate. In the last few years of Senator Russell's rule
over the Armed Services Committee,.?Senator Mansfield and
two other members of the Foreign Relations Committee were
also.,invited to participate in the oversight hearings.
Dr. Abshire pointed out that there should be a better
system for giving substantive information to interested
members. Colby said that the CIA does brief individual
Congressmen and Senators upon request and that he had
committed himself in his confirmation hearing to be
even more responsive in this area. He said, "I have
some people looking now at a ,way to do this on a regular,
periodic basis... It will...push sore of this material
towards them that they really might not know they want
to know." Dr. Abshire suggested that, every six weeks,
intelligence briefers might give interested members of
Congress a general rundown of world events and stress
emerging problems. Colby said he would be delighted
with this approach.
Dr. Abshire then asked Colby for his views on
Senator Cooper's bill about National Intelligence Estimates
being made available to Congress. Colby. replied that
briefings of Congress are often based on NIE's, but that
he was concerned about the physical security of the NIE's
themselves and leery about sending NIE's to Congressional
staff assistants, who might be prone to leak intelligence
information. Colby was hesitant about absolute rules
in this regard and suggested that briefings be handled
orally whenever appropriate. He added, however, that the
CIA could adjust to any changes in Congressional procedures
on this matter.
c. The Relationship of Intelligence to Foreign Policy
Mr. Colby suggested that the CIA should maintain a
certain distance from the foreign policy process -- providing
assessments of foreign situations but not casting a vote
for a particular policy. Dr. Kissinger regularly requires
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an intelligence briefing before meetings of the Washington
Special Action Group. After that, Colby says no more.
Colby added that the President reads intelligence
daily briefs and other material. Furthermore, Colby can
see the President any time he wants-(as of November, he
had seen him on intelligence matters three or four times).
Dean Wilcox asked whether Colby received ample
reports on the discussions of the President and Dr.
Kissinger with high level foreign officials. Colby said
he personally is privy to the general line and must levy
requirements on the intelligence community without giving
any details.
d. Organization of the Intelligence Community
When asked about the extent of his own authority,
Mr. Colby described his role in the community. As DCI,
he chairs the U.S. Intelligence Board, the Intelligence.
Resources Advisory Committee, and various other committees
that pass on certain sensitive collection programs. Colby
also has the last word on National.Intelligence Estimates.
He is, in short, the President's principal intelligence
->advisor...the-only one who regularly attends meetings of
the various NSC subcommittees, the WASAG, the 40 Committee,
and the Cabinet. Colby is also Vice-Chairman of the NSC
Intelligence Committee, which is designed to solicit theSTAT
views of intelligence consumers.
Colby admitted that there was some overlap in functions,
but that this was often deliberate. Thus the CIA's
office of Strategic Research takes on independent look
at basic military questions. Furthermore, each agency or
Department head insists'on having his own intelligence
support. Said Colby, "when I go to the President with
an assessment of some new Soviet missile...I have to be
assured that I am right..-.--and not just parrot what a
particular agency says." There is also a distinction
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between national intelligence (in support of foreign policy)
and departmental intelligence (in support of individual
departments and agencies). DIA, for example, contributes
to national intelligence but also serves the Joint Chiefs
and the Secretary of Defense.
Colby pointed out that the total number of people in
the intelligence business is going down sharply and will
continue to do so. It has to because of sharp annual
increases in personnel costs.
Colby said it was useful to have analysts, collectors,
and operators all under one roof. He likes experts in
one field talking to experts in another, and not hiding
in their ivory towers. The National Intelligence Officers
(NIOts - successors to the Board of National Estimates)
cut across functional lines within the bureaucracy and
thus get the best brains working on any given problem.
The NIOs are real specialists in their fields (and not
generalists like the former Board of National Estimates).
When asked what organizational changes he would
recommend, Colby said that he would like the authority to
deter someone from getting sensitive information outathen
spilling it (e.g., the Mardetti/Marks Case). When asked
about the National Security Act of 1947, Colby recommended
that the word "foreign" be put before the word "intellige ee
so the public would be reassured about the limits of CIA TAT
authority.
STAT
SITAT
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STAT
g. Covert Action
Mr. Colby said that covert action overseas was a
valuable tool that had been at times overused. In the
1950's, for example, there was a "missionary feeling"
about these operations and a sense-that "we had to go
out and fight every fight around the world. Obviously
we have a different policy now, a much more reserved
policy.
On the subject of controls over covert action,
Colby said'that "we don't do this without getting very
specific instructions from the NSC," via the 40 Committee
(an interagency group chaired by Dr. Kissinger). If the
CIA is asked to carry out some covert action or believes
one should be carried out, it will write a paper describing
the problem -rd what needs to be done. This paper is
then circulated to the members of the 40 Committee, who
either get together to discuss it or sign off on the
program by telephone. It then goes to the President for
approval.
When asked whether Congress is'also informed, Colby
said that budgetary details are discussed with the appropria-
tions committees and general plans are discussed with the
Armed Services Committees. All significant operations
are described.
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i. Indo China in General
Senator Mansfield said that, in his opinion, the
best intelligence reports on Vietnam were furnished by
the CIA, and it was too bad that these reports were not
given proper attention by the administration.
