SECRECY STUDY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A001100150001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 7, 1975
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2006/11/21 CIA-RDP80M01183AMIPW,50KJ4137
7 November 1975
SUBJECT:
Secrecy Study
1. This memorandum will confirm the details of our recent
conversation relating to the study you have been requested to undertake
on behalf of the DCI.
2. In short, we are looking for a reasonably brief philosophical
statement on secrecy and compartmentation and the strengths and weak-
nesses related to these matters. We ask that the paper focus on the
various elements of intelligence activities and describe in pro and con
fashion the requirements for secrecy and compartmentation in (a) research
and development of intelligence collection systems, (b) collection and
processing activities and (c) analysis and production.
3. There four primary objectives to be considered in the prepara-
tion of the paper.
(1) We need to make the intelligence product, simple for the
right consumers to obtain and receive.
(2) We need to knock down compartmentation when it lacks
justification and stands in the way of solid management procedures.
(3) We need to identify those areas of intelligence activities-
which must be cloaked with strong secrecy arrangements- so
that we can aid and assist in the development of
secrecy arrangements. And,
(4) We need to identify those areas of intelligence activities
which can be opened up more widely than they are now.
4. We need a preliminary (if not final) paper from you on these
matters prior to Friday, 21 November.
Approved For Release 2006/11/21: CIA-RDP80MO1133AO01100150001-0
 Approved For Release 2006/11/21 : CIA-RDP80M01133AO01100150001-0
5. In the course of your study, you should feel free to consult
with various members of the IC Staff particularly Major General
CIA authorities to be consulted 25X1
include the DDI who has strong personal views on these matters, and
the General Counsel who is actively involved with the Justice Department
in sketching out the details of new secrecy legislation.
action officers in'the Office of the General Counsel are
and
6. You should also consult with intelligence authorities outside
of Langley, including DIA and perhaps NSA. Two USIB Committee
if COMIREX25x1
Ch ' ifl-i ct interests in all this ar
C
and SIGINT. Feel free to deal with M em as well.
. 7. We know that we have given you a very tight and perhaps
unrealistic deadline, but we simply must be able to address this problem
with a preliminary paper and we have tasked you as one who is admirably
equipped to look across the range of intelligence activities to help us get
this job done well. We will help you in any way we can. Onward and
upward!
E. H. Knoche
AD/DCI/IC
cc: General Counsel
DDI
C /COMIREX
C /SIGINT
C/CS/ICS
2
Approved For Release 2006/11/21: CIA-RDP80M0l133A001100150001-0
The precise
 Approved For Release 2006/11/21: CIA-RDP80MO1133A001100150001-0
Approved For Release 2006/11/21: CIA-RDP80MO1133A001100150001-0
 Approved For Release 2006/11/21: CIA-RDP80M01133A001100150001-0
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., USN (Ret.)
Chairman, President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
I am writing now concerning heightened anxiety in the community
and in my own mind over leaks to the press of sensitive intelligence
data. I want to share with you and the Board my present appreciation
of the problem and to seek your advice and recommendations.
As you well know, unauthorized public disclosures of intelligence
information have occurred frequently in recent years. A more impor-
tant consideration, however, is that press revelations have come
increasingly to include explicit and generally accurate details about
the methods we use to obtain and exploit sensitive information. In
the past year we have witnessed a further upswing in the number and
severity of damaging intelligence leaks--a situation I can only describe
as a virtual hemorrhaging of the security control system. And it seems
clear that journalists are not just being briefed orally: they are now
being given direct access to highly classified documents.
Recently I had my staff take a fresh look at the problem to see
if there were not some as yet untried way--within the means at my
disposal--to halt and reverse this trend. Although I did this with a
sense of having been through the exercise many times before, it was
still essential to try again, not only because of the damage individual
leaks can cause to our long-term capabilities, but because the present
situation also generates widespread discouragement and frustration--
even cynicism--within the ranks of the intelligence community itself.
This has the potential for lowering security discipline even more.
Approved For Release 2006/11/21: CIA-RDP80M01133A001100150001-0
 Approved For Release 2006/11/21: CIA-RDP80MO1133A001100150001-0
In the past, expressions of serious concern over intelligence leaks
have been voiced by successive Presidents and their department heads
following a particularly grave leak or a series of damaging leaks. My
predecessors and I have responded largely by trying to improve docu-
ment and personnel security practices, issuing guidelines toGovernment
departments on procedures for sanitizing the intelligence to be used by
administration officials for public purposes, and carrying out investigations
of the more flagrant and damaging leaks. These are all necessary steps,
but clearly they have been insufficient, and simply repeating them will--
in my view--prove no more effective now than in the past.
