SECURITY COMPARTMENTATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A001100090016-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: December 2, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

I Executive Re 13Y
2 December l7
--': '?
Appro~ira0~~P$~I~E1340~11
SUBJECT: Security Compartmentation
When met with
you recently to tell you the results
told you indicated an interest in
seeing.
of his review of the "secrecy" problem,
he mentioned a paper prepared by Bob
on compartmentation. Attached
is a copy of that report which I was
Gen. Wilson has had several
meetings recently to devise a plan of
action for moving this problem forward.
He will be submitting to you soon some
recommendations on how we should proceed.
Major Geieral, USAF (Ret.)
Actng D/DCI/IC
INFORMATION
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A CONCEPT FOIZ
SECURITY AND COMPARTMENTATION OF
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
1. This paper offers a conceptual approach to
meeting today's seemingly contradictory requirements in
the handling of intelligence in general and its compartmentation
in particular.
2. On the-one hand there is a growing need to
simplify and facilitate official access to intelligence
within the Executive Branch, the Armed Forces and Congress;
on the other, we must focus our security efforts on the
protection of the truly sensitive intelligence sources and
methods. The conceptual 'approach presented in this paper
is based on two principles.
24 November 1975
,..a. The official use of Foreign Intelligence
can be facilitated by a better balance in the
considerations of the needs to protect intelligence.
At present unnecessary security procedures are
hampering the ..use -,of intelligence and diluting
the security attention that should be addressed to
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the really sensitive-aspects o
sources and methods.
intelligence
b. A.unique category of national security
. _i iformation. can be identified. as. "Foreign
Intelligence Information" and within this a smaller
unique category can be identified as information
revealing. intelligence sources and methods. The
degree and duration of security protection afforded
this information should. be viable factors.
3. Today, the prescriptions for protection of national
security informat.on is set forth in E. 0. 11652 and the
accompanying National Security Council Directive. In the
discharge of his responsibilities to protect intelligence
sources and methods the DCI has supplemented these prescriptions
with DCIDs and compartm.entation control procedures.
4. The concerns which have been expressed about
these, prescriptions and supplementary?guiides, particularly
.compartmentation procedures include the claims that:
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 a. There is unnecessary and excessive use of
classification and, compartmentation. There is little
realistic effort to evaluate the needs for continuing
-security protection or to. deve'lop'procedures for orderly
release of information. The complex and expensive pro-
cedures for access to compartmented materials are a practical
barrier to the dissemination of intelligence to those with a
need to know.
b. So many people now have access to the major
compartmentation systems that little real compartmentation
exist. In example, approximately 130,000 individuals were
credited as holding C01\11NT clearances in June 1.973, the last
date for which official USIB figures are available. There were
approximately 70,000 individuals. holding TK clearances in
July 1975. These figures do not include the very large
.number who had access in the past and have since been debriefed.
c. Procedures for removing compartmentation
controls are time consuming and administratively burdensome
.with the practical effect of retaining intelligence under
long after the need, has past.
have.been-recently adopted and: significant
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amounts of photography and reports have been.
released from. TK controls, questions 'remaiji about
the need to compartment residual TK materials.
And serious questions are raised. about the need for
controls over much SIGINT product.
.d. Compartmentation procedures artificially
divide the intelligence data base. The successes of
COMINT and TK have resulted in_a tremendous volume of
,highly valuable intelligence essential to the forei.g n
.intelligence data base. With the advent of the near
real time satellite system the volumne will increase
still further. However, compartmentation poses prob-
lems in integration and results in an artificial
duality of finished intelligence and, expensive pro-
cedures to maintain the separation. The utilization
of intelligence would be greatly facilitated if users
.could have access to the full body of. intelligence
information in a single simple format under a single
system of.simple, clearly understood security controls
5 Concomitantly, the producers of intelligence have
about unauthorized disclosure and seek
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a. The potential eaanage to sources of
.intelligence by unauthorized disclosures continues
,to be a real problem. For example, USIB has
r-Ccently discussed the -advisability of. imposing
tighter controls, limiting access and holding down
dissemination on intelligence related to Soviet
ABM development and missile testing based on
concern that such leaks could foster counter action
and- nullify the source of this intelligence.
b. The growing involvement of the contracted
scientific, technical and industrial sphere in the
areas of research, manufacture, operation and.
exploration of technical intelligence collectors and
resulting products indicates a need to examine the
adequacy of current security practices.
c. The requirements on the Intelligence
Community associated with Congressional interest
and oversight, issues.of energy research, narcotics,
international terrorism portend.a need
address unique security requirements . in' the.
