LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR THE CONDUCT AND CONTROL OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

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CIA-RDP80M01133A001000090001-8
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November 22, 1974
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Approve Rte L G1. Release 2004/03/26: CIA-RDP80MO1133AO01 :o LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR THE CONDUCT AND CONTROL STAT OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES A Commentary on the Summary of Issues Prepared by William R. Harris fo" the r-)mmission on the Organi:~w io~i of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy John T. Elliff STAT November 22, 197L Views expressed are solely those of the author, and should not be construed as representing views of the Commission or its staff. OGC Has Reviewed Dept of State review(s) completed. NSC Referral Not Required Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000090001-8 Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01133A001000090001-8 LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR THE CONDUCT AND CONTROL OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES - A COMMENTARY by John T. Elliff Part I FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW The paper prepared by Mr. Harris is one of the most important and perceptive contributions to the study of foreign intelligence activities in recent years. It strikes the right overall balance between recognition of the nation's intelligence needs and concern for public confidence in the responsible exercise of power. With some modifications, it should be endorsed and published by the Commission. Its analysis and evaluation of the issues would help improve public and Congressional understanding; and its recommendations would, if implemented, strengthen and clarify the legal framework for foreign intelligence activities. Some of the proposals are likely to arouse controversy because they place legislative limits on executive power. Nevertheless, the proposed limits do not seem unduly restrictive in a nation seeking to re-establish the rule of law as a constraint against abuses of authority. The recommendations may, in some instances, be too permissive with regard to possible infringements of the legal rights of United States citizens. This applies to Issues #2, #3, #7, and #16. Moreover, the paper does not devote sufficient attention to the need to define more clearly the statutory prohibition against the Central Intelligence Agency having "police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions." Ph.D., Harvard University, 1968; Associate Professor of Politics,. Brandeis University; consultant to the Senate Subcommittee on F.B.I. Oversight and to the National Commission for the Review of Federal and State Laws on Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance; consultant to the Police Foundation for the project, "An Analysis and Evaluatiion of the Internal. Security Intelligence Operations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation." Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M0l133A001000090001-8 Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80MO1133AO01000090001-8 -2- There is no clear delimitation of functions between the counter-espionage branches of the foreign intelligence agencies and the F.B.I. which has been directed by Presidential order to "take charge of investigative work in matters relating to espionage."1 A recently published Justice Department memorandum indicates that the F.B.I. is "normally not involved" in the investigation of matters covered by Paragraph 5, National Security Council Intelligence Directive Number it unless the inquiry is focused "within the F.B.I."2 One former intelligence agency official has described the reluctance of counter--espionage specialists to bring in the F.B.I. because Bureau officials are viewed as "publicity-conscious" and "handicapped by all the rules of evidence."3 The proposal for an additional ninth National Security Council I ntclligcncs Directive to govern domestic collection of foreign intelligence might address this.problem. (See p. 7.) Rather than attempt to draft such a directive, the Commission should recommend that the President and Congress re-affirm the F.B.I.,'s authority as the agency primarily responsible for "internal security functions." There are indications that the F.B.I.'s Intelligence Division - Counterintelli- gence Branch is developing, in the post-Hoover era, a more sophisticated understanding of the specialized techniques required for successful counter- espionage work. 1 Directive issued by President Roosevelt on September 6, 1939, reissued by President Roosevelt January 8, 1943 and reaffirmed by President Truman on July 24, 1950- 2 Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Subject: Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information to the Press, May 9, 1962. 3 M. Copeland, Without Cloak or. Danger: The Truth About the New Espionage, 182-183 (1974). Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP8OMOl133AOO1000090001-8 Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01133A001000090001-8 -3- Issue #1: The Commission should in its Report to the President and the Congress reaffirm the fundamental importance of compliance with the laws of the United States in the conduct of intelligence in support of foreign policy. Compliance with the law contributes to the effectiveness of American foreign policy because public confidence in the institutions of government is thereby sustained. Law is perhaps the most valuable resource for maintaining the legitimacy of public policy in the United States. Conversely, disregard of the law can undermine support for vital national security programs, especially in the intelligence field. Government under law is also the bond which holds together the domestic social fabric.I On at least three recent occasions, one or more foreign intelligence agencies have engaged in conduct of questionable legality. In 1970 the entire foreign intelligence community endorsed the surreptitious entry and illegal mail intercept features of the so-called "Huston plan." The C.I.A. provided Improper assistance to the White House "plumbers" unit in 1971. And in 1972 high C.I.A? officials seemed initially willing to request that the F.B.I. curtail its investigation of Watergate. Reaffirmation of the need to comply with law would strengthen the capacity of intelligence professionals to resist lawless external pressures. The law should be viewed as protecting legitimate intelligence functions, rather than as an obstacle to be circumvented in pursuit of the national interest. 