LETTER T(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A001000100002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 16, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 27, 1975
• Content Type: LETTER

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
C+ffice of the Deputy for the
Intelligence Community
27 February 1975'
25X1
Commission on the Organization of the
Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy
Flashington, D. C. 20506
25X1 Dear
0
I very much appreciated receiving the updated drafts
and your notes, and it is obvious that you are all working
hard to come out with a solid report. You asked that we
review the paper for security issues, and we do find some
problems. I suggest that when you are next in the building,
STATINTL you arrange to meet with the Chairman of the USIB
Security Committee, to go over these issues.
The section on covert action looks good to me, but I
~TATINTL have asked to take a look at it as ~,re11.
I'm sure he wi. e in ouch if he has any cor.~ents.
The draft on Intelligence Structures does give me a
little difficulty. It reaches conclusions, bt~t provides
very little analytic backstopping to support them. I know
that you have to write an unclassified report? but I think
some discussion of other options and your reasons for dis-
missing them would be useful.
25X1 I have talked with and he wi 11 be sending
us the final draft for formal comments so we will not
submit any formal comments now. as encouraged our
comments, just as you have, on an in ormal basis, and we
s ent some time on this with here last week.
STATINTL lso had some specs zc comments on the
ou and
hel
t
p y
o
paper, an am attaching those
in the present redrafting.
Sincerely,
25X1
25X1
25X1
STATINTL
.~%' Associate Depu y o the DCI
for the Intelligence Community
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NSC review(s) completed.
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24 February 1975
STATINTL MEMORANDUM FOR:
D
SUBJECT Comments on Murphy Commission Draft Report
Introduction - no comments.
Section I, p. 8, last two lines of second para. -better words would be:
". and as such is responsible for coordinating all foreign
intelligence activities of the U. S. Government. "
Section I, p. 10, lines 8 & 9 under DIA:
Director DIA is no longer program manager for GDIP and SRV.
ASD(I) .now has these responsibilities.
Section I, p. 11 -Under NSA. Second para. is incorrect. The Service
Cryptologic Agencies (SCAs) are under the operational and
technical control of Director, NSA. The SCA Chiefs also
perform certain Cryptologic related functions for their parent
Services, for which they receive direction from the Service
Chief. Some of these Service peculiar functions do involve
maintenance of field units for direct support to military forces.
The relationship between NSA and the SCAB is not ambiguous.
Section I, p. 11 - NRO - I believe it is incorrect to describe NRO as a
part of "Air Force intelligence. " It is not a part, either
organizationally or in management and direction.
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Section I, p. 12 -Many possible errors in fact or interpretation
under Service Intelligence para.
- - I que stion the source, validity and meaning of the large
.,. . `+
manpower figures given for Army, Navy, and Air Force intelli-
-- At least in the case of the Navy, it is totally incorrect to
say that, 'rONI employs about
-- Given the inaccuracy of these figures, it is wrong to say,
in the second sentence, that "the three major Service agencies
are all (SIC -- each) lager than DIA. (ONI, for example,
actually has aworld-wide strength of about
-- It is also incorrect, as noted previously, to include NRO
as a part of Air Force intelligence.
(Check accuracy of USIB Committee Chart)
Section II, p. 1, line 5 -change DCI to CIA.
Section III, p. 5, 2nd para. I understand the designation of the DCI
as vice Chairman of NSCIC has never been made official. Letter
drafted but never signed.
Section III, p. 6, first line -strike out "director"
Section IV, p. 1, first para. , last line - IRAC is "Resources" not
"requirements"
5X1
5X1
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Section V, p. 1, first Para -This paragraph conveys a very wrong
impression regarding the contribution of NSA, DIA and NRO
(see last sentence) when one reads the second Iine, "Most of
their effort is limited to 'tactical' ." Perhaps use of. ?,
word "much" in place of "most" would be easiest fix.
Section V, p. 2, lines 5-6 and 9-10 convey a misinterpretation.
"Tactical" or military force support intelligence elements are
organic to forces as a part of the force enabling the Commander
to execute his mission. They are not "nice to have" or "more
comfortable" to the Commander as their reason fcrr being, as
this paragraph portrays.
The second para. is a non sequitur. The I5-85 split refers to
"National" programs (Prog. III) and does not include "tactical"
resources, which may be as much as double.
Section V, p. 3 - "Tactical" figures are available, as are all DOD
_'"-"-
budget items, All one needs to find "tactical" intelligence
resource figures is a definition of what to include.
Section V, p. 5, NSA para. , lines 4-6: I agree that military coverage
dominates the SIGINT business, but I will not agree that this is
"at the expense of other national needs" -- a connotation that
other needs are not being met because of military dominance.
Not True.
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Section V, NSA para. , last sentence, again connotes that non-military
needs are not being met because of military dominance. This
is not true and is the fault of DCI and USIB if it should be true.
Section V, second para. , lines 3-5. Comments on further :career
aspirations hampering objectivity of DIRNSA is factually wrong.
Only one DIRNSA has ever been advanced in his Service, and only
one other has been advanced outside his Service. All other
retired, and one reverted to two-star status.
Section V, p, 7, lines 2-4. The only position in NSA traditionally held
by a military officer is the Director. All other senior positions
do rotate and all have rotated among civilians and military.
