CONVERSATION WITH WILLIAM BARNDS, MURPHY COMMISSION, ON 10 OCTOBER 1974, AT 1615 HOURS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A001000080021-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: October 31, 1974
• Content Type: MFR

Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000080021-7
31 October 1974
SUBJECT Conversation with William Barnds,
Murphy Commission, on 10 October
1974, at 1 615 Hours
1. Bill Barnda arrived late and tired for his conversation
.riling the USIB/IRAC structure. Consequently the discussion
a brief (20 minutes) and quite general in nature. We went over
e list of USIB and IRAC subordinate committees and touched on
the requirements problem and the DC's desires to improve the
mechanism relating requirements to resources, to the final intelli-
gence product. I commented on a number of changes which have
taken place, or were in train, regarding the HSC, the Watch
Committee, the Security Committee, and the SIC. We discussed
briefly the tasking procedures for USIB Committees.
2. When Bill left he said that he might wish to came back and
got a bit more detail on some of the subjects which had been
discussed.
STATINTL
Executive Secretary, USIB /IRAC
cc:
STATINTL Mrs.
ii.0
STAT USIB / IRAC /S:BAL
Distribution:
Original USIB/IRAC Memo for Record File
STATI TL LAI Mrs. I IC Staff
1 USIB -D-26. 3 /Murphy Commission
Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000080021-7
 Approved For Release 2006/0 .Nir W1h-RDP OIA61I33AO01000080021-7
DCI/IC 74-2355
22 October 1974
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence
William J. Barnds, Murphy Commission
C Staff
DATE: October 21, 1974
1. Mr. Colby and Mr. Barnds met for approximately
40 minutes and discussed four general topics (itemized below)
introduced by Mr. Barnds. The atmosphere was cordial and
relaxed. Mr. Barnds did not take notes.
2. Guidance and Feedback: Mr. Barnds asked whether
Mr. Colby felt policymakerswere sufficiently responsive in pro-
viding guidance and reactions. Mr. Colby remarked that in the
real world policymakers are extremely busy and do not have time
to sit down and produce report cards for the intelligence community.
He said that the consumer is used to a high standard of quality
and doesn't feel the need to comment on what is regarded as a
satisfactory norm. He pointed out that Secretary Kissinger called
for intelligence briefings at all major policy meetings. On the
subject of formal guidance, the Director outlined the KIQ/KEP process
and said that the main effort is to get policymakers to sign off on
the KIQs so that they will think about the issues and so that the
DCI can establish a baseline for how well the intelligence community
is responding to these questions. The Director also discussed the
NSCIC and his hope that this mechanism will be increasingly active.
He noted that consumer influence is likely to come largely from
informal channels, particularly through himself and the NIO
mechanism. Mr. Colby said he believes that cross-channel communication
is improving as the essentially vertical hierarchies of the intelligence
community learn to talk to one another. He pointed out that the NIO
system is not a command channel. It reflects the DCI's effort to
tell program managers what is important not how to manage their
separate organizations.
3. Economic Intelligence: Mr. Barnds outlined the problems
of establishing the boundaries of what should be collected in this
field, who should analyze it, and how non-USIB agencies tap into the
Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000080021-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000080021-7
INTERNAL USE ONLY
system. Mr. Colby pointed out the difficulties confronted by
'intelligence organizations which have information that would be
valuable to US business and the national economy, but which cannot
favor one US business over another. He remarked that this is a
dilemma that he has yet to solve. Mr. Colby explained that
non-USIB agencies can task the intelligence community directly or
through the Requirements Advisory Board. He said that a major
problem is that every agency has its own economic shop and that
'here is no central point to bring the research and analysis
together. He said that the NIO for economics is working on this
issue.
4. Organization of the CIA for Clandestine Activities:
Mr. Barnds said that clandestine activity is based on the assumption
that secrecy can be maintained, which may no longer be a safe
assumption, particularly with the divergence of views--both public
and in government--on US foreign policy activites. He pointed out
that clandestine activity, particularly covert action, is going
to be a highly controversial matter for some time and that the
Commission will be paying particular attention tothis issue. He
iindicated that he understood the impracticability of attempting
to set up two competing DDOs that would focus respectively on
clandestine intelligence gathering and on covert action. He asked
whether it might not be practical, however, to separate certain
deep cover covert action efforts.