1 "Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be subjected to. the same rules of conduct that are d.ommands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipotent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by Its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy." Justice Louis D. Brandeis, in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), dissenting opinion. Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M0l133A0010G0090001-8 Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000090001-8 _4 The issue of the overall legality of foreign intelligence functions delegated under the National Security Act of 1947 is reviewed effectively by Mr. Harris. The language and intent of the Act, plus annual ratification by Congress through post-briefing budget authorizations, constitute sufficient legislative authorization for covert intelligence actions. Wise policy may dictate more precise legislative standards, but the constitutional require- ments of the separation of powers are satisfied.) There is greater doubt as to the constitutionality of the provisions of the Central Intelligence Agency-Act of 1,949 which exempt the C.I.A. from normal controls over expenditures.2 As noted by Mr. Harris (Issue #14), the courts have declined to consider this issue in a taxpayer's suit. However, the constitutional principle of full disclosure should be given great weight in any consideration of legislative oversight procedures. From time to time it is asserted that there are exclusive Presidential powers to collect foreign intelligence. Mr. Harris properly rejects this conception (Issue #3, note 19) and recognizes that these powers may be shared by the legislative and executive branches.3 The National Security Act of 1947 is, of course, a prime example of this sharing of authority' 1 "When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum. . . Justice Robert H. Jackson, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), concurring opinion. 2 Article I, Section 9, of the Constitution provides: "No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time." 3 "When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb. . . ." Justice Jackson, P. cit. Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000090001-8 Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M0l133A001000090001-8 -5- Part 2 AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE Issue #2: The Commission should be concerned with standards and procedures for the lawful. collection and safeguarding of foreign intelligence acquired within the United States, or concerning U.S. citizens or corporations abroad. The main reason for concern is the public disclosure that the so-called "Huston plan" in 1970 included the following relevant provisions: --"coverage by N.S.A. of the communications of U.S. citizens using international facilities;-" --int;ensified F.B.I. electronic surveillance coverage "of foreign nationals and diplomatic establishments in the United States of interest to the intelligence community;" --relaxation of restrictions on illegal covert mail coverage "on selected targets of priority foreign intelligence. . .interes,;" --illegal surreptitious entry "to permit procurement of vitally needed foreign cryptographic material;" --increased "C.I.A. coverage of American students (and others) traveling or living abroad."1 Mr. Harris contends that the first item is a legitimate measure to obtain transnati.onal. intelligence received in or transmitted from the United States. He rightly observes that safeguards are needed to insure that such intelligence collection does not infringe the legal rights of citizens. Similar interests are at stake with regard to F.B.I. electronic surveillance within the United States and C.I.A. coverage of citizens overseas. 1 "operational Restraints on Intelligence Collection," in Statement of Information, Book VII--Fart 1, White House Surveillance Activities and CamTy.iirn Activi.tics. Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. , 2d Sess. (May-June, 197)4), pp. 418-442. Approved For Release 2004/03126 : CIA-RDP80M0l133A001000090001-8 Approved For Release 2004/03/26: CIA-RDP80M01133A001000090001- 76 2_-3 COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY 2025 M STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506 ORGANIZATION AND ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY: CONGRESSIONAL PERCEPTIONS R. Roger Majak Congressional Specialist TABLE 1 Role of Individual Members . 'Dissatisfied Role of Congress Satisfied Dissatisfied 68.2% 31.8% (15) (9) 8.6% 91.4% (5) (53) n = 94 Role of Con.crress Role of Executive Overall View of Re- - - - - cent Foreign Policy Satisfied Dissatisfied Satisfied Dissatisfied Support 26% 74% 68.2% 31.8% (13) (37) (30) (14) Oppose 11.1% 88.9% 22.2% 77.8% (1) (8) n = 59 (2) (7) n = 53 NOTE: The survey data reported are based on a preliminary and partial analysis and should be.-regarded, therefore, as tentative and subject to revision. Interpretations of findings and any views and conclusions. expressed are those of the author alone, and not-of-.any other member of the Commission staff, or of the Commission on the Organization of Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy or any of its member Commissioners, Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000090001-8 Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000090001-8 -6- Issue #3: Domestic collection of foreign intelligence or trans- national intelligence should as noted below be safeguarded by (a) legislatively mandated search warrants of court: of competent jurisdiction; (b) executive promulgation of standards for foreign intelligence collection; (c) legislatively mandated protection from public disclosure, and/or criminal sanctions for abuse of domestic, transnational, or foreign intelligence; and (d) legislatively mandated standards for domestic collection of foreign intelligence. The Commission should express its concern in this area by-recommending that the President and the Congress give careful consideration to the adoption of legislation and the issuance of executive orders which address the following problems. First, any interception of oral or wire communications within the United States or directed at U.S. citizens overseas must satisfy the "search and seizure" standards of the Fourth Amendment. Wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping are the most intrustive forms of surveillance, recording as tney ao every casual remark and expression. This writer believes that a prior judicial warrant procedure can be devised which would not unduly interfere with vital foreign intelligence collection within the United States or regarding U.S. citizens overseas.1 Second, assuming that burglaries and illegal opening of the mails are no longer seriously considered, other forms of intelligence gathering within the United States do not raise major constitutional problems. Wireless electronic communications may be intercepted; informants may be recruited; undercover agents may be planted; public record information may be compiled; interviews may be conducted. These and similar techniques may be used at home or abroad without infringing the rights of citizens subject to legitimate inquiry. J. Elliff, "Electronic Surveillance for National Security," New York L,w Journal, June 5-7, 197. Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000090001-8 Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000090001-8 _7_ However, wise policy may dictate careful limits on such measures when they are aimed at U.S. citizens. The ban on the C.I.A. performing "internal security functions" is one example. Thus, Mr. Harris properly suggests the need for a ninth National Security Council Intelligence Directive delimiting the scope and procedures for domestic collection of foreign intelligence. Third, legislation may be required to establish legal safeguards against the misuse of intelligence information. Recent investigations have discovered examples of the partisan use of national security intelligence information obtained through electronic surveillance.1 Intelligence gathered for legitimate purposes should be protected by statute from use for any other purpose unrelated to national security. i ourt h . in hi S disc>>ci nn of 1 ssue #1? (note 48), Mr. Harris cites proposed amendments to the National Security Act of 1947 to authorize various domestic functions of the C.I.A. in support of its foreign intelligence mission. Such legislation would be unnecessary if the additional NSCID discussed above were issued. 1 "In or about January 1970 H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman permitted the information contained in one of the summaries of the 1969-71 wiretaps to be used in connLction with political action in opposition to persons critical of the Administration's Vietnam policy." Statement of Information, op. cit., at p. 20. Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000090001-8 Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000090001-8 Issue #4: The Commission should not recommend new legislative authority for CIA or other USIB agencies to collect, disseminate and protect foreign intelligence of commercial value. Although this subject is not explicitly mentioned in the National Security Act of 1917, it might come within the broad interpretation of "other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security." Any dissemination of information to private firmlw should occur only when necessary to protect the national security, not simply to grant commercial benefits to U.S. firms. Issue #5 -- see discussion of Issue #15. Issue #6: The Commission should recommend legislative authorization and confirmation by advice and consent of the Senate of the Defense lnte'l ligence Agency and lt;_ Director. Such action would improve the conditions for legislative oversight. It should be noted that the position of F.B.I. Director was not made subject to confirmation by the Senate until 1968. Care should be taken not to derogate the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence. Issue #7: The Commission should not recommend supplemental legis- lative authorization of the National Security Agency, but should recommend confirmation of its Director by advice and consent of the Senate. Senate confirmation of the Director is again valuable to insure adequate responsibility to the Congress. However, the need for supplemental legisla- tive authorization is not clearly demonstrated, since there are serious doubts as to whether transnational intelligence regarding U.S. citizens and corporate activity abroad should be gathered through the communications interception facilities of N.S.A. Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000090001-8 Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01133A001000090001-8 -9- The fact that N.S.A. has vast capabilities should not be conclusive of the issue. The risks of collecting and storing extensive data about U.S. citizens are demonstrated by the F.B.I.'s past difficulties. An agency's power is magnified and the temptation to misuse the information correspondingly increases. The fears engendered may be more damaging to the nation's political life than the actual abuses of power. There should be no signi- ficant exception +.o the principle that the primary subjects 'of foreign intelligence agency interest are foreign nations and their citizens, not U.S. citizens or corporations. Overt information-gathering methods must suffice to supply data about American business firms. Secret surveillance, no matter how "non-intrusive," has no place in dealing with the lawful .tipcs if cl Lzenti at h:_mc The present policies of N.S.A., as described by Mr. Harris, appear to circumscribe these dangers properly. Unavoidable interceptions of U.S. citizen and corporate communications abroad should not contribute to the Agency's data base, but should be destroyed automatically. Issue #8: The Commission should not recommend legislative delegation of responsibility for new fields of foreign assessment and forecasting. Mr. Harris rightly stresses that the foreign intelligence agencies are not the only source of expertise in emerging areas of interest. The analysis here leads directly to consideration of Issue #14 with regard to the desirability of widening the intelligence marketplace. Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M0l133A001000090001-8 Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000090001-8 Part 3 CLANDESTINE SERVICES UNDER MUNICIPAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW Issue #9: Clandestine services do not constitute a der se violation of the obligations of the United States under inter- national law. Clandestine operations appear justifiable under international law in at least three different circumstances. First, there may be tacit or even explicit international recognition of the desirability of certain forms of intelligence penetration, as by means of remote sensing equipment and satellite surveillance, to monitor arms control agreements and maintain the stability of international expectations. Second, a right to retaliatory actions seems to be recognized under the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a treaty ratified with the advJee and consent, of in 1972.1 The thld, and most debatable condition applies to intervention by rival powers in a third nation. An charging principle may be that intervention is justified to counter the intervention of another power. However, this principle may be said to be firmly established only where the original foreign intervention seeks to threaten an existing government, which then requests the counter-intervention. Issue #10: The Commission should recommend amendment of the National Security Act of 1947 to require, prior to authorization of "other functions and duties," an opinion as to the legality under the laws of the United States and obligations of the United States under international law.. The ambiguities of international law suggest that this requirement would not unduly burden the foreign intelligence community. It would, however, 1The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, "Judicial Procedurec for National Security Electronic Surveillance," Federal. Le i.slation Report No. 74-4 (June 24, 19,"'L) 9 P? 17. Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000090001-8 Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000090001-8 provide for a detached analytical, evaluation of clandestine operations, from a perspective more likely to take "the long view." Mr. Harris' endorsement of this idea makes a major contribution to the search for reforms which can help re-build confidence in the ability of the foreign intelligence community to exercise its powers with responsibility and wise discretion. 1 Issue #ii: The Commission should not recommend amendment of the National Security Act of 1971,7 to permit, in the discretion of the National Security Council, delegation of "other functions and duties" to the Director of Central Intelligence rather than to the Central Intelligence Agency. This proposal misconceives the problem. In practical terms, it would al1.ew the Pirectrr of Central Intelligence to authorize the performance of clandestine functions by military services, rather than by an agency the C.I.A. with a significant civilian orientation. This would be an undesirable departure from the practice of vesting covert operations in a non-military agency. However, it may be desirable to divide the C.I.A. into two separate agencies, both non-military in character, but one for intelligence analysis and the other for clandestine operations. The advantage would be in removing the taint of "dirty tricks" from the analysis professionals. 1Professor Matthew Holden, Jr., of the University of Wisconsin observes, "The principle issue. . is whether de-stabilization is wise at a given time and whether it is properly authorized, controlled, conducted, and terminated when it is no longer approved or effective. What we cannot contemplate, in short, is hostile action taken without mature consideration, outside any framework of authoritative political approval, on the notion of some self- initi_atin- burcauoratic nucleus which cannot be called to account." Letter to the Editor, The W hinrrton Post, November 1, 1974. Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000090001-8 Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000090001-8 Issue #12: The Commission should not recommend amendment of the National Security Act of 1947 to require Presidential authorization of any "other function,- and duties" under subsection 403(d)(5). Mr. Harris appropriately points out that this proposal would lead to needless international embarrassment, unless it is meant as an abolition of covert operations entirely. The latter position is an intellectually and morally defensible one, although not required by prevailing principles -,f international law. The foreign intelligence community should be willing to face the possibility that the electorate might choose a President committed to refraining from intervention in foreign nations. If this appears the likely outcome of the political process, responsible intelligent- officials are obliged to aMJe by an autho:cit,aLive limiting tnei1 scope of ,-]Kid ion. Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000090001-8 Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000090001-8 -13- Part 4 N',ANAGE??1;NT OF THE -INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY Issue #13: The authority of the Director of Central Intelligence as intelligence adviser to the President should be strengthened by requiri n.r- of an annual report on the combined intelligence budget to the President of the United States. Every effort should be made to strengthen the position of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Intelligence Community staff, and the committees which otherwise support the Director. Firm leadership is necessary to control the vast and entrenched intelligence bureaucracies. A strong and creative Director might give serious consideration to the lowering of barriers to entry into the intelligence marketplace. Issue # 14: Efforts to expand consumer---reducer "intelligence markets" and to eliminate oligopolist practices of USIB-member agencies would. not require legislative #Civi~i. Mr. Harris argues effectively for reform in this area. He may understate the degree of comuetition among U.S.I.B. agencies and the current channels through which university research expertise is utilized. In this field it is difficult for an outsider to arrive at more than tentative conclusions. Nevertheless, the desirability of reducing the obstacles to more widespread participation in foreign assessments and forecasting appears clear. While no explicit legislative authority is required to initiate such reforms, the objectives might be accomplished more rapidly if the Director of Central Intelligence received a clear legislative mandate to declassify foreign intelligence (see Issue #20). Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000090001-8 Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000090001-8 Part 5 PROTECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS FROM UNA1NN ORIZED DISCLOSURE Issue /15: The Commission should recommend U.S. participation in multilateral agreements or treaties to protect peaceful. remote sensing; systems, and to dedicate designated systems as international observation systems u:vier Article 99 of the United Nations Charter. This is an especially fruitful area for bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union and multilaterial arrangements under the United Nations. As noted in the discussion of in-,,ernational law, the major powers and the entire international community have shared interests in remote peacetime observation. Formal recognition of these interests in international agreements and through pooling of information would provide a more effective framework for world security. Shared data might also c.,l.ance the development of multi 4ateral a_nalyticai e.n.na.hi Iit.IF;C in nnn-military fields rnjatinp: to food and energy resources. Issue #16: The Commission should not support enactment of legislation to protect foreign intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. After reviewing the legislation proposed by the C.I.A., the Justice Department, and Mr. Harris, this writer has reached the conclusion the new statute would create more difficulties than it would resolve. The wiser course is to allow the federal courts to proceed with the development of limited injunctive remedies along the lines of the Marchetti case. The theory behind prior restraint upon publication in the Marchetti case goes directly to the heart of the problem--the breach of fiduciary responsibility on the part of persons who have entered into specified contract agreements with the federal government. Furthermore, the courts have taken great care in the course of the Marchetti litigation to limit injunctive relief to matters determined upon judicial review to be properly classified. Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000090001-8 Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M0l133A001000090001-8 -15- It is recognized that; as stated by the Supreme Court in the Pentagon !LcrL Case, "Any system of prior restraints of expression fbear a heavy presumption against its constitutionality."1 Moreover, the Supreme Court may look with greater favor upon prior restraint authorized by Congressional legislation, rather than based on "the inherent powers of the Executive and the courts."2 If the Supreme Court were ultimately to reject the theory of the Mai-chetti case on these grounds, Congress could consider enacting legislation to authorize injunctive remedies against persons who breach explicit contractual agreements with the federal government. Such prior restraint is distinguishable from the Pentan;on Papers injunction because it is not directed at the press, but rather at the source of the "leak."3 / 1' Vl CU ncc W o u C l ac nc;, ~l^ V< no"', cE~i ~ yc.? n?, ..=ld be to invite rc:: prcble:r., at the risk of losing the gains made in the Marchetti case. The addition of criminal penalties merely complicates the issue by introducing the uncertainties of prosecutorial discretion and jury trial. The deterrent effect of subsequent punishment is limited at best. Another difficulty is the extension of coverage under a new statute to persons who have not explicitly entered into contracts with the government barring their disclosure of classified information about foreign intelligence sources and methods. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). - See the opinion of Justice Byron White, op. cit. 3? . .it is clear to me that it is the constitutional dut f y o the Executive-- as a matter of sovereign prero:;ative and not as a matter of law as the courts know law--through the promulnation and enforcement of executive regulations, to protect the confidentiality n0C1::.;azy to carry out its responsibilities in the fields of international relations and national defense." Opinion of Justice Potter Ste:war_t, off, cit. Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M0l133A001000090001-8 Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000090001-8 -16- Part 6 OVERSIGHT OF FOREIGN IIITEILIGE71,TCE ACTIVITIES Issue #17: Any legislation to protect intelligence sources and methods should expressly exempt communication of foreign intelligence, and intelligence sources and methods to any duly authorized Committee of the Con- rc:; s uT)On "lawful demand" or other-,,j 0. Mr. Harris properly suggests that a duly constituted Congressional Committee may not know enough to issue a "lawful demand" for information. Thus, any narrower exception would impede Congressional access to infor- mation it has a constitutional right to possess and receive (although an individual Congressn;an may not have the right to demand such data). Issue #18: Any revised format of Congressional oversight of intelligence activities should adapt procedural safeguards from NSA and AEX oversight practice. This Cvmmi ssi on should eccmmend that the Ho ise c f Repre;:- waive Rule XII, which gives any member of the House access to all committee documents. Especially sensitive documents should not be made available to non-members of the intelligence oversight committees. This would make it possible for the Director of Central Intelligence to submit his annual report on the combined intelligence budget to the intelligence oversight committees, as well as to the President. (See Issue #13.) Issue ##19: Presidential advice respecting foreign intelligence (PFIAB or PSAC-equivalent) should not be formalized by statute, but should be left to Presidential discretion by executive order. This Commission should recommend that President Ford re-establish the PFIAB by Executive Order and look to it for advice and guidance. However, statutory authorisation might derogate the authority of the Director of Central. Intelligence. Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000090001-8 Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000090001-8 -17- Issue #20: The Commission should seek to enhance public access to into] ligencc info_r_;ration, an,i accelerated de-classification of public record: by reform of the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelli;raonce to protect "sensitive intelligence sources and method bust also to mandate "declassification of such foreign intelligence infor_ration as is consistent with these duties." While declassification may be of value to historians, its greatest benefits would arise in conjunction with reforms to widen access to the intelligence marketplace. (See Issue #14.) Such steps may be taken without Con-,ressioila,l action; but if changes are to be made in the Director's responsibilities to protect "sources and methods," then a mandate to declassify would be in order.1 If the Constitution gives the Executive a large degree of unshaxed power in the