THE DILEMMA OF 'PROTECTION OF SOURCES'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A001000100006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 29, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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TO:
SUBJECT: The Dilemma of "Protection of Sources"
- 1/29/75
An urgent need arises to decide the manner in which
5i+vv?;7
the Commission addressas the complex and controversial
question of CIA authority in "prowection of sources." The
subject probably will come up m'0n 3.:a /Tuesday, February 3/4,
at the forthcoming Committee II - ---'h Leiiige:nce Meeting.
The National. Security Act of 1147 gives the DCI the
responsibility intelligence sources and.
methods from unauthorized disclosure." Under this provision,
CIA a io - l~eY - performs importan': counter-intelligence
A
activities abr It
also seeks to contain leaks and limit disclosures of
important information. Recently the CTA has sought to re-
enforce its statutory authority in this area, to match'what
it holds to be its responsibility and need.
The Commission initially contracted with
to make a study of the issue. As this one paper could not
encompass all the pros and cons of this complex i-z~se and
afford the Commission :oasis of r~--:sponsi.ble judgment, the
Committee II first draft avoi_'od tr issue. This nay not
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be possible any longer to do and yet the Committee lacks
any clear and comprehensive basis for taking a position.
Legally the issues seem to fall into the following
areas:
1. Should CIA have any authority for protection
of sources? Presumably it should because of
its overseas counter-intelligence responsibility.
In any event, a-contrary case would have to be
developed by lawyers who know intelligence.
2. CIA has recommended in its proposed legisla-
tion that it have some authority for prior
restraint. To evaluate responsibl this
complex constitutional issue would Y a major
exercise; to say anything about it without
such careful evaluation would be less than
fully responsible.
3. CIA also proposes
more restrictive disclosure
statutes and much stronger criminal punish-
ment for unauthorized disclosure. Again,
highly controversial legislation on which
the Commission should presumably be loathe
to make judgments without very thorough and
balanced evaluations .Lt probably is not
appropriate to the mandate simply to indicate
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the one side of the issue "a real
fwS r3
need to protect sources."
The question then is how to come to grips with
1. Can we duck it, taking the position that
intelligence is important to the support of
the conduct of foreign policy but the commission
c not look ,into every detail of the
Intelligence function and still keep to its
basic purpose, even as it cannot look into
every corner of the Pentagon? To some this
would be a cop-out.
2. Do we take a procedural route, pointing out
that the issue is big, technical and con-
stitutional and recommending a special
commission{ 4 iternatively, d we indicate it
is a Congressional matter and the Oversight
Committees should address. (Cop-out also?
What are we in business for?)
3. Do we go after the substance and in the
remaining weeks mount a panel of constitu-
tional lawyers and intelligence specialists
who can explore in whatever depth is
+9~v
necessary make recommendations to the
Commissionsa /'l-c.- '-
Other considerations:
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a. Other Congressional and Executive Committees and
Commissions cannot avoid being smothered in these
same issues.
b. Mounting publicity accompanies any discussion of
the issues, e.g. Marchetti, Agee.
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DHAFTi/2/13
II. THE DIR" CTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
In the quarter'century since the enabling act, the
DCI has assumed the leadership of the intelligence Community
and taken full responsibility for the coordination of
functions and organizations as well as for the production --
that is, correlation and evaluation -- of "national"
intelligence reports and estimates. To these ends he has
developed a) a "Community'Staff" to assist him in the
coordination of activities, and b) a group of National
Intelligence Officers (NIOs )
assist in the preparation
of coordinated substantive intelligence. On the other
hand, as the Director of the Agency he has been directly
in charge of all of its important collection and research
assessment functions.
The DCI, quite clearly, and purposefully, wears two hats.
He is theprincipal adviser to the President and the NSC
for intelligence and as such is responsible for the activities
of the entire intelligence community. And he-is-also the
head of CIA. Nor surprisingly, over the years proposals
have frequently, and responsibly, been put forward to separate
these two functions into two distinct positions, thus seeking
to reduce the burden and to avoid what appeared at times to be
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a conflict c interest between the two duties. For reasons
which the Commission believes to be altogether sound, this
course has not been follo,ved.: neither of the two responsibilities
could be strongly, or even adequately, discharged if divided. A
DCI without his own agency would have great difficulty filling
a leader:;b: ty; an independent intelli-
gence agency without a leadership responsibility would be at
the mercy of the several departments, particularly the
mil- tary .