Mr. Colby responded by pointing out that the trend in
the Agency is in the opposite direction, and that the experience
of the Bay of Pigs has taught us that it is important to have senior
analytical officers review proposed covert action plans before they
are submitted to the Forty Committee. He said that efforts to
separate portions of the DDO have proved unworkable in the past and
moreover would sacrifice the valuable interrelationship that officers
in the field must have if operations are to succeed at all. Mr. Colby
also noted that cover arrangements remain a problem, but are really
more a problem in the US than overseas where foreigners don't much
care since they view all US officials as reporters for the USG.
The Director outlined the normal working of an overseas station
and emphasized that it would not be possible for a station to separate
its functions into categories such as liaison or recruitment. All
officers should be able to do all tasks, and flaps do not result
when their work is done well. He said that professionalism is
increasing and that this is the best safeguard the community has
for its intelligence operations. The Director also discussed attempts
to misuse the Agency and his belief that any improper requests would
Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000080021-7
INTERNAL USE ONLY
 Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000080021-7
INTERNAL USE ONLY
meet with complete employee rejection, which he applauded. He
brought up his Sources and Methods legislative package and
explained the need for such a program, particularly following the
Agee and Marchetti cases. Mr. Colby reviewed the types of briefing
he provides for Congress and said that while he does not volunteer
the names of sources, he would give any information requested by
the Agency oversight committees.
5. Management Responsibilities: Mr. Barnds and Mr. Colby
briefly discussed the DCI's budget review of other agencies'
intelligence programs. Mr. Colby said he could identify questions
and make recommendations on budget questions, but could not force
other agencies to follow his guidance. Mr. Barnds asked what areas
of the community seem to be weakest, and Mr. Colby responded that
-inequalities in personnel grade levels have adversely affected soSATINTL
agencies.
Coordination Staff/Secretariat
DCI/IC/CS/
Distribution:
1 - PC I
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - DUO
1 - IC Reg
I M) c 5ron
Orig - CS subj
Approved For Release 2006/0 f'IVPIA-F P
W1133A001000080021-7
 Approved For Release 200
.PIA-RDP80 M 01133AO01000080021-7
IX I/IC 74-2331
i October 197
OP CONVERSATION
dward Proctor, Deputy Director for
intelligerigg
rr _ W113 8a' e s Murphy Comission Staff
Imunitv
O
C
Zr te131. toe
Staff
DATE
mbar 1974
ids discussed a n er of
d r
.
1, Proctor an
Mr .
issues conoorning the production of finished intelligence
and its general relevance to the policymaker.
asked `. ProCtort~ views a$I'. the general
noted that ~- much i~'~e
DDI in recent emphasis is now placed on ensuring that we know for whom we
are writing and why. This involves trying
much fe+ffifta4: from the consumer ~~ possible, particularly
thstl"'!'~ spo i'l8'.YCR?-
t~ on-routine ' production* In the ME.
itical concern
zees to key consumers was a cr
rting
They also discussed finished intelligence repo frOIR
the rule of O ins '
other agaencies, part
3C$ and the various sc cesr
Kr Bond reviewed the new has
a
the *
--- --
on economic reporting a n
in '+ers t; vn either o or of value to ?motor descrlbc chat
d
z
time - a bu$=eese~s abroa
- _t s k ^*% Uv tho AronaY and by 0
it >being aane '.i r W1,111
concerned ve~ent agencies, and he sairlorityeitem~
intelligence is likely to r n a high-p
98
r take 'UP the u30 ",WV
producing offices. . Proctor said that as far as
Mr. srnds suggested that the c issJon is likely
p.' arq 1tt ing the DDO away
,
25X1
Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000080021-7
cir-7 T
tit ti
 Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000080021-7
on serned that was going In precisely the wrong
instead attention ought to be foeused on
talked about the role
s in leading both the
asked about the
ntelligenee producing offices
s. They also diecus*ed the UST
indicated that the is ,litter
se co wittees has proved valuable over
?octor explained briefly the now NIO system
ip between the Me and the D1l
, Mr. ? otor pointed out that he felt
developing, closer relations between producers and clandestine
collectors, particlarly in some areas of political reporting.
e
repre
the yea
which was very general in nature and were phi ..ossophisel the
substantive. He did not got into matters that were beyond
the charter of the Commission.
does not by per their efforts.