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 Approved Fob a 09 4 j$ i? P $$A001000.050013~ V/ 73
November 7, 1973
The Honorable Robert D. Murphy, Chairman
Commission on the Organization of the Government
for the Conduct of Foreign Policy
2025 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20506
Dear Ambassador Murphy:
In response to your letter of October 15 I have de-
veloped the attached statement which provides an overall
response to the matters you suggested for coverage in my
presentation to the Commission in November. I developed
this in unclassified form, as I believed it the most useful
vehicle to stimulate future questions and thoughts by the
Commission members in the actual hearing. I am certainly
prepared to go into classified matters during the hearing
itself, or in any follow-up studies of more detail which might
be needed as you proceed toward your final report.
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'STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL 'INTELLIGENCE
First, let me confirm your assumption about what the
national intelligence program is. Our intelligence process
includes the collection and analysis of information in or-
der to produce what we call "finished intelligence." We
use overt, covert, technical, human, passive, and active
collectors. The information collected is then "processed"---
that 'is, it is-recorded, compared with other information,
and subjected to the appropriate techniques of scientific
examination such'as photographic interpretation, electronic
analysis,- and decryption. This "processing" of information
is followed by what we.call the "production" of "finished"
intelligence -- in the form of, reports, studies,' and estimates
which.".refle'dt the highest intellectual evaluation which
we can bring to bear upon all the bits and pieces of fact
and 'impression at .our disposal. The 'entire 'intelligence .
process, which '.I have described relates 'to 'fdrei:gn 'intelli,-
gerice sand counterintelligence, although a number of steps
in the- 'process 'obviously have 'to take place In the United
processing, and produc-
addition to collection,
States
' In
.
.
.
tion, .from timue Ito time CIA also conducts other activities
related to in.lligence'affecting the national security, as
directed by the National Security Council.
The current organization of the Intelligence.Community
is'-reflected in the President's directive 'of 5' November
1971. It called for the following:
-- That the Director of Central Intelligence ..(DCI)
provide 'leadership. to all foreign intelligence '
activities 'of the United States Government.
~--~ That there be established a National Security
Council Intelligence 'Committee (NSCIC) . * , The
purpose of the NSCIC is to give 'direction and
guidance'on national substantive intelligence
*Members area The Assistant to the President for
llationaZ Security Affairs (Chairman), the Under Secre-
tary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI.
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needs and to provide for the continuing evalua-
tion of intelligence products from the view-
point of the intelligence consumer.
-- That the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee
IP.AC be. 'formed.* This Committee is advisory
to the DCI in his management role.. It helps him
develop the annual National Foreign Intelligence
Program Budget Recommendations which 'are sent
by the DCI to the President--Recommendations
which'may concern any of the foreign intelligence
expenditures'of the United States Government.
-- That the United States intelligence Board .(USIB)**
be'reconstituted to include a representative
of the Secretary of the Treasury, and that it
continue'to advise and assist the DCI in his sub
stanti.ve'leadership role with respect to the 'In-
telligence 'Community .
Not addressed by that directive but continuing to operate
is'the'sd-called Forty Committee.'"* This body provides policy
guidance 'on activities' related to intelligence affecting the
national secutzity, as 'directed by the National Security Council.-
*Members are: the DCI (Chairman), and one senior repre-
sentative each from the Department of Defense, the Depart-
ment of State,' the office of Management and Budget, and
CIA.
**Members are: The DCI (Chairman); the DDCI;. the Director
of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, State Department;
the. Director of the National Security Agency (NSA); the
Director of the' Defense InteZZige,ice Agency (DIA.); repre-
sentatives of the Secretary of the Treasury, the' Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and the Atomic Energy Commission.
**.*Members are: The Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs (Chairman), the Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI.
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In his letter to me of 15 October, Chairman Murphy out-- .
lined a number of specific subjects which he wished me to ad-
dress in my statement and in follow-up studies of the Commis-
sion. I have generally keyed the' following remarks to the
numbered sections of that letter.
(]. ,) Authority
The. National Security Act of 1947, certain additional
legislation, and the National Security Council Directives
provided for in law are the authorities under which the
nationa:L intelligence program operates.-. The legislation
is -currently being re-evaluated by the 'Congres1 s, and it
may be 'that some 'modifications will be made. To the extent
that any changes further limit the national intelligence
activities -in which 'the DCI is interested to the field of
'foreign intelligence,' and to the. 'extent that they require
the-. reporting of foreign intelligence 'activities -on a
regular basis to certain members of the Congress, I. would
welcome them. The public should be as 'free 'as possible .
from concern about the operations of our national foreign
intelligence program,
The'NatiCna1 Security Council Directives whichI men-
tioned are :currently under evaluation to. determine whether
an unclassified version can be'writ.ten. This would help to
eliminate. 'an.y possible` misunderstanding about -the existence of
a "secret charter" for CIA or the Intelligence Community. At
the 'same 'time,: some 'classified directives will be necessary
to specifically- impleiierit the. unclassified guidance 'of tha
open directives
I do not view 'subordination to the NSC as 'different
from subordination to the President. The NSC historically,
has played different roles in foreign policy and national
security affairs. under different Presidents. But no Presi-
dent, in recent times has been willing to function without
access to good intelligence -- whether by direct contact
with 'appropriate agencies or through 'the 'NSC system.