To tackle this problem constructively, I believe we must be quite
frank. We have, I believe, focused so intently on the conditions that
make intelligence leaks possible that we have slighted consideration of
the climate of opinion in and out of Government that actually encourages
them.
The widespread public dissemination of classified intelligence
information does not represent a direct breakdown of the elaborate
system of classification, document controls, personnel security checks,
indoctrination practices, and application of the "need-to-know" principle
which we use to minimize the risks of exposing sensitive data to the many
persons who must work on and use them. The overwhelming number of
such disclosures come not from the rank and file of analysts and drafters
who were privy to the materials within the intelligence community. Rather,
most represent deliberate disclosures by senior or relatively senior
officials with an unquestionable "need to know"--most of them outside
the intelligence community--who evidently believe that the public benefits
of disclosing the information far outweigh the damage or risks involved.
Many disclosures identifiably represent a calculated "official" judg-
ment at departmental level that previously classified material--say, on
ICBM deployments--could be properly declassified and released. While
other disclosures are usually less easy to pinpoint as to source, most of
them appear designed to promote the programs, policies, or interests
of particular elements within the Government--or to rebut those of
others--as part of the continuing process in which national security
policies are hammered out. Relatively few can be readily construed
as the disclosures of a disgruntled or venal underling.
Approved For Release 2006/11/21: CIA-RDP80MO1133AO01100150001-0
 Approved For Release 2006/11/21: CIA-RDP80MO1133A001100150001-0
Most of the "official" disclosures noted above, and quite a few
of the others, have probably involved no serious threat to intelligence
sources and methods. A good deal of the intelligence we collect,
notably in the area of overhead reconnaissance, is less sensitive
than it once was. What is increasingly disregarded, however, is
that there remain many sensitive areas of information and analysis,
often identifiable as such only by intelligence specialists, where
disclosure could be highly detrimental. Unfortunately, however,
there is no established Government-wide procedure for determining
who can declassify intelligence information and for assuring that it
is properly sanitized before release, and there is a marked reluc-
tance within the responsible Government departments to pursue
investigations of potentially damaging disclosures that point toward
relatively senior levels of officials. Meanwhile, the increasing
frequency of disclosures of classified intelligence information--
whether "official" or not--encourages the growth of a permissive
atmosphere in which it seems that almost anything goes.
I see the press as largely an instrument in this process--not a
direct cause of it. While there are examples of what I consider
gratuitous and irresponsible exposure of sensitive data on the part
of individual journalists, most of these persons see themselves as
conforming to a widespread and generally accepted standard. Much
of what they report has been made available to them by presumably
responsible officials who clearly intended to have the information
made public. And in the present atmosphere of disclosures, small
wonder that many of the more energetic reporters feel that any
information they can dig out is fair game.
In sum, I believe our basic problem is with an increasingly
prevalent state of mind among many senior officials in the Executive
Branch, among members of the press, and among many in the Congress.
This involves a line of reasoning containing one or more of the following
elements:
The democratic process requires informed open debate,
and if the price of that is an occasional risk to intelligence, it
must be paid.
Approved For Release 2006/11/21: CIA-RDP80MO1133AO01100150001-0
 Approved For Release 2006/11/21: CIA-RDP80M01133A001100150001-0
The intelligence community has been overprotective and
unnecessarily secretive about sources and methods everyone
knows it employs. Despite frequent alarms about the alleged
damage caused by past disclosures, the US still has a highly
effective system for collecting intelligence information. The
problem, if any, is rather with how effectively it uses the
material.
The "leakage" issue is at least partially a red herring,
because every administration so far has selectively released
intelligence information to its own advantage. There are
complaints about "leaks" only when information which doesn't
support the official view gets out.
That line of reasoning cannot lightly be dismissed: there is in
fact much truth in it. The price of a free society must be paid if we
are to retain the democratic process. The intelligence community
probably has been overinclined to classify everything as a matter of
course, and often overly shrill in claiming irreparable damage to its
sources and methods when leaks have occurred. And there is some
validity to the argument that the Government has at times appeared
to follow a double standard in evaluating damage of intelligence dis-
closures and placing blame according to who makes them and whose
policies they support.