Section V=p. 7, second para. , line 3 -- word "cryptographic" should
be "cryptologic, "
Section V, last para. on p. 7 and first para. on p. 8 are r.~rossly mis-
t leading in impressions of relationships between NSA and SCAB
plus role of Service Chiefs. This was explained in great detail
25X1 td
Section V, p. 8, 2nd para. regarding CSS. The CSS is an abortion and
was deliberately engineered to be so by ASD(I) and a former
Director of NSA.
Section V, p. 13 -Remedies recommended to improve the Defense
Attache System are of little value. Promotion should not be
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treated as a reward for one tour of duty, as suggested. The
real remedy for DAS problems is to improve the prestige and
image of the Military Attache, and restore personnel reductions
which have cut the system by more than half. ~ -} ''
Section VI, p. 6, full para. at mid page:
Discussion equates HUMINT to clandestine HUMINT, which is
wrong, Result is wrong conclusion and bad recommendation.
Section VII - no comments.
Section VIII - no comments.
STATINTL
SAC/CPAD/IC
STATINTL ~y to:
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25X1
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COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY
2025 M STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
March 25, 1875
ssocia e eputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
The Commission is planning to publish as annexes
to its report eight of the analytical papers on intelli-
gence. These papers will require a security review
before publication which we request that you arrange.
In forwarding the documents we ask that you arrange
for this review on an urgent basis since we are obligated
to send the annexes to the printer no later than April 15
1975 to comply with our statutory filing time for the full
report.
Wherever suggestions for deletion are made, we would
appreciate it if appropriate substitute language can be
suggested to fill in the gaps.
UTith many thanks,
Cordially,
Francis 0. Wilcox
Executive Director
Enclosures: Papers by
Belcher
Macy
Barnds (2)
~3ui senga
L~Tnn
Smith
Ransom
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
25X1
ommission on ie rganization of the
Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy
Washington, D. C. 20506
25X1
STATINTL
STATINTL
Office of the Deputy for the
Intelligence Community
I appreciated receiving the updated drafts and your notes, and
it is apparent that you are all working very hard to get out a solid
report. In general, I have no problem with the Covert Action Annex,
but I have asked to look at it again to ensure that
there are no factual errors. On reading the paper, however, I have
no feel for the depth of analysis that went in to support its conclusions
nor can I understand whether you considered alternatives and on what
grounds you dismissed them. This is particularly true of the draft
on "Intelligence Structures. " I appreciate that you have to write
an open report and that maybe any in-depth effort in an analytical
sense is a restriction problem.
has gone over the draft and is offering some specific
suggestions. I am attaching a copy of his paper for you.
You also asked whether these presented security problems. They
do. I am attaching for you paper as Chairman of the STATINTL
USIB Security Committee.
For the time being, I have advised Bill Colby, on assurances from
Fisher Howe and yourself, that we will be given an opportunity to
review and comment formally on final drafts. Fisher called to tell
me that the current drafts will continue to get major revisions and
that while he welcomes any factual input we can provide along the way,
we will have an opportunity to comment on whatever the Commission's
final draft may be. Therefore, please consider the attached -except
for the security questions - as an informal response to your letter.
Sincerely,
STATINTL
ssocia e epu y to the DCI
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25X1
STATINTL
I very much appreciated receiving the updated
drafts and your notes, and it is obvious that you are
all working hard to come out with a solid report.
You asked that we review the paper for security issues,
and we do find some problems . ~?i~k I suggest that when
you are next in the building you arrange to meet with
the Chairman of the USIB Security Committee,
to go over these issues.
J w.~ ~.
The section on covert action ~g~ good to
STATINTL me . but I have asked
25X1
at it as well. I'm sure he will be in touch if he
~a~~t has any comments.
The draft on Intelligence Structures does give me
a little difficulty. It reaches conclusions, but provides
very little analytic backstopping to support them. I
know that you have to write an unclassified report, but
other
I think some disaassion of
options and your reasonsfor dismissing them would be
useful.
I have talked with
and he will be sending
us the final draft for formal comments, so we will not
submit any ~i~ formal comments now.
has encouraged
our comments, just as you have, on an informal basis, and
we spent some time on this ~ with here last
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25X1
25X1
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STATINTL week .
also had some specific comments
on the paper, and I am attaching those a~x~~a~~tv~~~~~x to help
~~ you and Tom Reckford in the present redrafting.
25X1
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 ILLEGIB
Approved For
February 12, 1975
STATINTL
Gffice of the Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.
Copies are enclosed of two draft sections of the Commis-
sion report which have been gone over and approved in substance by
the Commissioners on the Intelligence and National Security 5ub-
cornmittee. These are still subject to further adjustment, particularly
by the staff.
It would be helpful if you would review them to insure that
there are no classification problems with what has been written. Sub-
stantive comments off the record to me would also be welcome.
Kindly keep in mind that this is still a rough draft, and I will polish
up the language once I am sure the substance is acceptable and that
I have not inadvertently included classified data.
Also enclosed is a revised cover sheet which I hope you
will put on the historic review done by J.J. Hitchcock and myself.
Since rely,
25X1
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