THE DILEMMA OF 'PROTECTION OF SOURCES'

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP80M01133A001000100004-3
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RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
20
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 13, 2007
Sequence Number: 
4
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 29, 1975
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP80M01133A001000100004-3.pdf711.43 KB
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Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80M01133A001000100004-3 TO: William B. Spong COPIES TO: Francis O. Wilcox Peter Szanton Tom Reckford Kent Crane DRAFT = FH:mlv - 1/29/75 NSC Review Completed SUBJECT: The Dilemma of "Protect_Lcon of Sources" An urgent need arises to decide the manner in which the Commission addresses the complex and controversial n question of CIA authority in "prot_ecticn of sources." The subject probably will come up : n('::a}=/Tuesday, February 3/4, at the forthcoming Committee II - I;r e? lioence Meeting. The National Security Act of 1917 gives the DCI the responsibility "for?.L ~ ~_ i :..elligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." Under this provision, CIA, :~~n-c er performs important count-er-intelligence Al activities abroad, including su'veillazce of Americans. It also seeks to contain leaks and limit disclosures of important information. Recently the CTA has sought to re- enforce its statutory authority in this area, to mmatch'chat it holds to be its responsibility and need. The Commission initially contracted with Bil`! Harris to make a study of the issue. As this one paper could not encompass all the pros and cons of this complex i~& e and afford the Commission a asis of r= ponsihle judgment, the Committee II first drat t avoided the issue. This may not Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80M01133A001000100004-3 Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80MO1133AO01000100004-3 be possible any longer to do and yet the Committee lacks any clear and comprehensive basis for taking a position. Legally the issues seem to fall into the following areas: 1. Should CIA have any authority for protection of sources? Presumably it should because of its overseas counter-intelligence responsibility. In any event, a. contrary case would have to be developed by lawyers who know intelligence. 2. CIA has recommended in its proposed legisla- Lion that it have some authority for prior restraint. To evaluate responsib ' this complex constitutional issue would a major exercise; to say anything about it without such careful evaluation would be less than fully responsible. 3. CIA also proposes more restrictive disclosure statutes and much stronger criminal punish- ment for unauthorized disclosure. Again, highly controversial legislation on which the Commission should presumably be loatie to make judgments without very thorough and balanced evaluations t probably is not appropriate to the mandate simply to indicate Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80MO1133AO01000100004-3 Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80M01133A001000100004-3 ~j7' ST~`'-7hxc 0FJ the one side of the issue "a real f~vS 7-:5 need to protect sources." The question then is how to come to grips with iwe 1. Can we duck it, taking the position that intelligence is important to the support of the conduct of foreign policy but the Commission c4 not look-into every detail of the Intelligence function and still keep to its basic purpose, even as it cannot look into every corner of the Pentagon? To some this would be a cop-out. 2. Do we take a procedural route, pointing out that the issue is big, technical and con- stitutional and recommending a special commissiono Alternatively, d-:r we indicate it is a Congressional matter and the Oversight 7 Committees should address. (Cop-out also? What are we in business for?) 3. Do we go after the substance and in the remaining weeks mount a panel of constitu- tional lawyers and intelligence specialists who can explore in whatever depth is necessary make recommendations to the Commi s s ions.J F f''~-c.- Other considerations: Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80M01133A001000100004-3 Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80M01133A001000100004-3 a. Other Congressional and Executive Committees and Commissions cannot avoid being smothered in these same issues. b. Mounting publicity accompanies any discussion o.- L--the issues, e.g. Marchetti, Agee. Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80M01133A001000100004-3 Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80MO1133AO01000100004-3 DRAB /F'H/2/13 II. THE DIRECTc,R OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE In the quarter-century since the enabling act, the DCI has assumed the leadership of the Intelligence Community and taken full responsibility for the coordination of functions and organizations as well as for the production -- that is, correlation and evaluation -- of "national" intelligence reports and estimates. To these ends he has developed a) a "Community' Staff" to assist him in the coordination-of activities, and b) a group of National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) to assist in the preparation of coordinated substantive intelligence. On the other hand, as the=Director of the AL7ency he has been directly in charge of all of its important collection and research assessment functions. The DCI, quite clearly and purposefully, wears two hats. He is the principal