6. Mr. sands did not take notes during
that the organization of the F. telligesee C unity or any
of the AlSe cy t a or'porisents was really far less important
than the aotiYation of the people in the system. Good
people would producer good work no ttor what the ? r e,izatior
and it is only to be hoped that the organizational system
25X1A
25X
1A
CONCUR;
P 1 OCT 1974
SECnET
ation
f, Sway
at
Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000080021-7
 Approved For Release 2006/0 1q : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000080021-7
25X1A
PCI/IC/CS/S s (10/1/74)
DistributiC"n:
D/DCI/IC
-- AD/DCI/IC
- SDI
1 -- CS Sub j
1 -- CS chronn
1
Irono
1 IC Re@.'atry
5 T oci iii 4
Approved For Release 2006102110t CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000080021-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000080021-7
Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000080021-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80M01133A001000080021-7
I;.'T L~: CC: ;CE ANJ) GLTCYI?AKIj,G IN till IN3TITU`I'Ii A C0i':i' :XT
Wil l i ra m J. Barnds
i. The R z % T?;aterial of Inbe1J.i~,ence :='roductio.i
A. The methods of collection and the importance of dif :orent
sources of information relative to different areas and. issues
1. Open material in the public domain
2. Official reporting
3. Clandestine ropor.tin?_-
4. Communications intelligence (CC _,.rp
5. .rlectronic into ll?e' INT' & RADINT)
? trap iic intelligence
B. The potential and limitations of each type
II. The Structure and Output of the Production Units
A. The processing; and. transmission of the information collected
to analysts and to policymakors
B. The organization of the intelligence community for production
of finished intelligence
1. CIA--the Directorate of Intelligence
--the Directorate of Science Technology
--the National Intelligence Officers
2. State--the Bureau of Intelligence Research (INR)
3. Defense--the Defense Intelligence urgency (DIA)
--the National Security Agency (Nw )
--the intelligence arms of the military services
4. AEC, 'I P1311 and Treasury
(This section will include conira(_3r.ts on their rosconsibilies
and functioii s, publications, ewe strent-ths and ,?reaknesses)
III. The Role of Intelligence in the FolicymakinE Process
r1. The functions of intelligence
1. departing facts e:c:d trends to alert policyrnaker< to problem
2. Estimating developments to reduce uncertainties and risks
3. Evaluating the effects of alternative U.o. policies
4. Verifying compliance with agreement, (and judgin when
-
verifxcetion is and is not possible)
Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80M01133A001000080021-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80M01133A001000080021-7
B. Differing Views of the intelligence off'ice-policymaker relatie
1. The arms--length approach shi
2. The continuing contact approach
C. The tasks of the intelligence officers
1. Guid.ing the collector
2. :peeping attuned to the con-,cern-Ls of the pol'icynuaker
3. Producing high quality and objective intelligence
4. Convoying finished intelligence in a persuasive manner
D. The tasks of the policymokers
1. Providing guidance on. the type of intelligence needed
2. Keeping intelligence officers informed: of U.S. actions
and. policies under consideration
3. Conveying evaluations of the intelligence received
E. Organizational Structures and iN othods of Operations
-the interplay of man, facts, ideas, and institutions
IV. Kay- Issues in the TntelJ_i~,-ence-"'olicyLrnakin Relationshi?p
A. Guiding and evaluatia the performance of U.S. er,ba.: ss>i..s
e.~
B. Coordination and competition in reportiii': and analysis
C. The strengths and weaknesses of t e I1C system
B. An evaluation of the USIB system
E. Economic intollis once support for U.S. forei?n economic policy
F. Guidance by the ?-policymakers--inatitutio ,,,l arreng.;enionts
and. ad hoc procedures
G. J valuating the into lli ;once prod.uct--pro,.ress and. problems
FJ l((~' ~ILC I~
Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80M01133A001000080021-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000080021-7
1.C_2.1
1 October 1974
IOEA DUM 4MATIO
PARTICIPANTS; r. Edward proctor, Deputy Director for
intelligence
C scion Staff
telligen Ce un t,
September 19T4
1. Mr. Proctor and Mr. Iarnds diseussod
ues concerning the production of finished in
and its general relevance to the policy er. Mr. Bids
asked Mr. Procter's views or the general tree s within the
D1: in recent years, and Mr. Proctor noted that much more
~ is now placed on ensuring that we know for whom we
area writing and why. This involves trying to maintain as
much feedback from the consumer as possible, particularly on
non-routine production. Mr. Proctor basised that responsive--
leo discussed finished lutelligence reportin
to key consumers was a critical concern in the I.
else, particularly the role of DIA
lowed the no
basis
d the sensitivity of intelligence
or of value to multi-national corpora
abroad. Mr. Procter described w
Id both by the Agency and by other
Vern ent agencies, and he said that economic
not is lamely to rem in a high--priority it* =.
