MURPHY COMMISSION STUDY ON US POLICY TOWARD INDIA AND PAKISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A001000080051-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 4, 2005
• Sequence Number: 51
• Publication Date: December 30, 1974
• Content Type: NOTES

2bocl - ~1- 7 L-jA
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30 December 1974
Note for the DDI
SUBJECT: Murphy Commission Study on US Policy
Toward India and Pakistan
1. The attached tome is the product of the studies
done by and under Professors Rudolph for the Murphy Com-
mission. Rudolph sent me a copy, stating that "comments
are most welcome". I do not propose to make,any.
2. The present document consists of an 81-page study
by the Rudolphs themselves, done in the finest style of
political science, plus a series of separate, more factual,
studios by other academics. A short section on "intelligence"
begins on p. 18 of the Rudolphs' own paper. More or loss
incidental references to intelligence matters appear in
the section on "coordination as centralization", p. 30ff.,
including quotations that are claimed to be st.iLemonLs meclc~
by Mr. Helms in WSAG meetings. We did not furnish any
.uatorial of this kind; I assume it comes from NSC file:,.
3. The Rudolph:,' paper is basically an attack on
Kissinger, his outlook, which is described as " lobal
parochialism", and the way he does business. I _j 25X1
tells me it has raised hackles at State, and can see why.
I do not see any "problems" for us here, however.
4. The Agency so far has also had contact of some kind
with three of the authors of the individual studies included
in the Rudolphs' document. They are Messrs. Stephen P. Cohen,
Philip Oldenberg, and Robert Rich. Their contributions are
marked with a check in the table of contents.
5. I am also attaching some informal comment from
I I As he notes, we would like to have the "big
ack, if oossibl_e_
Bill Parmenter
DDOCI
Attachments: a/s
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 L)U l PProved For Release 2005/03/24: CIA-RDP80MQ1133A001000080051-4
0 & 1 /att
25X1 1 IC Staff w/R. Cook's paper att. only
1 DDOCI Chrono w/R. Cook's paper att. only:Also MComm.file
25X1 DDI:OCI:WPARMENTER:da:'I27Dec74
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 Approved For Release 2005/03/24: CIA-RDP80M01133AO0100008e05?er 2 7., 19 7I
Some Though-:;s on "The Coordination of Complexity in aouth Asia."
1. I've glanced through the first 181 pages of this document and found them
rather interesting. he "studies," beginning on page 82, were more factual
than the report at the beginning of the book by the hud,lphs and, consequently,,
made for more exciting reading. Almost made me nostalgic for the excitement
of 1971 in SOA. The Hudolphs, in turn, took me back far beyond 1971 -- to
about 1947 and Pot Sci 201. You might try this on your zither: "1'he diffi-
culties that arise from synchronic and from diachronic time al-e better man-
aged if cosmological pluralism as a world view and insulation and decentraliza-
tion as forms of organizational structure and relationships are preferred to
cosmological monism and centralization." -- p. 22.
2. The reports that I read are aimed primarily at reviewing and analyzing
foriign policy planning toward South Asia as it existed in 1971 and recom-
mending changes in those procedures. State and DOD are treated in considerable
detail out, appropriately, CIA is given peripheral treatment.
3. 1 found no serious factual errors as regards CIA or the intelligence cow-
munity. I am puzzled by Badalph's statement on pale 32 that Helms, at a ;gild
me ting on. -L 11ecomber, referred to "four small" airfields when discussing the
t.--vets of the Pak air at-pack the preceding day. Our djit 'ep of
quoted, without dispute, ::r6, dandhits charge that eighi,
irfi ds had been attacked. ( I no longer have the draft briefing for ti.e
T?:3AG meeting for the 1}th. )
would. a1.so di.s,)ute :tudalph's statement or the same page that ''Al'ter the
fact, CIA analysts wond )rod whether Pakistan esc .laced hostilities from one;
local to the international level to save a deteriorating situation by bringing
in thud powers or to win a decisive military victory from which to bargain,"
We concluded from the beginning of the attack that it was designed to bring
other powers or the UN into the act. In a special report for Kissinger, dated
6 December, 30A branch examined in detail the start of the war and concludes
that Pakistan eeca3,ed hostilities on that date, not in an attempt to gain a
quick victory, but in order to force the issue before the UN.
r'ina.lly, Oldenburg, on paves 170-172, writes of "weathervaiing" -- slanting
analysis to meet the preferences of the top loaders, I can't speak for DI-.A or
1N F, but as far as OCI is concerned~we never slanted our reports in 1971 to
conform with what we knew to be the biases at 1660 Pennsylvania Avenue.
All of the above is of little import, of course, but I include it to
keep the record straight.
4. This report is of sufficient interest that I would hope that the bra oil
might eventually reco~ve a copy for retention.
Uhlze d rapt 1,!ZA 0CI
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