adviser to the President and the MSC for intelligence and as such is responsible for the activities of the entire intelligence community. And he is-also the head of CIA. Nor surprisin ly, over the years proposals have frequently, and responsibly, been put fosvard to separate these two functions into two distinct positions, thus seeking to reduce the burden and to avoid what appeared at times to be Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80MO1133AO01000100004-3 Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80MO1133AO01000100004-3 a conflict G_?interest between the two duties. For reasons which the Commission believes to be altogether sound, this course has not been followed: neither of the two responsibilities coild be strongly, or even adequately, discharged if divided. A DCI without his own agency would have great difficulty filling a leadersh: ty; an independent intelli- gence agency without a leadership responsibility would be at the mercy of the several departments, particularly the military. In 1971,however, the President, on the recommendation of the Schlesinger Report, chose a compromise course: the DCI, while ?_sti l _:r . ? 1ne r e ' - - over the CIA, should remove himself from the qay~to-day direction of the agency and concentrate on his Community responsibilities. Although this directive, for a number of reasons, was never fully carried out, the Commission is impressed with its validity as a concept and with the undesirability of having the DCI preside over matters in which he is himself an interested party. The pattern of Chairman of the Board and President of a business-enterprise, although only partially analagous, suggests itself in this connection. In this way the DCI should be siZnificantly freed of a major management load but at the same time would out be wholly stripped of line responsibility which inevitably ances his leadership capability. Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80MO1133AO01000100004-3 Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80M0l 133A001000100004-3 RECO1 r1EN DATTTIO~T The Director of Central Intelligence should retain line authority over the CIA but delegate to the fullest possible extent the day-to-day manaF7ement responsibility to the Deputy Director of the au*ency and himself concentrate on the important leadership role of the Intelligence Community. The Commission has given some thought to the qualities to be sought: in a DCI:_what are the principal elements the President should loot; for in selecting a man for this taxing position, particularly as intelligence functions are, and inevitably will be, at once controversial and prominent in the public eye. In essence -- and part from the obvious characteristics of leadership, integrity, managerial talent and substantive knowledge of foreign affairs -- two perhaps conflicting demands afire presented. There is need for a man with experience and professional talent in the highly technical field of intelligence. At the same time there is need for someone with bigh public standing, one at home in the swirl of political life; in short, a man of cabinet stature. The Commission believes that the latter qualifications should be dominant. Without excluding the possibility of a professional career officer Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80M0l 133A001000100004-3 Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80M01133A001000100004-3 achieving the position -- even as a Foreign Service Officer "could be" Secretary of State -- the Commission would favor the position being filled by a public figure, a "politcal" appointment. REC0T?;l!ENIDA7IO? The position of DCI should be filled I~y someone with the strong personal confidence of the President. The DCI should probably be drawn from public l i T e, as Cabinet officer, instead of being a professional career intelligence officer. Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80M01133A001000100004-3 Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80M01133A001000100004-3 DRAFT/2/13 V. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT In dealing with the allocation of resources, three separate intractable problems plague the Intelligence Community: 1) The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has leadership responsibility over the entire Intelligence Community, but authority for budget resources, which is the basic instrument of control, remains with the Departments and agencies to whom Congress appropriates the funds. Thus, the DCI actually controls only 15 percent of the vast governmental intelligence budget; the remainin- 85 percent is beyond his reach, principally in the realm of the Secretary of Defense. 2) A curious anomaly exists in the matter of duplication and size of effort in the function of assessment of research and analysis, positive value is to be found in some measure of redundancy and duplication of effort. Moreover, the cost of additional resources is generally not consequential. On the other hand, with the function of collection, the reverse is true: duplication Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80M01133A001000100004-3 Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80MO1133AO01000100004-3 is of no value and of high cost; and the "need'' for more and more information is apparently limitless. Moreover, because of the technical facilities needed in collection, the high cost is almost impossible to assess. in meaningful terms. 