Unfortunately, when the issue is posed in these terms the wrong
dichotomy is emphasized. The proper question is not the public need
to know versus the parochial interests of the intelligence services
and the administration for self-protection. The issue is rather
between the short-term and long-term interests of us all. In other
words, a sound and defensible balance is needed between the con-
temporary domestic imperatives of an open society and the preserva-
tion of an ability in the future to detect dangers to that society that
originate from abroad.
There are somewhat parallel dilemmas in other areas of
Government which I have often referred to. For example, our
military forces must be responsive to civilian control, but the
public does not demand that detailed war plans be published. Our
judicial system must meet the public's standards of justice, but
Approved For Release 2006/11/21: CIA-RDP80M01133A001100150001-0
 Approved For Release 2006/11/21: CIA-RDP80MO1133A001100150001-0
grand jury proceedings are not conducted in the open. It is even
necessary for the Congress to conduct some of its business in
executive session, while remaining accountable to the voters for
the legislation it passes. What we no longer can count on is a
general public understanding and acceptance of the need for
similar trade-offs between openness and confidentiality in the
field of foreign intelligence.
To deal with the problem of protecting vital sources and
methods against unwarranted disclosure, there is a clear need
to consider significant departures from the limited approaches
that have been taken in the past. As I see it, there are several
areas that call for careful and simultaneous attention:
Continued efforts within the intelligence community
are needed to limit the opportunity for inadvertent or intended
(but unauthorized) disclosures of classified information when
the disclosures are made by persons in the intelligence services,
and to facilitate successful investigation and application of
penalties. A number of activities are under way within the
USIB arena to study this problem and to make such changes
as are necessary in the classification and compartmentation
system and in controlling the dissemination of sensitive data.
There is also a need to develop more effective controls
and sanctions relating to disclosures of foreign intelligence
information by officials outside the intelligence services of
Government departments. No adequate procedures or common
standards exist for determining accountability for press dis-
closures or for guiding the preparation of authorized texts
for public disclosures and for reporting them. This would
require action by USIB in concert with several other departments
of Government.
Ways need to be devised to discourage and if necessary
penalize unauthorized disclosures by advocates of particular
programs or policies within the Government and by contractors
with access to intelligence data. The availability of judicial
sanctions would be helpful in this regard-wand I have proposed
legislation to that end--but a greater degree of organizational
Approved For Release 2006/11/21: CIA-RDP80MO1133AO01100150001-0
 Approved For Release 2006/11/21: CIA-RDP80M01133A001100150001-0
and ultimately self-imposed discipline by senior officials within
Government is equally essential. This is probably the most
difficult of all objectives to achieve. It lies almost wholly
outside the intelligence community's ability to do more than
seek to persuade, and it involves the delicate question of how
each administration wishes to deal with adversary procedures
within its own ranks. Its achievement would clearly require
a significant change in attitude not only by the officials directly
involved but ultimately by key elements in the Congress and the
press and the public with whom they must deal. But I feel
certain that the lack of such discipline has come to be a central
weakness in our foreign intelligence security control system,
and I would be derelict in not forthrightly saying so.
Finally, the intelligence community needs itself to re-
examine its traditional classification standards and practices,
with a view to being more forthcoming in making public those
intelligence findings and materials whose disclosure would not
create security problems or diplomatic difficulties or otherwise
damage the national interest. Only if we are seen to be reason-
able in such matters can we expect full acceptance of our demands
for continued protection of data which remains sensitive. In this,
a more careful distinction must be made among what I have
termed good secrets, bad secrets, and non-secrets. I am taking
some initiatives in this area but will wish to obtain the views of
others--including the PFIAB--as well.
The situation we face is serious--and getting worse. It is almost
overwhelming in its complexity and resistance to solution. The atti-
tudinal factors which encourage disclosures are the dominant elements
of my concern right now, because they feed and nourish the trend.
And yet there is little I alone can do on that central problem. I have
outlined some areas that need attention, and request your early
consideration of them and your thoughts on how to proceed.
Sincerely,
W. E. Colby
Approved For Release 2006/11/21: CIA-RDP80M01133A001100150001-0
 Approved For Release 2006/11/21: CIA-RDP80M01133A001100150001-
SECRET
DCI/IC-75-0682
13 August 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for the IC
SUBJECT "Secrecy" Paper
,/5- -
11
i-I 1Y
Attached is a proposed approach to the "secrecy"
problem assigned to you by the DCI following his discussion
with the PFIAB on 7 August.
