GENERAL POWER'S TESTIMONY TO THE MAHON COMMITTEE, 22 MARCH 1960

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80M01389R000400130016-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 9, 2000
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: March 31, 1960
• Content Type: MF

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31 March 1960
SUBJECT: General Power's Testimony to the Mahon Committee, 22 March 1960
1. My overall reaction to this testimony is that General Power,
who is responsible for some 90 percent of the West's capacity to
deliver megatons, was at pains to establish that he and his command
are competent, confident, and ready to cope with any situation
that might arise. The Committee clearly respected him for this,
but challenged him on several critical points. These challenges
brought responses which, at least where intelligence on the USSR
was involved, gave an impression of much greater certainty than
we gave in recent NIE's and in the CIA testimony to the Mahon
Committee in January.
2. The discussion on intelligence was mainly about the identi-
fication and location of targets in the USSR, especially Soviet
missile launching sites. It recurred several times during the
hearing, and I have marked the main points with double clips.
Committee members identified in the record as participating in this
discussion were Congressmen Mahon, Sikes, Flood, Ford, Laird and
Thomson. At two points the discussion went off the record and
others may have participated.
3. Congressman Mahon initiated the discussion by asking
(p. 29L1) how General Power expected to neutralize Soviet attack
capabilities when we do not and probably will not know where their
missile launching sites are. Power said he thought we would and
At this point he
merely stated that intelligence was beginning to get some indications
of likely launching areas. Later, Sikes criticized "fuzzy" CIA
briefings (p. 2998) and asked how Power could be so confident about
where his targets were# to which Power responded by describing SAC's
detailed target folders. This exchange did not deal specifically
with missile sites, but it and a similar exchange with Ford (p. 3047)
created a general impression that SAC's targeting information was
quite firm.
L. Ford's questioning (p. 3051) finally brought Power's assertion
that in his opinion there are at least 26 to 28 sites that Air
Force Intelligence is "reasonably sure" are operational ICBM sites.
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He attributed this to General Walsh, who he said had told him of
some 54 possibilities, some 26 of which General Walsh was
"reasonably sure" about. He said he had been briefed for three
hours on the subject, that the information was in process of
being developed like a jigsaw puzzle, and that the pieces were
starting to fall into place. In response to a question, he
said he didn't know if CIA agreed with the Air Force analysis.
5. Later (p. 3089), in an exchange with Flood and Laird,
General Power modified his statement to indicate that there are
26 places where "there is real good evidence that they are going
to have an ICBM site." This occurred after Flood had interpreted
50 sites to mean that the Soviets now have 300 missiles, the
figure General Power had previously used in public and which he
had called "hypothetical" (p. 2983). Laird took the discussion off
the record at this point, and when Thomson brought up the question
of what CIA thought about target identifications it went off the
record again (p. 3120).
6. The probable source for General Power's statements on
ICBM sites is the - team's briefing, although when given
to the USIB even that briefing did not include as many as 50
specific locations. I also note that the GMAIC working group
on site deployment made a preliminary report on 25 March in which
they said they had examined 28 suspect locations. Of these, in
addition to Tyura Tam and Kapustin Yar, they evaluated only one
(Berezovka near Saratov as a possible ICBM site under construction.
Representatives of the team audited this working group.
My own judgment, after hearing both briefings, is that we have
not yet turned up anything that we can be "reasonably sure" is an
operational ICBM site.
7. When you testified to the Mahon Committee on 11 January,
you were asked by Congressman Thomson whether we had identified
any Soviet missile launching sites under construction, other than
Tyura Tam and Kapustin Yar. You said (p. 7) "Not apart from
these. We have some indications." You noted that their operational
sites would probably be fairly simple and mentioned rail mobility.
You added that we "hope to be able to come before you later and be
able to tell you about (operational sites), but we cannot today."
In my opinion, your testimony remains valid at the present time.
8. Other points of particular interest are marked with
single clips. They include:
a. 1961-1963 as a period when the Soviets may feel
they have their greatest relative capability versus the US
(pp. 2951-52 and p. 3115).
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be Assertion that SAC can attack the USSR in such a
way as to prevent fall-out from damaging friendly countries,
a
d C
itt
n
omm
ee skepticism about this (pp. 2988 if.
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