3) The normal difficulti:s in bureaucratic budget procedures are compounded in the intelligence area by the pervasive necessity for confidentiality which inhibits the normal governmental practices, especially-those of open Congressional review. The foregoing problems were explored with special thoroughness in an !?SC/0113 study in 1971, led by James Schlesinger. The Schlesinga:? Report, endorsed b;; President Nixon and reaffirmed by President cord, led to several important developments in the resource management effort of Intelligence Community. The Commission has leaned heavily upon that report and without exception has endorsed its proposals in respect to resource management. The recommendations which the Commission makes therefore are by way of being supplementary. However, because of the enormous size of the intelligence effort - several billions of dollars, and because the manner in which the resources of intelligence are allocated are at the heart of one of the two imperatives to which !he Commission attaches such importance -- the imperative of oonomy of Effort -- it has Given great weight to these nattmm-s and makes its Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80MO1133AO01000100004-3 Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80MO1133AO01000100004-3 recommendations with particular care. A. Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC). Following the recommendations of the Schlesinger -ort, IRAC was established, shared by the DCI and including representatives of 0MB and the main components of the intelligence community. It (~Gsigned to provide advice to the DCI on he allocation of resources in much the same way as does the USIB assist the DCI in the coordination of intelligence activities anti the finished intelligence. IRAC apparently has proved itself to be a useful instrument. It meets regularly and has active working groups; its members have gained a much deeper understanding of the collection activiL L E..- . ~ ,J-blems of other members of the community. It has helped the DCI to identify some of the major collection resource issues even though members tend still to be defensive about their o n organizations' resources. The Commission's studies reveal that there is still a -nLt.:;_r l tendency to concentrate on proposals_ fcr new projects; the temptation is ever present to accept items uncritically because they are about the same as the previous year or generally s within budget guidelines for increases, and to concentrate _t_ention on proposed new items. An aggressive policy is n--aed to adjust this perspective. Ho.%,ever, no specific Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80MO1133AO01000100004-3 Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80MO1133AO01000100004-3 recommendations are presented .wTith respect to IRAC. B. Intelligence Co:7imn_ini ty Staff. In accordance with the Schlesinger Report, the President directed the DCI to emphasize positive leadership in planning, reviewing, and evaluating intelligence programs and to structure ardstrengthen its personal staff to accomplish this. Since that time, the DCI perscnal staff - the IC staff - has been very substantially expanded and has become very much involved in community management. Its endeavors are in part directed at the guidelines for collection of intelligence and in the KIQ's program (fey Intelligence Questions) which are discussed in relation to the "Policymaker and Intelligence Support." lost importantly, the IC staff plays a central role in the resource allocation management, in the IRAC deliberations and in the whole budget process and procedures for the intelligence Community. The Commission believes that the work of the IC staff is altogehter constructive and useful and has no recommendations to make. C. Budget Procedures. Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80MO1133AO01000100004-3 Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80MO1133AO01000100004-3 -5- Ingredients of an effective resource management and of sound budgetary process are threefold: - - a clear understanding of the purposes for which resources are to be expended. -- a comprehensive plan and strategyt?;hich would relate programs for intelligence to these purposes. a consolidated presentation which relates agency budgets to coordip.ated programs and functional objectives. To meet the foregoing demands, the DCI no: ?r has two important instrumentalities, which were the direct product of the Schlesinger T~epor?t. i) Perspectives for `slii er n 1975-]O4n is an important annual substantive overview of the political, econommic, and security environment anticipated in the next five years prepared by the DCI in collaboration with members of the Intelligence Community. This document has value in many aspects of intelligence support for policy. In terms of budget it could play a more effective S. part by setting a common base, reviewed annually, on which intelligence needs are structured. Accordingly, the Commission believes that Perspectives , as prepared by the DOT, and coordinated in USIB and IPAC, should be reviewed and endorsed by the i'1SC and made the foundation block for resource allocation. Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80MO1133AO01000100004-3 Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80MO1133AO01000100004-3 -6- ii) Also pursuant to the Schlesinger Report recornmenda- tions, a Gon. olidu.ted 'rational ?orei c n Intelli.