The responsibilities of some of the agencies of the
Intelligence Community to produce both"departmental"
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and "national" intelligence are not in conflict. In fact,
they are mutually supporting. The military services, for
instance, have intelligence arms which provide the tactical
intelligence necessary to support-the operational forces.
They also contribute information and analysis to those in
the Community who work on "national" level problems. A
study is now underway to determine how these programs can
better support each other for both substantive benefit
and possible resource savings.
The DCI's responsibility to "protect intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure" is
basically a responsibility without authority. I do not
view it as giving any authority beyond the right to call
the attention of the appropriate prosecuting authority
to any cases of. unauthorized disclosure. In this regard
I confess-.-great concern. at the absence 'of any effective
statutes.-to prevent or punish'the unauthorized disclosure
of sensitive intelligence' matters. It was only by civil
action based upon his pre-employment secrecy agreement
that an ex-employee was prevented from revealing a number
of.-delicate matters in' a book which he had written. (U.S.
.vs.' Marchetti:, 466 F. 2d 1309, 1316). This decision is
being tested again.
Aside'from this particular weakness of the statutes,I
see 'no need for particular new authority to carry out an
effective 'intelligence 'program. The "services of common con-
cern mandate in' the current law is adequate.' though of course
there 'are always' minor negotiations between agencies about the
kind and quality of service to be performed.
You have asked whether section 102 (d) (5) of the Na-
tional Security Act, which provides that the CIA shall per-
form such other functions and duties. related to intelligence
affecting the national security as the NSC may from time to
time direct,. is too broad and open-ended. This is currently
being considered in Congress. I wculd offer that this pro-
vision has been used only when specifically directed by the-
NSC under Presidential authority, that every President
since 1947 has-used it, and that the shape of the world
today seems to require its use much less often than in the
more critical of the cold war years. I do not believe that
this weapon should be lightly discarded. from our national
arsenal.
Section 102 (e) of the 1947 Act, which gives the CIA the
right to see the foreign intelligence of all of the departments
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and agencies, is a key factor in molding a group of intelli-
gence agencies into a community. Without that right, there
could be no single source of intelligence advice which ac-
counted for the variety of available facts, and the policy-
maker would be buried in a confusion of uncorrelated- reports
and analyses about major problems and events.
(2) 'Requirements
The principal.custo?aer of our national. intelligence pro-
gram is, of course,'-the President. But his key advisors
and officers need also to be informed (i.e.', the 'Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs, the Secre-
taries of State, Defense, Treasury, and so on). ' Their re-
quirements area compilation both of their expressed needs
and of the Intelligence. Co;n.Tn.uni ty' s jud inaent about what
they might need.
There 'are 'a variety of techniques -for refining such re--
quirements The 'USIB and the DCI have 'established and con-
tinually review a formal list of relatively constant major
requirercients.- Crisis requirements are generally conveyed
to the proper action arm of the Cormunity as a result of my
participation in the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG)
which 'meets regularly and keeps' me informed of activities
Vw~ which' 'mi.ght - beriefit from intelligence 'support.
In non-crisis situations,- requirerrients for information
come to the Intelligence 'Community in a wide. variety of effec-
tive'but not necessarily orderly ways. On 'a daily basis,-
policy-oriented analysts are in contact with. intelligence '
analysts and make their needs known in that.context. Through
the ;requirements staffs-of each 'intelligence 'agency, collec-
tion components can be tasked. Formal requests- for specific
facts or analyses also come by letter or telephone from. USIB
.principals, Cabinet members,- and the 'NSC/National Security Ad-
visor level. . Policymaker feedback to, the Intelligence Corn--
-munity on intelligence 'problems below .the '.first level of
priority,.or in non-crisis situations'.gerierally does not
give a clear eriough signal about how much 'collection and
analytical effort the Intelligence Community should expend
on a specific subject. The Community tasks itself when this
is-the case.
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inflation; first in manpower.-costs, but in all other as
of our profession as well. The 'problem can be stated in~
this
way
.V nen to the Congress is -reviewed, 'however, by the Intelli-
gence Community (IC) Staff of the DCI. From IC staff sugges-
tions," ,IRA C deliberations,, and USIB .requirements, the DCI
formula i_e s his National Foreign Intelligence Programs Budget
Recommendations. -for the President.
The major resource problem facing the Comri
't
( ~) '(12) Performance and Resources', Budgets
The DCI has no authority to determine the budget and man-
power needs of the various agencies in the Intelligence Co-m-
munity. Each 'component goes through an independent program
and budget development process (in the case of State and DOD
intelligence 'program there are department-wide guidances and
constraints which apply apart from intelligence' considerations)
Each 'component has an independent review by the O vLB . Each
component receives from, the Congress an appropriation which
is under its 'full control.? The program proposed by each cor-
o t
a. assuming level' manpower, level program
size, and continued inflation, the 'resources 'for
intelligence would have to 'in:crease' 'by nearly :25
percent -by 1978.. This alternative would be unac-*
ceptable: 'to the Congress
b.. assuming level dollars, a level program.,
and inflation offset -by manpower reductions; a
'40. percent 'cut 'in 'ranpower would be required by
19 7,3 . The Col- imun.ity could not take 'such *a cut
and continue to meet its' obligations
c. assuming level dollars, level manpower,
and continued-inflation, there would have to be'a
drastic and unacceptable `cut in our investment in
technical systems for the future 'and in procuremexit.
