SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01389R000400110002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 13, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

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TS # 102426_a
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
13 April 1956
DCI Presentation for Symington Committee, 18 April 1956
Common st Bloc Air Capabilities Thrau?h mid?
Introduction
In order to give you as graphic a presentation as possible on this
very broad subject, I intend to follow the outline you see on this ak"r%
The strengths Mich enable the Communist Bloc to undertake a wide variety
of air actions against the U.S. and its Allies can best be examined in
terms of three broad capabilities:
First, to undertake penetration of Western defended air space;
Second? to resist penetration of Bloc defended air space;
Third, to engage in fighter versus fighter contests for control of
air space,
I will discuss the first of these capabilities from the standpoint
of Bloc capability to undertake penetration of Western defended air space
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(1); Over North America
(2) Over Europe, North Africa and the Middle East, and
(3) Over the Far East.
The second will be considered in terms of Bloc capability to resist
penetration of its own air space
(i) Over the Soviet Union
(2) Over the Europoan Satellites, and
(3) Over Communist China and North Korea;,
The third will be considered in terms of Bloc capability to engage
in fighter versus fighter contosts for the control of air space.
Finally, I will summarizo some of the related Soviet capabilities
which support the air establishment or contribute to its effectiveness
in performing assigned missions.
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I, Bloo Offensive Air Capabilities
In discussing Bloc offensive air capabilities,, it will first of all
be necessary to evaluate those capabilities which could be do7oted to
conducting initial attacks against the continental US and against her key
installations and forces overseas. In undertaking such attacks the Soviet
leadership would most v ob-bly have in mind three major objectives. First
of all,, the Sr.-o% iet leaders would aim to dostroy or neutralize US c~17ubilitios
for nuclear warfare. In the second place they would seek to prevent the
effective operational employment of US n:.ilitary forces by attacking our
overseas forces and our lines of com:iunicati.cn with thew fo:~~os0 Thirdly,
the Scv3.,~t leader hip would aim to deliver such attacks on urban and indus-
trial targets as would hamper, to the maximum degree possible, the mobiliza-
tion of US ;,itnry and industrial strengths. hose are the objectives
which the Soviet Union would pursue in initial att?.cks delivered against
us both now and in nid-1959
(1) Penetration over North A::orica
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Lot us consider,, to begin with, Seviot capabilities for achieving these
objectives insofar as attack on the continental United &i tes is concern::,;;
Such an attack would be oxocutod primarily by 5.:.- iot Long Rc: e Avia.tion.
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Currently we estimate that Soviet Long Range Aviation has at its
disposal about 1250 bombers. Nearly two-thirds of these bombers (790)
are BULL piston medium bombers comparable to the US B-29, and are
incapable of reaching the continental United States on two way missions,
unless modified to achieve maximum range by sacrificing equipment and
crew weight, in a manner similar to the US B29B. In this event they
could reach the area of Seattle on two-way missions. Nearly one-third
(375) of the bombers currently available to Soviet Long Range Aviation
are BADGER jet medium bombers!, roughly comparable to the B-147. The
speed and combat ceiling of the current BADGER represent a significant
advance over the BULL. Its range capabilities are approximately the
same as those of the BULL, however., and it is also incapable of reaching
the United States on two-way missions except for the area of Seattle.
Both the BULL and the current BADGER could cover most significant targets
in the United States providing a) they were refueled inflight and
b) they were dispatched on one way missions. We believe the Soviets are
psychologically capable of undertaking one-way missions if required.
There is thus far little evidence that inflight refueling has gone beyond
the experimental stage in the USSR, although its deve,3,opment is well
,within Soviet capabilities.
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There remain some 90 BISON and BEAR heavy bombers which, w e estimate
are currently operational, The BISON, whose performance characteristics
are shown on this slue, is a jet heavy bomber roughly comparable to
the B-52. With inflight refueling, the BISON could range over the US
as far as Los Angeles and Detroit on two way missions from forward bases.
The BEAR, which is a turboprop heavy bomber, is inferior to the BISON in
speed and altitude capabilities, as shown on this slide. With its
superior range, however, it could reach virtually any target in the
United States on two-way missions from forward bases without refueling.
The ranges I have just given for the BULL, the BADGER, and the
BISON are based on the assumption that these bombers Would be launched
from Soviet bases closest to North America, those in the Chukotski,
Kamchatka, and Kola peninsulas, and those located in the Central Arctic.
No Soviet Long Range Air Force units are currently known to be stationed
at these forward bases. While these bases are, in the nature of things,
dependent upon seasonal supply lines, the supplies necessary for a
staging operation could be stock piled in advance. We estimate that
as a gross capability the USSR could at present launch from these for-
ward areas an initial force of about 600 bombers. Not considering combat
losses, a maximum of 500 of these bombers could arrive in target areas.
If tankers were available, and if they were employed from these same
forward bases, the initial strike force would have to be reduced
accordingly.
LUBW
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In addition to the forward, bases,, Long Range units right also crplcy
airfields in the Loninf. ad and Daltc-East German areas. In this case a
naxinun of some 900 bombers could ho launched at the present tine, of which
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some 700 would reach target areas if combat losses 4ow not taken into account,
But in the event those adc'.iticnal bases were used, the chances of supriso
would be materially reduced.
Soviet crows,, in addition to the basic navigational skills,, are
? rocioving training in the Utilization of radar and other
electronic bombing and navigation aids. Some Soviet crows are almost
certainly capable of navigation to the rocs t difficult targets in the US.
Most crows are probably capable of navigating with sufficient accuracy to
roach major cities and industrial canters in the US0
With regard to crew proficiency,, lot no detail for a moment the staimus
of personnel in the Soviet air farces. Officer and non-coro-Assionod
personnel,, the real backbone of the air forces,, are nearly all career per-
sonnel. They enjoy many special privileges and morale is believed to be
high. Their career status moons teat their proficiency improves criminal vo'y
with years of trnining, The Soviet air forces also receive high priority
in the allocation of conscripted personnel. We know, for oxanplo,, that
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they receive the pick of each year's crop of draftees. The legal term of
service for Soviet air force conscripts is longer than that for the ground
forces, and a high rate of reenlistment is achieved through both pay '
benefits and coercive methods. As does the Soviet economy generally., the
air forces probably do have problems in acquiring skilled technicians. While
many young men entering service have already been subjected to pro-induction
training in military skills, their average l6vel of mechanical knowwhow is
low? The retention of air force personnel for long periods of service is
part of the S