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December 16, 2016
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March 15, 2005
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January 29, 1975
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Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000100006-1 TO: SUBJECT: The Dilemma of "Protection of Sources" - 1/29/75 An urgent need arises to decide the manner in which 5i+vv?;7 the Commission addressas the complex and controversial question of CIA authority in "prowection of sources." The subject probably will come up m'0n 3.:a /Tuesday, February 3/4, at the forthcoming Committee II - ---'h Leiiige:nce Meeting. The National. Security Act of 1147 gives the DCI the responsibility intelligence sources and. methods from unauthorized disclosure." Under this provision, CIA a io - l~eY - performs importan': counter-intelligence A activities abr It also seeks to contain leaks and limit disclosures of important information. Recently the CTA has sought to re- enforce its statutory authority in this area, to match'what it holds to be its responsibility and need. The Commission initially contracted with to make a study of the issue. As this one paper could not encompass all the pros and cons of this complex i-z~se and afford the Commission :oasis of r~--:sponsi.ble judgment, the Committee II first draft avoi_'od tr issue. This nay not 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000100006-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000100006-1 be possible any longer to do and yet the Committee lacks any clear and comprehensive basis for taking a position. Legally the issues seem to fall into the following areas: 1. Should CIA have any authority for protection of sources? Presumably it should because of its overseas counter-intelligence responsibility. In any event, a-contrary case would have to be developed by lawyers who know intelligence. 2. CIA has recommended in its proposed legisla- tion that it have some authority for prior restraint. To evaluate responsibl this complex constitutional issue would Y a major exercise; to say anything about it without such careful evaluation would be less than fully responsible. 3. CIA also proposes more restrictive disclosure statutes and much stronger criminal punish- ment for unauthorized disclosure. Again, highly controversial legislation on which the Commission should presumably be loathe to make judgments without very thorough and balanced evaluations .Lt probably is not appropriate to the mandate simply to indicate Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000100006-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/18: CIA-RDP80M01133A00.1000100006-1 the one side of the issue "a real fwS r3 need to protect sources." The question then is how to come to grips with 1. Can we duck it, taking the position that intelligence is important to the support of the conduct of foreign policy but the commission c not look ,into every detail of the Intelligence function and still keep to its basic purpose, even as it cannot look into every corner of the Pentagon? To some this would be a cop-out. 2. Do we take a procedural route, pointing out that the issue is big, technical and con- stitutional and recommending a special commission{ 4 iternatively, d we indicate it is a Congressional matter and the Oversight Committees should address. (Cop-out also? What are we in business for?) 3. Do we go after the substance and in the remaining weeks mount a panel of constitu- tional lawyers and intelligence specialists who can explore in whatever depth is +9~v necessary make recommendations to the Commissionsa /'l-c.- '- Other considerations: Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000100006-1 Approved For Release 2005/Q411.8 :_CIA-RDP80Miit1.33AQIl 1.000.19400&-.1_ a. Other Congressional and Executive Committees and Commissions cannot avoid being smothered in these same issues. b. Mounting publicity accompanies any discussion of the issues, e.g. Marchetti, Agee. Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000100006-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80M01133A001000100006-1 DHAFTi/2/13 II. THE DIR" CTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE In the quarter'century since the enabling act, the DCI has assumed the leadership of the intelligence Community and taken full responsibility for the coordination of functions and organizations as well as for the production -- that is, correlation and evaluation -- of "national" intelligence reports and estimates. To these ends he has developed a) a "Community'Staff" to assist him in the coordination of activities, and b) a group of National Intelligence Officers (NIOs ) assist in the preparation of coordinated substantive intelligence. On the other hand, as the Director of the Agency he has been directly in charge of all of its important collection and research assessment functions. The DCI, quite clearly, and purposefully, wears two hats. He is theprincipal adviser to the President and the NSC for intelligence and as such is responsible for the activities of the entire intelligence community. And he-is-also the head of CIA. Nor surprisingly, over the years proposals have frequently, and responsibly, been put forward to separate these two functions into two distinct positions, thus seeking to reduce the burden and to avoid what appeared at times to be Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80M0l133A001000100006-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/18: CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000100006-1 a conflict c interest between the two duties. For reasons which the Commission believes to be altogether sound, this course has not been follo,ved.: neither of the two responsibilities could be strongly, or even adequately, discharged if divided. A DCI without his own agency would have great difficulty filling a leader:;b: ty; an independent intelli- gence agency without a leadership responsibility would be at the mercy of the several departments, particularly the mil- tary . In 1.971,however, the President, on the recommendation of the Schlesinger Report, chose a compromise course: the DCI, while ever the CIA, should remove himself from the nay-to-day direction of the agency and concentrate on his Community responsibilities. Although this directive, for a number of reasons, was never fully carried out, the Commission is impressed w ,its its validity as a concept and with the undesirability of having the DCI preside over matters in which he is himself an interested party. The pattern of Chairman of the Board and President of a busi-ness?enterprise, although only partially analagous, suggests itself in this connection. In this way the DCI should be significantly freed of a major management load but at the same time would rtuc be wholly stripped of line responsibility which inevitably '.:',;nces his leadership capability. Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000100006-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80M01133A001000100006-1 ' PECOP P E1 DA_TTO'r : The Director of Central Intelligence should retain line authority over the CIA but deleaaie to the fullest possible extent the day-to-day management responsibility to the Deputy Director of the agency and himself concentrate on the imoertant leadership role of the Intelligence Community. The Commission has given some thought to the qualities to be sought in a DCI: what are the principal elements the President should loo', for in selecting a man for this taxing position, particularly as intelligence functions are, and inevitably will be, at once controversial and prominent in the public eye. In essence -- and part from the obvious characteristics of leadership, integrity, managerial talent and substantive knowledge of foreign affairs -- two perhaps conflicting demands are presented. There is need for a man with experience and professional talent in the highly technical field of intelligence. At the same time there is need for someone with high public standing, one at home in the swirl of political life; in short, a man of cabinet stature. The Commission believes that the latter qualifications should be dominant. Without excluding the possibility of a professional career officer Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80M0l133A001000100006-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000100006-1 . achieving the position -- even as a Foreign Service Officer "could be" Secretary of State -- the Commission would favor the position being filled by a public figure, a "political" appointment. RECOMMENDATION The position of DCI should be filled'-',).y someone with the strong personal confidence .of the President. The DCI should probably be drawn from public life, as -a Cabinet officer, instead of being a professional career intelligence officer. Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000100006-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80M01133A001000100006-1 DRAFT/2/13 V V. RESOURCE MANAGEMENT In dealing with the allocation of resources, three separate intractable problems plague the Intelligence Community: 1) The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) has leadershio responsibility over the entire Intelligence Community, but authority for budget resources, which is the basic instrument of control, remains with the Departments and agencies to whom Congress appropriates the funds. Thus, the DCI actually controls only 15 percent of the vast governmental intelligence budget; the remaining 85 percent is beyond his reach, principally in the realm of the Secretary of Defense. 2) A curious anomaly exists in the matter of duplication and size of effort in the function of assessment of research and analysis, positive value is to be found in home measure of redundancy and duplication of effort. Moreover, the cost of additional resources is generally not consequential. On the other hand, with the function of collection, the reverse is true: duplication Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80M0l133A001000100006-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80M01133A001000100006-1 is of no value and of high cost; and the "need" for more and more information is apparently limitless. Moreover, because of the technical facilities needed in collection, the high cost is almost impossible to assess in meaningful terms. 3) The normal difficulties in barr-eaucratic budget procedures are compounded in the intelligence area by the pervasive necessity for confidentiality which inhibits the normal governmental practices, especially those of open Congressional review. The for. egoing problems were explored with special thoroughness in an NSC/OT\"B study in 1971, led by James Schlesinger. The Schlesin Report, endorsed-by President Nixon and reaffirmed by President Ford, led to several important developments in the resource management effort of Intelligence Community. The Commission has leaned heavily upon that report and without exception has endorsed its proposals in respect to resource management. The recommendations which the Commission makes therefore are by way of being supplementary. However, because of the enormous size of the intelligence effort - several billions of dollars, and because the manner in which the resources of intelligence are allocated are at the heart of one of the two i oeratives to which the Commission attaches such importance -- the imperative of r:;conomy of Effort -- it has given great w?:ei_ght to these matte::--~s and makes its Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80M0l133A001000100006-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000100006-1 -3- recommendations with particular care. A. Intelli.ence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC). Following the recom-L,_n_,endations of the Schlesinger _.ort, IRAC was established, shared by the DCI and including representatives of 0.-H3 and the main components of the intelligence community. It i-.: rl.