The solution to the 'dilema posed above lies' in the
hands of the President and the Congress.' We can help by
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lwo~ reducing our breadth of coverage -- by keying on the most im-
portant issues and cutting activities and area coverages which
do not contribute directly to the resolution of the highest
priority problems. It is the job of the DCI to advise the
government as to what constitutes a sufficiency of resources -
in dollar terms, in terms of the systems the dollars will
support, and most importantly in terms of major substantive
need.
(4) Evaluation
Evaluation of the performance of the Intelligence Com-
rounity. is a relatively untapped field. For years evalua-
tive efforts. have been: made. within the Cortimunity itself,
but as I have 'suggested above, we have not had a strong
standard of pre.'-established user requirements against
which 'to measure ourselves. As a consequence, measure- .
'merits. of effectiveness have usually been taken during or
following some crisis which might or might not have been of
prior concern to policymakers..our reviews under such
circumstances 'have been mixed. At the same time, on such
"constants"- as SALT verification and Iv FR support we would
get high marks
I have asked my Intelligence Community Staff to corn--
ceritrate. 'heavily on the. 'development of a method. to eval~
uate our performance: I hope to establish 'standards
and to have regular measurement of the effectiveness 'of all
..aspects of the profession underway within a year:
(5) ' 'Other Intelligence Activities
Foreign counterintelligence activity is designed to pro-
tect the U.S.' government and the private sector from penetra-
tion or manipulation by the 'intelligence 'services 'of other
countries(. It is our defensive 'arm, and in this' respect
it is-an important adjunct to the conduct-of foreign policy-
In general, intelligence 'activities in support of opera-
tional' military forces are-'subject to direction from the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Unified and Specified Com-
manders in the field. The 'information collected by these ac-
tivities is of use mainly to the forces in the field. It
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updates their contingency planning for war and affects their
state of readiness. There is some spin-off value to foreign
Policy intelligence needs from these activities, ho:wrever.
This is particularly true, for example,' during negotia-
tions for peace, for detente, and, in the NBFR context. Data
provided by some basically force-related systems becomes
part of a larger data base used by analysts who must furnish
background to negotiators.
(6) Sp~e'ci'ai: kroc rams
The. cryptologic programs of the 'various agencies are
coordinated by the National Security Agency (NSA) . Each of
the- military service_ -cryptologic agencies receives: 'a budget
to support a program. which it plans in response in two sets
of guidances'. ?-- one 'essentially related to support of the
operational forces,' and the other, designed to satisfy "na-
tional` needs., .' The. Director of NSA is'-responsible for tech--;
nical direction and support to the service ~cryptologic
agencies,- for the. tasking of those 'agencies for national
level ob jedtived.,' and for the production of cryptologic in-
telligence 'in support of national security and foreign pol-
icy objectives.
In general,' other advanced technological collection
programs are 'managed jointly by the DC1' and the 'Secretary
of Defense. Naturally there is concern for both 'substan-
tive requuirer i,ents and resource 'constraints.
Studies are now underway to determine the 'degree to
which- It is possible- 'for intelligence-related technical
collection systems to support similar but non-intelligence
information needs --elsewhere in the' government. In the
past some systems, such 'as the U-2 aircraft, have be6n
used to support snowpack studies in the American west and
to photograph hurricane,' earthquake and flood damage far-
national emergency relief and economic planning purposes.
(7) : Reports 'and Estimates
Virtually all of the major questions of concern to
American foreign policy today involve political, economic,.
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military and other factors. It is essential for good in-
telligence'assessments to reflect this variety. In the
past, the ultimate analytical medium was the National In-
telligence Estimate. In recent years there have been a
variety of other NSC-inspired forms which 'also required
the best analysis. in an effort to account for this change
and to make the intelligence process which I described '
earlier more responsive to policymaker information require-
ments,, I have recently established a new group of "Na-
tional :Intelligence Officers" (NIOs )' for specific subject
areas. Their job 'w:ill be 'to enlist all elements of the
Intelligence Community in the development of the best pos-
sible assessments of the 'intelligence questions facing the
government. I have 'instructed that Community reports and
estimates be independent of policy pressure and- objective
in tone and content. They will also incorporate minority
or adverse views when these exist.
I do not believe that agencies should handle research
and analysis-entirely apart from collection and operations,
or in ignorance of-the policy formulation and implementation
process,.* If anything, the 'interdependence of policymaking,.
analysis, and collection should be increased so that col-*
lection and analysis'are'focused more precisely on user
needs and profit more from user experience. Foreign policy
and national security concerns arise "in a dynamic environ-
? mer t _ ~-- one 'in which 'collectors and decisionmakers are ac-
tive." To divorce 'analysis 'from this environment-would re?
duce and slow its flow of information and minimize its
utility., At the same 'time,' .control over the substantive
content of analytical responses to policy questions should
not be :vested in the policymaker except with, respect to. sub-
stantive 'requirements and the timing and format of re-
sponse.s. From time 'to time analysts remind policymakers
-of this distinction.
