PHASE I REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01133A001200040011-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 21, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20303 5_9 l/lf 7 ~_/9 e.~~
Intelligence Community Staff
21 March 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Participants in Intelligence-Exercise
(See Distribution)
SUBJECT: Phase I Report
REFERENCE: IC 75-1367, 4 March 1975
1. On 18 March representatives-from the Offices of Current
Intelligence, Economic Research, Political Research, and Strategic
Research, the Central Reference Service, the Directorate of Operations,
and the CIA Operations. Center, joined the Assistant National Intelli-
gence Officer for,IJSSR-EE in the Intelligence Community Staff Conference
Room in the preliminary phase of the intelligence exercise. The
discussions benefited greatly from a comprehensive outline prepared
by the Chief of OCI's East Europe Branch. A summary of the discussions
is at annex.
2. The time and place for Phase II remain, as scheduled, Tuesday,
25 March, from 1330-1600 in the IC Staff Conference Room, 6 E 0708.
the NIO for USSR-EE, will chair the conference. Dr.
'ill brief the participants on CONTEXT and other rapid
con erencing techniques which we hope to test during Phase III. As
indicated in the 4 March memorandum, there is a possibility that
delays in the installation of CONTEXT may require slipping Phase III
to 8 April.
Product Review Division
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Distribution:
1 - Deputy Director for Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
1 - Deputy Director for Operations
Central Intelligence Agency
1 - Deputy to the DCI for the National Intelligence Officers
1 - Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
1 - Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
1 - Director, National Security Agency .
1 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
1 - Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
1 - Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Air Force
1 - Chief, Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Internal Distribution:
Original - AB Subject
,,Y- IC Registry
1 - General Wilson
I.- PRD Chrono
1-
DCI/IC/PRD
121 Mar 75
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ANNEX
Intelligence Exercise, Phase I
Most participants expect that there probably would be no crisis--in
the strict sense of the term--immediately after Tito's death; thus, the
general posture of the Agency would be to react to the developing situation.
One task already levied by the DCI would involve participation in a
SNIE on the short-term prospects for Yugoslavia. OCI would do most
of the drafting of that SNIE, under the direction of the NIO for USSR/EE.
Aside from that OCI envisages producing a White House Spot Report
essentially reporting the fact (i. e., Tito is dead) and immediate circum-
stances; follow-up items for the NID, NIB, and PDB; and briefings as
required. Personnel within the East European Branch of OCI would be
placed on stand-by for possible task force manning.
If a crisis did develop, the Chief of OCI/EE Branch probably would
serve as chief of a substantive task force responsible for producing all
Agency current intelligence on the crisis. Moreover, OCI expects to be
called on by the NIO in the drafting of any Alert Memoranda which might
be required.
Other offices in the Directorate of Intelligence would contribute
inputs as determined by the chief of the task force and personnel as
determined by the DDI. The Regional Analysis Division of OSR certainly
would be represented on the task force. OER does not envision a need
for the physical move of an analyst up to the Operations Center for a
Yugoslav crisis, although,as the Chief of the Operations Center observed,
an OER analyst became a vital part of the October War task force.
OPR does not envision any particular role for itself, as an office,
in connection with task force production requirements, although it would
be prepared to respond to requests for special assessments. The Chairman
suggested that in a condition simmering just below the crisis level, OPR
must be asked to set up an ongoing quantitative study similar to its past
efforts on Vietnam, Sino-Soviet hostilities, and Arab-Israeli hostilities..
The Assistant NIO, among others, was skeptical that overworked analysts
would put up with the type of analyst polling procedures required for such
studies.
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CRS' main function would be to supply biographic information on
old or new members of the post-Tito leadership as requested. For
requests outside normal daytime duty hours, the contact point would
be the CIA Operations Center, which would then contact a CRS duty
officer.
The CIA Operations Center would in a crisis situation be making
special efforts to alert the OCI/EE Branch Chief, his analyst, and the
NIO Editor to major, fast-breaking developments. It would also do
some "brokering" of requests for information, especially when the NIO
and Assistant NIO were unavailable.
The NIO's role would generally be to insure the proper flow of
requested information from producer to consumer, and, as mentioned
previously, to supervise the preparation of a SNIE and Alert Memoranda.
The Assistant NIO stressed that the. NIO would not expect to get involved
in intra-agency managerial problems and would be concerned with such
problems in the Community only if there were "major gliches. " Regarding
the consumers, she agreed with the Chairman's suggestion that we were
really talking about "only four or five. " She would not expect that the
"back-channel" traffic on this kind of problem would require the NIO
to travel downtown to examine a reading file. If Brezhnev died, rather
than Tito, that would be a different matter.
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~RET
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The participants generally agreed with the written statements by
OCI/EE Branch on CIA's expectations of the interface with the rest of
the Community and with the NSC Staff:
--NSC Staff: Keep producing offices informed of changing
needs of top policy-making officers; levy requirements for special
production.
The Chairman of the conference infers from the discussion that
CIA components do not anticipate major problems in handling a post-
Tito crisis. Indeed, the Chairman had to contrive a number of worst
case hypotheses in order to provoke discussion, e. g. :
--Urgent requests for biographic information outside
normal duty hours, on individuals for whom no finished
report existed;
--A situation in which the differences between Bulgarian
Macedonian and Yugoslav Macedonian became important;
--Situations in which vital information might be denied
to an analyst because of his or her lack of clearance for
exotic information.
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Two problems were raised which fall within the competence of
DIA and NSA. The Chairman has notified those agencies of the
problems and asked them for comments at Phase II. A third problem,
cited by an OSR analyst, bears on the lack of Community access to
information on US-Yugoslav bilaterals. The D/DCI/IC was briefed
on this problem some time ago and intends to raise it in the final
report on this exercise.
Prepared by:
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