In 1.971,however, the President, on the recommendation of
the Schlesinger Report, chose a compromise course: the DCI, while
ever the CIA, should remove himself
from the nay-to-day direction of the agency and concentrate
on his Community responsibilities. Although this directive,
for a number of reasons, was never fully carried out, the
Commission is impressed w ,its its validity as a concept and
with the undesirability of having the DCI preside over matters
in which he is himself an interested party. The pattern of
Chairman of the Board and President of a busi-ness?enterprise,
although only partially analagous, suggests itself in this
connection. In this way the DCI should be significantly
freed of a major management load but at the same time would
rtuc be wholly stripped of line responsibility which inevitably
'.:',;nces his leadership capability.
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PECOP P E1 DA_TTO'r : The Director of Central
Intelligence should retain line authority over
the CIA but deleaaie to the fullest possible extent
the day-to-day management responsibility to the
Deputy Director of the agency and himself
concentrate on the imoertant leadership role of
the Intelligence Community.
The Commission has given some thought to the qualities
to be sought in a DCI: what are the principal elements the
President should loo', for in selecting a man for this taxing
position, particularly as intelligence functions are, and inevitably
will be, at once controversial and prominent in the public eye.
In essence -- and part from the obvious characteristics of
leadership, integrity, managerial talent and substantive
knowledge of foreign affairs -- two perhaps conflicting demands
are presented. There is need for a man with experience and
professional talent in the highly technical field of intelligence.
At the same time there is need for someone with high public
standing, one at home in the swirl of political life; in
short, a man of cabinet stature. The Commission believes
that the latter qualifications should be dominant. Without
excluding the possibility of a professional career officer
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achieving the position -- even as a Foreign Service Officer
"could be" Secretary of State -- the Commission would favor
the position being filled by a public figure, a "political"
appointment.
RECOMMENDATION The position of DCI should be
filled'-',).y someone with the strong personal confidence
.of the President. The DCI should probably be drawn
from public life, as -a Cabinet officer, instead of
being a professional career intelligence officer.
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DRAFT/2/13
V V. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
In dealing with the allocation of resources, three
separate intractable problems plague the Intelligence
Community:
1) The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has
leadershio responsibility over the entire
Intelligence Community, but authority for budget
resources, which is the basic instrument of control,
remains with the Departments and agencies to whom
Congress appropriates the funds. Thus, the DCI
actually controls only 15 percent of the vast
governmental intelligence budget; the remaining
85 percent is beyond his reach, principally in the
realm of the Secretary of Defense.
2) A curious anomaly exists in the matter of
duplication and size of effort in the function of
assessment of research and analysis, positive value
is to be found in home measure of redundancy and
duplication of effort. Moreover, the cost of
additional resources is generally not
consequential. On the other hand, with the
function of collection, the reverse is true: duplication
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is of no value and of high cost; and the "need"
for more and more information is apparently
limitless. Moreover, because of the technical
facilities needed in collection, the high cost
is almost impossible to assess in meaningful terms.
3) The normal difficulties in barr-eaucratic budget
procedures are compounded in the intelligence
area by the pervasive necessity for confidentiality
which inhibits the normal governmental practices,
especially those of open Congressional review.
The for. egoing problems were
explored with special
thoroughness in an NSC/OT\"B study in 1971, led by James
Schlesinger. The Schlesin Report, endorsed-by President
Nixon and reaffirmed by President Ford, led to several important
developments in the resource management effort of Intelligence
Community. The Commission has leaned heavily upon that report
and without exception has endorsed its proposals in respect to
resource management. The recommendations which the Commission
makes therefore are by way of being supplementary. However,
because of the enormous size of the intelligence effort - several
billions of dollars, and because the manner in which the
resources of intelligence are allocated are at the heart of
one of the two i oeratives to which the Commission attaches
such importance -- the imperative of r:;conomy of Effort -- it
has given great w?:ei_ght to these matte::--~s and makes its
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recommendations with particular care.
A. Intelli.ence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC).
Following the recom-L,_n_,endations of the Schlesinger
_.ort, IRAC was established, shared by the DCI and including
representatives of 0.-H3 and the main components of the intelligence
community. It i-.: rl.-i fined to provide advice to the DCI
cri Lhe allocation of resources in much the same way as
does the USIB assist the DCI in the coordi_natb n of
intelligence activities and the finished intelligence.
IRAC apparently has proved itself to be a useful instrument.
It meets regularly and has active working groups; its members
have gained a much deeper understanding of the collection
activei,_c )blems of other members of
the co_:munit0T It has helped the DCI to identify some
of the major collection resource issues even though members
tend still to be defensive about their G'v.:l OrtaniZatiO?':S'
resources.