8.} Emerging Needs
Any answer to this question must, of course, be given
in classified testimony. It is 'clear, however, that the'in-
telligen.ce 'questions facing our nation in the 70s are dif-
ferent from those of the more extreme 'days of the Cold War.
New needs are arising which require intelligence support
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in the fields of econoraics narcotics,- and international ter-
rorism. These new 'needs are reflected in the overall guid-
ance being. developed for the Community.
. . . ...... ...... ....
(9) Oversight and .Accountability
The DCI is responsible in detail to the authority of
four committees of the Congress -- the two Armed Serviced
Committees and the two Appropriations Committees -- under
the rules established in each House. In addition, he:'pro-
vides' regular substantive briefings-to a number of other
committees In the Executive `Branch,. he 'is responsible 'for
substantive 'matters to the National Security Council and
the president,. and for budget and management matters to
OMB and the President. He is responsive to the 'subs antive
requirements. of the. 'Secretaries of State,' Defense, and other
agencies with :foreign intelligence interest, and the activi-
'ties: 'of the. 'Intelligence 'Community are subj'edt to their
evaluation. All activities in which 'CIA and the: -rest of
the 'Intelligence 'Community. engage are 'subject to review, ."in
detail by. -the 'Prestderit's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board. '
As . the. 'chairman of the Armed Services Committee said
in 1949 wwhen i.e reported to the Senate the Central Intelli-
gence :Agency. Tct,'
"O.urs wi'.ZZ perhaps be: the only Government
having a taw providing for such an activity.
Other governmen.ts simply appropriate a disguised
sum of money:, without any authority of law,. to
handle the 'mattes through, some government .offi--
cial.' We 'are writing the. whole law out..-...We
are not doing what 'other' countries' do. We are
throwing every possible democratic safeguard-
around it as we. go, along.."
In testimony during my confirmation hearings,' I indi-
cated that it is 'for.the 'Congress to decide whether there
should be.'legislative changes in the ..authorities.'over for-.
eign intelligence activities. It is a persistent dilemma
for the 'governmerit to determine 'to what degree the public
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should be informed about intelligence activities. The pol-
icy of the Intelligence Community is to be as forthcoming
as possible while protecting the basic elements of secrecy
which are necessary if we are to be effective.
(10) Controls
All intelligence operations stem from a variety of au-
thorities. The'NSC's "Forty Committee" controls foreign
operations.. By Presidential letter the Ambassador has
overall- authority over operations in the country to which
he is posted. He is -kept aware of operational activity in
his country.
(1_1)' Peers rate?l
There are'no cross-Community personnel procedures over
which*t.he'DCI has control. The individual components of the
Community. establish their own professional criteria. In
testimony at my confirmation hearings I-included a report on
CIA's recruitment activity (see pages 185-186). While im-
provements can be made,' there are no special legislative
needs at this time.'
In answer to the second part of your question, let me
1 say thait I believe that compartmentation is not a serious
restraint upon the 'exchange of ideas within the, 'Intelligence
Community. Usually "compartments" are 'used to protect'
sources and methods rather than facts -themselves. Need-to-
know is the guiding factor in the protection of information.
Those who work'on a problem at the highest level have ready
acces's to information they' need. They must only show that
the kind of information which they seek is key to their an-
alysis, and that their project will be used by a policymak-
ing level sufficiently high 'to warrant the 'inclusion of com-
partmented intelligence.
(13Y Overseas Establishment
Control and coordination of foreign intelligence activi-
ties overseas is not a serious problem. The Ambassador is
charged. by the President to direct and coordinate.'the'activi-
ties and operations 'of all elements at his mission. He 'ac-
tively directs overt information collection and reporting
activities. Subject to his authority, the senior CIA
_11--
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representative in a foreign post is responsible for the
coordination of other foreign intelligence activities
there..
With very rare exception, close and effective relation-
ships exist between all members of the country team. If
there are problems which are particularly difficult to re-
solve in the field-they are worked out in Washington. The
question of effectiveness in the field is under constant
evaluation at the agency, Community, and user level. Coord-
ination, however, is not a major problem with respect to
the effectiveness of foreign intelligence activities.
-12-
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Distribution: .
0&2-Addressee
1 - ASD(I)
1 - State / INR
1-NSC
DCI
DDCI
ER
D/PPB
DDS&T
DDI
DDO
DDM&S
D/DCI/IC
PD/DCI/IC
D/MPRRG/IC
IC Registry
MPRRG
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 F Ref55 p 31p ,_ .
ApprovedCG~}v1,v11 1~2 u~v~Fit`~ 9OW13-9
FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY
2025 M STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
October 15, 1973
Mr. William J. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
Headquarters, CIA
McLean, Virginia 22101
As Congressman Zablocki?'and Dean Wilcox indicated in
their recent conversation with you, the Commission is looking
forward to meeting with you in November. In preparing for
the meeting, the Commission believes it would be especially
useful to have a statement setting forth the views of the
intelligence community which the members can study in advance
and thus make the discussion more profitable. We hope that
you will be able to assemble such a statement by the first
week in November to permit its distribution to Commission
members for the meeting on November 19.