2. This is a rough first cut at an approach, and as
the text indicates, it will need to aetfleshedcout Nn one
numerous places, probably by "consensus."
else has read this draft, so it does not reflect any
3. In I I view, during the discussion at the
PFIAB meeting, the ed to favor an incremental approach
to the problem, while several PFIAB members came out in favor
of drastic change in the classification/compartment systems.
4. What I have sought to do is outline the approach,
fill in part of the text, and included samplings of the ideas
which I suggest that you discuss with the DCI to ascertain
whether this is the kind of a paper he had in mind.
Majo CPeneral, U e .)
Chief, Coordination Staff, ICS
Attachment:
as stated
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/11/21: CIA-RDP80M01133A001100150001-0
 Approved For Release 2006/11/21St ftlOM01133A001100150001-0
THE APPLICATION OF SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS
AND COMPARTMENTATION IN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
PROBLEM
To assess the continued validity of the existing system
of classification (as provided by E.O. 11652) and the compart-
mentation systems utilized by the U.S. Intelligence Community
in view of the changing political and social U.S. attitudes
toward secrecy in government, and to recommend such changes
as the Director of Central Intelligence could sponsor.
BACKGROUND
1. This paper responds to a request made by the PFIAB
at its 7 August 1975 meeting that the DCI address this problem
at the next PFIAB meeting in October. PFIAB concerns relate
to the recent spate of disclosures of sensitive intelligence
information--as indicative that the current classification/
compartmentation system is not working.
2. PFIAB expressions of a need for a new look at the
classification/compartmentation picture relate to a widespread
concern with "secrecy in government" reflected in numerous
recent publications.*
FOUNDATION OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM: E.O. 11652
3. The opening three paragraphs of E.O. 11652, "Classifica-
tion and Declassification of National Security Information and
Material," dated 8 March 1972, present the philosophy of the
existing system:
In addition to magazine articles, newspaper columns and
statements by Senators and Congressmen, three books which
illustrate the kinds of criticisms being publicly expressed
are:
Government Secrecy, Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Intergovernmental Relations of the Committee on Government
Operations, United States Senate, 93rd Congress, 2nd
Session, on 5.1520, 5.1726, S.2451, S.2738, S.3393, and
5.3399, May 22, 23, 29, 30, 31 and June 10, 1974 (908 pg.)
Secrecy and Foreign Policy, Edited by Thomas M. Franck and
Edward Weisband, Oxford University Press, 1974 (453 pg.)
None of Your Business: Government Secrecy in America,
Edited by Norman Dorsen and Stephen Gillers, Penguin
Books, 1975
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/11/21: CIA-RDP80M01133A001100150001-0
 Approved For Release 2006/11/21: CIA-RDP80M01133A001100150001-0
SECRET
"The interests of the United States and its citizens
are best served by making information regarding the
affairs of the Government readily available to the
public. This concept of an informed citizenry is
reflected in the Freedom of Information Act and in
current public information policies of the Executive
Branch.
"Within the Federal Government there is some official
information and material which, because it bears directly
on the effectiveness of our national defense and the
conduct of our foreign relations, must be subject to
some constraints for the security of our Nation and the
safety of our people and our allies. To protect against
actions hostile to the United States, of both an overt
and covert nature, it is essential that such official
information and material be given only limited dissemin-
ation.
"This official information or material, referred to as
classified information or material in this order, is
expressly exempted from public disclosure by Section
552(b)(1) of Title 5, United States Code. Wrongful
disclosure of such information or material is recognized
in the Federal Criminal Code as providing a basis for
prosecution."
4. Definitions of security classification categories
in E.O. 11652 are as follows:
Top Secret:
"national security information or
material which requires the highest
degree of protection. The test for
assigning "Top Secret" classification
shall be whether its unauthorized
disclosure could reasonably be
expected to cause exceptionally grave
damage to the national security."
(Among the examples the E.O.
cites are "the compromise of
complex cryptologic or communica-
tions intelligence systems; the
revelation of sensitive intelli-
gence operations...")
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/11/21: CIA-RDP80M01133A001100150001-0
 Approved For Release 2006/11/21 : ( f-MR01133A001100150001-0
Secret: "national security information or
material which requires a substantial
degree of protection. The test for
assigning "Secret" classification shall
be whether its unauthorized disclosure
could reasonably be expected to cause
serious damage to the national security."