conduct of foreign affairs and the maintenance of our national defense, then under the Constitution the Executive must have the largely unshared duty to determine and preserve the degree of internal security necessary to exercise that po er successfully. It is an awesome responsibility, requiring judgment and wisdom of a high order. I should suppose that moral, political, and practical considerations would dictate that a very first principle of that wisdom would be an insistence upon avoiding secrecy for its own sake. For when everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipu- lated by those intent on self-prot-ction or self-promotion. I should suppose, in short, that the hallmark of a truly effective internal security system would be the maximum possible disclosure, recognizing that secrecy can best be preserved only ti-;hen credibility is truly maintained." Potter Stewart, Now York United ~ Opinion of Justice roles Co. V. UStates, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000090001-8 Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M0l133A001000090001-8 PI'FI.I'':_CN \ X DR\FT ? r~ -5 C` -H r T FOR PUBLIC RELEASE I-VITIIUUT CONN1SSION .'APPROVAL o: 1_ssut r t11(:i Con n: ssi n on the the C for the Con duct of Fore igrn Pol-icy W11.l i,Im R. 1t; ~-is October 30, 1 1074, rcv7_S~:d November 22, 1974. i".: :r~: e cd l _1E'1v t%Ics' .`E e f ?' C, S' 3Lit or Z should n Oot be cC,is":n:, (1, r~.p r Views C; the C:O2n 1SS Y staf~ . ~_OIl O l~.S Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M0l133A001000090001-8 Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000090001-8 .. ii -- SUNu'LARY Review of legal authority indicates that essential U.S. foreign intelligence functions may be performed consistently with the laws and constitution of the United States, with two possible exceptions: the National Security Agency may require legislation if assigned enlarged collection duties (Issue 7,Rp.L-16), and criminal sanctionc may be required to protect against un- authorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods (Issues 16, 17, 20, pp. 33-38, 40-41, and Appendix: 1). Earlier delegations of intelligence functions beyond law- ful authority (pp. 2-4), without adequate legal advice, need- lessly da..ia ;e c' the foreign intelligence mission. Present dele- gaitions of au horny by National Security Council Intelligence Direct-.'I_ve (NSCIDs) are consistent with law. A new NSCID address- ing standards and procedures to safeguard domestic collection of fore:i.gn intelligence would be appropriate (p. 7), within a broader effort to r.e r`ilat:e not only the aperature of domestic collection but also the adequacy of surveillance records, sanctions for im- prop-r disclosure, and safeguards for external access (pp. 8-11). Emphasis upon dissemination of foreign intelligence of commercial 71 p 1-11- t 11 - f-1' .] Un i t ?? i r~ [r r, specialized agencies (pp.13-14), or specific new fields of Intel-- l i genr_c~ (1 .1.7; ,would be accelerated by specific legislative assignment of functions. Clandestine services have been undertaken consistently with the National Security Act of 1947 (though ambiguous on its face), as elucidated by annual budget and oversight review by four Com- mittees of the Congress (pp. 5- 7) . However, certain clandestine services may be inconsistent with particular treaty obligations which, under the supremacy clause of the constitution, are part of the laws of the United States (pp. 7, 19). It is proposed that inconsistent practices of the United States in international legal practi_ce and in direction of clandestine service functions by the National Security Council be rendered more fully compatible by amendment of the National Security Act of 1947, so as to re- quire a legal. opinion prior to such National Security Council authorizations (pp. 19-21, and Appendix 2). Were a prima facie case established that the clandestine services of CIA should be "spun off", it is suggested that any "spin off" not be imposed upon the National Security Council, but be rendered discretionary so as not to compel an arrangement which with hindsight may appear to be unworkable (Issue 11, pp. 21-22, and Appendi_: 2). If the 'case for a "spin off" has not been adequately de onstrated (and in this author's view it has not been so demonstrated), even the discretionary "spi.n off" authority may be un%w:arranted. Requiring .residential certification of cland .~s- tine services appears unsound Issue 12 22-231. Approved For Release 2004/03/26: CIA-RDP8bMOI'I33AO01000090001-8 Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000090001-8 SU-14,NMRY (CONTINUED Efforts to strengthen the managerial authority of the Director of Central Intelligence are addressed (pp.25-27). The impact of legislative direction of an annual budget report (now issued) by the Director of Central Intelligence is considered (Issue 13, pp. 27-28) as is the possibility of providing statutory authority for the Intelligence Community (IC) staff (p.28). Obstacles to intro- duction of market or quasi-market mechanisms (by which consumer needs might be more adequately met) are not primarily legal in nature. Discriminatory informational practices by intelligence producing agencies, which have the effect of precluding governmental access to outstanding analytic skills in universities, industry, and other research institutes deserve careful review, and perhaps inves- tigation by the General Accounting Office (Issue 14, pp.30-31). Two aspects of the protection of foreign intelligence sources and methods are reviewed: strengthening international law safe- guards for remote sensing in peacetime (Issue 15, p. 32), and streng- thening U.S. criminal laws so as to reverse an ethic of fiduciary irrC,''- ,p--j' bi_?.ity respecting protection of intelligence sources and methods (Issue 16, pp.33-38) . Department of Justice draft legisla-- :_.L ois ~c-~j~F~c ti u.i. I, Tau A aE~~~eai~ to oe L o LIs 1.ituLiuual buy. 1.L1dQ Ulld5t . CIA draft , gi. ~l.atiorl (Appendix 1, Tabs C and F) appears to be uncon- s4t c?lal, and, 1. en if constitutional, inadequate to protect agaist- extraterritorial disclosures. Amendments to draft legisla- tion are suggested (p.37). It is proposed that the Commission con- sider the issue of supporting the principle of strengthened criminal sanctions rather than supporting any particular draft of proposed legislation. Protection of Congressional access to executive rnforma- tion does not appear to be adequate in either the Department of Justice or the CIA draft legislation (issue 17, p. 38, and Appendix 1, pp. A8-A10). Oversight of foreign intelligence by Congress is to be considered by another. Commission panel. Procedural safeguards for sensitive intelligence information are here considered (Issue 18, pp.38-39), so that Congressional oversight may be rigorous, and so that the appearance of diligence need not be shielded from, view. Review by Presidential advisory groups, with or without a statutory basis (Issue 19, pp.39-40), and by accelerated public access to intelli- gence information (Issue 20, pp.40-41) are discussed. Although reform of the U.S. foreign intelligence community is not primarily an issue of law, it is essential that duties be assigned and faith- fully executed in accordance with the constitution and laws of the United States. Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000090001-8 Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000090001-8 TABLE OF CONTENTS S um: na ry Table of Contents iv Legal Authority for the Conduct and Control of Foreign Intelligence Activities - A Sunrnary of Issues 1 1 Foreign Intelligence and Government under Law 1 2 Authorit-j w,-ith Respect to Foreign Intelligence 8 ? 3 Clandest3_r e Services under Municipal and International Law 18 19 4 Manage ent of the Intelligence Community 25 5 I'rotocti_c.n of Foreign Intelligence Sources and 31 6 Methods from Unauthorized Disclosure Oversight of Foreign Intelli_s,ence Activities 38 1 7 Tatbl.c: of Issues Considered 42 Lp cndi_x 1: Protection o Foreign Intel.li_gence Sources and ods from Unauthorized Disclosure Introduction to Recent Draft Legis- lation, by William R. Harris Tab A: 5.1, A Bill to Codify, Revise and Tab B. Tab C(l) : Tab C(2) : Tab C"3) : Tab C(4): Tab C(5) : Tab C(6) : Tab L. Reform Title 13 of the United States Code, 5 2-5B3, "Misuse of National Defense Information." S.1400, Criminal Code Reform Act, ? 1124, "Disclosing Classified infor- mation. " Letter, W. E. Colby, DCI, to Roy L. Ash, OMB, January 14, 1974. CIA Draft Legislation, January 14, 1974 CIA Sectional Analysis and Explanation Proposed Changes in Existing Law Draft Transmittal Letters Cost Analysis Department of Justice Draft Legislation, August 14 1974 Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000090001-8 Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000090001-8 Tab E: Letter, T. E. Colby, DCI, to W. B. Saxbe, Attorney General, September 17, 1974 Tab F: CIA Office of the General Counsel Draft Legislation, September 12, 1974 Tab G: ClA Office of the General. Counsel Comparison of Draft Legislation in Tabs D and F. su ra Tab H: S. [blank], Criminal Code Reform Act, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. ?1124 [revised], "Disclos- ing Classified Information," transmitted October 15, 1974. '!pp =nd i.x 2: Proposed transfer of "other functions and duties relating to intelligence as the National Security Council may from time to time direct" from "the [Central Intelligence] Agency, under the ciiection of the National Security Council" to "The Director of tine ea: tion of the N', ti_or,` Security Council"; Proposed duty to furnish to the Na- tional Security Council an opinion as to "the legality under the la,,s of the United States and the obligations of the United States under international law" prior to authorization of any "other functions and duties. " Author's Draft, October 30, 1974. Supl_,le?Went to Appendix 2: National Security Act of 1947, as amended, Title I, Coordination for National Security, 101-102. Appendix 3: Classified Information, Deleted Per Determination of the National. Security Agency [separate appendix, Confidential, Group 2]. Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000090001-8 Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01133A001000090001-8 LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR T1117 CONDUCT AND CONTROL OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES - A SUINE11ARY OF ISSUES by William R. Harris''` 1 FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND GOVER'N'MENT UNDER LAW The secrecy and mystique of foreign intelligence activi- ties exascerbate the usual difficulties of public agency accountability. As has often been noted, there is no sub- stitute for leadership of integrity and self-discipline.' Still, the discipline of legal accountability remains a bulwark of liberty, in a society where, strictly construed, executive power is the power to execute the laws.2 Because it is undisputed that intelligence agencies are fully bound by t:?gee la; ,s and constitution of the United States, any pro- posed statutory prohibition against official agency par_tici- "in any i ecra1 arf$tirif-r c.rii} 1r 7 ,ITT arcac r;C'_C a "lli::l-\'c orders calle._. National Security Intelligence Directives. . . . the public still has no way of knowing, what that mandate is." In August 1-974 Senator Pro-;mire testiii..ed before the Subcomnlttc_ on Intelligence of the House Armed Services Committee re- specting '". . . the so-called secret charter of the CIA The . . . NSC IDs ,'F urging that "[t]he NSCIDs should . . . be the subject of an intensive investigation by the [oversight] committees." Statement of Senator Prox- mire, at 2 (1974). ii Previously reviewed by the author. No opinion is expressed with respect to National Security Council delegations (other than NSCID's) in the period 1965-1974, in directives not reviewed by the author. Because the National Security Council is, by statute, advisory to the President, National Security Council decisions and directives remaining in force should not generally be construed as inconsistent with Presi- dential policy. Titus, the statement prepared for and publicly released in the name of President Harry S, Truman, in December 1963, stating, inter al a, "I never had any thought that when I set up the CTA it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and- da g{; pp ldzftoX Release ~U0V01 /2 tICI RD['.tQ Q.u1J 3AQ QOQQ990Q11t8 than the relevant National. Security Council directives of the Truman AriminiSiratiL,n. Approved For Release 2004F03b26-: CIA-RDP80M0l133A001000090001-8 Defeat of a blanket prohibition of CIA covert action by a lopsided margin in October 1974,12 is far less. signifi- cant than the knowledge of customary practice, and annual budget review by four oversight committees of the Congress.13 Uncertainty respecting the scope of National Security Coun- cil delegations of functions, on the part of then-Director of Central Intelligence Hillenkoetter in 1947-1948, was resolved by NSC directives within the first year of opera- tion under the National Security Act of 1947. Accordingly, the clandestine service functions which are per_fo -u-,ed may fairly be characterized as consistent with the legislative purpose of the National Security Act of 1947, l1 The Abourezk A .: ndment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, would hove added to the Foreign Assistance Act of 19(_11 ? 