To be most helpful, the statement should address all of
the major elements of the national intelligence effort in
support of the conduct of foreign policy. For this purpose,
it is assumed --- and the Commission would like confirmation
or correction of the assumption -- that this effort involves
the -political, economic, sociological, scientific and
military affairs of foreign states, organizations and
individuals and that it consists essentially of three
principal elements:
(a) the collection, evaluation and dissemination
of information from the following sources:
- open published materials
- overt reporting
- clandestine reporting
- communications and electronic penetration
advanced technological systems
(b) the preparation through research and analysis,
and the dissemination, of studies, reports and
estimates
) covert action in support of policy decisions
For each of these elements, the Commission requests an outline
of the present organization and procedures particularly in
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Mr. William J. Colby
respect to coordination among agencies, an identification
of the principal obstacles to improved performance, and
recommendations for appropriate action.
We hope the statement, in addressing the foregoing matters,
will touch upon the following questions in addition to any
others which you consider to be of importance:
(1) Authority. Has the National Security Act of 1947
proved to be sufficiently sound as a basic authority
for the Director of Central Intelligence to fulfill
his role both witr:,respect to the coordination of
intelligence for national security and for the
management of the Central Intelligence Agency?
In particular,
a. what are the practical effects of subordination
to the National Security Council rather than
directly to the President or a department of
the government? Should the system be altered?
b. can the responsibilities "to correlate and
evaluate intelligence relating to the national
security" be adequately delineated from the
responsibilities of departments and other
agencies "to collect, evaluate, correlate
and disseminate departmental intelligence"?
(Section 102(d)(3))
c. has the responsibility "to protect intelligence
sources" proved workable and useful? (Section
102(d)(3))
d. is the mandate to perform "such additional
services of common concern" (Section 102(d)(14))
adequate to the needs of the intelligence
community and the-government as a whole? Is
the mandate to perform "such other functions
and duties" (Section 102(d)(5)) too broad and
open-ended?
e. has the authority to inspect intelligence of
the departments and agencies (Section 102(e))
proved adequate and useful?
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 Mr. William J. Colby Page 3
(2) Requirements. Who are the principal users of
intelligence in support of the conduct of
foreign policy? What is the present organization
and procedure for the preparation and updating
of their requirements to guide the intelligence
effort? Are such requirements adequate and
what recommendations for improvement are suggested?
How are requirements handled in crisis situations,
and how can that process be improved?
(3) Performance and Resources. In the fulfillment of
these requirement;s.,is the most effective and
efficient use made of the resources of the
intelligence community? What is the basis for
.arriving at the optimum level of such resources
and their distribution within the community in
order to give the most effective support? What
resource requirements are anticipated for the
future?
(1+) Evaluation. How effective is the method of evaluating
the performance of the intelligence effort in ful-
filling the requirements in support of the conduct
of foreign policy? What changes are recommended
in this regard?
(5) Other Intelligence Activities.. What is the relation-
ship of intelligence activities in support of
military-tactical, counterintelligence, or other
purposes to the intelligence activities in support
of foreign policy?
(6) Special Programs. What is the institutional
mechanism for coordinating cryptological programs
among the several agencies? For managing the
advanced technological collection programs?
How does this tie in with other government
programs using similarly advanced technological
systems? Is there a way to economize in this
field and perhaps even produce a more effective
government-wide effort?
(7) Reports and Estimates. What is the need of the
government for coordinated reports and estimates?
How are such reports and estimates now produced?
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Mr. William J. Colby Page 14
What means are employed to assure that the
analyses are forthright, objective, useful to
policy makers at all levels of the government,
and as free as possible of institutional
biases? Should the research and analytical
functions be handled in agencies other than
those responsible for collection and operations?
For policy formulation and implementation?
(8) Emerging Needs. How is the mission of the
intelligence community changing in the 1970s?
What steps are being taken to adapt the
intelligence effort to new demands for support
in such fields as international trade, energy
matters, the environment, and narcotics control?
(9) Oversight and Accountability. What are the
institutional controls through which the
Executive Branch and Congress oversee activities
of the intelligence community? Are they effective
in making the intelligence community realistically
responsive to government authorities? Does the
public have a right to be better informed about
the intelligence business; what improvements should
be 'made in the process of accountability of
intelligence activities to the public?
(10) Controls. In respect to the activities and
operations of intelligence which may impinge upon
the conduct of foreign policy or in respect to
operations designed to support specific policies,
what is the system of guidance and control and
is it fully adequate? What is done to assure
that approving officials are fully aware of the
possible consequences of a given action? What
improvements in the sy-stem are recommended?
(1:1) Personnel. Are the personnel procedures for CIA
and other agencies in the intelligence community
soundly based to recruit and sustain the professional
corps necessary for the best intelligence support
of the conduct of foreign policy? What steps are
being taken throughout the community to mitigate
the adverse effects of compartmentalization arising
from security requirements in order to achieve
greater cross-fertilization of ideas and personnel?
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(12) Budgets. To what extent does the DCl have the
authority to determine or otherwise oversee
the budget and manpower needs of the various
agencies in the intelligence community? Should
he have greater authority in this regard? Are
the-present budget resources of the several
components of the intelligence community
adequate, excessive or insufficient for their
contributions to the intelligence effort in
support of the conduct of foreign policy?
(13) Overseas Establishment. What are the problems
of control, coordination, and communications in
overseas establishments as they pertain to
intelligence? How can these establishments be
made more effective and efficient?