(Among the examples the E.O. cites
are "revelation of significant
intelligence operations...")
Confidential: "national security information or material
which requires protection. The test for
assigning "Confidential" classification
shall be whether its unauthorized disclosure
could reasonably be expected to cause
damage to the national security."
5. "National Security" in all of the foregoing definitions
is used in the collective sense of "the national defense or
foreign relations of the United States."
6. The special compartmentation systems which organizations
of the Intelligence Community have used as tools to protect
particularly important or particularly sensitive information
by controlling its dissemination and access are based on two
sources of authority:
a. The provision of the National Security Act of
1947 which charges the Director of Central Intelligence
with the responsibility for protecting intelligence
sources and methods (which is also reflected in NSCID
No. 1), and
b. Section 9 of E.O. 11652 which provides:
"Special Departmental Arrangements. The
originating Department or other appropriate
authority may impose, in conformity with the
provisions of this order, special requirements
with respect to access, distribution and
protection of classified information and
material, including those which presently
relate to communications intelligence,
intelligence sources and methods and crypt-
ography."
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/11/21: CIA-RDP80M 01133A001100150001-0
 Approved For Release 2006/11/2SECRE 80M01133A001100150001-0
DISCUSSION
7. Problems with the Security Classification System
a. While problems of security classification
undoubtedly apply to various kinds of national security
information or material other than those with which the
Intelligence Community is concerned, this paper deals
only with those which relate to intelligence and which,
in some instances, are peculiar to intelligence--such
as the protection of sensitive sources and methods.
b. Critics of classification, as used by intelli-
gence organizations, cite the following:
(1) There are no objective standards to guide
the classifiers and personal judgment plays too
large a role. Overclassification tends to be the
almost inevitable result.
(2) The system is not enforceable, as
evidenced by numerous "unauthorized disclosures,"
a continuing inability to identify the sources of
leaks, and a failure or inability to impose sanctions
even if the source of the leak is identified.
(FLESH OUT WITH MORE CRITICISMS)
c. Supporters of the existing classification
system emphasize:
(1) Despite its shortcomings, the present
system imposes a sense of discipline, both on
members of the Intelligence Community and on the
recipients of the information.
(FLESH OUT WITH MORE DEFENSES)
8. Problems with the Compartmentation Systems
a. Critics of the existing systems of compartmenta-
tion cite that:
(1) Compartmentation is excessively used, with
the result that often times those who require the
information cannot have access.
(2) The unauthorized disclosure of even highly
compartmented information demonstrates that rigidly
applied "need to know" criteria does not prevent
exposure of data the Intelligence Community considers
particularly sensitive.
(FLESH OUT THE CRITICISMS)
Approved For Release 2006/11/21 S KTOM01133A001100150001-0
 Approved For Release 2006/11/25:Ef80M01133A001100150001-0
b. Supporters of the use of compartments to
restrict dissemination and access to sensitive
information argue:
(1) Protection of truly sensitive sources
and methods--and the resultant information--is of
such importance that it justifies the effort
even though experience has shown this is no
guarantee against exposure.
(2) Proper application of the "need to know"
criteria can ensure that those who require the
information will have access to it.
(FLESH OUT THE SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS)
9. Factors Considered in Developing Alternative
Approaches
a. The requirement to protect sensitive intelli-
gence sources and methods is both real and imperative--
the problem is to assure that the classification/
compartmentalization process is applied only to that
which really needs to be, and truly must be, protected.
b. The cloak of classification developed over the
past 30 years, however justified it may have been, needs
adjustment to the realities of the mid-1970's world--
but adjustment with which the Intelligence Community
can function effectively. The "that's classified"
admonition now carries less weight and is accorded less
support than has been the case during the developmental
period of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Questions
as to "why" or "for what reason" need to be squarely
faced.
c. Considerations of "need to know" must be
addressed in terms of a deliberate balance between the
requirements of sophisticated users of the intelligence
product and careful examination of what intelligence
sources and methods truly need protection.
d. The public's "right to know" has spokesmen
who today are more persuasive in many instances than
those who would defend a pervasive intelligence classifica-
tion and compartmentalization structure.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/11/21: CIA-RDP80M01133A001100150001-0
 Approved For Release 2006/11/21
e. The present system of top secret-secret-
confidential classifications is deeply ingrained in
not only the Intelligence Community, but in the
government as a whole as well, and any attempt to
"tinker" with existing definitions probably would be
unproductive.
f. There is need, however, for more definitive
criteria for the application of classification categories.