The Commission's studies reveal that there is still a
tendency to concentrate on proposals_fcr:e`?r projects;
the temptation is ever present to accept items uncritically
because they are about the same as the previous year or generally
within budget guidelines for increases, and to concentrate
E+ ention on proposed new items. An aggressive policy is
re"'aed to adjust this perspective. however, no specific
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recom.-nendations are presented with respect to IRAC.
B. Intelligence Corr unity Staff.
In accordance with the Schlesinger Report, the President
directed the DCI to emphasize positive leadership in planning,
reviewing, and evaluating intelligence programs and to structure
ardstrengthen its personal staff to accomplish this. Since
that time, the DCI perscnal staff - the IC staff - has been
very substantially expanded and has become very much
involved in community management. Its endeavors are in
part directed at the guidelines for collection of intelligence
and in the KIQ's program (Key Intelligence Questions) which
are discussed in relation to the "Policy-maker and Intelligence
Support." Most importantly, the IC staff plays a
central role in the resource allocation management, in the
IRAC deliberations and in the whole budget process and
procedures for the intelligence Community. The Commission
believes that the work of the IC staff is altogehter constructive
and useful and has no recommendations to make.
C. Budget Procedures.
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Ingredients of an effective resource management and
of sound budgetary process are threefold:
a clear understanding of the purposes for which
resources are to be expended.
-- a comprehensive plan and strategy which would
relate programs for intelligence to these
purposes.
-- a consolidated presentation which relates agency
budgets to coordinated programs and functional
objectives.
To meet the foregoing demands, the DCI. now has two
important instrumentalities, which were the direct product
of the Schlesinger Report.
i) Perspectives for irtell,Tence 1975-]QQn is an
important annual substantive overview of the
political, economic, and security environment
anticipated in the next five years prepared by
the DCI in collaboration with members of the
Intelligence Community. This document has value
in many aspects of intelligence support for policy.
In terms of budget it could play a more effective
part by setting a common base, reviewed annually,
on which intelligence needs are structured.
Accordingly, the CoPJnission believes that Perspectives, as
prepared by the DCI, and coordinated in USIB and
IRAC, should be reviewed and endorsed by the
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ii) Also pursuant to the Schlesi_n ger Report recommenda-
tions, a Consolidated National. Foreign Intelligence
Budget has been pulled together by the DCI for the
past three ,years. This Consolidated Budget presentation is
valuable as it puts forward a consistent overall
picture of the intelligence effort which can be
reviewed in the normal budgetary process by ONB,
by the President, and by Congress.
The remaining key ingredient to a sound resource management
and budgetary process -- a comprehensive plan and strategy --
still needs to be developed. The Commission believes a start
has been made but that strong steps should be taken by the
DCI - with the constant backing of the NSC and in particular
the full concur ence of the Secretaries of State and Defense -
to formulate annually such a community-iide plan and stratev.
This document should give a forward look to intelligence programs,
should bring greater coherence to the community effort, and should
afford the President and ,ISC a useful instrumentl in its
direction of the Intelligence Community. The Plan and Strategy
must critically examine on-going programs and--in p-articular
highlight the impact and future costs of current intelligence
pro`ra-m and budget decisions. in addition, it should each
year `focus attention on the five or six major issues in the
current community budget, on which the members of the Community,
and the NSC should emphasize. In this way the Plan and
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Strategy could become for the DCI a far more effective
instrument of leadership than the cumbersome and limited
review process now carried out in conjunction with the
OMB. Indeed, the Commission believes this instrument -
an annual Plan and Strategy - could become a central means
of ResourccsYlanagement of the intelligence community on which
the President can confidently rely.
In its examination of the economy of effort in the
Intelligence Co.*mmunity, the Commission has struggled with
the simple problem of size. It believes that significant cur-
tailment is possible ~;_;thout cripplirg the intelligence support
for policy and operations and that his curtailment can only be
achieved by the strong leadership of the DCI and the strict
budgetary review procedures it recommends. From testimony
before it, however, the Commission has come firmly to the
view that intelligence agencies must go to exceptional
lengths to overcome inherent pressures for enlarged budgets.
Despite the fact that roughly a 40 percent cutback has been
made in personnel over the last five years, and that the
overall intelligence budget has been held reFlati"Vely constant,
we are persuaded that agencies can make substantial further
RECO ?i_ `ID!'i''ION The NSC should a) direct the
DCT to prepare in addition to the Consolidated
National Foreign Intelligence Budget and his Five-
Year PersoectfvT 's for lntelli_gence an annual "Plan
and Strategy for Intelligence" to be the basis for
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reductions.