^ence Budget has been pulled together by the PCI for the past three years. This Consolidated Bud=get presentation is valuable as it puts forward a consistent overall picture of the intelligence effort which can be reviewed in the normal budgetary process by 01"MFIB, by the President, and by Congress. The remaining key ingredient to a sound resource management and budgetary process -- a comprehensive plan and strategy -- still needs to be developed. The Commission believes a start has been made but that strong steps should be taken by the DCI - with the constant backing-; of the MSC and in particular the full concur ence of the Secretar_as of Stat.e- and Defense - to formulate annually such a community-:ride plan and strategy. This document should give a forward look to intelligence programs, should bring greater coherence to the community effort, and should afford the President and NSC a useful instrument in its direction of the Intelligence Community. The Plan and Strategy must critically examine on-going programs and-in particular 1 CD highlight the impact and future costs of current intelligence program and budget decisions. In addition, ittshould each year focus attention on the five or six major issues in the current com:.,nity budget, on which the -members of the Community, and the NSC should ernphasi?e. In this way the Plan and Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80MO1133AO01000100004-3 Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80MO1133AO01000100004-3 . -7- Strategy could become for the DCI a far more effective instrument of leadership tb n the cumbersome and limited review process now carried cut in conjunction with the 0,,1B. Indeed, the Cor mission believes this instrument - an annual Plan and Strategy - could become a central means of Resources 1?'anagement of the intelligence community on which the President can confidently rely. In its examination of the economy of effort in the Intelligence Community, the Commission has struggled with the simple problem of size. It believes that significant cur- tailment is possible without cripnling the intelligence support for policy and operations and that his curtailment can only be achieved by the strong leadership of the DCI and the strict budgetary review procedures recommends. From testimony before it, ho~rever, the Commission has come firmly to the view that intelligence agencies must go to exceptional lengths to overcome inheret pressures for enlarged budgets. Despite the fact that roughly a 40 percent cutback has been made in personnel over the last five years, and that the overall intelligence budget has been held rL-latilvely constant, we are persuaded that agencies can maize substantial further reductions. z RECD: _E';DAT10,~ Tne ?1SC should a) direct the DCI to prepare in addition to the Consolidated National Foreign Into l i gence Budget and his Five- s lve- Yea.r Perspectives for -telliF_ence, an annual "Plan and StrateHy for Intelligence" to be the basis for Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80MO1133AO01000100004-3 Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80MO1133AO01000100004-3 -8- agency; budgets b} Y>ec ;ire all intelligence agency budgeL, submissions to conform to -at asking pattern deterrni.;ed by the DCI which would set agency responsibilities and budget lir:itations, Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80MO1133AO01000100004-3 Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80M01133A001000100004-3 DRAFT :FH/hpl/2/l4/75 S;IIl. Executive Oversight The U.S. government must have adequate safeguards for overseeing U.S. foreign intelligence activities. The very nature of its work and the fact that it operates under the screen of secrecy which greatly inhibits normal processors of oversight, m kcs this especially necessary. Some constraints among CIA activities are of course built into the normal foreign policy procedures of the Executive branch. Intelligence officers, for example, deal with, and therefore are somewhat controlled by, policymakers. The CIF, representative in each country abroad is subject to the overall rdirection of the US Ambassador - although the privacy of communication makes this relationship difficult to control. In Washington CIA officials meet regularly with policy officers to review both substantive developments and operational a-ctivity. More importantly, the 40 Committee of the NSC approves all covert actions undertaken by CIA. Elsewhere, the Commission recommends a strengthening of this important review procedure. In addition to the foregoing, the President has need for an altogether independent body, free of operational responsibilities and removed from the possibility of any organizational bias, constantly to assess the effectiveness of the intelligence community and to oversee its conformity to the letter and the spirit of the President's wishes. President Eisenhower established a Citizens Panel in 1956 to perform this oversight role. The group, now known as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80M01133A001000100004-3 Approved For Release 2007/07/13: CIA-RDP80M01133A001000100004-3 Page 2 Board (PFIAB) is composed of japproximatel_y! 12 distinguished I C private citizens, selected on a non-partisan basis whose knowledge in previous experience qualify them as advisers on intelligence matters. The PFIAB meets regularly two dais every other month, and its chairman anti various mer ers devote time betieeen meetings to the work of the Board. The Board is served by a two-man professional staff. In its early days, the Board played a role in satellite systems. In recent years, the PFIAB has conducted several useful postmortem studies of alleged intelligence failures, such as Sihanouk_ville, Chile and the Middle East war of 1973. It has also produced constructive reports on subs-t