Present guidance allows too much leeway and depends more
than it should on judgment factors which vary from one
classifier to another. The factor of human judgment
cannot be eliminated, but the uncertainty factor could
be narrowed by guidance which is quite specific in
nature.
g. "National security" as now defined in E.O.
11652 is not necessarily the only basis for the
classification of official information. "National
welfare" as influenced by intelligence on foreign energy
developments, foreign resource use, changes in the world
physical environment, etc. may also provide a basis for
application of security classifications.
h. Whatever system of classification is applied
by the Intelligence Community to its finished products
must be one which the users of intelligence recognize
as being useful, necessary and logical.
i. Nothing short of a basic overhaul of the
compartmentation system, with its multiple use of
codewords, is likely to satisfy the critics of the
present system among the recipients of intelligence
products.
j. Some statutory means of applying criminal
sanctions to persons who are responsible for unauthorized
disclosure of classified information would probably
enhance the disciplinary effect of both classification
and compartmentation systems.
(FLESH OUT WITH MORE FACTORS)
10. Action options
a. The classification/compartmentation problems
now confronting the Intelligence Community can be
addressed in terms of action options which are either
incremental or major in scope. The following options
are grouped accordingly. The basic tenet is that the
Community is not in a position to "stand fast" on
past and present procedures and practices. It must,
in one way or another, reflect the changing U.S. concepts
6
Approved For Release 2006/11/21 SEC
OCT
Rt3R&0M01133A001100150001-0
 Approved For Release 2006/11/21 ST' ETOM01133A001100150001-0
of "national interest" and "national security" or risk
statutory or other reactions which might impose
limitations or changes which the Community is better
advised to accomplish on its own initiative.
b. Incremental options
(1) Without change in the existing E.O.
11652, the DCI could issue a new DCID providing
specific guidance for the application of each of
the existing security categories. Such a DCID
would be as definitive as the current "state of
the art" makes possible in listing those types of
information to which a classification of top secret,
secret or confidential applies. Wide dissemination
of such a list of examples would provide better
guidance than is now available to those intelligence
officers who are authorized to classify materials
information.
(2) The DCI could indicate a recognition of
complaints which have been addressed to the current
application of compartments to various kinds of
intelligence information and intelligence projects
by issuing a new DCID which would provide guidance
as to the circumstances under which adoption of a
compartmented approach is justified and list the
criteria which should be applied in deciding whether
or not compartmentation is required.
(3) The DCI could solicit active support from
departmental secretaries who have intelligence
responsibilities to lend impetus to his ongoing
efforts to obtain statutory authorization for the
application of criminal sanctions against personnel
responsible for the unauthorized disclosure of
classified intelligence information.
(FLESH OUT THE INCREMENTAL OPTIONS)
c. Options for major change
(1) Formulate a new approach to the application
of codeword compartments which would eliminate the
use of codewords on all finished intelligence products
and depend on the classification of the paper itself
to indicate the degree of sensitivity of the informa-
tion. Codewords would still be used within the
Intelligence Community on raw information reports and
on draft papers to assist analysts who need to be
aware of the source of particular information as a
measure of the degree of credence which can be given
to the data.
Approved For Release 2006/11/21 : CA- xE133A001100150001-0
 Approved For Release 2006/11/21 : CIA.Dft1Q.1133A001100150001-0
(2) (This would be the new proposal on
compartmentalization which is being developed by
Robert Taylor, Executive Secretary of the USIB
Security Committee.)
(3) Limit the use of compartment codewords
only to operational aspects of particularly
sensitive projects, and require DCI approval,
with the advice of the USIB, for the establishment
of any codeword compartmented access list.
(4) Delimit, by issuance of a new DCID,
particular kinds of intelligence information or
products to which no security classification is
to be applied, e.g., information relating to
developments in basic science.
(TO BE FLESHED OUT WITH OTHER OPTIONS)
11. Recommended DCI Course/Courses of Action
(TO BE DEVELOPED FROM CONSIDERATION OF THE
VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 10.)
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/11/21: CIA-RDP80M01133A001100150001-0
 Approved For Release 2006/11/21 : CIA-RDP80MO1133AO 1-0
~Iimkrl lease 2006/11/21: CIA-RDP80MO1133A001100150001-0