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agency budgets ; b) recI:ire all int-,e1ligence agency
budget submissions to conform to a tasking
pattern determined by the DCI which would set
agency responsibilities and budget limitations.
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x/75 25X1
i,III. Executive Oversight
The U.S. government must have adequate safeguards for
overseeing U.S. foreign intelligence activities. The very
nature of ii s work and the fact. that it operates under the
screen of secrecy which greatly inhibits normal processors of
oversighT , crakes this especially necessary.
Some constraints among CIA activities are of course
built into the normal foreign policy procedures of the Executive
branch. Intelligence officers, for example, deal with, and
therefore are somewhat controlled by, policymakers. The CIA
representative in each country abroad is subject to the overall
direction of the US Ambassador - although the privacy of
communication makes this relationship difficult to-.control.
In Washington CIA officials meet regularly with policy officers
to review both substantive developments and operational activity.
More inoortantly, the 40 Committee of the NSC approves
all covert actions undertaken by CIA. Elsewhere, the Commission
recommends a strengthening of this important review procedure.
In addition to the foregoing, the President has need for
an altogether independent body, free of operational responsibilities
and removed from the possibility of any organizational bias,
constantly to assess the effectiveness of the intelligence
community and to oversee its conformity to the letter and the
spirit of the President's wishes. President Eisenhower established
a Citizens Panel in 1956 to perform this oversight role. The
group, now known as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
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Board (PFIAB% is composed oflapproximate y 12 distinguished
private citizens, selected on a non-partisan basis whose
knowledge in previous experience qualify them as advisers on
intelligence matters.
The PFIAB meets regularly two dais every other month,
and its chairman anci various rren'i rs devote time between meetings
to the work of the Board. The Board is served by a two-man
professional staff. In its early days, the Board played a role
in the development of the U-2 and later in satellite systems.
In recent years, the PFIAB has conducted several useful postmortem
studies of alleged intelligence failures, such as Sihanoukville,
Chile and the Middle East war of 1973. It has also produced
constructive reports on substant;u.e-areas, such as on economic
intelligence,on the growing Soviet naval power,on the Communist
strategic threat, and, of special value, on human source
intelligence.
The Commission believes that PFIAB has been an important
source of advice to the President on the adequacy of the intelligence
community, but that its full potential has not..beexi realized.
In large part this shortfall arises from limitations sometimes
imposed on its relationship with the Chief Executive, including
the interposition of staff layers and the infrequent personal
meetings with the President.
RECOMMENDATION PFIAB performs a critical function.
To be effective it must have the confidence of the President
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-as well as Executive. over:-4, -h - . is required
c`~ r'ft`a t at h
and receive its regular attention. The membership
of PFIAB could usefully be enlarged to include a
wider spectrum of public interest. The staff too,
should be enlarged and be dra~?rr_ from outside as well
as from within the intelligence community.
CommitteeII believes that more effective Congressional
subject is being
Lislative).
addressed by Committee I (Congress and Executivd
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(S
and receive is regular attention. Th r._ mb rsh`
of PFIAB could usefully be enlarged to a
wider spectrum of public interest. The staff too,
should be enlarged and be drawn from outside as well
as from within the intelligence community.
NOTE:
CommitteeII believes that more effective
as well as Executive oversight is required and no :, that tl1
subject is being addressed by Committee I (Con.gresz-, and
Lislat've) .
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Februarv
STATINTL
Office of the Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.
25X1A Dear
The enclosed draft of the entire report on intelligence
was discussed by Commissioners on our subcommittee on February I,-.
My marginal notes are shown, and some general comments, identified
by the section of the report concerned, are attached on separate note
sheets. Tom Reckford will do the rewrite.
An additional copy is being passed to Andy Marshall for
review and comment by DOD, as was previously done. Let me
reiterate that the material is being passed along informally on my uwri
authority for comment. We definitely do not want to make any snbs=ar:-
tive errors or security violations.
In case you think the draft might have been stron,er
I do), another set of papers are enclosed which indicate what I L:a?,ve
managed to keep out of the final report. It has been a real h~issle.
Although I am not particularly proud of the finished product, at least
most of the main points are included and very little damagint n,aterial
has crept in. Let me know if that assessment appears incorrect
Sincerely,
25X1
25X1A
NSC review(s) completed.
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