.':.dissemination of,.int.elligence from all sources to an
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d. The growing intelligence liaison with
foreign intelligence allies raises the question of
need for a security analysis of historical second and
third party agrccmeiits.
e, The present inquiry by the Executive and
Legislative Branches of the Intelligence Community
has disturbed the concept of sanctity of classified
material, indicates the need for and presents the
opportunity for a redefinition of what intelligence
material requires what degree of security protection
6. These opposing concerns, i.e., a need for access
and a need to control disseminations stem from divergent but
equally valid objectives. Intelligence must be made available
to those with a need-to-know. Appropriate controls must be
...exercised to maintain a viability of the source. At the
.present time, the concerns indicate that our current security
procedures including compartmentation practices are not
.'.working and should be redressed. Toward this objective a
concept for security and compartmentation
proposed. The specific elements
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of Foreign Intell.i-
of the concept are:
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a. Establishment by US.IB and promulgation by
Executive Order with Congressional agreement(of a
definition of "Foreign Intelligence Information" as.
-a separate category witfiin the totality of the
national security information.
b. Establishment by USIB and promulgation by the
NSC and DCI of a uniform set of security procedures
.for the protection.of all. Foreign Intelligence
Information including:
(l)? A single security clearance for access
to Foreign Intelligence Information based on
investigation to determine trustworthiness
as required in accordance with E.O. 10450 for
access to TOP SECRET material. The clearance
will be withdrawn when no longer required in
performance of official duties or contractual
obligations.
(2)-.A determination of the need for access
the particular Foreign Intelligence. sought
connection with performance of. official
contractual obligations., The deter-
minations of that need shall be'made by Senior
Intelligence Officers of the departments participating
on the USIB.
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(3) The requirement of a secrecy agreement
supported by legislation. for criminal sanctions
as a condition of access to classified Foreign
Intelligence information.
(4) Delegation of the responsibility for
protection of Foreign Intelligence to the holder.
(5). Adoption of physical security requirements
.similar to those prescribed in. E.O. 11652 and the
accompanying NSC Directive of May 1972.
(6) Development of a procedure similar to the
General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652
to declassify Foreign Intelligence Information
when protection is no longer required.
(7)
and
this concept.)
c. The elimination of the COMINT, TK,
Adoption of the uniform marking procedures
of DCID 1/7 (modified as necessary to accommodate
other compartmenta ti.on systems),as
in favor of a single compartmentation
now structured,
control procedure
for the protection of truly sensitive intelligence
sources and methods. As a preliminary step, the -
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Managers of the current compartmented systems,
should be :required to review their materials and
activities and clearly identify "essential secrets."'
These would be nominated for protection under this
single compartmentation`system. 'Everything else
would be protected by the procedures described above.
Features of the single compartmentation systems are:
(1) Approval for use of compartmentation
procedures would be vested in the DCI on the
advice of USIB which would provide for an annual
review-of continuing need and judicious employment.
(2) Determination of need-to-know would be
vested in the project officer or cognizant department
of the USIB with the exception that prior
recognition could be afforded the need to know
*Coinpartment.ation is really not required for most products of.
technical collection including photography and the substance of
.SIGINT intercepts. (The actual film and raw text may require
compartmentation.) Compartmentati.on should not be used for
.'the security protection of generic reference to technical sources
.--in finished intelligence such as "Photography reveals.. ,"
."From COMINT we know...'.', for administrative procedures, for
. codewords. or to protect indicators, initials or.titles.
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of exploitation and analytic personnel. A'bil.let
structure could be organized to facilitate the
need-to-know determination.
(3) Computer technology could be applied
.to,assist in the registration of small compartmentation
projects, individuals approved for access and the
control of dissemination of documentation. The
USIB is currently investigating use of computer
technology to control compartmented clearances.
(4) Markings of compartmented materials would
be kept to a minimum and would not normally be
carried forward in finished intelligence products.
(5) No additional personnel`or physical security
requirements would be required for access or pro-
tection of compartmented intelligence than is required
for any other TOP SECRET Foreign Intelligence
.infromation. No. additional secrecy agreements would
required although it may he advisable to provide
sonal.security briefing on the extra-sensitive
information.
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7. No additional or more comprehensive background
investigation would be required for access to compartmented
materials as is now required by DCID/1/14. The determination
of clearability would be based on the required background
investigation for access to TOP SECRET. But some feasible
program of reinvestigations should be considered by the USIB.
8. This concept for a new approach to security and
compartmentation has not been developed in consequence of
definitive studies of all features involved. However, there
have been prior studies that support many of the proposals.
'T'here are additional studies now underway in the community which
indicate that some elements might be favorably received in
some quarters. DCI authorities now exist under the
National Security Act of 1947 to segregate and uniquely
..identify Foreign Intelligence Information. Access controls
and dissemination procedures proposed in this concept are
in accordance with provisions of E.O. 11652. The recent
successful decompartmentation of large-volumes of TK material
is a precedent supporting the contention that compartmentation
as it exists today is not essential to. the protection. of
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large systems and. large volumes of technical intelligence
products. While there is a requirement to obtain Executive
release or decompartmentation.=of the '.'fact of" and
.products from SIGINT satellites, the DCI now has : authority
to decompartment SIGINT products from other sources.
9. This concept. is presented as a starting point
for still broader and more detailed examination of its
potential value. It will raise many questions and evoke
many comments, some of which surfaced in the drafting and
they are annexed for information purposes.
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