661 "I1_l ega Activities in Foreign Countries," s to prohibit rrany agency. . . to carry out any activity { .? ?,-,.. -F- .~ -' r - . - L^. n 1'\ 1 1 rl f' (l c` Fl Y !' l Yl {` (_l rl n /) (l to e;1cr,,, a tl-.e violation of, the l.a?c?js of the Lni_ted States of of sueii country." Under the su.pr?nnacy cause of the LT,S.. Co ,; f_ .tlli io 1 treaties become the supreme law of the lane, but the m. nicipal laws or foreign states are not generally recognized as obli.vat . on , of the United State. lle A'~o Y he A:,,hcd by executive order in 1952, and was thereby llll')1_ i C'C';-_`' recognized by consequence Of the Act of October 31, 1951, found at Title 18 U.S.C. ? 798(b), as a protected cr;,ptclo~J-i_c authority designated by the President . P.L. 86- 36 of 1959 provided administrative authority for ieSAA. Since 1.962 there have been direct annual Congressional. appropriations. Following the Marti_n- NitC hC'1l defect: ions p rsonnel security provisions were establ.i_s` ed under P.I_,, 82-90 of 1964. A Cor ,rressi_ona1 _ l~ic1h z (vz is-eL110 1Cga1 aut-}1c) r i L y c)i various c C) C, 1)c' .c'1 e C1 C nci d Li not estion 'C', i% 's J le gal authority as ,.shed feenCy. SCe U S COIZc're ) ices C r' f t c' 7r, a C L L t t o 1; Approves F~qr~ lease ~( 4%0 261;,CI~4= T 4 ~ A. L 0 0 `~" s . :I L v u ._ { 1. `~ u ) Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000090001-8 16 1 i~1.S J~age l'i ou 1 C: C 1x:71 '~ c._ne Se'!"'~ 7_C~" lie formed outside CIA coc%:'t'inat.ed tire:. DCI be precluded by Act of Congress? Con- ver":se V, if the cLor-:ni st:s F::!-n, but are wrong, should a. return t.U U.1,lul: L'. c,(1.Li ~uiL tl :d s i_rlce 19/=7 . In accordance w:i_t.'. a.IL ~. c:,-" 1'"1 J_c. 1Z S.!i {:.L:`d ? t0 I_Y.'C'.C t:Or c)f CC_']"lta"c'l.. 1_.rl ~!:. (? i 1- a!_ ganca J'1Ct.:JI'e . fl . 1t. :i S ilia isl] t-}7 t yo serve as the Government s .''r 11_z_r-nc,e Offj icery and as suc'h_ that you l ndo::' C cu ' _ c ' l;C l"1 of your responsibility, the COG? Ct_1`i::: jLl t~:iilCe O:L {i.l:'0 t'0'l=clI 1Jni_t( C Ste Lire o latce11 enef:fort_. you n Cont i_nui ng review of the U pro- f~J`c' ,:S ails. ?'ictjv:i_t:'_es ;? 1-1 U S eign J;ILc] t'IgencE ac :L 1t;C t.witl1 ]`vie to assuring effi_. c'icncy of 1:ertivc le0s end to avoiding undesirable dupli.- cLI rr tiQiJ ~~ }`C iLIjflOLtC1 Ff _sta t y if2c e - .1 - c,,-vv c i. al, tin 1Cn of f e T ' L c I7 Cl 1'? t - _ Deno) t..: ?lt d Po C 21 aEioi1 f _ ~_ .. , 50 Stci_ t02.cC'_ Staff reporL 1. 17. n:oilic,ence is 1rEi- 1)re,J ,C- Jj oiTy CL1:TI i!l_1.tee (?RAC) and the lit to .I_l.i. c`J]_i t) ) }). (.ijiC') "?tE unCdo]: the aegis of the 1`1i.rect ' _oo cD, i: C,:,- CC'iiL --lice 4:':) a G?l_ 11t c ut/hority of law, ,..rr r, r! t .. rd more er i-~ r? ! .-nr! c ,.*r.,ep o T k :'!)c -nd under OOkCn oI_ C:c nt~ct_i_pt._cn of e`, :l _Itory ,i'ysi unct.; on is not ai fu "i J. : 1li1? maw y of Cs cool-'0 1.: i r,;:c~ l l ~;e;1c-e system, '?i ny consumers are see- v_Lcec, by C:>CC:' -i '1- responsive Lo c'C..ic;rlCi t ft_. . ;;}ail problems persist, despite many instances CAS: out St.:t;iiC..:i` 1';ltclligence producti oII: 1' i rst, in t}'.e n ?:le Of sec Li'C 01 `CC.-pal 1Siv SS to iio]_ cry the producing a ic?encies may unreasonably xse: harr _c1:.. to market crltr_y, through data com,part.mentation or fall uiC: to ub:11:i_t estimating tasks to the scrutiny of appropriate _~..nsi' _t:)- t:Lctns in inclu :try, university or other non-profit research establz..>1,-?. menta. Secon', 'Consu'mer:, may be precluded from exerting quasi--market influences upon production decisions, via budget choices or the of production schedules in bodies from which consumers are excluded C- L" I .~ ].......,,. ._ _~ - -- --. ... iCl C )'-'i ail C:1i1' r ill t1. } i?. ,_ i r'OO Lc" 1,' 0('v i it-(it i_011;3:L C. , c- 't tai: 11s 1_ ,> r ~;,~f~pro~~fl 0 'ii~leasre; X00'103 DOk Q'1l d3Ac0,1~'I'u000 6b . ~$ S :1, L c: G+ , / 1Cf is (]` C girt -O c v 11~C.. lid e S - 1. .Ii U, S-i S, C)f ,sec -:_ on 1021 (Cl) ( 1 C) i the Of 1 Li,t 7, 1) y 14h1_C}'1 t:}"I C'. Director O Conti l.)t 1 1 C c L t 1 __ ,C (_. c:J_tC'. y I_i J1 T)7: )'C , 1 i ? Lin- 1 ; ?nC_-C, SC L.7 C. o ~~_ _, o~- of Con .,~Ul Inlets 1 ncc ncas issued at t once D r c C. C) f C) :E C e 1 C r r , .'_Lc.1 1C_11 i'-,C:nC,n Dirc_ctj e ,. i. t:r t; i-s -- in -?-1 4-% y , in 1-iniVc.rS1_tleSy in re3~'~ 7.:C~I7 "i_,nSi:i_ :re precluded froi1 direct: utilization of i:;i1 11 tc_ ;- int:ell ge oe. Legitimate security concerns may be channeled by mc'cnc; 4.T111E}1 Ci].rce C'.OI711)E't _1_t:1G_1 Oi private experts with 1_i1tC f. j.:i tencO. n tystS, 1i.C':1 E.11: ou 't e ~;Ci'- -COnti'aCt7.-I1g via intel-7 LgenCC ?< El":cies t}1C i ,`;t -:: acres to Ol)_rOpSOn]_St C011tr_0.' of the market) or t'711=(C'}1 7 f Lh C:-.c1 lucin of t.}1C nat ? t)11 T , c Ps t minds from 60 6 . St i t . 2u I L \ 5 (ci) s t has be'e'f. U.17SUC'Ci'S iu~_1_~~ ehC.1. I .E i1 TC C~ :Iii thu C',); 2c' 396 U< S. 91,9 ee J s~ d r ' ) 1 V. LI . ~ ' 4 ( C ) ' Ct:. 20 62 , U.S.L.W. 5076 (June 25, 197' 1 c):_ A P-~6 el dran naitiona1 Leo-,+t 5 AA prbvedFor.R a easec20o4i03/26 : tl RPP6dM91;133,AQ0WQOQIQOQ'k-$1 i_n tE- r e st, J'_'. Jr . 1'1;1)1 i c:ILie & c>i-DctCn:~e Infca~u)ati on," 73 Lol_unI,. L. l z't. X297 Approved For Release 2004/03/26 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000090001-8 - 34 .. tyi_rl i.nt el?.igen e "sources and methods" lcgislution to S. 1400 7 would be of no g neater merit than tyirl a r-acE horse to the he ;rse in a fun: -:, ;_ t;roce sion, Those opposed to criminal- sanctions for It;? 1l)i:.iC?=`7_;'`'C} Cj1. ;E'I.C ure of intell7_ ?;en`ce. sources and methods may CL'::17C:'lld i.=h:_S of actio11. Recently ro CSC';l sonroC'.S Arid methods leg isslation, from the , Off ic? e c>..r the General C)u 1 e:! , CIA (At T) pe7_, Tab C, January lj St1?,-17.F31_('.Ct a Jl1Sl"7_CE'. CUUn.tt=2:p3"0- p 'ca I } L u?_`: 1_!tJ ~J St_ Tust 9 t. U no other 3L)i_(` in that 1_t doe not appe:'a) , on its face, to be U1:cia: t Jt'_1'._1 or 1 e son G,h:._Cil lll: here so m 1 eI CJ jT 1.. 1. l.'S.. P i f) th L:, ._ VC: C.C)o C'1 ns ~!j "n~, )_i,Llc.1 securi-ty" and , hich T. do not ,;) 4.. t_i: c. ). '_ C x_11:+i.1 'ae eg: .~.~., t:1 hi' C71 af't ~? p rl, " d, overly b1-cad, or . ' .? . t C. aF I .I : I t~' '~-? ~_