3. Mr. aarnds suggested that the Cc isston is li el.:
again: to take up the old notion of splitting the DDO away
from the producing offices. Mr. Proctor said that as far
25X1
touus services.
Approved For Release 2006/02/10 & F 8OM01133AO01000080021-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP8OM01133AO01000080021-7
he was concerned that was going in precisely the wrong
direction and that instead attention ought to be focused on
developing closer relations between producers and clandestine
collectors, particularly in some areas of political reporting.
4. Mr. Barnds and Mr. Proctor talked about the role
the Director of Central Intelligence in leading both the
Agency and the Community. Mr. Barnds asked about the
ent of contact between the intelligence producing offices
and various military services. They also discussed the USIB
Coimcittees,, and Mr. Proctor indicated that the .litter
representation on those cozsi.ttees has proved valuable over
the years. Mr. Proctor explained briefly the new NWE3 system
and the relationship between the NICe and the DDI.
In closing, dir. Proctor pointed out that he felt
he organization of the Intelligence Community or any
ney's components was really far less Important
would produce goad work no matter what the organisation,
is only to be hoped that the organizational system
activation of the people in the system. good
does not hamper their efforts.
6. Mr. Barnes did not take notes during the meeting,
which was very general, in nature and more philosophical than
substantive. Be did not get into matters that were beyond
the charter of the Commission.
25X1A
Coordinat
CONCUR:
1 OCT 1y74
Staff/Secretariat
1.s
Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA=RDP80M01133A001000080021-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/10 CIA7RDP80M01133AO01000080021-7
DCI/IC/CS/S is (10/1/714)
Distribution: -
0 - D/DCI/IC.
1 - AD/DCI/IC
1 - DDI
1 - CS sub j
~, - CS chrono
1hrono
1 - IC Registry
Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000080021-7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000080021-7
Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000080021-7
 Tiff-INhllflAl USE ONLY
Approved F U6B / - 0 1 33A001000080021-7
DCI/IC 74-2329
30 September 1974
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: Mr. George Carver, D/DCI/NIO
hNN-111151
Mr. William Barnds, Murphy Commission
DATE : September 9, 1974
C Staff
1. Mr. Carver and Mr. Barnds had a general discussion of recent
trends in intelligence production, with particular reference to the
new estimating procedures embodied in the NIO concept. They discussed
the background of the abolition of the Board of National Estimates,
and the benefits the new system is intended to provide.
2. Mr. Barnds was particularly interested in determining how
Mr. Carver and the NIOs went about keeping in touch with policymakers
and the topics that are of current concern to them. He was interested
in the feedback intelligence producers receive from the consumer. Mr.
Carver assured him that this was a subject of continuing concern to
the Community, and to the NIOs in particular. He mentioned that it
was important to remember that while the NIOs attempted to identify
policy needs, they did not serve as policy advocates. They also
discussed the NIOs' roles in the KIQ/KEP process and in the evaluation
of information collected against substantive questions.
3. Mr. Barnds did not press for any specific information on
contacts between intelligence producers and consumers nor did he
focus on any particular substantive issue. The discussion was largely
philosophical. Mr. Barnds did not take notes and neither did he
stray into areas that could in any way be considered beyond the
Coordination Staff/Secretariat
CONCUR:
eo ge Carver, Jr.
D/DCI/NIO
Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000080021-7
Ai 1TATI'E-INTERNAL. ICE Q#% 11
I.
25X1A
 Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000080021-7
DCI/I 1) saw
Distri~ utiuti o
0 - D/DCI/IC
6' 1 - AD/DCI/IC
1 - D/DCI/NI0
1 - CS Subj.
1 - CS Ch ro
11 _ rono
egistry
(30 Sept 74)
Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000080021-7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000080021-7
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000080021-7
 Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000080021-7
23 September 1974
My conversation on 10 September with Bill Barnes, an
old friend and colleague for many years, was a general dis-
cussion of the problems involved in the kind of study he is
working on arising from my own experience in 1968 when I co-
edited the book, The President and the Management of National
Security.
Beyond that, we discussed mainly the differences
between the present system of producing national intelli-
gence and that in effect under the Board of National Estimates. STATINTL
National Intelligence Officer
for Western Europe
Approved For Release 2006/02/10 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000080021-7