-i fined to provide advice to the DCI cri Lhe allocation of resources in much the same way as does the USIB assist the DCI in the coordi_natb n of intelligence activities and the finished intelligence. IRAC apparently has proved itself to be a useful instrument. It meets regularly and has active working groups; its members have gained a much deeper understanding of the collection activei,_c )blems of other members of the co_:munit0T It has helped the DCI to identify some of the major collection resource issues even though members tend still to be defensive about their G'v.:l OrtaniZatiO?':S' resources. The Commission's studies reveal that there is still a tendency to concentrate on proposals_fcr:e`?r projects; the temptation is ever present to accept items uncritically because they are about the same as the previous year or generally within budget guidelines for increases, and to concentrate E+ ention on proposed new items. An aggressive policy is re"'aed to adjust this perspective. however, no specific Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000100006-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000100006-1 . _'4_ recom.-nendations are presented with respect to IRAC. B. Intelligence Corr unity Staff. In accordance with the Schlesinger Report, the President directed the DCI to emphasize positive leadership in planning, reviewing, and evaluating intelligence programs and to structure ardstrengthen its personal staff to accomplish this. Since that time, the DCI perscnal staff - the IC staff - has been very substantially expanded and has become very much involved in community management. Its endeavors are in part directed at the guidelines for collection of intelligence and in the KIQ's program (Key Intelligence Questions) which are discussed in relation to the "Policy-maker and Intelligence Support." Most importantly, the IC staff plays a central role in the resource allocation management, in the IRAC deliberations and in the whole budget process and procedures for the intelligence Community. The Commission believes that the work of the IC staff is altogehter constructive and useful and has no recommendations to make. C. Budget Procedures. Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000100006-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000100006-1 -5- Ingredients of an effective resource management and of sound budgetary process are threefold: a clear understanding of the purposes for which resources are to be expended. -- a comprehensive plan and strategy which would relate programs for intelligence to these purposes. -- a consolidated presentation which relates agency budgets to coordinated programs and functional objectives. To meet the foregoing demands, the DCI. now has two important instrumentalities, which were the direct product of the Schlesinger Report. i) Perspectives for irtell,Tence 1975-]QQn is an important annual substantive overview of the political, economic, and security environment anticipated in the next five years prepared by the DCI in collaboration with members of the Intelligence Community. This document has value in many aspects of intelligence support for policy. In terms of budget it could play a more effective part by setting a common base, reviewed annually, on which intelligence needs are structured. Accordingly, the CoPJnission believes that Perspectives, as prepared by the DCI, and coordinated in USIB and IRAC, should be reviewed and endorsed by the Approve rLd or F sX05/ /~Fd F RD0> B~QI~11 3A00'~fi~011Q4k~~6-1 allocation. Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO010001-00006-1 -6- ii) Also pursuant to the Schlesi_n ger Report recommenda- tions, a Consolidated National. Foreign Intelligence Budget has been pulled together by the DCI for the past three ,years. This Consolidated Budget presentation is valuable as it puts forward a consistent overall picture of the intelligence effort which can be reviewed in the normal budgetary process by ONB, by the President, and by Congress. The remaining key ingredient to a sound resource management and budgetary process -- a comprehensive plan and strategy -- still needs to be developed. The Commission believes a start has been made but that strong steps should be taken by the DCI - with the constant backing of the NSC and in particular the full concur ence of the Secretaries of State and Defense - to formulate annually such a community-iide plan and stratev. This document should give a forward look to intelligence programs, should bring greater coherence to the community effort, and should afford the President and ,ISC a useful instrumentl in its direction of the Intelligence Community. The Plan and Strategy must critically examine on-going programs and--in p-articular highlight the impact and future costs of current intelligence pro`ra-m and budget decisions. in addition, it should each year `focus attention on the five or six major issues in the current community budget, on which the members of the Community, and the NSC should emphasize. In this way the Plan and Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000100006-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80M01133A001000100006-1 -7- Strategy could become for the DCI a far more effective instrument of leadership than the cumbersome and limited review process now carried out in conjunction with the OMB. Indeed, the Commission believes this instrument - an annual Plan and Strategy - could become a central means of ResourccsYlanagement of the intelligence community on which the President can confidently rely. In its examination of the economy of effort in the Intelligence Co.*mmunity, the Commission has struggled with the simple problem of size. It believes that significant cur- tailment is possible ~;_;thout cripplirg the intelligence support for policy and operations and that his curtailment can only be achieved by the strong leadership of the DCI and the strict budgetary review procedures it recommends. From testimony before it, however, the Commission has come firmly to the view that intelligence agencies must go to exceptional lengths to overcome inherent pressures for enlarged budgets. Despite the fact that roughly a 40 percent cutback has been made in personnel over the last five years, and that the overall intelligence budget has been held reFlati"Vely constant, we are persuaded that agencies can make substantial further RECO ?i_ `ID!'i''ION The NSC should a) direct the DCT to prepare in addition to the Consolidated National Foreign Intelligence Budget and his Five- Year PersoectfvT 's for lntelli_gence an annual "Plan and Strategy for Intelligence" to be the basis for Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80M0l133A001000100006-1 reductions. Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80MO1133AO01000100006-1 -8- agency budgets ; b) recI:ire all int-,e1ligence agency budget submissions to conform to a tasking pattern determined by the DCI which would set agency responsibilities and budget limitations. Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000100006-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80M01133A001000100006-1 x/75 25X1 i,III. Executive Oversight The U.S. government must have adequate safeguards for overseeing U.S. foreign intelligence activities. The very nature of ii s work and the fact. that it operates under the screen of secrecy which greatly inhibits normal processors of oversighT , crakes this especially necessary. Some constraints among CIA activities are of course built into the normal foreign policy procedures of the Executive branch. Intelligence officers, for example, deal with, and therefore are somewhat controlled by, policymakers. The CIA representative in each country abroad is subject to the overall direction of the US Ambassador - although the privacy of communication makes this relationship difficult to-.control. In Washington CIA officials meet regularly with policy officers to review both substantive developments and operational activity. More inoortantly, the 40 Committee of the NSC approves all covert actions undertaken by CIA. Elsewhere, the Commission recommends a strengthening of this important review procedure. In addition to the foregoing, the President has need for an altogether independent body, free of operational responsibilities and removed from the possibility of any organizational bias, constantly to assess the effectiveness of the intelligence community and to oversee its conformity to the letter and the spirit of the President's wishes. President Eisenhower established a Citizens Panel in 1956 to perform this oversight role. The group, now known as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80M0l133A001000100006-1 Approved For. Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80M01133A001000100006-1 Page 2 Board (PFIAB% is composed oflapproximate y 12 distinguished private citizens, selected on a non-partisan basis whose knowledge in previous experience qualify them as advisers on intelligence matters. The PFIAB meets regularly two dais every other month, and its chairman anci various rren'i rs devote time between meetings to the work of the Board. The Board is served by a two-man professional staff. In its early days, the Board played a role in the development of the U-2 and later in satellite systems. In recent years, the PFIAB has conducted several useful postmortem studies of alleged intelligence failures, such as Sihanoukville, Chile and the Middle East war of 1973. It has also produced constructive reports on substant;u.e-areas, such as on economic intelligence,on the growing Soviet naval power,on the Communist strategic threat, and, of special value, on human source intelligence. The Commission believes that PFIAB has been an important source of advice to the President on the adequacy of the intelligence community, but that its full potential has not..beexi realized. In large part this shortfall arises from limitations sometimes imposed on its relationship with the Chief Executive, including the interposition of staff layers and the infrequent personal meetings with the President. RECOMMENDATION PFIAB performs a critical function. To be effective it must have the confidence of the President Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80M0l133A001000100006-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/18: CIA-RDP89M01133A001000100006-1 icJc 3 -as well as Executive. over:-4, -h - . is required c`~ r'ft`a t at h and receive its regular attention. The membership of PFIAB could usefully be enlarged to include a wider spectrum of public interest. The staff too, should be enlarged and be dra~?rr_ from outside as well as from within the intelligence community. CommitteeII believes that more effective Congressional subject is being Lislative). addressed by Committee I (Congress and Executivd Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000100006-1 _ Approved For.Release 2005/04/18: CIA RDP80.M011.33A001000100006-1 ;1 ;t(Je 3 (S and receive is regular attention. Th r._ mb rsh` of PFIAB could usefully be enlarged to a wider spectrum of public interest. The staff too, should be enlarged and be drawn from outside as well as from within the intelligence community. NOTE: CommitteeII believes that more effective as well as Executive oversight is required and no :, that tl1 subject is being addressed by Committee I (Con.gresz-, and Lislat've) . Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80M0l133A001000100006-1 Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01000100006-1 Februarv STATINTL Office of the Director Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C. 25X1A Dear The enclosed draft of the entire report on intelligence was discussed by Commissioners on our subcommittee on February I,-. My marginal notes are shown, and some general comments, identified by the section of the report concerned, are attached on separate note sheets. Tom Reckford will do the rewrite. An additional copy is being passed to Andy Marshall for review and comment by DOD, as was previously done. Let me reiterate that the material is being passed along informally on my uwri authority for comment. We definitely do not want to make any snbs=ar:- tive errors or security violations. In case you think the draft might have been stron,er I do), another set of papers are enclosed which indicate what I L:a?,ve managed to keep out of the final report. It has been a real h~issle. Although I am not particularly proud of the finished product, at least most of the main points are included and very little damagint n,aterial has crept in. Let me know if that assessment appears incorrect Sincerely, 25X1 25X1A NSC review(s) completed. Approved For Release 2005/04/18 : CIA-RDP80MOl 133AO01 000100006-1