The Commission is aware that a comprehensive response to
these questions could lead to a most exhaustive study and
a very lengthy report. We are hopeful, however, that while
giving, full attention to the important implications of the
questions, you can in your report identify and emphasize the
most important elements in our inquiry.
A copy of this letter is going to the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Defense and the President's Special
Assistant for-National Security Affairs, as members of the
National Security Council, with the request that they offer
whatever co ,ents they can on the foregoing questions to
assist the Commission in its study.
The Commission is most appreciative of your personal
assistance and thatof other components of the intelligence
community in the fulfillment of our.tasks.
Cordially yours,
Robert D. Murphy
Chairman
cc: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The President's Special Assistant
for National Security Affairs
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TAB
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 Co ,:~ ;o n.\ T E O G Ai'i z ; { o, ?f i'~ 1t~1-C:l :~.:C ( f
Fes:: 7f i: Q DI ..~ ~~ 1~ , p~` ..-Y
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2025 M S CPC' T, P.. 1.
'!AS11P1 C., D.C. 20505
- , D.P E
The. Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972 (P.L. 92-352,
u1-y 13, 1972) established a point PresiC?m ia1-Cron c ssio a st y
commission to submit to the Congress and, the President findings and
="#Commendatior s "to Provide a more effective system for tf1e form u1ation
and implementation of the Nation's foreign policy."
In describing the duties of the' Commission the law states that
the Commission Shall? study and investigate the organization, methods
of operation, and poviers of all departments, agencies, independent estab-
lisC ments, and instrumental des of the United States Government
Da ticipating in the formulation and implementation of United States foreign.
polio f." in Carrying out its responsibilities, the Commission may rake
recommendations with respect to the reorganization- of the departments and
2. ncies, more effective arrangements between executive branch and
Congress, improved procedures among departments and ag~ n_cies , the
abolition, of services, activities and functions not necessary to the of iciest
con duct of foreign policy, and "ot1her measures to, promote peace, economy,
efficiency and improved administration of foreign policy
The report of the Commission, which'is'to be submitted to the
President and the Congress by June 30, 1975, may include "proposed
constitutional amendments, legislation, and administrative action conside_-red
app- opriate in carrying out its duties." ' The Commission, in per forming
its responsibilities, is authorized to hold hearings, subpoena vritresses
and secure directly information from. ; any executive d.eoa tmvnt or agency.
J . f1 f- O MEMBERS
The Commission is composed of twelve members, four each
L 1 1 ! of the ; T?C' . of t~ T
e C d J
e~ rit. 'o_ L]ei ~Lc'.~, ~tL of Gi ^.~'. C::.?'I.:sue,
,._ d t e Preside LT. The Ito:?'bars are:
.1.H :T~1\.~~:~:~tBLt O E 1 T' D. MUR =1 ~' - ~.7 i?.,~
C,'7_'i! iwg Gl~tis 1ntF__ na_'0:1_'_1
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 DR. DAVID M. ABSIII E
A roved For eeQQ3E0#1a8y, JApfp~I~pi$glf~01, ~3440013-9
l,i '~.~~ V.L J.._c_l?:r 1.. tt 11 Lt* i :l : c_..
Ceo ;ot.In Uni ers tJ
r:: AttvS I O\
President
to the President
White House
THE HO `; ORABLE WILLIAM, i .. CASEY
EX- Im. Bank
ML it , S . C E-IARLES W. E G_JEHARD , JR
.z I Far Hills; New Jersey
MR. AP.E:-,D D . LUBBERS
President, Grand Valley State College
Allendale, Michigan
IN-111. FRANK G. P. h cGLLNN
Executive Vice President
Fidelity Bank
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
THE HONORABLE Peter Frelinghuysen
House of Representatives
THE HONORABLE MIKE MANSFIELD
United States Senate
DR. STANLEY P. WAGNER
President, East Central State College
Ada, Oklahoma
TLTE HONORABLE CLEMENT J. ZABLOCM
House of Representatives
CO J^ .USSIO `I STAFF
.C. 1 S O Z~'-ive Direc`oa- of ts,a Commission- and
F I ?-,,. T WILCOX is the E_? Fcul T
rrn :- ?.7 t
nto-
--iaLy r Executive Director tox . Fo m4_ Y Soa ILILT ,I_ A\ I B.
_
i; one Deputy
JR. , is General Counsel to the Commission. The Corti nission offices
locat-ed at 2025 Street, N. ''l . , W%Tashington, D.C. 20506. Tel- 'hone
1, 1%73
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 Approved For Release 2003/04/18 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000050013-9
Murphy Commission Subcommittee on Intelligence:
Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, Chairman
Dr. David M. Abshire
Representative Peter Frelinghuysen (R-N.J.)
Mr. Arend D. Lubbers
William J. Casey
Commission Staff dealing with intelligence:
Dean Francis O. Wilcox
Mr. Fisher Howe
Mr. Thomas Reckford
Intelligence Analytical Issue Papers: Dr. William Harris, Direct
#11 Intelligence Functions. This paper will define the
.intelligence functions, stress the limits of the intelligence
mission, and link alternative conceptions of management
responsibility and functions. The paper will discuss the
roles and relationships of the DCI, the NSC, and policy
makers.
Status: Draft nearing completion.
Author: William J. Barnds, i n STAT
the Office of National Estimates. Currently with the
Council on Foreign Relations.
#2 Intelligence and Policymaking in the Institutional Con-
text. A detailed paper relating the concepts of intelligence
and the broad organizational and procedural alternatives
(addressed in Paper #1) to the institutional mechanisms
and practices of the Intelligence Community. It will
focus closely on the relationships between intelligence
producers and consumers.
Status: Draft outline approved, interviews to be
completed by 15 October, paper due no later than l November.
Author: William J. Barnds
#3 Innovation in Intelligence Production. Part I: Will
summarize prior work on probabilistic forecasting and scor-
ing techniques to evaluate intelligence products and fore-
caster performance. Part II: Will discuss new fields for
intelligence research and consider new consumers for in-
telligence support.
Status: Both drafts completed.
Authors: Part I: Clinton W. Kelly III of Decisions
and Designs, Inc., McLean, Va. Part II: Colonel Frank
L. Schaf, US Army Ret., presently a consultant to John
Thro at INR. Neither author has sought interviews at CIA.
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Murphy Commission Subcommittees:
International Economics: Senator James Pearson, Chairman
William J. Casey
Mrs. Charles.Englehard, Jr.
Congress:
Public Policy:
Senator Mike Mansfield, Chairman
Mrs. Anne Armstrong ?
Dr. Stanley P. Wagner
Representative Clement Zablocki
Representative Zablocki, Chairman
David M. Abshire
Frank C.P. McGlinn
National Security and Ambassador Robert Murphy, Chairman
Intelligence: Representative Peter Frelinghuysen
Arend D. Lubbers
David M. Abshire
William J. Casey
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`4. Authority for the Conduct and Management of Foreign
Intelligence. Will discuss the constitutional and statutory
base for foreign intelligence with explicit reference to
the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA Act of 1949,'
and the NSCIDs. Will suggest alternative approaches and
discuss the.pros and cons of recommending statutory reforms.
Status: Draft nearing completion, due 15 October.
Author: Dr. William It. Harris, RAND Corporation,
>anta Monica. Former consultant to Andy Marshall on the
NSC Staff, participant in preparing the Lindsay Report,
#5 Intelligence Resource Management. Paper discusses
not only the efficient allocation of resources but also
the capacity of the DCI and others to make appropriate
decisions and to manage resources appropriated to other
agencies. Will focus on the roles of the Secretary of -
Defense, the DCI, OMB, IRAC, the Intelligence Community
Staff, PFIAB, and the Congress. Will discuss alternative
techniques for the budgetary review of intelligence
activities.
Status: Draft completed.
Author: Robert Macy, with the Bureau of the Budget
until 1962 Since that time has worked
as a consultant to a number of government agencies and
with the UN both domestically and abroad.
#6 Clandestine Operations and Covert Action. To discuss
the pros and cons of maintaining a capability for covert
action and the criteria that ought to govern its use.
Will address problems of command and control inherent.
in highly compartmented operations, and will examine
carefully the review process of the 40 Committee and other
oversight groups.
Status: Draft due on October 15.
Author: Taylor G. Belcher,'former US Ambassador to
Cyprus and Peru. In addition, Chester Cooper, of the
Council of Foreign Relations, will do a think piece on
the same topic.
All Source Study: Kent Crane, Project Director
A limited access report of analysis, without recom- STAT
mendation, of past s idies on the intelligence Community. STAT
Status: Draft due on 1 November.
Author: J. J. Hitchcock,
a consultant with INR. Kent Crane
who has served on the staff of former Vice President Agnew
and is currently the Administrative Assistant-to Congressman
Peter Frelinghuysen.
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i.~.I~ECE RELATED STUDIES AUTHOR
a Intelligence Analytical Issue Papers, William R. Harris, Director
ff1 Intallinanra Fllnrf;nnc
-f II11~111 J. I)QIIIU.
STAT
STATUS
STATINTL STATINTL _
Has Seen: Colby, Carver,
Ernst, Knoche,
0
#2 Intelligence and Policymaking in the
Institutional Context
William J. Barnds
Duckett,
Same as above
Proctor, Lehman,
STATINTL
STATINTL
#3 Innovation in Intelligence Production Clinton W. Kelly Ill No contact
Frank Schaf , Robert Young
Thomas A. Brown, Comment
#4 Authority for the Conduct and William R. Harris
Management of Foreign Intelligence John Elliff, Comment
STATINTL STATINTL
STATINTL
Has Seen: Cary, Warner Angleton,
John Warner, Comment
STATINTL
STATINTL
#5 Intelligence Resource Management Robert M. Macy Has Seen: Colby, Graham,
TATINTL
#6 Clandestine Operations and Covert Action Ambassador Taylor Belcher
Chef Cooper
0 All Source Study, Kent Crane, Intelligence Project Director
All Source Survey
J.J. Hitchcock To See: STATINTL
Kent Crane Has Shen:
_1 Nelson, Clarke,
n__________ r___ fl_I____ nnnn.n w/wn _ fm r,r,r,nneenw w nn nnnw nnnnennwn
Has Seen: Blee,
II
Blee,
STATINTL
STATINTL
Reviewing studies.